United States v. Louis Carini (1977)

Under § 3161(h)(8)(C), however, the court's discretion to grant continuances upon a finding that "the ends of justice" are served thereby is explicitly qualified by the limitation that "(n)o continuance . . . shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar . . . ." See United States v. Didier, 542 F.2d at 1188 ; United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Roberts, 515 F.2d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1975).

We need not choose, however, from among these various calculations, because 18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c) delays the effective date of the sanctions provided in § 3162 for violations of the Act until July 1, 1979, United States v. New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368 at 376-377 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1977), and § 11(e) of the Plan provides that failure to comply with its provisions shall not require dismissal.

III at 133 10 Citing United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir.1977), Mr. Gomez vigorously argues that a reviewing court should consider a violation of the Speedy Trial Act as a factor in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred.

That district court concluded that the defendant-appellant's failing to appear by leaving the jurisdiction demonstrated a willful disregard for the law because he knew that charges were pending against him 7 See United States v. Valencia, 985 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir.1993) ("good faith in negotiating plea bargains") (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 , 92 S.Ct. 495, 498-99 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)); United States v. Lewis, 980 F.2d 555, 561 (9th Cir.1992) ("de…

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir.1977).

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir.1977).

See also William Flowers v. Warden, 853 F.2d 131, 132 (2d Cir.1988) (no sixth amendment violation even though “sole reason for [17-month] delay” in processing defendant’s case was court docket congestion); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 151-52 (2d Cir.1977) (although delay was a “patently long one” and “largely chargeable to the government,” court still hesitated to find sixth amendment violation, and was only persuaded to do so by government’s conceded violation of …

Excluding time chargeable to pretrial defense motions and psychiatric examinations, appellant argues that trial should have begun on January 28, 1980, under the 1978 local speedy trial plan’s 60-day limit. 9 Appellant also applies this timetable to count I, arguing that, because the district court erred in accepting appellant’s guilty plea, any delay attributable to the guilty plea should be “constructively chargeable to the government,” citing United States v. Carini, 562 F…

United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632, 641-42 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. DiFrancesco, supra; United States v. New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368, 376-77 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1977).

United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1977). 6 .

See 18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Amendola, supra, 558 F.2d 1043, 1044 (2d Cir. 1977). 16 Second, the Plan for the Northern District of Ohio expressly provides that failure to meet its goals does not require dismissal of the indictment except in proceedings against juveniles.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Amendola, supra, 558 F.2d 1043, 1044 (2d Cir. 1977).

United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1977).

See United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845, 850 (11th Cir.1982) (government acts at its own risk in prolonging a defendant's case deliberately and for its own benefit), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1207 , 103 S.Ct. 1198 , 75 L.Ed.2d 441 (1983); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir.1977).

See United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 432 (5th Cir.2009); United States v. Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 764 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that rather than carrying prejudice forward from “presumptively prejudicial” delay, prejudice to the defendant may only be presumed “ ‘when the delay is great and attributable to the government’ ” (quoting United States v. Shell, 974 F.2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir.1992))); United States v…

United States v. McAfee, 780 F.2d 143, 146 (1st Cir.1985), vacated and remanded on other grounds, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 49 , 93 L.Ed.2d 10 (1986); United States v. Dennard, 722 F.2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir.1984); Duckworth, 715 F.2d at 1220 ; New Buffalo, 600 F.2d at 377; United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir.1977); Vispi, 545 F.2d at 334 .

Véanse Jiménez Román v. Tribunal Superior, 98 D.P.R. 874 (1970); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149 (2do Cir. 1977).

Settlement negotiations can be analogized to the process of plea bargaining, the period for which has been held to weigh against the government. “[I]f the government wishes to bargain ..., it may but it should do so mindful of the risks which it thereby assumes of dismissed indictments for unconstitutional delay.” United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir.1977).

The Second Circuit, in holding that a defendant’s sixth amendment claim to a speedy trial had been violated found it “to be of especial importance that, even after [defendant] had clearly warned the government that he was not waiving his Sixth Amendment rights, there was an additional 14-month delay, a substantial portion of which was attributable to the government.” United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir.1977).

E. g., U. S. v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1977); U. S. v. Bullock, 551 F.2d 1377, 1381 (5th Cir. 1977); U. S. v. Lee, 575 F.2d 1184 , 1186 (6th Cir. 1978); U. S. v. White, 607 F.2d 203, 205 (7th Cir. 1979); U. S. v. Jankowski, 470 F.Supp. 464, 470 (W.D.Pa.1979); U. S. v. Koch, 438 F.Supp. 307, 308 (S.D.N.Y.1977); United States v. Castellana, 461 F.Supp. 233, 234 (M.D.Fla.1978).

Cf. United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2 Cir. 1977) (violation of Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 , is factor in weighing speedy trial claim).

United States v. Carini, supra, at n. 1.

See United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1977) (illnesses of judges are institutional delays properly chargeable to the government).

See United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Lane, 561 F.2d 1075, 1079 (2d Cir. 1977); Francis v. People, 63 V.I. 724, 751 (2015) (holding that “delays 72 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion otherwise, we have “critically assess[ed]” the government’s account of discovery logistics and have found ample support for it in the record.

See United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1977) (illnesses of judges are institutional delays properly chargeable to the government).

See United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144 , 149-50 (2d Cir. 1977) (“While it is .... true that ‘institutional’ delays are not counted as heavily against the government as are delays caused or encouraged by the prosecution for tactical reasons,” delays “occasioned by ... unexplained inaction of the District Court, caused, no doubt, by an .overloaded docket ... are properly chargeable against the government under prevailing case law.”) (collecting cases).' Specifically, when t…

See 2 United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144 , 149‐50 (2d Cir. 1977) (“While it is . . . true that 3 ‘institutional’ delays are not counted as heavily against the government as are 4 delays caused or encouraged by the prosecution for tactical reasons,” delays 5 “occasioned by . . . unexplained inaction of the District Court, caused, no doubt, 6 by an overloaded docket . . . are properly chargeable against the government 7 under prevailing case law.”) (collecting cases).

Although some delay can be attributed to Pennick, such as delays arising from retaining four different attorneys, some delay can also be attributed to the government, such as for twice superseding the indictment, and much of the delay can be attributed to the court, as it candidly acknowledged, such as the delay in deciding motions. ʺWhile the government may have had little control over the ʹinstitutional delaysʹ more appropriately attributable to the court, ʹthe ultimate re…

“While the government may have had little control over the ‘institutional delays’ more appropriately attributable to the court, ‘the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than the defendant.’” United States v. New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ); see also United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding the court’s delays against the…

See United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368, 377-78 (2d Cir. 1979).

See United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Amendola, 558 F.2d 1043, 1044 (2d Cir. 1977).

See also United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1977).

See United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir.1977).

See United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d 1098, 1104 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Roberts, 293 F.Supp. 195, 198 (S.D.N.Y.1968); Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Admin. v. Commonwealth of Mass., 358 F.Supp. 953, 958 (D.Mass.), aff’d, 488 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 , 94 S.Ct. 2389 , 40 L.Ed.2d 763 (1974).

See United States v. Carini, supra, 562 F.2d at 148-49 ; United States v. Seafarers Int’l Union, 343 F.Supp. 779, 787 (S.D.N.Y.1972).