Cluster 577151 (1992)

See, e.g., Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149 (“To be willfully blind, a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate.”); Fo *110 novisa, 76 F.3d at 265 (applying Hard Rock Cafe’s reasoning to conclude that “a swap meet can not disregard its vendors’ blatant trademark infringements with impunity”). 15 In the words of the Seventh Circuit, “willful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of the Lanham Act.” Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149…

In Hard Rock, the Seventh Circuit explicitly addressed the distinction between a product and a service, noting that while the pharmaceutical company in Inwood Lab. clearly supplied a product to the third-party pharmacists, a “temporary help service ... might not be liable if it furnished [to the defendant] the workers he employed to erect his stand.” Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148.

See, e.g., Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148 (“we have ... turned to the common law to guide our inquiry into the appropriate boundaries of liability”); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp.

See, e.g., Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148 ("we have ... turned to the common law to guide our inquiry into the appropriate boundaries of liability"); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp.

See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 165 (4th Cir.2012); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.1992) (defining requirements of vicarious liability).

See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 165 (4th Cir. 2012); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992) (defining requirements of vicarious liability).

See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 854 , 102 S.Ct. 2182 , 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d at 265 ; Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992).

See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that vicarious liability will exist when defendant (1) has right and ability to supervise infringing activity, and (2) has direct financial interest in such activities); RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Graystron Co., 845 F.2d 773 , 781 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1150 (same); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. H.

See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir.2001) (observing that vicarious liability will exist when defendant (1) has right and ability to supervise infringing activity, and (2) has direct financial interest in such activities); RCA/Ariola Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773 , 781 (8th Cir.1988) (same); Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1150 (same); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.

See, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2182 , 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114 in support of claim of contributory infringement); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp., 955 F.2d at 1148 (treating both 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(a) as encompassing contributory liability); Med.

The court first noted that it is “not clear how the doctrine [of contributory trademark infringement] applies to people who do not actually manufacture or distribute the good that is ultimately palmed off as made by someone else.” Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148.

Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 13 717 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2013); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265 ; Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148.

See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2013); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265 ; Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148.

Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149.

It then explained that the “direct control and monitoring” rule in service-based contributory infringement cases evolved in the “context of renting booth space at a flea market.” See id. at 984 (citing Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148-49).

The Seventh Circuit held “that the Inwood Labs, test for contributory liability applies” and that the flea-market operator “may be liable for trademark violations by [a vendor] if it knew or had reason to know of them.” Additionally, the court held that the knowledge element for purposes of the Lanham Act can be met by demonstrating that the operator was “willfully blind.” Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149.

See, e.g., Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854-55 , 102 S.Ct. 2182 ; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264-65 ; Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148-50.

See Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148 (“it is not clear how the doctrine applies to people who do not actually manufacture or distribute the good that is ultimately palmed off as made by *248 someone else”); see also Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 504 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (reversed on other grounds).

Splunge v. Shoney’s, Inc., 97 F.3d 488, 491 (11th Cir.1996); Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1151; see also United States v. Adair, 951 F.2d 316 , 319 n. 6 (11th Cir.1992) (“A showing of negligence or mistake is not sufficient to support a finding of willfulness or knowledge.”); A Touch of Class Jewelry v. J.C.

Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 , 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e have treated trademark infringement as a species of tort and have turned to the common law to guide our inquiry into the appropriate boundaries of liability.”).

See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854-55 , 102 S.Ct. 2182 (finding that a defendant is contributorially liable for the direct infringement of others if, inter alia, the defendant “continues to supply its service to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.”); Goodfellow, 717 F.3d at 503-05 (holding that a flea market owner and operator who “provide[d] ... rental booths and storage units for vendors’ was contrib-utorily liable when he had reason to …

See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103 (explaining that this doctrine is derived from the common law of torts); Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148-49 (“[W]e have treated trademark infringement as a species of tort and have turned to the common law to guide our inquiry into the appropriate boundaries of liability”); Restatement of the Law (Second)—Torts § 877 & cmt. d (explaining that a landowner is equally liable “for the activity of servants on his land” and for “permit[ting] others not his…

See Sapatis, 2014 DNH 021, 14-15 , 994 F.Supp.2d at 199 (citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir.1999); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265; Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148-49) (“[T]he relevant inquiry is ... whether the defendant had sufficient control over the individuals directly engaging in [trademark] infringement.”).

This theory of liability for vicarious trademark infringement exists where “the defendant and the infringer have an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to bind one another in transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing product.” Rosetta Stone, Ltd., 676 F.3d at 165 (quoting Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp., 955 F.2d at 1150) (emphasis added).

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1) (“Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, ... uses in commerce ... any false designation of origin ... shall be liable in a civil action ....” (emphasis added)); Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 265 (holding that a plaintiff stated a claim for contributory trademark infringement by alleging that a swap meet “disregarded] its vendors’ blatant trademark infringements with impunity”); Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149 (holding that a…

Assoc., 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d at 1150 (reasoning that vicarious liability is a joint-tortfeasor theory of liability)).

Similarly, Yahoo! cannot be vicariously liable without “a finding that the defendant and the infringer have an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to bind one another in transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing product.” Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1150, Indeed, the only way Yahoo! could exert any control over the results of a search engine query would be to change its underlying, proprietary algorithm.

Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149.

Liability for vicarious trademark infringement “requires a finding that the defendant and the infringer have an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to bind one another in transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing product.” Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp., 955 F.2d at 1150 (citation omitted).

Indeed, to be “willfully blind” for liability under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (l)(a, b), 1125(a) “a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate.” See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir.1992).

No allegations in the amended complaint support “a finding that the defendant and the infringer have an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to bind one another in transactions with third parties, or exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing product.” Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1150.

“Willful blindness is sufficient to trigger the mandatory provisions of [§ 1117(b)].” Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1151.

Cal. 16 Oct. 22, 2009) (“Willful infringement occurs when the defendant knowingly and 17 intentionally infringes on a trademark.”); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession 18 Servs., 955 F.2d 1143 , 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (“To be willfully blind, a person must suspect 19 wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate.”).

Corp. v. Concession Servs., 955 F.2d 1143 , 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) ("To be willfully blind, a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate."); Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584 , 590 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is enough ... that the defendant failed to inquire ... because he was afraid of what the inquiry would yield.") ).

See Duty Free Americas, Inc. , 797 F.3d at 1277 ("under appropriate facts, contributory trademark infringement might be grounded upon a [defendant's] bad faith refusal to exercise a clear contractual power to halt the infringing activities"); see also Goodfellow , 717 F.3d at 503-05 (holding that a flea market owner and operator who "provide[d] ... rental booths and storage units for vendors" was contributorily liable when he had reason to know of trademark infringement comm…

See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (willful blindness requires that defendant have a “reason to suspect” that counterfeit goods are being sold and “intentionally shielding] itself from discovering ... the particular infringing transactions”); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., 955 F.2d 1143 , 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (“To be willfully blind, a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate.”); Louis …

The Ninth Circuit cited Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir.1992) for the proposition that direct knowledge of infringement ■ was not required; rather, a landlord’s willful blindness to direct infringement was sufficient to impose secondary liability.

It is usually fairly clear if a product is a counterfeit: a manufacturer indicates that the product was not made to their standards, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc. v. A & E Oil, Inc., 503 F.3d 588, 589 (7th Cir.2007), Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir.1992); or that the producer was not authorized to use that mark on certain products it produced, e.g., Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, L.L.C. v. Gabbanelli, 575 F.3d 6…

Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149.

A party can be held liable for contributory infringement if the party had “[w]illful blindness” to the trademark infringement, which is determined by assessing “what a reasonably prudent person would understand .... ” Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (7th Cir.1992) (stating “it does not impose any duty to seek out and prevent violations”). 1.

See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir.1996) (denying motion to dismiss contributory trademark infringement claim against operators of swap meet because the complaint alleged that the operators had knowledge of blatant infringe *715 ment by the vendors); Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149 (holding that contributory liability could be imposed if operator of a flea market was “willfully blind” to the ongoing violations by vendors); cf. Columbia Pic…

Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 , 102 S.Ct. 2182 , 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir.1992); SB Designs v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 338 F.Supp.2d 904, 911-12 (N.D.Ill.2004).

Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2182 , 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982); Hard Rock *912 Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1150 (applying the In-wood Laboratories standard).

Vicarious copyright infringement is established when a defendant has “the right and ability to supervise infringing activity and also has direct financial interest in such activities.” Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162 ).

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984-85 (9th Cir.1999) (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir.1996) and Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149).

Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir.1992).

Id. (quoting Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.1992) (citing David Berg & Co. v. Gatto International Trading Co., 884 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir.1989))).

Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir.1992).

See Hard Rock Cafe , 955 F.2d at 1148-49 ; Fonovisa , 76 F.3d at 265 (citing Hard Rock Cafe ); Coach , 717 F.3d at 503-04 (citing Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa ).

Cal. Sep. 28, 2015); See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession 18 19 Serv., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 , 114 (7th Cir. 1992).