U.S. Code » Title 18 » Part PART II— CRIMINAL PROCEDURE › Chapter CHAPTER 208— SPEEDY TRIAL

18 U.S.C. § 3163

Effective dates

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(a) The time limitation in section 3161(b) of this chapter—(1) shall apply to all individuals who are arrested or served with a summons on or after the date of expiration of the twelve-calendar-month period following July 1, 1975; and(2) shall commence to run on such date of expiration to all individuals who are arrested or served with a summons prior to the date of expiration of such twelve-calendar-month period, in connection with the commission of an offense, and with respect to which offense no information or indictment has been filed prior to such date of expiration.(b) The time limitation in section 3161(c) of this chapter—(1) shall apply to all offenses charged in informations or indictments filed on or after the date of expiration of the twelve-calendar-month period following July 1, 1975; and(2) shall commence to run on such date of expiration as to all offenses charged in informations or indictments filed prior to that date.(c) Subject to the provisions of section 3174(c), section 3162 of this chapter shall become effective and apply to all cases commenced by arrest or summons, and all informations or indictments filed, on or after July 1, 1980.(Added Pub. L. 93–619, title I, § 101, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2080; amended Pub. L. 96–43, § 6, Aug. 2, 1979, 93 Stat. 328.)Editorial NotesAmendments

1979—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 96–43 substituted provision that section 3162 of this title was to become effective and apply to all cases commenced by arrest or summons, and all informations and indictments filed, on or after July 1, 1980, subject to section 3174(c) of this title, for provision that such section was to become effective after the date of expiration of the fourth twelve-calendar-month period following July 1, 1975.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 82 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1976–2024 · leading case: United States v. Mohammad Reza Mehrmanesh, Patricia Mehrmanesh, & Abofazl Mehrmanesh, 652 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1981).
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United States v. Mohammad Reza Mehrmanesh, Patricia Mehrmanesh, & Abofazl Mehrmanesh, 652 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1981). · cites it 7× “18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c). Before reaching that issue, however, we are presented with a threshold question whether the denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act is appealable prior to final judgment.”
United States v. Mohammad Reza Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1982). · cites it 3× “See 18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c) (Supp. III 1979). There is no dispute that a violation of the Act occurred; 2 the only issue is whether sanctions for the violation apply.”
United States v. Pablo Carreon, 626 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1980). · cites it 3× “18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c) (1976). The August 2, 1979 amendments moved the effective date of the sanctions back to July 1, 1980.”
United States v. James R. Lord, Jr., Gerald J. Yagy, & Gerhardt J. Schwartz, 565 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1977). · cites it 2× “When excludable periods are taken into account it is clear that Yagy’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act were not violated.”
United States v. Carl Fielding, 645 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981). · cites it 2× “2080 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c)). In other words, sanctions were not applicable until July 1, 1979.”
United States v. Burnell G. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980). · cites it 2× “7 Without addressing the merits of the parties’ contentions regarding calculation of time periods under the Act, we note that dismissal is the appropriate sanction for the violation alleged by Watson. 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a)(2). Under the terms of the Act, however, this sanction…”
United States v. Jerome G. Beery, 678 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1982). · cites it 2× “We first observe that Beery cannot rely on the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.”
United States v. Louis Carini, 562 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1977). · cites it 2× “§ 3162 (a)(2), is not yet effective, 18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c). In the presence of a conceded violation of the Act it might be argued that during the transition period, although dismissal of the information might not as yet be mandated, the imposition of such a drastic sanction lies…”
United States v. Mark Berkwitt & Barry Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1980). · cites it 2× “§ 3162 , was originally made effective on July 1,1979 (see 18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c)), a date about six months after appellants’ trial.”
United States v. James E. Howard, United States of Am. v. Berry L. Palmer, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir. 1979). · cites it 2× “18 U.S.C. § 3163 . The Act also provides certain “interim limits” for designated high-risk defendants and for pretrial detainees.”
United States of Am., Harold Omar Mack, 669 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1982). · cites it 2× “See 18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c), prior to amendment by Pub.”
United States v. Henry A. Molt, Jr., 631 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1980). · cites it 3× “18 U.S.C. § 3163 (c) (1976). Asserting that the sanction was available to defendants indicted before July 1, 1979, whose trials were still pending as of that date, Molt contends that as of July 28, 1979 he had a right under the Act to dismissal of the indictments.”
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