Singleton v. United States (2010)

In determining whether this standard has been met, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1320 (D.C.1991) (en banc) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)), as viewed “through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training....” Johnson v. United States, 33 A.3d 361, 370 (D.C.2011) (quoting Singleton v. United States…

While this court reviews de novo the trial court’s conclusion that reasonable grounds for a frisk existed, we must view “the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom ... in favor of sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 299 (D.C.2010).

See Singleton, 998 A.2d at 302 (“[E]ven though a particular officer might believe a bulge conceals a weapon, a purely subjective impression is not an ‘objective justification’ that can be judicially examined against the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”).

We agree with the State that, generally “a bulge and hand movements around the waistband are not equivalent factors in a reasonable suspicion analysis.” See, e.g., Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 302-03 (D.C.2010) (although a bulge in the defendant’s pocket did not give rise to reasonable suspicion “without further elaboration,” where defendant also en gaged in an “awkward walk and hand movement that seemed to be protective of a firearm secreted in the pocket” and …

Officer Vaillancourt offered only that the location of the bulge on Mr. Golden’s right hip “reminds me that’s where I keep my gun.” This was “a purely subjective impression” that affords no insight at all into whether Mr. Golden was carrying a gun or something else on his hip.69 The generalization that people (at least, right-handed people) 70 who do have guns often carry them on 67 Id. at 302 (internal citation omitted). 68 Id. 69 See id. (“[E]ven though a particular office…

Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 300 (D.C.2010).

We recognize that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, officers “must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot” in order to conduct a “brief, investigatory stop.” Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 299 (D.C.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson v. United States, 802 A.2d 367, 369 (D.C. 2002)). “[T]he threshold question is whether a seizure has occurred” because “an encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment pro…

But we 56 officer instead must be able to point to “specific evidence . . . that led the officer to suspect criminal activity in a particular circumstance.” Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 300-01 (D.C. 2010); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (explaining that “[t]he scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of …

Similarly, we have cautioned that “[t]he requirement of ‘articulable suspicion’ is not an onerous one” and have reiterated that the “level of justification” for a protective frisk “is ‘less demanding’ than probable cause and ‘considerably less’ than preponderance.” Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 299, 300 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). 2 (Walter) Johnson v. United States, 33 A.3d 361, 368 (D.C. 2011) (emphasis in the opinion); …

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (reasonable, articulable suspicion may not be based on “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch”); Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 301 (D.C. 2010) (“To be ‘articulable’ there must be specific evidence—not merely conclusions—that led the officer to suspect criminal activity in a particular circumstance.”). 43 We signaled that a more robust examination of high crime evidence was required in our recent decision in Maye v. United S…

If that suspicion were founded, it would seem to provide cause for both a seizure and a pat-down search. 2 See United States v. Bellamy, 619 A.2d 515, 524 (D.C. 1993) (factor counseling against reasonable suspicion where officers did not “see any physical sign of a concealed weapon, such as a bulge in one of the appellees’ clothing”); Robinson, 76 A.3d at 337 (stating there was no “testimony that [appellant] held any object or had any ‘bulge’ on his person that required conc…

See, e.g., Brown, supra, 97 A.3d at 97 n.5. 18 Robinson v. United States, 76 A.3d 329, 331 (D.C. 2013) (“Although the reasonable, articulable suspicion threshold is low, it nonetheless requires an objective foundation both for the belief that an individual is engaged in criminal activity and, before a protective pat[-]down is conducted, for the belief that the individual is armed and dangerous.”); Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 300-01 (D.C. 2010) (“But even though…

Courts consider the totality of the circumstances “through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.” Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 300 (D.C. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted).

The most Officer Pugh could say about Mr. Sharp in particular was that he seemed nervous, that he made some odd nonresponsive comments about police officers he knew, and that he declined the request to search his car before the officer “asked him can he step out of the vehicle.” Although the trial court did not decide the question, it had its own doubts about the justification for getting Mr. Sharp out of the car, noting that if Mr. Sharp had been seized, “the inarticulate c…

To accept such a subjective impression without further elaboration would be tantamount to judicial acquiescence in an officer’s legal determination that the requirements of the Fourth Amendment have been satisfied.” Singleton v. U.S. 998 A.2d 295 at 302 (D.C.

To accept such a subjective impression without further elaboration would be tantamount to judicial acquiescence in an officer’s legal determination that the requirements of the Fourth Amendment have been satisfied.” Singleton v. U.S. 998 A.2d 295 at 302 (D.C.

To accept such a subjective impression without further elaboration would be tantamount to judicial acquiescence in an officer’s legal determination that the requirements of the Fourth Amendment have been satisfied.” Singleton v. U.S. 998 A.2d 295 at 302 (D.C.

Other factors that may warrant a conclusion that a stop was justified include “the time of day, flight, the high crime nature of the location, furtive hand movements, an informant’s tip, a person’s reaction to questioning, a report of criminal activity or gunshots, and viewing of an object or bulge indicating a weapon.” Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 299 (D.C.2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

However, “[w]hile factual findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 299 (D.C.2010) (quotation omitted).

See Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 302 (D.C.2010) (A "generic bulge in a pocket can be explained by too many innocent causes to constitute 'reasonable' suspicion.”). .

See Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 301 (D.C.2010) (noting that the two requirements for a Terry stop and frisk — that any suspicion be reasonable and articulable— are “not only the minimal safeguard of a person’s constitutionally protected freedom to go about without coercion or seizure, but also are necessary for meaningful judicial evaluation of police action”). 12 “Unparticularized suspicion” and “inarticulate hunches” are not sufficient to sustain a Terry stop…

See, e.g., Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 302 (D.C.2010); see also Price, 2014 WL 558674 , at *7 (finding no justification for a Teny stop where the testimony of both officers who claimed to have seen a bulge was “implausible”); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540, 614-15 (S.D.N.Y.2013), appeal dismissed (Sept. 25, 2013) (holding that an officer’s observation of a bulge that could be “a commonly carried object such as a wallet or cell phone does not justi…