Cotton v. Superior Court (1961)

(See In re Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 129, fn. 9 [“When an ‘associated crime’ is involved, there can be no violation of section 207 unless the asportation is more than incidental to the commission of that crime.”]; People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1130-1131 [movements incidental to rapes and robberies insufficient evidence of asportation]; Cotton v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 465 [where the movement is merely incidental to the alleged assault and ri…

Because the sexual assault there took place wholly within the confines of a single room in a laundromat, any asportation involved was not "`into another part of the same county'" within the meaning of section 207. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1140 ; Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 465 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ]; People v. Rocco (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 96, 105 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 365 ].) We therefore turn our attention to each of the two secti…

In Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 465 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ], we held that brief movements "incidental to" an assault or riot do not amount to the asportation necessary to support a kidnaping conviction; in Daniels we concluded by the same token that "`the Legislature could not reasonably have intended that such incidental movement be a taking "... from one part of the county to another."'" (Italics added; fn. omitted.) *394 ( 71 Cal.2d at p. 113…

(See Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 464 [where the victims were “pushed to the ground, dragged around, chased, and assaulted,” any asportation was “natural in a riot or assault” and “only incidental to the assault and rioting”]; People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 299 [moving the victims 15 feet from the teller area of a bank to the vault was incidental to the robbery].) The People argue the error was harmless because whether the movement was inc…

(See Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 463-464 [movement 8 incidental where union picketers moved migrant workers 15 feet during riot]; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1126 [movement incidental where defendants, "in the course of robbing and raping three women in their own homes, forced them to move about their rooms for distances of 18 feet, 5 or 6 feet, and 30 feet respectively"].) The cases were decided before Martinez clarified the factors relevant …

(See Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 463-464 [movement 8 incidental where union picketers moved migrant workers 15 feet during riot]; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1126 [movement incidental where defendants, "in the course of robbing and raping three women in their own homes, forced them to move about their rooms for distances of 18 feet, 5 or 6 feet, and 30 feet respectively"].) The cases were decided before Martinez clarified the factors relevant …

In support of his arguments, defendant asks us to consider Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 463-465 (Cotton)3 and People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1130-1131, 1140 (Daniels),4 in which our Supreme Court discussed the asportation requirement for kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping in the context of the commission of other crimes.

(See Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 464 [dragging of victim 15 feet was incidental to assault]; People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 607 [movement was merely incidental where it “served only to facilitate the crime with no other apparent purpose”].) On this record, we conclude that a properly instructed jury might have reached a different result and thus that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

(See Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 464 [dragging of victim 15 feet was incidental to assault]; People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 607 [movement was merely incidental where it “served only to facilitate the crime with no other apparent purpose”].) On this record, we conclude that a properly instructed jury might have reached a different result and thus that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

It has long been the law in California that even a simple kidnapping requires movement more than incidental to the commission of an “associated crime.” (People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 973 P.2d 512 ]; In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 129, fn. 9 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 881 , 534 P.2d 721 ]; Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 465 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ].) Consequently, we hold that kidnapping within the meaning of section 6…

The rationale of that approach is the concern that a literal reading of the kidnapping statutes, which often carry significant penalties, can lead to an overzealous enforcement, with the result that “persons who have committed such substantive crimes as robbery or assault— which inherently involve the temporary detention or seizure of the victim—will suffer the far greater penalties prescribed by the kidnapping statutes.” Government of Virgin Islands, supra, 604 F.2d at 226 …

(See Taylor v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 578, 581-582 [information]; Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 462 [indictment]; People v. Nagle (1944) 25 Cal.2d 216, 222 [information].) The "reasonable or probable cause" standard is the equivalent of the "sufficient cause" test of sections 871 and 8724 governing when a magistrate after a preliminary hearing must either discharge the defendant or issue an order holding him or her to answer the complaint.

(People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 599.) The court pointed out that “kidnapping, as defined by such section 207, may occur in the absence of another crime.” (Id., at p. 600, italics added.) Conceding that an earlier opinion, Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 465 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ], (which involved kidnaping and related charges of rioting and assault), had concluded that the Legislature did not intend to apply the criminal sanctions of s…

Because the property thus was not “posted industrial property” (Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 463 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ]), the trial court held Zerbe was not protected by section 552.1.

In Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 464 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ], the Supreme Court stated that the facts in Rich “manifestly demonstrate” a kidnaping.

“Probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution or prudence could entertain a strong suspicion of guilt of the accused, and if some rational ground exists for an assumption of guilt the indictment will not be set aside.” (Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 462 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ].) Joseph claimed first, with respect to counts II and III, that the preliminary hearing testimony of Spears was not competent admissible evidence inasmuch as the Peo…

(Italics added.)” 4 This conclusion is reinforced by reference to the following order issued by the Supreme Court in In re Anderson on Habeas Corpus, Crim. 14570, on June 28, 1971: “The Director of the Department of Corrections is ordered to show cause before the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles why the judgment of conviction . . . should not be vacated and defendant be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty to the count of violating Penal Code section 209, in …

Daniels involved a robbery, rape, and an act which could technically be defined as kidnaping. 4 The California Supreme Court had previously construed the kidnaping statute in Cotton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 459, 465 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ] to mean that the asportation element of kidnaping was some *1005 thing more than an incidental movement involved in the underlying crime.

This evidence alone would meet the standard of reasonable cause applicable to grand jury indictments (Cotton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 459, 461-462 [15 Cal.Rptr: 65, 364 P.2d 241 ] ; Pen.

It was not bound to follow any erroneous determination it had made in the order suppressing evidence. [5] Reasonable or probable cause to hold a defendant to answer means "such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused." (People v. Nagle, 25 Cal.2d 216, 222 [ 153 P.2d 344 ]; accord: Perry v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 276, 283 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 368 P.2d 529 ]; …

Reasonable or probable cause to hold a defendant to answer means “such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” (People v. Nagle, 25 Cal.2d 216, 222 [ 153 P.2d 344 ] ; accord: Perry v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 276, 283 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 368 P.2d 529 ] ; Cotton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 459, 462 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ]; Robison v. Superior Cou…

(See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 478, fn. 6 [ 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 ]; Draper v. United States (1959) 358 U.S. 307, 310, fn. 3 [ 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 ]; United States v. Elgisser (2d Cir. 1964) 334 F.2d 103, 109 ; People v. Morfield *446 (1964) 41 MisCal.2d 935 [ 246 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 ].) [fn. 4] The standard or test of reasonable or probable cause applicable to all of the last mentioned situations, namely, to the issuance of a search warran…

(See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 478, fn. 6 [ 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 ] ; Draper v. United States (1959) 358 U.S. 307, 310, fn. 3 [ 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 ]; United States v. Elgisser (2d Cir. 1964) 334 F.2d 103, 109 ; People v. Morfield (1964) 41 Misc. 2d 935 [ 246 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 ].) 4 The standard or test of reasonable or probable cause applicable to all of the last mentioned situations, namely, to the issuance of a search warrant, an arres…

Code, § 1528.) In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant, the standard or test of probable cause is approximately the same as that applicable to an arrest without a warrant, a commitment by a magistrate or an indictment by a grand jury (People v. Aday (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 520, 532-533 [38 Cal.Rptr. 199] ; Williams v. Justice Court (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 87, 94 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 724 ]), namely, “such a state of facts as would lead a man …

Section 872 of the Penal Code requires the magistrate to hold a defendant to answer if “it appears from the examination that a public offense has been committed, and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof,...” Section 995 provides that the information must be set aside by the court in which the defendant is arraigned, upon his motion where the defendant has been “committed without reasonable or probable cause.” The phrase “sufficient cause” found i…

See, e.g., Garabedian v. Superior Court (1963) 59 Cal.2d 124, 127 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 318 , 378 P.2d 590 ] (leaving the scene of an automobile accident) ; Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 463-465 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ] (kidnaping); Callan v. Superior Court (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 652, 662 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 508 ] (conspiracy to commit grand theft); Whitlock v. Superior Court (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 26 [ 217 P.2d 158 ] (felony drunk driving) ; In re Jang (1938) 25…

(People v. Nathanson, 134 Cal.App.2d 43 [ 284 P.2d 975 ].)” (People v. Olf, 195 Cal.App.2d 97, 102 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 390 ].) See also, People v. Rissman, 143 Cal.App.2d 488, 495 [ 299 P.2d 944]; Cotton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 459, 462 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ].

(Cotton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 459, 465 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ] ; see County of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal.2d 625, 629 [ 59 P.2d 139 , 106 A.L.R. 903 ].) The conclusion that section 1249 cannot constitutionally apply to public utility condemnations does not mean that there is no way a trial court, in a Code of Civil Procedure condemnation, can make an award for improvements made after the date of summons.

(Greenberg v. Superior Court (1942), supra, 19 Cal.2d 319 ; Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 463-465 [5] [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ] ; Saugstad v. Superior Court (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 277, 282-283 [lb], 287 [6] [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 580 ]; Davis v. Superior Court (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 8, 22 [7a]-26 [7c] [ 345 P.2d 513 ].) An accusatory pleading must allege facts showing that the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations (People v. McGee (1934), sup…

Such factors would be relevant in a Daniels situation of aggravated kidnaping—a kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen.Code, § 209)—but we held in Stanworth that the Daniels test was not applicable to simple kidnaping under Penal Code section 207." ( Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 574 , 146 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 , fn. omitted; see also Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 464-465 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 .) As more than one Court of Appeal has o…

Section 209, subdivision (b)(2), instructs that a defendant is guilty of kidnapping for robbery, rape, spousal rape, oral copulation or certain other sex crimes, only “if the movement of the victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of . . . the intended underlying offense.” (Ibid., italics added; accord, § 209.5, subd. (b) [defendant guilty of kidnapping for carjacking only if “the movement of the victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of …