United States v. Gennaro J. Angiulo, Donato F. Angiulo, Samuel S. Granito, Francesco J. Angiulo and Michele A. Angiulo (1990)

See Curtis v. Duval, 124 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[W]e cannot peer behind the prosecution's plausible assertion of a legitimate interest in keeping the way clear for a possible future prosecution [of a witness]."); Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1193 (explaining that the government's "desire not to hinder possible state and federal prosecutions . . . show[s] that the government's conduct was motivated by something other than the sole desire to keep [the witness]'s exculpatory test…

A Presumption of Prejudice Exists Which Cannot Be Overcome “In determining whether sufficient prejudice exist[s] to require a change of venue, we must conduct two inquiries: 1) whether jury prejudice should be presumed given the facts before us; or 2) if prejudice should not be presumed, whether the jury was actually prejudiced.” United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir. 1990).

Cadden contends that the District Court erred in finding that all NECC proceeds obtained during the relevant period were - 77 - "obtained" "from racketeering activity." When property interests are "in a" racketeering enterprise, they are subject to forfeiture "in their entirety, regardless of whether some portion of the enterprise is not tainted by the racketeering activity." United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1211 (1st Cir. 1990).

See also Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1182 (“Mere knowledge or awareness of a defendant’s past ... is not sufficient to presume prejudice.

See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802 , 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2037 , 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975) (news articles “largely factual in nature”); Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1181 (“Although the news coverage was extensive, it largely was factual in nature”); Harris, 885 F.2d at 1362 (“The vast majority of the media accounts are largely factual in nature.”); Bailleaux, 685 F.2d at 1109 (“media coverage of the crimes themselves was basically factual and neutral”).

Id.; Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1186 (“Because the trial court’s determination regarding continued juror impartiality is a question of fact, this enhances the deference due its ultimate finding on the issue.”).

See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802 , 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2037 , 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975) (news articles “largely factual in nature”); Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1181 (“Although the news coverage was extensive, it largely was factual in nature”); Harris, 885 F.2d at 1362 (“The vast majority of the media accounts are largely factual in nature.”); Bailleaux, 685 F.2d at 1109 (“media coverage of the crimes themselves was basically factual and neutral”).

See Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1207 ("There was little or no evidentiary grounds to warrant instructing the jury on the [defense] theory.").

See Montas, 41 F.3d at 783 ("We have admitted expert testimony regarding the operation of criminal schemes and activities in a variety of contexts, finding such testimony helpful to juries in understanding some obscure or complex aspect of the crime."); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1189 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding admission of expert testimony that "assist[ed] the jury to understand the often complex structure of organized crime activities"); see also, e.g., Unite…

Generally, “[a] presumption of prejudice is reserved for those extreme cases where publicity is ‘both extensive and sensational in nature.’ ” Misla-Aldarondo, 478 F.3d at 58 (quoting United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir.1990)).

Id. at 1180 ("A person of ordinary intelligence could not help but realize that illegal activities of an organized crime family fall within the ambit of RICO's pattern of racketeering activity.").

Id. at 1180 (“A person of ordinary intelligence could not help but realize that illegal activities of an organized crime family fall within the ambit of RICO’s pattern of racketeering activity.”).

We have held to be beyond the ken of an average juror expert testimony about the "typical methods of drug dealers," United States v. Monell, 801 F.3d 34, 45 (1st Cir. 2015); "the nature of narcotics trafficking by vessels," United States v. Peña-Santo, 809 F.3d 686 , 694–95 (1st Cir. 2015); and "certain roles in . . . [a] crime family's 'extensive criminal organization,'" Montas, 41 F.3d 783 (quoting United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1189 (1st Cir. 1990)).

Ordinarily, "[a]n appellate court may not lawfully sustain a conviction on a theory entirely different from the theory upon which the jury was charged." United States v. Gomes, 969 F.2d 1290, 1295 (1st Cir. 1992) (first citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980); then citing United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1197 (1st Cir. 1990); and then citing United States v. Hill, 835 F.2d 759 , 764 n.7 (10th Cir. 1987)).

But, at a later point in its closing, the government stated, "[t]here is another kind of inference that you can make . . . which is, based on how the carjacking happened, it could be inferred that they were going to murder [Mayol-Rivera]." - 25 - 2022), cert. denied, No. 22-5637, 2022 WL 16542129 (Oct. 31, 2022) (concluding that defendant was not prejudiced by a jury instruction including an invalid predicate offense because "the jury found facts 'satisfying the essential el…

Such claim is not 4 See United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1194 (1st Cir. 1990). - 15 - covered by the certificate of appealability issued by the district court.

A defendant usually cannot "properly challenge on appeal a proposal he himself offered to the trial court." United States v. Amaro-Santiago, 824 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1216 (1st Cir. 1990)).

A A defendant's proceeds from racketeering activity are "subject to a rule of proportionality." Cadden, 965 F.3d at 37 (quoting United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1211 (1st Cir. 1990)).

But, nothing in the record suggests -- nor does Wright contend -- that the communication between Juror 25 and the FBI agent was "about the case." See id. ("In those instances where it is shown that there was a communication about the case, the communication would be deemed prejudicial unless shown to be harmless." (emphasis added)); United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 41 (1st Cir. 2007) ("We have attached significance before to the fact that a juror's casual ex parte comm…

And that is so notwithstanding Amaro’s contention on appeal that, because the instruction was not given until the morning after the prosecutor made the statement, it “increased the risk that the improper comment solidified in the minds of some jurors.” The problem for Amaro is that he objected to the District Court’s giving a curative instruction immediately after the statement was made, on the ground that the jury was “tired” and thus that it would be “extreme[ly] prejudici…

“Substantial deference is due the trial court’s exercise of its discretion,” United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1185 (1st Cir.1990), and the “deference due the court’s ultimate finding on the issue of continued juror impartiality is enhanced because this determination is a question of fact,” United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1307 (1st Cir.1997).

Although the instruction given by the district court did not contain the specific language sought by González, “there is no reversible error if the jury charge taken as a whole substantially covered the issues contained in the requested instruction.” United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1207 (1st Cir.1990).

Although the instruction given by the district court did not contain the specific language sought by González, "there is no reversible error if the jury charge taken as a whole substantially covered the issues contained in the requested instruction." United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1207 (1st Cir. 1990).

Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 442 (2d Cir.1991) (“Prosecutorial overreaching may also involve deliberate denial of immunity for the purpose of withholding exculpatory evidence and gaining a tactical advantage through such manipulation.”); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1192 (1st Cir.1990) (“[T]he. government could intentionally distort the fact-finding process by deliberately withholding immunity from certain prospective defense witnesses for the purpose of ke…

See United States v. Useni, 516 F.3d 634, 656-57 (7th Cir.2008) (applying IGBA to bingo hall); Gotti, 459 F.3d at 341 (same as to business operating video game Joker Poker); United States v. Pack, 16 F.3d 1222 , 1994 WL 19945, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Jan. 25, 1994) (unpublished opinion) (same as to multi-faceted gambling business that included poker); United States v. Trupiano, 11 F.3d 769, 771-72 (8th Cir.1993) (same as to gin rummy business); United States v. Rieger, 942 F.2d 23…

Identification evidence,' including voice identifications, must be “received with caution and scrutinized with care.” United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1204-05 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting proposed jury instruction, which the court found to be substantively correct).

See, e.g., United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1289 (1st Cir.1997) ("In the early *44 1980s, the Patriarca Family was run by boss Raymond Patriarca, Sr., underboss Gennaro 'Gerry' Angiulo, consigliere Vittore Nicolo Angiulo, and capo regimes including Donato F. ‘Danny’ Angiulo...."); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1175-76 (1st Cir.1990) (stating that “Gennaro Angiulo, Donato Angiulo, ...

See Anguilo, 897 F.2d at 1212 (“[T]he forfeiture of any interest in an enterprise ... are ‘inside’ interests subject to forfeiture regardless of percentage of taint”).

“Any interests in an enterprise, including the enterprise itself, are subject to forfeiture in their entirety, regardless of whether some portion of the enterprise is not tainted -by the racketeering activity.” United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1211 (1st Cir.1990).

United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1193 (1st Cir. 1990); see People v. Stewart, 93 P.3d 271, 304 (Cal. 2004) (explaining that to demonstrate interference with right to compulsory process, defendant must show “causal link” between prosecution intimidation and witness’s refusal to testify (quotation omitted)). ¶ 41.

App. 2007) (quoting United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir. 1990)).

(ECF No. 16-16 at 166-76.) “The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a state criminal defendant to an impartial jury, which is to say a jury that determines guilt on the basis of the judge’s instructions and the evidence introduced at trial, as distinct from preconceptions or other extraneous sources of decision.” Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted) (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726 (1992); Patton v…

Further, the First Circuit has noted that “[s]ubstantial deference is due the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in handling situations involving potential juror bias or misconduct.” United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1185 (1st Cir. 1990).

Pagan-San-Miguel v. United States, 517 U.S. 1234 (1996), quoting United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1196-1197 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990) ("appellate determination of sufficiency must be constrained by trial court's instructions; 'otherwise . . . [the appellate court] would be sustaining a conviction on appeal on a theory upon which the jury [were] not instructed below'"); United States v. Cluck, 542 F.2d 728 , 731 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.…

As the trial judge rightly concluded, this mostly "fact-based publicity . . . is not the sort of sensational publicity that would give rise to a presumption of prejudice." Id., citing Morales, 440 Mass. at 540 , and United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990).

Right to an Impartial Jury (Claim 3) “The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a state criminal defendant to an impartial jury, which is to say a jury that determines guilt on the basis of the judge’s instructions and the evidence introduced at trial, as distinct from preconceptions or other extraneous sources of decision.” Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726 (1992); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. …

An impartial jury is one that determines guilt on the basis of the judge’s instructions and the evidence introduced at trial, as distinct from preconceptions or other extraneous sources of decision.” Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Morgan, 504 U.S. at 726 ; Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 , 1037 n.12 (1984); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-23 (1961); United States v. McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1185-86 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Angiulo, 89…

Glecier, 923 F.2d 496 , 498 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he RICO statute is not unconstitutional despite Justice Scalia’s statements [in H.J.,, Inc.] concerning the pattern requirement... .”); pte States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1180 (1st Cir. 1990) (rejecting appellant’s argument that RICO statute was void for vagueness because “[a] person of ordinary intelligence could not help but realize that illegal activities of an organized crime family fall within the ambit of RICO’s p…

Because the postconviction court 1 In State v. Simpson, the court addressed the “effective defense theory,” which “holds that a court has the inherent power to immunize witnesses whose testimony is essential to an effective defense.” 587 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Iowa 1998) (citing United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1190 (1st Cir. 1990)).

The court quoted United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1180 (1st Cir.1990): [Pjattern may be proven through the nature of the RICO enterprise.

Other courts have recognized that such unique circumstances might emerge “where there exists prosecutorial misconduct arising from the government’s deliberate intent to distort the fact-finding process.” United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1190 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.

State v. Simpson, 587 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Iowa 1998) (citing United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1190 (1st Cir. 1990)).

Therefore, presumptive, or inherent, prejudice may arise when a “barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial,” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798 (1975), amounts to a “huge ... wave of public passion,” Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728 . “[Prejudice may properly be presumed where prejudicial, inflammatory publicity about a case so saturated the community from which the defendant’s jury was drawn as to render it virtually impossible to obtain an impartial jury.” Unite…

If the media coverage is factual as opposed to inflammatory or sensational, this undermines any claim for a presumption of prejudice.” ’ Billups v. State, 86 So.3d 1032, 1069 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir.1990)). ‘Moreover, “the passage of time is a factor that can bring objectivity to a case in which the pretrial publicity has been extensive.” ’ Carruth v. State, 927 So.2d 866, 876 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) …

In sum, here, while the defendant has shown the existence of substantial pretrial publicity surrounding the kidnapping that was somewhat sensational, the coverage focused primarily on the defendant’s name change and apparent affectation of a upper-class lifestyle. 4 “These references, however, are ‘significantly short of the type of emotionally charged, inflammatory, sensationalistic coverage needed to support a presumption of prejudice.’ ” Commonwealth v. Morales, 440 Mass.…

Cf United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1366 (2d Cir.1989) (applying RICO forfeiture statute); United States v. Ofchinick, 883 F.2d 1172, 1183 (3d Cir.1989) (same); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1213 (1st Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1243 (7th Cir.1987) (same).

If the media coverage is factual as opposed to inflammatory or sensational, this undermines any claim for a presumption of prejudice.’ ” Billups v. State, 86 So.3d 1032, 1069 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (em-phasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir.1990)).

If the media coverage is factual as opposed to inflammatory or sensational, this undermines any claim for a presumption of prejudice.” United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir.1990).

Anguilo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir. 1990) (“To justify a presumption of prejudice under this standard, the publicity must be both extensive and sensational in nature.

In Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1105 , the Third Circuit wrote: “we have doubts that a successful vagueness challenge to RICO ever could be raised by defendants in an organized crime case.” See also United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1180 (1st Cir. 1990) (“A person of ordinary intelligence could not help but realize that illegal activities of an organized crime family fall within the ambit of RICO’s pattern of racketeering activity.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 130 ,…