Donald Parkell v. Carl Danberg (2016)

But see Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 329-30 (3d Cir. 2016) (prison policy of conducting thrice-daily body cavity searches on inmates who had been previously thoroughly searched and held in stripped-down isolation cells without human contact raised a Fourth Amendment claim).

See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219 (3d Cir. 2017); Parkell v. 3 Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016).

Nor did Nixon provide any facts supporting a reasonable inference that a prison official deprived him of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 225 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 335 (3d Cir. 2016)).

The District Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on the merits of all of Ivy’s Eighth Amendment claims. 2 To succeed on his claims that prison medical care violated his Eighth Amendment rights, Ivy had to establish “(i) a serious medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016).

See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 331 (3d Cir. 2016) (“To presume that [unconstitutional] practices arose from [an official’s] policies merely because of his position . . . is to rely on respondeat superior.”).

See Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that we review an order denying appointment of counsel under an abuse of discretion standard); see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 340 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Appointing counsel for an indigent civil litigant is usually only granted upon a showing of special circumstances indicating the likelihood of substantial prejudice to him....”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

June 14, 2022) (“while Plaintiff may wish to see an outside ophthalmologist, disagreement with medical care does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim”). 72 Szubielski, 2014 WL 5500229 , at *2 (citation omitted); see also Parkell, 833 F.3d at 337 (“A prisoner bringing a medical-needs claim ‘must show more than negligence; he must show “deliberate indifference” to a serious medical need.’”) (quoting Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 ); Sims v. Wexford Health Sources, 635 F. Ap…

See also Parkell, 833 F.3d at 328 (“the probability is vanishingly small that an inmate locked in a stripped-down isolation cell…, once searched, could then obtain contraband during a subsequent eight-hour period involving no human contact.”).

See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (“A prisoner states a claim under the Eighth Amendment when he plausibly alleges that the strip-search in 16 question was motivated by a desire to harass or humiliate....”) (quoting Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995)).”?

Pa. Mar. 8, 2023) (citation omitted); , 2024 WL 1919238 , at *10. 7 Because Larkin will only proceed on claims for injunctive relief, the question of whether any defendant was personally involved in past denials of the CPAP machine is irrelevant. , 833 F.3d at 332 (“Our conclusion that the State Defendants lacked personal involvement in past constitutional violations does not preclude [the plaintiff] from obtaining prospective injunctive relief for ongoing violations.”).

Parkell, 833 F.3d at 332 (“In seeking a prospective injunction against the implementation of an unconstitutional state policy, [plaintiff] is required to name an official or officials ‘who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief.’”)(citing Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (proper defendant is one “responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief is ca…

See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The written responses to those grievance show that the prison officials ensured that [plaintiff] was under the care of medical personnel and being treated, and therefore that the officials were not deliberately indifferent.”).

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313 , 332 12 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Our conclusion that the State Defendants lacked personal involvement in past constitutional violations does not preclude Parkell from obtaining prospective injunctive relief for ongoing violations.”).

“There are two theories of supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm, and another under which they can be liable if they participated in violating plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2…

“There are two theories of supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm, and another under which they can be liable if they participated in violating plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates' violations.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 20…

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). “[T]here are two theories of supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm, and another under wh…

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). “[{T]here are two theories of supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm, and another under w…

“There are two theories of supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm, and another under which they can be liable if they participated in violating plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates' violations.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 20…

“The court must review the record as a whole, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and must not ‘weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.’” Jd. at 308 (quoting Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016)).

Local Civil Rule 10.C states that “[a]bsent special circumstances, no motions for the appointment of counsel will be granted until after the dispositive motions have been resolved.” See also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 340 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Appointing counsel for an indigent civil litigant is usually only granted upon a showing of special circumstances indicating the likelihood of substantial prejudice to him resulting, for example, from his probably inability without s…

The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference “where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “[T]here is a critical distinction ‘between cases where the complaint…

See Savoia-McHugh v. Glass, 95 F.4th 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 2024) (“While [affiants’] declarations are unsworn, they carry the same force as a sworn affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 because [affiants] signed and dated their documents, and ‘declare[d] under penalty of perjury that’ their statements ‘[are] true, correct[,] and made in good faith.’”); Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313 , 320 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Because those documents were signed under penalty of perjury in accor…

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison context.”).

White ‘created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred’ are insufficient to allege personal involvement.” (quoting Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 331 (3d Cir. 2016) (“To presume that [unconstitutional] practices arose from [an official’s] policies merely because of his position . . . is to rely on respondeat superior.”)); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “merely hypothesiz[ing] that [a defendant] may have been…

See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 331 (3d Cir. 2016) (“To presume that [unconstitutional] practices arose from [an official’s] policies merely because of his position . . . is to rely on respondeat superior.”); Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354 .

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313 , 320 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Because [statements in verified complaint and other court filings] were signed under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 , we consider them as equivalent to statements in an affidavit.”); Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating verified complaint as an affidavit on summary judgment motion).

See Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, 2022 WL 17248100 , at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 28, 2022) (“His conclusory statements that defendants Delbalso, Mason, and White ‘created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred’ are insufficient to allege personal involvement.” (quoting Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 331 (3d Cir. 2016) (“To presume that [unconstitutional] practices arose from [an official’s] policies merely because of his position . . . is to rely …

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison context.”).

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313 , 320 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Because [statements in verified complaint and other court filings] were signed under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 , we consider them as equivalent to statements in an affidavit.”); Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating verified complaint as an affidavit on summary judgment motion).

See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that the evidentiary record presents no genuine issue of material fact.”) (quotations removed). 10 For the reasons set forth above, summary judgment will be denied as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.6 B.

Pa. Dec. 20, 2023); Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 320 (d Cir. 2016) (“[b]ecause [plaintiff's verified complaints] were signed under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 , we consider them as equivalent to statements in an affidavit”).

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313 , 320 n.2 (d Cir. 2016) (“Because [statements in verified complaint and other court filings] were signed under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 , we consider them as equivalent to statements in an affidavit.”); Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating verified complaint as an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment).

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison context.”).

See Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, 2022 WL 17248100 , at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 28, 2022) (“His conclusory statements that defendants Delbalso, Mason, and White ‘created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred’ are insufficient to allege personal involvement.” (quoting Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 331 (3d Cir. 2016) (“To presume that [unconstitutional] practices arose from [an official’s] policies merely because of his position . . . is to rely …

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison context.”).

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison context.”).

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison context.”).

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison context.”).

See, e.g., Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 332 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Our conclusion that the State Defendants lacked personal involvement in past constitutional violations does not preclude [plaintiff’s] from obtaining prospective injunctive relief for ongoing violations.”). 8 Plaintiff also seeks preliminary injunctive relief.

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison context.”).

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that a right to privacy in one's own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison context.”).

See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[S]upervisors can be liable if they participated in violating plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.”).

See Parkell v. Danbert, 833 F.3d 313, 332 (3d Cir. 2016) (“In seeking a prospective injunction against the implementation of an unconstitutional state policy, [the plaintiff] is required to name [as a defendant] an official or . officials who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 332 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Our conclusion that the State Defendants lacked personal involvement in past constitutional violations does not preclude Parkell from obtaining prospective injunctive relief for ongoing violations.”).

See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Having determined that Parkell presents a triable Fourth Amendment claim, we next consider whether Parkell may pursue money damages from the State Defendants, who did not themselves conduct the visual body-cavity searches but may have had supervisory involvement.”); Gordon v. Morton, 131 F. App’x 797, 799 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing A.M. ex rel.

See, e.g., Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313 , 324 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (“unrepresented litigants are not relieved from the rules of procedure and the requirements of substantive law.”).

See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313 , 320 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Because [statements in verified complaint and other court filings] were signed under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 , we consider them as equivalent to statements in an affidavit.”); Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating verified complaint as an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment).

See Parkell v. Danberg , 833 F.3d 313 , 320 n.1 (3d Cir. 2016) ("Lawyers who act pro bono fulfill the highest service that members of the bar can offer to indigent parties and *388 to the legal profession.").

See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313 , 320 n.1 (3d Cir. 2016) ("Lawyers who act pro bono fulfill the highest service that members of the bar can offer to indigent parties and to the legal profession.").

Mar. 31, 2003) (Chin, J.) ("[A]ctions involving claims for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief are permissible provided the official against whom the action is brought has a direct connection to, or responsibility for, the alleged illegal action." (quoting Davidson v. Scully , 148 F.Supp.2d 249 , 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ), aff'd , 120 Fed.Appx. 393 (2d Cir. 2005) ; see also Parkell v. Danberg , 833 F.3d 313 , 332 (3d Cir. 2016) ("Our conclusion that the State Defendants…