Maria Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham Pc (2016)

Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, No. 14-15672, — F.3d —, 2016 WL 3913445, at *8 (9th Cir. July 20, 2016); see also Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002).

HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON 11 Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2016).

The majority’s failure to account for the variation between §§ 3347(b) and 3348(a)(2) further confirms that it adopts a strained reading of the statutory text. 3 A third rule that counsels against my colleagues’ interpretation is that we must not adopt a reading that renders an ambiguous provision “almost a nullity.” Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 281 (2013) (Scalia, J., disse…

We are not convinced of any contrary conclusion by Amyndas's argument regarding the parties' use of the definite article "the" before "venue" in the forum-selection clause. "[T]he definite article 'the' 'particularizes the subject spoken of,' - 24 - suggesting . . . refer[ence] to a single object." Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1647 (4th ed. 1968)).

USDA 829 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

That reading “produce[s] an understanding of the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.” Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

BLM function . . . is to enforce it according to its terms.’” Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)); see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.

The explicit textual cross- references between subsections (a) and (b), and the use of the definite article (“the standard, limitation, or order”),15 signify 15 “[T]he definite article ‘the’ particularizes the subject spoken of, suggesting that Congress meant to refer to a single object . . . .” Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th IN RE VOLKSWAGEN LITIGATION 19 with precision that the diligent prosecution bar forecloses only citizen suits that…

But if the plain meaning of the statutory text remains unclear after consulting internal indicia of congressional intent, we may then turn to extrinsic indicators, such as legislative history, to help resolve the ambiguity.” Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002).

To 18 isolate the understanding of “goods and services” from “video tape service provider” 19 as Plaintiff suggests would ignore the purpose of the statute, which is to prohibit 20 entities which primarily serve as audio video providers from disclosing an individual’s 21 viewing history to others. 22 Plaintiff claims that Carter is distinguishable for multiple reasons, including 23 that the court failed to liberally construe the VPPA as required under Hernandez v. 24 William…

See Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068 , 1073 5 (9th Cir. 2016) (“When an examination of the plain language of the statute, its structure, and purpose 6 clearly reveals congressional intent, our judicial inquiry is complete.”); Riganian v. LiveRamp 7 Holdings, Inc., No. 25-CV-00824-JST, 2025 WL 2021802 , at *12 (N.D.

Mo. Nov. 2, 2 2011) (two telephone contacts with debt collector was sufficient to award maximum 3 statutory damages); Hernandez v. Williams, 829 F.3d 1068, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2016) 4 (In enacting § 1692g, Congress intended to protect consumers from abusive debt 5 collection practices by giving consumers information about their debts and 6 opportunities to verify them); see also Perrigo v. Premium Asset Servs., No. 2:14- 7 cv-01052-GMN-PAL, 2015 U.S. Dist.

Hernandez v. Williams, 829 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Interpretation 4 of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and 5 context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.”) 6 (citing Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)); Larkin v. Workers’ Comp.

No. 35-1 at 5.) But the debt verification rights provided under 15 § 1692g(b) are tied to the debt collector’s first communication with the debtor, not the second. 16 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (defining “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding 17 a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium”); Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman 18 & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding “that the phrase ‘the initial 19 communication’ [in § 1692…

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit notably reached this conclusion in Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, holding that “the initial communication” refers “to the first communication by any debt collector.” 829 F.3d 1068, 1078 (9th Cir. 2016).

See Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2016).

See Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016).

See Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he definite article ‘the’ ‘particularizes the subject spoken of’ . . . .” (quoting The, Black’s Law Dictionary 1647 (4th ed. 1968))); see also Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev.

See Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068 , 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2016).

See, e.g., Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he definite article ‘the’ ‘particularizes the subject spoken of,’ suggesting that Congress meant to refer to a single object.” (citation omitted)); Onink v. Cardelucci (In re Cardelucci), 285 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 2002).

Where, as here, there are better indicators of a regulation or statute’s meaning, we have rejected excessive reliance on the distinction between definite articles such as “the” and indefinite articles such as “a” and “any.” See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126 , 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2009); City of Ketchikan v. Cape Fox Corp., 85 F.3d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016); NLRB v. New Vista N…

Where, as here, there are better indicators of a regulation or statute’s meaning, we have rejected excessive reliance on the distinction between definite articles such as “the” and indefinite articles such as “a” and “any.” See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126 , 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2009); City of Ketchikan v. Cape Fox Corp., 85 F.3d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016); NLRB v. New Vista N…

Further, the position of the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits 10 is consistent with the remedial nature of the FDCPA and “its solicitude for the least 11 sophisticated consumer.” Vangorden, 897 F.3d at 439 ; see also Hernandez v. Williams, 12 Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating that “[s] a ‘broad 13 remedial statute,’. . . the FDCPA must be liberally construed in favor of the consumer”) 14 (quoting Gonzales v. Arrow Fin.

See Hernandez , 829 F.3d at 1073 (court may look to legislative history to ascertain Congress's intent if statute's internal indicia are insufficiently clear).