United States v. Reink Kamer (1986)

Kamer, 781 F.2d at 1383-85 ("The dictates of Rule 11 and the federal policy of fair and efficient judicial administration require that the reviewing court look solely to the record of the plea proceeding."); United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 559 (9th Cir.1992).

United States v. Mandell, 905 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.1986)). 26 In the present case, the state promised Smith not to recommend a life sentence.

United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 857 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.1986)).

See United States v. Gastelum, 16 F.3d 996, 998-99 (9th Cir.1994), citing United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 857 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.1986); see also United States v. VanDoren, 182 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir.1999).

See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d) (1994); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir.1986).

Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986). 7 Here, the district court advised Flowers of the nature of the charges against him and the maximum possible penalty.

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986). 28 In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976), the Court ruled that a defendant must have adequate notice of the offense for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid.

While that determination depends upon “ ‘the peculiar facts of each situation, looking to both the complexity of the charge and the personal characteristics of the defendant,’ ” United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 , 107 S.Ct. 80 , 93 L.Ed.2d 35 (1986) (quoting United States v. Wetterlin, 583 F.2d 346, 351 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127 , 99 S.Ct. 1044 , 59 L.Ed.2d 88 (1979)), we are required to base our resolution o…

Indeed, “no specific method of advising the defendant is mandated.” United States v. Rivera-Ramirez, 715 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that “a court need not rely on the plea colloquy alone,” but may rely upon “anything that appears on the record”) (citation omitted); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1986) (indicating that in “non-complex cases, a reading of the indictm…

Flores- Villalvaso responded to both questions affirmatively and unequivocally with “Yes.” Because the magistrate judge made the “investment of time and effort necessary to set forth the meaning of the charges and to demonstrate on the record that the defendant underst[ood],” United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986), no plain error occurred.

See United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The requirement that the trial judge adequately inquire of the defendant, at the plea proceeding, as to the nature of the charge effectuates the purposes of Rule 11 and the policy of efficient judicial administration.”).

See United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380 , 1384–85 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The requirement that the trial UNITED STATES V.

See United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380 , UNITED STATES V.

In determining whether the government breached the plea agreement, the Court looks to “what was reasonably understood by the defendant when he entered his plea 3 18-30085 of guilty.” United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

“Plea agreements are subject to contract-law standards of interpretation.” United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir. 1986).

Similarly, in determining whether the government breached the agreement, “courts look to what was reasonably understood by the defendant when he entered his plea of guilty.” United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.1979)).

See United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333 , 1337 n. 8 (9th Cir.1993) (“[I]t is the defendant’s understanding at the time of the plea that controls.”); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.1986) (“In determining whether a plea agreement has been broken, courts look to what was reasonably understood by the defendant when he entered his plea of guilty.”) (internal quotation marks omit *1213 ted).

Fin., Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1386 (9th Cir.1986).

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.1986).

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1986).

Further, there is no “objective proof on the record,” United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.1986), that would support a different reading of Kindsfather’s waiver here.

Moreover, in evaluating the sufficiency of the plea colloquy, we must consider “the complexity of the charges and the personal characteristics of the defendant, such as his age, education, intelligence, and the alacrity of his responses, and also whether he is represented by counsel.” U.S. v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir.1986).

Rule 11 requires “that the sentencing judge must develop, on the record, the factual basis for the plea....” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); see also United States v. Jimenez-Dominguez, 296 F.3d 863, 866-67 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that one of the "constitutionally-required determinations” in a valid guilty plea is "a factual basis which supports [the] conviction”); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1386 (9th Cir.1986) (v…

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1386 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 , 89 S.Ct. 1166 , 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)).

“The sufficiency of any particular colloquy between the judge and the defendant as to the nature of the charges will vary from case to case, depending on the peculiar facts of each situation,” United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir.1986).

Pursuant to Rule 11(c), the judge must “engage in a colloquy with the defendant and elicit responses from him which demonstrate, on the record, that the accused does so understand.” United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir.1986).

In this regard, “[i]t is incumbent upon a district judge accepting a plea to make the minor investment of time and effort necessary to set forth the meaning of the charges and to demonstrate on the record that the defendant understands [the precise nature of the plea].” United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir.1986).

See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(B); cf. United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1386 (9th Cir.1986) (discussing sentence that breaches plea agreement made pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(A) and (C)). 5 AFFIRMED. ** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument.

Undisputed facts supported the plea, meeting Rule 11(f), Alber, 56 F.3d at 1110 , and precluding the prejudicial probability of conviction of a lesser offense, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985), United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir.1991) (assistance claim directly reviewable on clear record). 5 Lewis also contends that the district court violated Rule 11(c)(1) by failing to explain the nature of his offense and his career offender status, but the ind…

"The dictates of Rule 11 and the federal policy of fair and efficient judicial administration require that the reviewing court look solely to the record of the plea proceeding." United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.1986). 55 AFFIRMED. ** Honorable Thomas M.

"The trial judge is required to engage in a colloquy with the defendant and elicit responses from him which demonstrate, on the record, that the accused does so understand." United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 55 ( (9th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir.1986). "[I]n judging compliance with Rule 11, [a court] is confined to the record of the plea proceeding." Kamer, 781 F.2d at 1383 .

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.1986).

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986).

See United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Kramer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986); United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 712 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983). 3 AFFIRMED. * The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument.

Accordingly, it would appear that Mahan has waived his right to appeal that which he seeks to appeal here -- "the manner" in which the district court determined his sentence. 8 Mahan argues that the waiver has been nullified by (1) the government's breach of the plea agreement; and (2) the district court's refusal to accept the waiver provision. 9 We reject Mahan's contention that the government's failure to recommend a downward departure for acceptance of responsibility con…

Jaramillo-Suarez, 857 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. *598 819, 107 S.Ct. 80 , 93 L.Ed.2d 35 (1986).

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986).

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986). 4 Here, the district court accepted Strickland's guilty plea without informing him that he had rights to assistance of counsel and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986).

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986).

See id.; see also United States v. Runck, 817 F.2d 470, 471 (8th Cir.1987) (holding that imposition of $28,000 restitution was not prejudicial when the pleading defendant knew that a fine 3 of $20,000 could have been imposed); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986) (holding that the imposition of millions of dollars in restitution when the plea agreement contemplated none was a material change in the agreement).

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir.1986).

United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 559 (9th Cir.1992). " 'Claims of noncompliance with rule 11 must be resolved solely on the basis of the rule 11 transcript.' " United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166 , 170 n. 5 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986). 6 We consider, first, Brown's contention that the district court did not properly determine whether he under…

United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986). 11 Mack contends that, because he did not testify against his codefendants, which was a condition of the plea bargain, the prosecutor was required to declare a breach of the agreement and return him to the status quo ante, i.e., the preliminary hearing stage.

"In order to determine whether the sentence imposed comports with the reasonable understanding and expectations of the defendant as to the sentence for which he had bargained, we look to the objective proof of the record." United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.1986).

Cf. United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383-85 (9th Cir.1986) (conclusory statement by pro se defendant in complex case did not satisfy Rule 11 requirements). 27 The sentencing guidelines were referred to in paragraph three of the plea agreement.

United States v. Mandell, 905 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir. 1986)).

See Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir.1993)); see also In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198 , 1207 (9th Cir.2004); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.1979).

In determining whether a plea agreement has been breached, contract law principles apply. " See United States v. Trapp, 257 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.2001); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 , 107 S.Ct. 80 , 93 L.Ed.2d 35 (1986); United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 , 107 S.Ct. 131 , 93 L.Ed.2d 75 (1986); United States v. Arnett, supra. “In construing an agreement, the court must…

In fact, SCRA 1986, 5-303(G) (Repl.Pamp. 1992) expressly provides for the making of the appropriate record of this proceeding and it reads in relevant part: “A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea shall be made and, if there is a plea of guilty ... the record shall include, without limitation, the court’s advice to the defendant.” See also, McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465 , 89 S.Ct. at 1170 (“[T]he rule is intended to produce a complete record at…