Saltsman v. United States (1997)

Id. at 788. 23 .

(See Motion to Dismiss, R. 60-1, PageID 1999–2001.) No. 14-5451 Koprowski v. Baker Page 16 See Demko, 385 U.S. at 152 ; Vaccaro, 81 F.3d at 857 ; cf. Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 790 (6th Cir. 1997) (similarly holding that the “exclusive” nature of the FECA’s workers’ compensation scheme precludes a simultaneous action against the United States under the FTCA).

Legal Framework A. Standard of Review We review de novo a district court’s grant of a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 789 (6th Cir. 1997), construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Leisure v. FBI, 2 F. App’x 488, 489 (6th Cir. 2001).

Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 789 (6th Cir.1997).

See Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir.1999) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 789 (6th Cir.1997) (Rule 12(b)(1)).

See Saltsman, 104 F.3d at 790 (“Plaintiffs cannot avoid the exclusive and limited nature of relief under FECA by labeling their various damages as an array of different claims to which defendant is subject, some covered by FECA and some not.”); see also Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir.1992); Griffin v. United States, 703 F.2d 321, 322 (8th Cir.1983).

Id. (“Plaintiffs cannot avoid the exclusive and limited nature of relief under FECA by labeling their various damages as an array of different claims to which defendant is subject, some covered by FECA and some not.”).

See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8102 (a), 8116(c); Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 789 (6th Cir. 1997).

See Saltsman, 104 F.3d at 790 (“Plaintiffs cannot avoid the exclusive and limited nature of relief under FECA by labeling their various damages as an array of different claims to which defendant is subject, some covered by FECA and some not.”); see also Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir.1992); Griffin v. United States, 703 F.2d 321, 322 (8th Cir.1983).

And insofar as he suggests that he presented multiple claims to the Secretary, only one of which was found to be covered by the Compensation Act, he “cannot avoid the exclusive and limited nature of relief under [the Compensation Act] by labelling [his] various damages as an array of different claims to which defendant is subject, some covered by [the Compensation Act] and some not.” Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 790 (6th Cir. 1997).

FECA is the “exclusive remedy for all damages arising out of a discrete personal injury which kills or disables an employee.” Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 790 (6th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original); see Williamson, 862 F.3d at 580 (“FECA creates a quid pro quo—federal employees receive compensation for work-related injuries without having to prove fault, and in exchange, they lose the right to sue their government employer in tort.”).

See Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 789 (6th Cir.1997).

See Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 789 (6th Cir.1997); Greater Detroit Res.

See Saltsman, 104 F.3d at 790 (not reaching issue of whether nonphysical injuries that do not flow from physical injuries are compensable).

See 714 F.2d at 649-50 . 25 Dismissal is warranted because Mr. Fiaseu’s and Mr. Martinez’s causes of action 26 plainly seek “to recover damages suffered precisely because the . . . injury of a given 27 employee has impaired the special relationship between that employee and his or her 28 1 spouse or dependent.” See Saltsman, 104 F.3d at 790-91 (distinguishing and dismissing 2 loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims from those in 3 Woerth). 4 …

See Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 791 (6th Cir. 1997); Morris v. Potter, No. 1:04CV858, 2005 WL 5454330 , at *4 (M.D.N.C.

RMI Titanium, 78 F.3d at 1135 ; see also Saltsman v. United States, 104 F.3d 787, 789 (6th Cir.1997) (making a de novo review of a motion to dismiss granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 16 IV.