United States v. Nicholas J. Mangieri, Jr. (1982)

See United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 262-65 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Wertz, 625 F.2d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir.1980); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1282 (D.C.Cir.1982).

Cir. 1998) (“We cannot conclude that it was plain error not to give a special unanimity instruction” where “an indictment charges more than one act.”); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1281 (D.C.

See United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 262-65 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wertz, 625 F.2d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1282 (D.C.

Cf. Mangieri, 694 F.2d at 1282 (indictment not duplicitous where each count included several misrepresentations as part of one fraudulent loan application transaction).

See, e.g., United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 324 (2d Cir. 1975) (recognizing that where a single count of an indictment charges a defendant with multiple false statements, jury can convict provided that it unanimously agrees defendant was guilty of making at least one of the false statements charged); United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104 , *474 1105 (6th Cir. 1988) (same), overruled on other grounds by Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 , 111 S.Ct. 2491 , 115 L.Ed.2d 555…

Notwithstanding that “[a] selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution,” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 , 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), defendants assert such challenges in the course of the prosecution (usually pretrial), see 4 LaFave, supra, § 13.4(a), at 170-71, and courts of appeals addres…

Further, we need not address their contention that some responses to the jury notes resulted in an improper amendment of the superceding indictment, see generally United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1277 (D.C.Cir.1982) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C.Cir.1969)); see also United States v. Dickerson, 705 F.3d 683, 694 (7th Cir.2013), even if untimely raised in their reply brief, see (George) Wilson, 605 F.3d at 1035 , because we are vacating p…

Regardless whether EPS and G & S were similarly situated, EPS has not shown the EPA lacked a rational basis for bringing an enforcement action against EPS but not against G & S, see 3883 Conn. LLC v. District of Columbia, 336 F.3d 1068, 1075 (D.C.Cir.2003), or that the EPA had an improper motive, such as suppressing the petitioner’s speech about G & S, see United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1273 (D.C.Cir.1982).

Regardless whether EPS and G & S were similarly situated, EPS has not shown the EPA lacked a rational basis for bringing an enforcement action against EPS but not against G & S, see 3883 Conn. LLC v. District of Columbia, 336 F.3d 1068, 1075 (D.C.Cir.2003), or that the EPA had an improper motive, such as suppressing the petitioner’s speech about G & S, see United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1273 (D.C.Cir.1982).

The decision whether to grant relief from a Rule 12 waiver “lies in the discretion of the district court.” United States v. Tekle, 329 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Hamm, 786 F.2d 804, 806 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1283 (D.C.Cir.1982).

The decision whether to grant relief from a Rule 12 waiver “lies in the dis- cretion of the district court.” United States v. Tekle, 329 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Hamm, 786 F.2d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1283 (D.C.

Cf. United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1277 (D.C.Cir. 1982).

United States v. Sobin, 56 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C.Cir.)(failing to consider merits of suppression issue after finding the defendant failed to make a timely motion), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 348 , 133 L.Ed.2d 244 (1995); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1282 (D.C.Cir.1982)(same); Brown, 663 F.2d 229 (by failing to file a pretrial motion, the defendant waived his right to appeal a suppression claim).

In United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1281 (D.C.Cir.1982), the court noted with approval the rule announced by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982), that “when one charge encompasses two separate incidents, the judge must instruct the jury that if a guilty verdict is returned the jurors must be unanimous as to which incident or incidents they find the defendant guilty.” 44 Despite its endorse *1013 ment of th…

See United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir.1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1091 , 101 S.Ct. 887 , 66 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); United States v. Rie-bold, 557 F.2d 697, 708 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 860 , 98 S.Ct. 186 , 54 L.Ed.2d 133 (1977); see also United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (“especially reluctant to reverse for plain error when it is ‘invited’ ”).

This does not make that count duplic[itous] . . . .” (citation omitted)); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1281 (D.C.

To prove that the government acted with a discriminatory purpose, Mr. Hawkins must show “that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, or was designed to prevent or paralyze his exercise of constitutional rights.” Mangieri, 694 F.2d at 1273 (citations omitted).

Circuit has explained, “[a]n amendment of the indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by prosecutor or court after the grand jury has last passed upon them.” United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1277 (D.C.

To establish a discriminatory purpose, the defendant must show “that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, or was designed to prevent or paralyze his exercise of constitutional rights.” Mangieri, 694 F.2d at 1273 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Cf. Weathers, 186 F.3d at 958 . 22 (quoting U.S. v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1281 (D.C.

Cir. 1977)), and demonstrating that a new trial is “in the interest of justice” is a burden placed on the defendant, United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.

“The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a new trial is justified,” United States v. Venkata, 709 F. Supp. 3d 9 , 20 (D.D.C. 2024) (citing United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.

Nevertheless, the Court has discretion to consider the motion regardless of whether it is untimely, United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1283 (D.C.

A count is duplicitous only if it joins “distinct and separate offenses.” Klat, 156 F.3d at 1266 (citing United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1281 (D.C.Cir.1982)).

In United States v. Mangieri, the defendant submitted nine applications for loans from a credit union; on each, he “failed to disclose thirteen outstanding debts (totaling over $30,000), as well as the fact that he had twice ‘taken bankruptcy.’” United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1272 (D.C.

Cir. 2005); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1277 (D.C.

The defendant must carry the burden in demonstrating that a new trial is “in the interest of justice.” United States v. Machado-Erazo, 986 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.

The defendant must carry the burden in demonstrating that a new trial is “in the interest of justice.” United States v. Machado-Erazo, 986 F.Supp.2d 39, 44 (D.D.C.2013) (citing United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1982)).

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1982).

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1982).

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1982); Reese, 561 F.2d at 902 .

Ultimately, “[a] motion for a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and should be reversed only for abuse or misapplication of the law.” United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Reese, 561 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C.Cir.1977)).

See United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130, 133 (D.C.Cir.1986); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1982).

“A motion for a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and should be reversed only for abuse or misapplication of the law.” United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Reese, 561 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C.Cir.1977)). *5 DISCUSSION I.

United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130, 133 (D.C.Cir.1986); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1982).

Indeed, had prosecutors organized the charges in the indictment by regulation rather than by event — or separated out attempt, evasion, and aiding and abetting as distinct counts — the Court would be faced with the greater danger of “inappropriate multiple punishments for a single criminal episode.” See United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1282 (D.C.Cir.1982).

D.C. 295, 305, 694 F.2d 1270, 1280 (1982) (citations omitted); Brown v. United States, 627 A.2d 499, 508 (D.C.1993) (holding claim of error in failing to instruct jury on issue barred because defense counsel asked court not to instruct jury on matter, noting that this court has “repeatedly held that a defendant may not take one position at trial and a contradictory position on appeal”) (citations omitted).

D.C. 295, 309-11, 694 F.2d 1270, 1284-86 (1982) (motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence denied because moving party failed to show due diligence in procuring the evidence); Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 1140 , 1143 n. 6 *259 (D.C.1992) (same).

To allow the defense to now raise this matter four months after discovering the basis for the motion and only one month prior to a trial that had been set in March of this year would subvert the orderly management of the Court’s docket. “[G]iven the intricacies of trial scheduling and crowded dockets, and the desirability of deciding questions of government misconduct not relevant to the issue of guilt prior to trial, courts are understandably reluctant to grant relief excep…

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1286 (D.C.Cir.1982), citing Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.1928) (the “Larrison standard”).

Under this more lenient standard, a new trial cannot be granted unless: (1) the Court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false; (2) that without [the false testimony] the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and (3) that the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial See United States v. Mangieri, 694 …

D.C. 295, 298, 694 F.2d 1270, 1273 (1982) (discussing the standards for a defense of selective prosecution).

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1281 (D.C.Cir.1982).

United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1282 (D.C.