United States v. Freeman Eugene Jockisch (2017)

A district court abuses its discretion by rejecting a proposed instruction only when the instruction “(1) was correct, (2) was not substantially covered by the charge actually given, and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important that failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct his defense.” United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1126 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).

United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1126 (11th Cir. 2017).

In United States v. Jockisch, we held that when the government relies on multiple potential state predicate offenses to convict a defendant under § 2422(b), the jury need not unanimously agree about which sex offense the defendant’s intended conduct would have violated. 857 F.3d 1122, 1131 (11th Cir. 2017).

United States v. Jockish, 857 F.3d 1122, 1126-27, 1133 (11th Cir. 2017).

United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1127 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).

United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1091 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1126 (11th Cir. 2017).

But “not every fact important to a determination of guilt constitutes an element of the offense.” United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1127 (11th Cir. 2017). “[I]f a fact is an element, the jury must unanimously agree that this fact has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt; but if a particular fact is nothing more than a possible means by which a defendant met an element of the offense, than no unanimity is required.” Id.

United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1129 (11th Cir. 2017).

“The facts regarding a challenged instruction are viewed ‘in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.’” Id. at 327 (quoting Cooper v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 377, 381 (2009)). “[N]ot every fact important to a determination of guilt constitutes an element of the offense.” Id. at 328 (quoting United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1127 (11th Cir. 2017)). “[I]f a particular fact is nothing more than a possible means by which a defendant met an element of t…

The “existence of an actual minor victim is not required for an attempt conviction under § 2422(b), so long as the defendant intended to cause assent on the part of a minor and took a substantial step toward causing assent, not toward causing actual sexual contact.” United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1129 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). transported using a means and facility of interstate commerce, that is, by computer via the intern…

And as to any fact that is not an element, unanimity by jurors as to the proof of that fact is not required.” United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1127 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that the trial court did not err in rejecting defendant’s proffered jury instruction because the jury was not required to agree unanimously as to which of several statutes prohibiting sexual activity with minors defendant would have violated if he had been successful in his efforts to engage in …

See Jockisch, 857 F.3d at 1131–32; Hart, 635 F.3d at 855–56.

See, e.g., United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122 , 1126–33 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that the jury need not unanimously agree on the specific unlawful sexual activity the defendant was attempting to entice a minor to engage in under 18 U.S.C § 2422(b), provided there is unanimous agreement that the activity would violate at least one applicable statute).

See United States v. Tykarsky , 446 F.3d 458 , 465-69 (3d Cir. 2006) (so holding and collecting cases); see also United States v. Jockisch , 857 F.3d 1122 , 1129 (11th Cir.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 284 , 199 L.Ed.2d 181 (2017) ; United States v. Hart , 635 F.3d 850 , 855 (6th Cir. 2011) ; United States v. Mannava , 565 F.3d 412 , 416 (7th Cir. 2009) ; United States v. Gagliardi , 506 F.3d 140 , 145-147 (2d Cir. 2007) ; United States v. Helder , 452 F.3d 751 …

Compare United States v. Mannava, 565 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2009) ("The liability created by 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (b) [, whose relevant language is identical to § 2423,] depends on the defendant’s having violated another statute, and the elements of the offense under that other statute must therefore be elements of the federal offense in order to preserve the requirement of jury unanimity.”) with United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1127 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that the…

The Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions explain that “[i]t is not necessary for the Government to prove that the intended victim was in fact less than 18 years of age; but it is necessary for the Government to prove that Defendant believed such individual to be under that age.” See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, O92.3 (2020); see also United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1129 (11th Cir. 2017) (existence of an actual minor victim not required for an a…