Peter Hanlon Irons v. Griffin B. Bell (1979)

Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F.Supp. 761, 773 (S.D.N.Y.1979); but cf. Curran v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 475 (1st Cir.1987) (“‘investigatory records of law enforcement agencies are inherently records compiled for “law enforcement purposes” within the meaning of Exemption 7.’”) (quoting Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 475 (1st Cir.1979)). 3 II.

But see Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1979) (Coffin, C.J.) (even though documents not gathered for law enforcement, court will protect them from disclosure under Exemption 7(c) to protect privacy values). 50 .

E.g., Church of Scientology v. Department of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 473 (1st Cir. 1979); Ramo v. Department of the Navy, 487 F.Supp. 127, 130-31 (N.D.Cal.1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-4791 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 1981) (submission vacated pending Supreme Court decision in FBI v. Abramson); see Note, FOIA Exemption 7 and Broader Disclosure of Unlawful FBI Investigations, 65 Minn.L.Rev. 1139, 1145-49 (1981).

See Irons, 596 F.2d at 473 (“At best, we glean that the requirement of a law enforcement purpose serves as a condition on Exemption 7 when an agency has both administrative and enforcement functions.”).

The 1986 amendment broadened the scope of exemption 7’s threshold requirement from “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes” to "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes.” Although several courts have stated that a federal law enforcement purpose must be shown in order for the government to meet the threshold requirement for exemption 7, see, e.g., Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420 (D.C.Cir.1982); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471 (1s…

We have previously noted that “the investigatory records of law enforcement agencies are inherently records compiled for ‘law enforcement purposes’ within the meaning of Exemption 7.” Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 475 (1st Cir.1979).

(D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation . . . confidential information furnished only by the confidential source.” Apparently mindful of what we decided in Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 475 (1st Cir. *970 1979), the plaintiffs do not dispute that the records here sought are, within the meaning of exemption 7(D), “investigatory records compiled for…

Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471, n.6 (1st Cir. 1979).

Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471, n.6 (1st Cir. 1979).

Other circuits apply a "per se” rule, under which "documents compiled by law enforcement agencies are inherently records compiled for law enforcement purposes within the meaning of Exemption 7.” Jordan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1994); Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882 , 883-86 (2d Cir. 1984), Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 666-67 (8th Cir. 1980); …

Id. at 558 (citing Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir.1979)). 5 .

See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2), (4); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir.1979).

See 5 U.S.C. §552a(g)(2), (4); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir. 1979).

We have previously acknowledged, in a suit involving one of the very appellees who is again before the court, a congressional intent that “the investigatory records of law enforcement agencies are inherently records complied for ‘law enforcement purposes’ within the meaning of Exemption 7.” Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 475 (1st Cir. 1979).

Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 475 (1st Cir.1979).

Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 475 (1st Cir.1979).

Whatever the merits of appellant’s assessment of the affidavits, once the trial court commenced a first-hand review of the documents themselves “[s]uch an inspection would determine whether the failure of the affidavit stemmed from mere inadvertence or from a truly overbroad reading of the exemption by the agency.” Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471, n. 6 (1st Cir.1979).

See, e.g., Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420-21 (D.C.Cir.1982); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 666-67 (8th Cir.1980); Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738 , 748 (9th Cir.1979); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474-75 (1st Cir.1979). 43 In this circuit, an agency with a clear law enforcement mandate such as the FBI need establish only a "rational nexus" between its law enforcement duties and the document for which Exemption 7 is claimed.

See, e.g., Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420-21 (D.C.Cir.1982); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 666-67 (8th Cir.1980); Church of Scientology v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 611 F.2d 738 , 748 (9th Cir.1979); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474-75 (1st Cir.1979).

The nature of the “law enforcement purposes” requirement has been explored previously by this court, see, e.g., Abramson v. FBI, 212 U.S.App.D.C. 58 , 658 F.2d 806 (1980), cert. granted, 452 U.S. 937 , 101 S.Ct. 3079 , 69 L.Ed.2d 951 (1981); Weissman v. CIA, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 119-121 , 565 F.2d 692, 694-696 (1977); Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 128-131 , 498 F.2d 73, 79-82 (1974) (decided prior to enactment of 1974 FO…

Cf. Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, at 665-666 (8th Cir. 1980) (law enforcement exemption extends to all investigative files of a criminal law enforcement agency; no showing of legitimate law enforcement purpose necessary); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471-76 (1st Cir. 1979) (same). .

For example, Document 1 is a memorandum of an FBI interview with Kuehnert in which agents inquired whether Kuehnert knew of any "plans for violence" on the part of the Revolutionary Union. 8 From other documents, however, we are unable to infer "a colorable claim of a rational nexus between the organizations and activities being investigated and violations of federal laws." Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1979).

For example, Document 1 is a memorandum of an FBI interview with Kuehnert in which agents inquired whether Kuehnert knew of any “plans for violence” on the part of the Revolutionary Union. 8 From other documents, however, we are unable to infer “a colorable claim of a rational nexus between the organizations and activities being investigated and violations of federal laws.” Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1979).

The threshold question is whether the documents in question are “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes .... ” For a law enforcement agency such as the FBI, there need only be established that there is a “ ‘rational nexus’ between the enforcement of a federal law and the document for which an exemption is claimed.” Church of Scientology v. United States Department of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1980), quoting Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 472 (1…

Accord, Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468 , 471 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979) (“When the legal issue of the applicability of an exemption depends upon the factual nature of the contents of a document, we think it appropriate to obtain fairly complete information about the factual question before deciding the legal issue.”).

See Jordan v. United States Dept. of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188 , 1197 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The per se rule *663 [also] permits agencies whose primary function is not law enforcement to rely on [the exemption].”); Irons, 596 F.2d at 473 (“At best, we glean that the requirement of a law enforcement purpose serves as a condition on [the exemption] when an agency has both administrative and enforcement functions”).

Id. at 473.

The First Circuit allows a similar construction: We have previously noted that “the investigatory records of law enforcement agencies are inherently records compiled for ‘law enforcement purposes’ within the meaning of Exemption 7.” Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 475 (1st Cir.1979). 6 *961 The FBI is such an agency.

Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1979); see Lamont v. Department of Just., 475 F.Supp. 761, 773 (S.D.N.Y.1979). 60 .

Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 666-67 (8th Cir. 1980); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474-76 (1st Cir. 1979).

If an agency’s explanations are inadequate to permit a court to determine whether the agency satisfied the FOIA requirements, the court may “direct the government to revise its submissions,” Church of Scientology Int'l v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 30 F.3d 224, 239 (1st Cir. 1994), or conduct an in camera review to “determine whether the failure of the affidavit stemmed from mere inadvertence or from a truly overbroad reading of the exemption by the agency.” Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2…

If an agency’s explanations are inadequate to permit a court to determine whether the agency satisfied the requirements of the FOIA, the court may “direct the government to revise its submissions,” Church of Scientology Int'l v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 30 F.3d 224, 239 (1st Cir. 1994), or conduct an in camera review to “determine whether the failure of the affidavit stemmed from mere inadvertence or from a truly overbroad reading of the exemption by the agency.” Irons v. Bell, …

See Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, 819 F.2d 1181, 1184 (D.C.Cir.l987)(§ 552a(q) 2 explicitly provides that “[i]f a[n Information Act] exemption covers the documents, but a Privacy Act exemption does not, the documents must be released under the Privacy Act; if a Privacy Act exemption but not a[n Information Act] exemption applies, the documents must be released under [the Information Act].”); Shapiro v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 762 F.2d 611, 612 (7th Cir.1985)(court re…

Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 475 (1st Cir.1979); Curran v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 474 (1st Cir.1987).

Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882 , 884-886 (2d Cir.1984); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 668 (8th Cir.1980); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 472-476 (1st Cir.1978). 9 The Court has reviewed the above cases, as well as others cited by the *1123 parties, and determines that the reasoning of the Courts of Appeal for the District of Columbia and for the Ninth Circuit is the correct rule.

Crooker v. United States Parole Commission, 730 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir.1984); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir.1979).

See Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. Miller, 490 F.Supp. 144 , 146 n. 1, 150 (D.D.C. 1980); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir.1979) (FBI moved “with glacial celerity.”).

See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 , 93 S.Ct. 827, 838 , 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 475-76 (1st Cir.1979). 4 .

Irons v. Bell, 596 F. 2d 468, 474 (1st Cir. 1979).

Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 666 (8th Cir. 1980); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 476 (1st Cir. 1979).

Cir. 1979); Baez v. U. S. Dept. of Justice, supra, at pp. 1332-1333. 9 As the court said in Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474 (1st Cir. 1979), ... we are hard pressed to conceive of a standard that would enable a district court to distinguish at an in camera proceeding between a colorably justifiable investigation that turned out to be a blind alley and an investigation that was bogus from the beginning.

There is no question but that the documents sought by plaintiff are “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes.” See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 475 (1st Cir. 1979).

See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 473-75 (1st Cir.1979); Curran v. Dep’t of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 475 (1st Cir.1987); Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882 , 884-85 (2d Cir.1984); Ferguson v. FBI, 957 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir.1992); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 666 (8th Cir.1980).

See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468 , 471 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979); Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C.Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 , 94 S.Ct. 1564 , 39 L.Ed.2d 873 (1974); Note, In Camera Inspection Under the Freedom of Information Act, 41 U.Chi.L.Rev. 557, 581 (1974). 36 This determination is made difficult by the fact that the party seeking disclosure does not know the contents of the information sought and is, therefore, helpless to contradict the government'…

See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir.1979).

See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474 (1st Cir.1979).

See Irons v. Levi, 451 F.Supp. 751, 753 (D.Mass.1978) (requester only entitled to that portion of the file listed in see references), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir.1979).

See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1979). 63 .

See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir.1979).

See Irons v. Bell, supra, 596 F.2d at 475 (presumption that records of agency whose function is almost entirely limited to the enforcement of federal law are inherently records for law enforcement purposes within the meaning of Exemption 7).