Woods v. Start Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc. (2017)

Our decision in Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc. held that “a ‘motivating factor’ 1 The district court construed Radiall’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. 2 causation standard applies” to FMLA retaliation claims. 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

The FMLA “provides broad protections to employees who need to take time away from work to deal with serious health conditions of the employee or her family.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2017).

See Gross, 557 U.S. at 174-75 ; Nassar, 570 U.S. at 351-362 ; Comcast, 589 U.S. at 330-35, 341 ; cf. Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 165-69 (2d Cir. 2017) (rejecting applicability of but- for causation standard to Family Medical Leave Act retaliation claim because of that statute’s particular text).

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 165 (2d 14 Cir. 2017). 15 Here, adidas cannot show an error, let alone a prejudicial one, in the district court’s charge. 16 The district court instructed the jury multiple times to confine its inquiry to initial-interest and 17 post-sale confusion.

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

See § 2615(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.”); see, e.g., Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158 , 166–67 (2d Cir. 2017) (“We now hold that FMLA retaliation claims like [the plaintiff’s], i.e., terminations for exercising FMLA rights by, for example, taking legitimate FMLA leave, are actionable under § 2615(a)(1).”); H…

Woods v. 18 START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

See Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017) (“FMLA claims come in at least two varieties: interference and retaliation.”); Arnold v. Rsch.

See Doyle v. City of New York, 91 F. Supp. 3d 480, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Furman, J.) (analyzing whether the DOL’s definition of “volunteer” was entitled to Chevron deference); Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2017) (evaluating whether a DOL regulation was entitled to Chevron deference).5 Pursuant to a Chevron analysis, the Court concludes that the DOL’s interpretation of “furnished” in section 203(m) is unreasonable, and thus is not …

An interference claim requires a plaintiff to show “that the defendant denied or otherwise interfered with a benefit to which she was entitled under the FMLA,” Graziadio v. Culinary Institute of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 2016), whereas a retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to establish that her decision to take leave was a “motivating factor” in the defendant’s decision to fire her, Wood v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., “provides broad protections to employees who need to take time away from work to deal with serious health conditions of the employee or her family.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2017).

“FMLA claims come in at least two varieties: interference and retaliation.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017). “[A]n employee brings an ‘interference’ claim when her employer has prevented or otherwise impeded [her] ability to exercise [her] rights under the FMLA.” Id.

See generally Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[FJMLA rights have two parts—the right to take leave and the right to reinstatement, so terminating an employee who has taken leave is itself an outright denial of FMLA rights.”). ° However, as with the FMLA interference claim, plaintiff would need to provide the Court with more information.

As Simmons points out, a reasonable jury “may conclude that Plaintiff’s FMLA leave request was a ‘negative factor’ in Defendant’s decision to terminate her at the time it made the decision, and thus Defendant ‘prevented her ability to exercise rights under the FMLA.’” Mem. in Opp’n at 17 (citing Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2017)) (emphasis in original). �e jury could thus conclude that “[u]nlike the case cited by Defendant, P…

The Second Circuit has held that both claims arise under the same statutory prohibition against “interference.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017) (“We hold that FMLA retaliation claims [in which an employee claims she was terminated for taking FMLA leave] are grounded in 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1) . . . .”).

See Woods, 864 F.3d at 169 (“[W]e defer to the Labor Department’ □ regulation implementing a ‘negative factor’ causation standard for FMLA retaliation claims.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (“[E]mployers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions.”).

“FMLA claims come in at least two varieties: interference and retaliation.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

Conn. Mar. 29, 2024) (quoting Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2017)).

“In a general sense, an employee brings an ‘interference’ claim when her employer has prevented or otherwise impeded the employee’s ability to exercise rights under the FMLA.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

See, e.g., Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017) (“FMLA claims come in at least two varieties: interference and retaliation.”); Dennis v. Ultimus Fund Sols., LLC, No. 20-CV-2813, 2021 WL 3566593 , at *2 (E.D.N.Y.

Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 , 724–25 (2003)); Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017) (same); see Linardos v. Juthani, No. 24-CV-962, 2025 WL 887693 , at *14 (D.

Retaliation for Taking FMLA Leave The AC’s final claim is of retaliation under the FMLA. “(T]he FMLA prohibits retaliation against employees who attempt to exercise their rights under the statute.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

See Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2017) (“FMLA retaliation claims . . . [alleging] terminations for exercising FMLA rights . . . are actionable under § 2615(a)(1).”).

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

FMLA The FMLA provides “protections to employees who need to take time away from work to deal with serious health conditions of the employee or her family,” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2017), including “the right to take up to twelve work weeks per year of unpaid leave,” Gen. v. Malcho’s 650 Mosely Rd.

The Milman Court noted that “we and other circuits have recognized [that] a retaliation claim may also be cognizable under § 2615(a)(1).” Id. at 866. (citing Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2017)); see also Wysong, 503 F.3d at 446 ; Smith v. City of Niles, 505 F. App’x 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2012).

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to allege an interference claim, however, this would be inapplicable here given that Mr. Cartagena-Cordero alleges that he was permitted to take leave due to his medical condition, and thus was not “prevented or otherwise impeded” from “exercis[ing] rights under the FMLA.” Woods, 864 F.3d at 166 (“In a general sense, an employee brings an ‘interference’ claim when her employer has prevented or otherwise impeded the employee's ability to exercise…

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2017).

“When an employee requests FMLA leave . . . the employer must notify the employee of the employee’s eligibility to take FMLA leave within five business days, absent extenuating circumstances.”92 However, “[a] mere administrative delay in approving a leave request does not amount to interference unless a plaintiff shows that [he] was harmed as a result of the delay, and did not take FMLA days because [he] lacked the approval.”93 Plaintiff alleges that although he applied for …

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

“The FMLA’s central provision guarantees eligible employees 12 weeks of leave in a 1-year period following certain events: a disabling health problem; a family member’s serious illness; or the arrival of a new son or daughter.” Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)); see also Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158 , 165–66 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The Family and Medical Leave Act provides broad protectio…

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

Under the FMLA, eligible employees are entitled to take a maximum of twelve weeks of leave “[i]n order to care for the spouse, or son, daughter, or parent of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.”8 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)(C); Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158 , 165–66 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[The FMLA] provides broad protections to employees who need to take time away from work to deal with serious healt…

Sept. 20, 2019) (quoting Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2017)).

“The Act’s prohibition against interference prohibits an employer from discriminating or retaliating against an employee or prospective employee for having exercised or attempted to exercise FMLA rights.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (c)).

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained in Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers., Incorporated, 864 F.3d 158, 166, 167 (2d Cir. 2017), prohibited conduct under § 2615(a)(1) can “come in at least two varieties: interference and retaliation.”1 The former claim is an ex-ante protection, meaning it arises when the “employer has prevented or otherwise impeded the employee’s ability to exercise rights under the FMLA.” Id.

(See ECF 9, at 12, n.2.) Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

The two types of claims serve as ex ante and ex post protections for employees who seek to avail themselves of rights granted by the FMLA.” Woods, 864 F.3d at 166 (internal citations omitted).

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

An employee who takes approved FMLA leave generally has the right to return to the same position that the employee held before taking leave, or to an “equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.” Id. § 2614(a)(1)(B); Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).Here, Plaintiff does not state any facts suggesting that BronxCare violated the FMLA.

Accordingly, “FMLA claims [often] come in . . . two varieties: interference and retaliation.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

An employee who takes approved FMLA leave generally has the right to return to the same position that the employee held before taking leave, or to an “equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.” Id. § 2614(a)(1)(B); Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

Finally, the ultimate burden of proving causation under an FMLA retaliation claim is more lenient than the but-for causation necessary to prove an ADA claim—a plaintiff asserting an FMLA retaliation claim need only show the “taking of FMLA leave [w]as a negative factor in employment actions.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2017). 2.

DISCUSSION A claim for interference of FMLA rights is available when an “employer has prevented or otherwise impeded the employees’ ability to exercise rights under the FMLA.” Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017).

Compare Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158 , 167–69 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[The FMLA] makes no mention of a motivating factor test, and unlike the statutes in Nassar and Gross, it lacks any indicia of Congress’s intent to create ‘but for’ causation.”) and Egan v. Delaware River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 273 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The FMLA interference provision on which the regulation is based does not provide a causation standard and thus does not unambiguo…

Woods v. Start Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[A] ‘motivating factor’ causation standard applies to [FMLA retaliation claims].”).