15 U.S.C. § 1692a

Definitions

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As used in this subchapter—(1) The term “Bureau” means the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.(2) The term “communication” means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.(3) The term “consumer” means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.(4) The term “creditor” means any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.(5) The term “debt” means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.(6) The term “debt collector” means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. The term does not include—(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor;(B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts;(C) any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties;(D) any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt;(E) any nonprofit organization which, at the request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such consumers and distributing such amounts to creditors; and(F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person; (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.(7) The term “location information” means a consumer’s place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or his place of employment.(8) The term “State” means any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing.(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, § 803, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 875; amended Pub. L. 99–361, July 9, 1986, 100 Stat. 768; Pub. L. 111–203, title X, § 1089(2), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2092.)Editorial NotesAmendments

2010—Par. (1). Pub. L. 111–203 added par. (1) and struck out former par. (1) which read as follows: “The term ‘Commission’ means the Federal Trade Commission.”

1986—Par. (6). Pub. L. 99–361 in provision preceding cl. (A) substituted “clause (F)” for “clause (G)”, struck out cl. (F) which excluded any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client from term “debt collector”, and redesignated cl. (G) as (F).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2010 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 111–203 effective on the designated transfer date, see section 1100H of Pub. L. 111–203, set out as a note under section 552a of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

Effective Date

Section effective upon the expiration of six months after Sept. 20, 1977, see section 819 of Pub. L. 90–321, as added by Pub. L. 95–109, set out as a note under section 1692 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2,661 cases (852 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case: Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2012).
Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2012). · cites it 28× “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (emphasis added). A debt is any obligation or alleged obligation.”
Vincent v. The Money Store, 736 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2013). · cites it 25× “, whether the creditor has “used” a name, and the role of the third party, i.”
Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2016). · cites it 14× “” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. The meaning must therefore be derived from the manner in which the term is used, namely, one who dispossesses or disables personal property- .”
Alaska Tr., LLC v. Ambridge, 372 P.3d 207 (Alaska 2016). · cites it 30× “11 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 12 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).”
Todd Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, 958 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2020). · cites it 7× “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). But the Act adds a separate debt-collector definition “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6),” a subsection regulating the repossession of property.”
St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 898 F.3d 351 (3rd Cir. 2018). · cites it 10× “Pierre's amended class action complaint alleges that the disclosure of these two pieces of information on the envelope violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a - 1692p, which prohibits the use of any "unfair or unconscionable means to collect…”
Barbato v. Greystone All., LLC, 916 F.3d 260 (3rd Cir. 2019). · cites it 10× “at 371 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) ). Like Crown, the defendant based this argument on Third Circuit precedent that characterized the two statuses as "mutually exclusive.”
McKinney v. Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2008). · cites it 12× “2003); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4), (6) & (6)(F). The undisputed evidence here establishes that Cadleway is a debt collector, not a creditor.”
Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009). · cites it 10× “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The FDCPA provides for a number of exceptions from the term “debt collector.”
Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. Recontrust Co., 840 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 2016). · cites it 21× “” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. The meaning must therefore be derived from the manner in which the term is used, namely, one who dispossesses or disables personal property.”
Dale Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2017). · cites it 6× “” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Each of the four FDCPA provisions under which Plaintiffs sue applies to only the conduct of a “debt collector.”
Henson v. Santander Consum. USA Inc., 198 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2017). · cites it 3× “Looking to other neighboring provisions in the Act, it quickly comes clear that Congress routinely used the word "owed" to refer to present (not past) debt relationships.”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(1) — 1 case
Bergida v. PlusFour, Inc. (D. Nev. 2023).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(10) — 1 case
Morton v. O'Brien (S.D. Ohio 2020).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(11) — 1 case
Cooper v. Litton Loan Servicing (In Re Cooper), 253 B.R. 286 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2000).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) — 160 cases
McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. Mass. 2012).
William Brown, III v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 804 F.3d 740 (6th Cir. 2015).
Maria Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham Pc, 829 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2016).
Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir. 2013).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) — 349 cases
Loja v. Main St. Acquisition Corp., 906 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2018).
Villanueva v. Account Discovery Sys., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (D. Colo. 2015).
Dunham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 663 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2011).
Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2018).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) — 201 cases
McKinney v. Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2008). “2003); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4), (6) & (6)(F). The undisputed evidence here establishes that Cadleway is a debt collector, not a creditor.”
Henson v. Santander Consum. USA Inc., 198 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2017). “Looking to other neighboring provisions in the Act, it quickly comes clear that Congress routinely used the word "owed" to refer to present (not past) debt relationships.”
Barbato v. Greystone All., LLC, 916 F.3d 260 (3rd Cir. 2019). “at 371 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) ). Like Crown, the defendant based this argument on Third Circuit precedent that characterized the two statuses as "mutually exclusive.”
Andrew Schlaf v. Safeguard Prop., LLC, 899 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 2018).
Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships, 577 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2009).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4)(6)(F) — 1 case
McAndrew v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 977 F. Supp. 2d 440 (M.D. Penn. 2013).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4)(B) — 1 case
Pelfrey v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) — 644 cases
St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 898 F.3d 351 (3rd Cir. 2018). “Pierre's amended class action complaint alleges that the disclosure of these two pieces of information on the envelope violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a - 1692p, which prohibits the use of any "unfair or unconscionable means to collect…”
Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2016). “” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. The meaning must therefore be derived from the manner in which the term is used, namely, one who dispossesses or disables personal property- .”
Alaska Tr., LLC v. Ambridge, 372 P.3d 207 (Alaska 2016). “11 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 12 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).”
Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 914 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. Recontrust Co., 840 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 2016). “” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. The meaning must therefore be derived from the manner in which the term is used, namely, one who dispossesses or disables personal property.”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) — 1594 cases
Vincent v. The Money Store, 736 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2013). “, whether the creditor has “used” a name, and the role of the third party, i.”
Todd Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, 958 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2020). “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). But the Act adds a separate debt-collector definition “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6),” a subsection regulating the repossession of property.”
Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2012). “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (emphasis added). A debt is any obligation or alleged obligation.”
Alaska Tr., LLC v. Ambridge, 372 P.3d 207 (Alaska 2016). “11 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 12 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).”
Barbato v. Greystone All., LLC, 916 F.3d 260 (3rd Cir. 2019). “at 371 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) ). Like Crown, the defendant based this argument on Third Circuit precedent that characterized the two statuses as "mutually exclusive.”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(1988) — 1 case
First Interstate Bank of Fort Collins, N. A. v. Soucie, 924 P.2d 1200 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A) — 103 cases
Alaska Tr., LLC v. Ambridge, 372 P.3d 207 (Alaska 2016). “11 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 12 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).”
Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2016). “” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. The meaning must therefore be derived from the manner in which the term is used, namely, one who dispossesses or disables personal property- .”
Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013).
Stephanie Reygadas v. DNF Assocs., 982 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 2020).
Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009). “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The FDCPA provides for a number of exceptions from the term “debt collector.”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(B) — 32 cases
Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Williams v. Citibank, N.A., 565 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Bihn v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., 980 F. Supp. 2d 892 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C) — 62 cases
Pamela Gillie v. Law Off. of Eric A. Jones, 785 F.3d 1091 (6th Cir. 2015).
Gradisher v. Check Enf't Unit, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 988 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009). “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The FDCPA provides for a number of exceptions from the term “debt collector.”
April Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1996).
Mark Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2014).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(D) — 20 cases
Holmes v. Elec. Document Processing, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2015).
Jennifer Lynn Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Citimortgage, Inc. v. Cotton, 2012 IL App (1st) 102438 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(E) — 2 cases
Yang v. DTS Fin. Grp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
Schueler v. Roman Asphalt Corp., 827 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F) — 157 cases
Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2016). “” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. The meaning must therefore be derived from the manner in which the term is used, namely, one who dispossesses or disables personal property- .”
Zirogiannis v. Seterus, Inc., 707 F. App'x 724 (2d Cir. 2017).
Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2012). “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (emphasis added). A debt is any obligation or alleged obligation.”
Alaska Tr., LLC v. Ambridge, 372 P.3d 207 (Alaska 2016). “11 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 12 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(1977) — 1 case
First Interstate Bank of Fort Collins, N. A. v. Soucie, 924 P.2d 1200 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(1988) — 1 case
First Interstate Bank of Fort Collins, N. A. v. Soucie, 924 P.2d 1200 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(1999) — 1 case
Sponaugle v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 40 F. App'x 715 (3rd Cir. 2002).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(I) — 1 case
Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Or. 2010).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(i) — 38 cases
Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009). “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The FDCPA provides for a number of exceptions from the term “debt collector.”
Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2016). “” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. The meaning must therefore be derived from the manner in which the term is used, namely, one who dispossesses or disables personal property- .”
Todd Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, 958 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2020). “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). But the Act adds a separate debt-collector definition “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6),” a subsection regulating the repossession of property.”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) — 41 cases
Est. of Egenious Coles v. Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman, 658 F. App'x 108 (3rd Cir. 2016).
Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Or. 2002).
Conquest v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 247 F. Supp. 3d 618 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
Sterling v. Ourisman Chevrolet of Bowie Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 577 (D. Maryland 2013).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) — 133 cases
Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2012). “15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (emphasis added). A debt is any obligation or alleged obligation.”
Henson v. Santander Consum. USA Inc., 198 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2017). “Looking to other neighboring provisions in the Act, it quickly comes clear that Congress routinely used the word "owed" to refer to present (not past) debt relationships.”
Llewellyn v. Shearson Fin. Network, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D. Colo. 2009).
Skerry v. Massachusetts Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D. Mass. 1999).
Ca Partners v. Spears, 274 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. App. 2008).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(in) — 1 case
Berndt v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iv) — 4 cases
Hardy v. N. Leasing Sys., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2013).
Avila v. Citimortgage, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 110 (D.D.C. 2014).
Walker v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 142 F. Supp. 3d 63 (D.D.C. 2015).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(G) — 3 cases
Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1985).
McGrew v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (S.D. Cal. 2009).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(a) — 3 cases
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(c) — 9 cases
Allen v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 755 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2010).
Campbell v. Baldwin, 90 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
Okoro v. Garner, 21 F. App'x 486 (7th Cir. 2001).
Passa v. City of Columbus, 266 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
Sole v. DeVos (M.D. Fla. 2020).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(f) — 2 cases
Garth Cooper v. PHEAA (11th Cir. 2020).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(iii) — 1 case
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(7) — 4 cases
Naomi Cushman v. GC Servs., L.P., 397 F. App'x 24 (5th Cir. 2010).
Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 535 (M.D. Penn. 2013).
Rivera (D. Conn. 2026).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(8) — 6 cases
Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985).
Pelfrey v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379 (3rd Cir. 2000).
Hart v. Shmayenik (S.D.N.Y. 2023).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(F) — 1 case
Montgomery v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 238 B.R. 806 (D. Minnesota 1999).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(F)(6)(ii) — 1 case
Pultz v. Novastar Mortg., Inc. (In Re Pultz), 400 B.R. 185 (Bankr. D. Md. 2008).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(F)(i) — 1 case
Berndt v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(a)(6)(F) — 3 cases
U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Hill, 2023 OK 86 (Okla. 2023).
U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Hill, 2023 OK 86 (Okla. 2023).
U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Hill, 2023 OK 86 (Okla. 2023).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(e) — 2 cases
Conquest v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 247 F. Supp. 3d 618 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
Thomas W. Lovegrove v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, 698 F. App'x 159 (4th Cir. 2017).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(fe) — 1 case
Bock v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, 30 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.N.J. 2014).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(g) — 1 case
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(l) — 1 case
Edeh v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (D. Minnesota 2010).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(l)(6) — 1 case
Santoro v. CTC Foreclosures Servs. Corp., 193 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1999).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(ll) — 1 case
Hart v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. (In Re Hart), 246 B.R. 709 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.