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U.S. CodeTitle 15Chapter 22— TrademarksSubchapter III— General Provisions

15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2026)

False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1947–2026 9,361citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 9,361 opinions since 1947, 2,360 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (73 cases).

(a) Civil action(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.(2) As used in this subsection, the term “any person” includes any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.(3) In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.(b) Importation

Any goods marked or labeled in contravention of the provisions of this section shall not be imported into the United States or admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States. The owner, importer, or consignee of goods refused entry at any customhouse under this section may have any recourse by protest or appeal that is given under the customs revenue laws or may have the remedy given by this chapter in cases involving goods refused entry or seized.

(c) Dilution by blurring; dilution by tarnishment(1) Injunctive relief

Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.

(2) Definitions(A) For purposes of paragraph (1), a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following:(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark.(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.(B) For purposes of paragraph (1), “dilution by blurring” is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark. In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following:(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the famous mark.(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.(C) For purposes of paragraph (1), “dilution by tarnishment” is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.(3) ExclusionsThe following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection:(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with—(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services; or(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.(4) Burden of proofIn a civil action for trade dress dilution under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that—(A) the claimed trade dress, taken as a whole, is not functional and is famous; and(B) if the claimed trade dress includes any mark or marks registered on the principal register, the unregistered matter, taken as a whole, is famous separate and apart from any fame of such registered marks.(5) Additional remediesIn an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall be entitled to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116 of this title. The owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and 1118 of this title, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity if—(A) the mark or trade name that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment was first used in commerce by the person against whom the injunction is sought after October 6, 2006; and(B) in a claim arising under this subsection—(i) by reason of dilution by blurring, the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the famous mark; or(ii) by reason of dilution by tarnishment, the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark.(6) Ownership of valid registration a complete bar to actionThe ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register under this chapter shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that—(A) is brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State; and(B)(i) seeks to prevent dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment; or(ii) asserts any claim of actual or likely damage or harm to the distinctiveness or reputation of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.(7) Savings clause

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair, modify, or supersede the applicability of the patent laws of the United States.

(d) Cyberpiracy prevention(1)(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person—(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that—(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark; or(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of title 18 or section 220506 of title 36.(B)(i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to—(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the domain name;(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person;(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;(IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name;(V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;(VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;(VII) the person’s provision of material and misleading false contact information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the person’s intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;(VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the parties; and(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c).(ii) Bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A) shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.(C) In any civil action involving the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name under this paragraph, a court may order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.(D) A person shall be liable for using a domain name under subparagraph (A) only if that person is the domain name registrant or that registrant’s authorized licensee.(E) As used in this paragraph, the term “traffics in” refers to transactions that include, but are not limited to, sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration.(2)(A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located if—(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c); and(ii) the court finds that the owner—(I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or(II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by—(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail address provided by the registrant to the registrar; and(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly after filing the action.(B) The actions under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall constitute service of process.(C) In an in rem action under this paragraph, a domain name shall be deemed to have its situs in the judicial district in which—(i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located; or(ii) documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the court.(D)(i) The remedies in an in rem action under this paragraph shall be limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark. Upon receipt of written notification of a filed, stamped copy of a complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a United States district court under this paragraph, the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority shall—(I) expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the court’s control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name to the court; and(II) not transfer, suspend, or otherwise modify the domain name during the pendency of the action, except upon order of the court.(ii) The domain name registrar or registry or other domain name authority shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary relief under this paragraph except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard, which includes a willful failure to comply with any such court order.(3) The civil action established under paragraph (1) and the in rem action established under paragraph (2), and any remedy available under either such action, shall be in addition to any other civil action or remedy otherwise applicable.(4) The in rem jurisdiction established under paragraph (2) shall be in addition to any other jurisdiction that otherwise exists, whether in rem or in personam.(July 5, 1946, ch. 540, title VIII, § 43, 60 Stat. 441; Pub. L. 100–667, title I, § 132, Nov. 16, 1988, 102 Stat. 3946; Pub. L. 102–542, § 3(c), Oct. 27, 1992, 106 Stat. 3568; Pub. L. 104–98, § 3(a), Jan. 16, 1996, 109 Stat. 985; Pub. L. 106–43, §§ 3(a)(2), 5, Aug. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 219, 220; Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, § 1000(a)(9) [title III, § 3002(a)], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–545; Pub. L. 109–312, § 2, Oct. 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1730; Pub. L. 112–190, § 1(a), Oct. 5, 2012, 126 Stat. 1436.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

Acts March 3, 1881, and February 20, 1905, referred to in subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iv), (6), are acts Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, and Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, which were repealed insofar as inconsistent with this chapter by act July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444. Act Feb. 20, 1905, was classified to sections 81 to 109 of this title.

Constitutionality

For information regarding the constitutionality of this section, see the Table of Laws Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court on the Constitution Annotated website, constitution.congress.gov.

Prior Provisions

Act Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 534.

Amendments

2012—Subsec. (c)(6). Pub. L. 112–190 added subpars. (A) and (B) and struck out former subpars. (A) and (B) which read as follows:

“(A)(i) is brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State; and

“(ii) seeks to prevent dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment; or

“(B) asserts any claim of actual or likely damage or harm to the distinctiveness or reputation of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.”

2006—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 109–312, § 2(1), added subsec. (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) which related to remedies for dilution of famous marks.

Subsec. (d)(1)(B)(i)(IX). Pub. L. 109–312, § 2(2), substituted “subsection (c)” for “subsection (c)(1)”.

1999—Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 106–43, § 5, added par. (3).

Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 106–43, § 3(a)(2), inserted “as set forth in section 1116 of this title” after “relief” in first sentence.

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 106–113 added subsec. (d).

1996—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104–98 added subsec. (c).

1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–542 designated existing provisions as par. (1), redesignated former pars. (1) and (2) as subpars. (A) and (B), respectively, and added par. (2).

1988—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100–667 amended subsec. (a) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (a) read as follows: “Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.”

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2012 Amendment

Pub. L. 112–190, § 1(b), Oct. 5, 2012, 126 Stat. 1436, provided that: “The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall apply to any action commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 5, 2012].”

Effective Date of 1999 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 106–113 applicable to all domain names registered before, on, or after Nov. 29, 1999, see section 1000(a)(9) [title III, § 3010] of Pub. L. 106–113, set out as a note under section 1117 of this title.

Effective Date of 1996 Amendment

Pub. L. 104–98, § 5, Jan. 16, 1996, 109 Stat. 987, provided that: “This Act [amending this section and section 1127 of this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 1051 of this title] and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [Jan. 16, 1996].”

Effective Date of 1992 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–542 effective with respect to violations that occur on or after Oct. 27, 1992, see section 4 of Pub. L. 102–542, set out as a note under section 1114 of this title.

Effective Date of 1988 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–667 effective one year after Nov. 16, 1988, see section 136 of Pub. L. 100–667, set out as a note under section 1051 of this title.

Repeal and Effect on Existing Rights

Repeal of inconsistent provisions, effect of this chapter on pending proceedings and existing registrations and rights under prior acts, see notes set out under section 1051 of this title.

Study on Abusive Domain Name Registrations Involving Personal Names

Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, § 1000(a)(9) [title III, § 3006], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–550, provided that:“(a)In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 29, 1999], the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal Election Commission, shall conduct a study and report to Congress with recommendations on guidelines and procedures for resolving disputes involving the registration or use by a person of a domain name that includes the personal name of another person, in whole or in part, or a name confusingly similar thereto, including consideration of and recommendations for—“(1) protecting personal names from registration by another person as a second level domain name for purposes of selling or otherwise transferring such domain name to such other person or any third party for financial gain;“(2) protecting individuals from bad faith uses of their personal names as second level domain names by others with malicious intent to harm the reputation of the individual or the goodwill associated with that individual’s name;“(3) protecting consumers from the registration and use of domain names that include personal names in the second level domain in manners which are intended or are likely to confuse or deceive the public as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the domain name registrant, or a site accessible under the domain name, with such other person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods, services, or commercial activities of the domain name registrant;“(4) protecting the public from registration of domain names that include the personal names of government officials, official candidates, and potential official candidates for Federal, State, or local political office in the United States, and the use of such domain names in a manner that disrupts the electoral process or the public’s ability to access accurate and reliable information regarding such individuals;“(5) existing remedies, whether under State law or otherwise, and the extent to which such remedies are sufficient to address the considerations described in paragraphs (1) through (4); and“(6) the guidelines, procedures, and policies of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the extent to which they address the considerations described in paragraphs (1) through (4).“(b)Guidelines and Procedures.—The Secretary of Commerce shall, under its Memorandum of Understanding with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, collaborate to develop guidelines and procedures for resolving disputes involving the registration or use by a person of a domain name that includes the personal name of another person, in whole or in part, or a name confusingly similar thereto.”

The 20 cases that cite 15 U.S.C. § 1125 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENHarrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002).
cites § 1125 22×cited by 704 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“Harrods UK alleged that the Domain Names infringed and diluted its American “Harrods” trademark and that Harrods BA registered the Names in bad faith as prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1). 1 The district court dismissed the infringement and dilution claims, holding that in…”
The case’s holding
Summary judgment is premature if a nonmoving party demonstrates that additional discovery is necessary to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
Later courts cite it for
“the party opposing summary judgment 'cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.” · 293 citing courts
2
GREENStarbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).
cites § 1125 29×cited by 213 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“Complaint and Trial After failed negotiations with Black Bear, on July 2, 2001, Starbucks filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging trademark dilution in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125 (c), 1127; trademark infringement in violation of 15 U.”
The case’s holding
The federal trademark dilution statute does not require a showing of substantial similarity between a famous mark and a junior mark to establish dilution by blurring.
Later courts cite it for
“the application of the polaroid test is 'not mechanical, but rather, focuses on the ultimate question of whether, looking at the products in their totality, consumers are likely to be confused.” · 29 citing courts
3
GREENS. Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2009).
cites § 1125 21×cited by 140 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“Southern Grouts sued 3M alleging that 3M’s continued registration of the domain name violated the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d), and constituted unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff seeking leave to amend a complaint after a scheduling order deadline must demonstrate good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b).
Later courts cite it for
“a plaintiff seeking leave to amend its complaint after the deadline designated in a scheduling order must demonstrate 'good cause' under fed.r.civ.p. 16(b).” · 11 citing courts
4
GREENFranklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 184 Cal. App. 4th 313 (Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 1125 31×cited by 48 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“Franklin Mint's malicious prosecution claim is based upon two of the claims that were alleged in that underlying lawsuit, for false advertising and trademark dilution under the Lanham Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a), (c)). After a 17-day jury trial, the trial court granted Manatt's…”
The case’s holding
A claim for malicious prosecution may be based on specific causes of action from an underlying lawsuit rather than the entire proceeding.
Later courts cite it for
“a claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may . . . be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENRosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012).
cites § 1125 18×cited by 138 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“§ 1114 (l)(a); contributory and vicarious trademark infringement; and trademark dilution, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1). Rosetta Stone also appeals from an order dismissing its unjust enrichment claim under Virginia Law.”
The case’s holding
The knowledge prong of inducement liability applies to those who supply services (applying Inwood’s knowledge prong to one supplying services).
Later courts cite it for
“defendant must supply its product or service to 'identified individuals' that it knows or has reason to know are engaging in trademark infringement.” · 9 citing courts
6
GREENTwo Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
cites § 1125 12×cited by 1,531 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“441 , 15 U. S. C. § 1125 (a) *765 (1982 ed.), based on a finding of inherent distinctiveness, without proof that the trade dress has secondary meaning.”
The case’s holding
Trade dress is protectable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act if it is inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.
Later courts cite it for
“their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product.” · 88 citing courts
7
GREENNew York City Triathlon, LLC v. Nyc Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
cites § 1125 17×cited by 107 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“NYC TRIATHLON is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Its Claims The Verified Complaint sets forth seven counts arising out of Defendant’s use of “NYC Triathlon Club” as a name and domain name: (1) trademark infringement, false designation of origin and unfair competition pursuant…”
The case’s holding
Prospective loss of goodwill alone is sufficient to support a finding of irreparable harm in a trademark case.
Later courts cite it for
“the public has an interest in not being deceived-in being assured that the mark it associates with a product is not attached to goods of unknown origin and quality.” · 36 citing courts
8
GREENFifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015).
cites § 1125 18×cited by 90 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“, X One X Movie Archive, Leo Valencia, Freeze, and Jem Sportswear (collectively “Defendants”), (a) used Bob Marley’s image (b) on their t-shirts and other merchandise, (c) in a manner likely to cause confusion as to Plaintiffs’ sponsorship or FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V.”
The case’s holding
A claim for disgorgement of profits under the Lanham Act is equitable in nature and does not require a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
Later courts cite it for
“a party is a prevailing party for purposes of an attorneys' fee award if it 'achieved a- material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties that is judicially sanctioned.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 1125 10×cited by 462 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“In addition, Bird asserts a claim for “cybersquat-ting” under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999 (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d), as well as for copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.”
The case’s holding
Specific personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant purposefully avails itself of a forum through an interactive website and the cause of action arises from those contacts.
Later courts cite it for
“if the defendant is amenable to service of process under the forum state's long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny the defendant due process.” · 52 citing courts
10
GREENYelp Inc. v. Catron, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
cites § 1125 17×cited by 93 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“§ 1114 , unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a), dilution of a famous mark under 15 U.”
The case’s holding
Statutory damages in trademark infringement cases must serve as a deterrent without providing a windfall or lacking a plausible relationship to actual damages.
Later courts cite it for
“for ease of analysis, the merits of plaintiffs substantive claims and sufficiency 18 of the complaint are considered together” · 12 citing courts
11
GREENPepsico, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
cites § 1125 8×cited by 905 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“§ 1114 and common law; (3) false designation of origin in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a); (4) unfair competition in violation of Cal.”
The case’s holding
Upon entry of default, all well-pleaded facts in a complaint are taken as true except those relating to damages.
Later courts cite it for
“a 13 defendant's default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” · 196 citing courts
12
REDCable News Network L.P., L.L.L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001).
cites § 1125 30×cited by 23 cases
Vacated in part by Cable News Network, LP v. CNNEWS.com (2003): the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's own opinion in this case ("VACATED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; FINAL ORDER AFFIRMED.").
Where it cites § 1125
“At issue on cross-motions for summary judgment are the following questions: (1) whether this suit meets the ACPA’s procedural requirements for an in rem action; (2) whether the existing record establishes as a matter of law that plaintiff has proven the substantive elements of…”
The case’s holding
The provision of news and information services on the Internet constitutes commerce under the Lanham Act, so a domain name used for such services is subject to trademark law.
13
GREENMoseley v. v. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
cites § 1125 12×cited by 194 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“[†] In 1995 Congress amended § 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U. S. C. § 1125 , to provide a remedy for the "dilution of famous marks.”
The case’s holding
A claim for trademark dilution requires evidence of actual dilution to withstand summary judgment, even if the claim for trademark infringement is unsuccessful.
Later courts cite it for
“it may well be, however, that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence - the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical.” · 24 citing courts
14
YELLOWFamous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2010).
cites § 1125 12×cited by 183 cases
Abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. on other grounds: 5 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
The case’s holding
A plaintiff has standing under the Lanham Act if it demonstrates a reasonable interest to be protected and a reasonable basis for believing that interest is likely to be damaged.
Later courts cite it for
“accepting all factual claims in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” · 54 citing courts
cites § 1125 14×cited by 116 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“Procedural History UTLM’s complaint made six claims for relief: (1) trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a); (2) unfair competition, id.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant used a trademark in connection with the sale of goods or services to prevail on a Lanham Act claim.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant could also intend to profit by diverting customers from the website of the trademark owner to the defendant's own website, where those consumers would purchase the defendant's products or services instead of the trademark owner's.” · 5 citing courts
16
GREENEtw Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
cites § 1125 13×cited by 141 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“§ 1114 ; dilution of the mark under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c); unfair competition and false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.”
The case’s holding
The Lanham Act applies to artistic works only when the use lacks artistic relevance or explicitly misleads consumers as to the source of the work.
Later courts cite it for
“false endorsement occurs when a celebrity's identity is connected with a product or service in such a way that consumers are likely to be misled about the celebrity's sponsorship or approval of the product or service.” · 9 citing courts
17
GREENDAN-FOAM A/S v. Brand Named Beds, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
cites § 1125 23×cited by 34 cases
The case’s holding
In gray goods cases, differences in product packaging are material differences supporting Lanham Act infringement claims, and Polaroid factors have limited relevance where the mark is the plaintiff's actual mark.
Later courts cite it for
“differences in product packaging have been found to constitute material differences in a variety of gray goods cases.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENNew World Solutions, Inc. v. NameMedia Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
cites § 1125 17×cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“com” (the “Domain Name”), constitute trademark dilution in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c), cybersquatting in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.”
The case’s holding
A court may disregard assertions that lack adequate citations to the record and unsubstantiated or self-serving testimony is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Later courts cite it for
“unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony is insufficient, without more, to defeat summary judgment.” · 11 citing courts
19
GREENVirtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001).
cites § 1125 13×cited by 108 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d). The district court granted Volkswagen’s motion for summary judgment on its cybersquat-ting, dilution, and infringement counterclaims and dismissed Virtual Works’ cross-motions on the same.”
The case’s holding
A defendant who acts even partially in bad faith in registering a domain name is not entitled to the safe harbor provision of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant who acts even partially in bad faith in registering a domain name is not, as a matter of law, entitled to benefit from the act's safe harbor provision.” · 15 citing courts
20
GREENLouis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).
cites § 1125 14×subsections: (c)cited by 78 cases
Where it cites § 1125
“§ 1114 (l)(a), trademark dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c), copyright infringement under 17 U.”
The case’s holding
A successful parody does not constitute trademark dilution by blurring if the association does not impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.
Later courts cite it for
“well established that no actual confusion is required to prove a case of trademark infringement.” · 8 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
194619862026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 932 cases in 2024–2025. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
S.D.N.Y.1,050N.D. Ill.4152d Cir.3529th Cir.321E.D.N.Y270N.D. Cal.264S.D. Fla.264D.N.J.249

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 200 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)73 cases
IQ Prods. Co. v. Pandora Mfg Inc, 305 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2002).
Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 1996).
Maguire v. Gorruso, 800 A.2d 1085 (Vt. 2002).
Flentye v. Kathrein, 485 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Showing the top 5 of 73. More in the list view →
(a)(1)12 cases
Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
Roberts v. Bliss, 229 F. Supp. 3d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. William Morris, 19 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 1999).
Sonoma Foods, Inc. v. Sonoma Cheese Factory, LLC, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(a)(1)(A)13 cases
Souza v. Exotic Island Enter., Inc., 68 F.4th 99 (2d Cir. 2023).
Island Insteel Sys., Inc. v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2002).
THOIP v. Walt Disney Co., 690 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
KatiRoll Co. v. Kati Junction, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Efs Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487 (2d Cir. 1996).
Showing the top 5 of 13. More in the list view →
(a)(1)(B)11 cases
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D. Del. 2009).
H & R Indus., Inc. v. Kirshner, 899 F. Supp. 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
Mission Pharmacal Co. v. Virtus Pharm., LLC, 23 F. Supp. 3d 748 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
Showing the top 5 of 11. More in the list view →
(a)(3)2 cases
TP-Link Sys. Inc. v. Shenzhen Cudy Tech. CO., LTD., No. 2:25-cv-00057 (D. Nev. May 21, 2025).
(c)8 cases
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).“§ 1114 (l)(a), trademark dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c), copyright infringement under 17 U.”
Arcsoft, Inc. v. Cyberlink Corp., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
WHS Ent. Ventures v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 997 F. Supp. 946 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
Bulova Corp. v. Bulova Do Brasil Com. Rep. Imp. & Exp. Ltda., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
NBA Props., Inc. v. Dahlonega Mint, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(c)(1)4 cases
Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Ent., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
Bijur Lubricating Corp. v. Devco Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 722 (D.N.J. 2004).
(c)(1)(A)1 case
(c)(2)(A)2 cases
Univ. of Kansas v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2009).
Deere & Co. v. Fimco Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Ky. 2017).
(c)(2)(B)2 cases
Deere & Co. v. FIMCO Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 964 (W.D. Ky. 2017).
Deere & Co. v. Fimco Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d 704 (W.D. Ky. 2018).
(c)(4)2 cases
Geigtech E. Bay LLC v. Lutron Elecs. Co., 352 F. Supp. 3d 265 (S.D. Ill. 2018).
Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Peet's Coffee, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-02209 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2023).
(d)8 cases
Minarik Elec. Co. v. Electro Sales Co., 223 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D. Mass. 2002).
Joseph Oat Holdings, Inc. v. RCM Digesters, Inc., 409 F. App'x 498 (3d Cir. 2010).
La Michoacana Nat., LLC v. Maestre, No. 3:17-cv-00727 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 7, 2021).
Pace v. Daniel, No. 2:20-cv-01455 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2022).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(d)(1)(A)5 cases
DSPT Int'l, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010).
Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Venetiangold. Com, 380 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Va. 2005).
Sterling Auto. Grp. Inc v. Ramayo, No. 6:20-cv-00809 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2020).
GS Holistic LLC v. Vape Savvy LLC, No. 2:23-cv-00373 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 19, 2024).
(d)(1)(A)(ii)1 case
Tekever Tecnologias de Informacao, S.A. v. Tekever Holdings, S.A., No. 1:23-cv-00838 (E.D. Va. Sept. 18, 2024).
(d)(1)(B)1 case
BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
(d)(1)(B)(i)4 cases
Rearden LLC v. Rearden Com., Inc., 683 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2012).
Xereas v. Heiss, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 624 F. Supp. 2d 883 (W.D. Tenn. 2008).
Mira Holdings, Inc. v. ZoomerMedia, Ltd., 676 F. Supp. 3d 909 (D. Colo. 2023).
(d)(2)1 case
Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Wuhan Wolon Commc'n Tech. Co., No. 5:21-cv-04272 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2021).
(d)(2)(A)1 case
Porsche Cars North Am., Inc. v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002).
(d)(2)(A)(ii)1 case
GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe. Com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
(d)(3)1 case
Sporty's Farm LLC v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000).

Show all 9,361 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments
(July 5, 1946, ch. 540, title VIII, § 43, 60 Stat. 441; Pub. L. 100–667, title I, § 132, Nov. 16, 1988, 102 Stat. 3946; Pub. L. 102–542, § 3(c), Oct. 27, 1992, 106 Stat. 3568; Pub. L. 104–98, § 3(a), Jan. 16, 1996, 109 Stat. 985; Pub. L. 106–43, §§ 3(a)(2), 5, Aug. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 219, 220; Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, § 1000(a)(9) [title III, § 3002(a)], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–545; Pub. L. 109–312, § 2, Oct. 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1730; Pub. L. 112–190, § 1(a), Oct. 5, 2012, 126 Stat. 1436.)
Amendment years (notes): 2012, 2006, 1999, 1996, 1992, 1988
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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