Bijan N. Tabrizi and Fahimeh A. Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn (1989)

Co. v. C & O Enterprises, Inc., 886 F.2d 1485 , 1491 (7th Cir.1989); Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 855 F.2d 385, 393 (7th Cir.1988); Beeman v. Fiester, 852 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir.1988); but see Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 884 F.2d 312 (7th Cir.1989), and Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 1989) (employing subjective test).

Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d 587, 592 (7th Cir.1989) (Rule 11 sanctions reviewed for abuse of discretion because "the trial court [can better] discern the motivations of the parties or counsel."). 19 We recently held that where there are multiple instances of sanctionable conduct, more harsh sanctions are appropriate.

Second, there must be reasonable inquiry into both fact and law; ... the legal theory must be objectively warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the modification of existing law; and the lawyer must believe that the complaint is well grounded in fact. 43 Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d 587, 592 (7th Cir. Aug. 31, 1989) (quotations and citations omitted; emphasis in original). 44 Defendant contends that plaintiffs have failed in both respects.

And it is also old hat to state the twofold standard that such a certification establishes: the objective one via the first-stated “frivolousness clause” and the subjective one via the later “improper purpose clause” (see such cases in our Court of Appeals as Brown v. Federation of State Medical Boards, 830 F.2d 1429, 1435-36 (7th Cir.1987) and, most recently, Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d 587, 592 [7th Cir.1989] ). 3 Rule ll’s first (objective) branch in turn h…

Second, the court must inquire as to whether the legal theory being proposed is “objectively warranted by existing law; and the lawyer must believe that the complaint is well grounded in fact.” Id. (quoting Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 1989)).

The certification requirement of HRCP Rule 11 establishes a twofold standard, one objective, via the “frivolousness clause” (namely, the imperative that the filed document be supported by existing or dicov-erable evidence and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law), and the other subjective, via the “improper purpose clause.” Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ill.1990) (cit…

Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d 587, 592 (7th Cir.1989), Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir.1987).

See, e.g., Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d 587, 592 (7th Cir.1989) (decision whether to award Rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion because “the trial court ... has an intimate familiarity with the relevant proceedings and is in a ... superior position to discern the motivations of the parties or counsel.”); Amendola v. Bayer, 907 F.2d 760, 764 (7th Cir.1990) (“trial judge is particularly well-suited to judge the worthiness of a plaintiff’s moti…

We are entirely sympathetic to her position, and we give deference to district courts’ decisions to award sanctions, but “the articulated considerations on which the district court based its award of sanctions [must] support the award.” In re Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 218 (7th Cir.1988); see also Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d 587, 591 (7th Cir.1989).