Patten v. Ardis (2018)

But see Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140 , 145 (3) ( 816 SE2d 623 ) (2018) (holding OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), permitting grandparent visitation absent clear and convincing showing of harm to child, is unconstitutional). 6 The record reflects that the Father never attempted to collect the overdue child support through any court proceeding.

See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (120 SCt 2054, 147 LE2d 49) (2000) (plurality opinion); Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 143-144 (2) (816 SE2d 633) (2018).

However, the Supreme Court of Georgia declared a previous version of the subsection unconstitutional in 2018, see Patten, 304 Ga. at 145 (3), and the current version of the statute did not take effect until July 1, 2022, after the trial court ruled on the motion to dismiss the modification petition and shortly before the trial court entered the Final Order in this case.

And, while the version of subsection (d) in effect at the time the trial court awarded visitation to Alford, see Ga. L. 2012, Act 702, § 1, was declared unconstitutional by this Court in Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 145 (3) (816 SE2d 633) (2018), subsection (c) (1)—as we have already concluded—is constitutional, and that is the standard the trial court applied here.

Parental control is a this-child-centered, truly personalist, value, while state control . . . respects the personhood of children only if one believes that there is something dignified about being regarded by a hubristic state as a policy datum to be manipulated . . . in accord with best-interests generalities.” (footnotes omitted)). 5 Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 141 (2) ( 816 SE2d 633 ) (2018). 6 Id. (“More than a hundred years ago, this Court identified [the right of pa…

Under OCGA § 15-11-2 (22), a “dependent child” is defined, in relevant part, as a child who “[h]as been abused or neglected and is in need of the protection of the court . . . .” And suffice it to say, “parental unfitness” is essential to supporting an “adjudication of dependency.”14 So, in making its determination as to dependency, a juvenile court “may consider evidence of past conduct, but the record must contain 12 Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 141 (2) ( 816 SE2d 633 ) (…

Our Supreme Court has long recognized that “[t]he right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children is deeply embedded in our law [and] among the inherent rights that are derived from the law of nature.” Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 141 (2) ( 816 SE2d 633 ) (2018).

Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 140 ( 816 SE2d 633 ) (2018). 5 pursuant to subsection (c) (1).7 Accordingly, we do not address whether the Grandmother would be entitled to such rights should she decide to pursue them.

Similarly, in Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 140 ( 816 SE2d 633 ) (2018), the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) is constitutional.

I., 277 Ga. App. at 230 . 9 Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 141 (2) ( 816 SE2d 633 ) (2018); accord Sloan v. Jones, 130 Ga. 836, 847 ( 62 SE 21 ) (1908), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Proctor v. Proctor, 164 Ga. 721 ( 139 SE 531 ) (1927); Moore v. Dozier, 128 Ga. 90, 93-94 ( 57 SE 110 ) (1907); see generally In the Interest of R.

See Court of Appeals Rule 33.2 (a) (1). 2 Patten v. Ardis , 304 Ga. 140 , 141, 816 S.E.2d 633 (2018). 3 Id. at 141 , 816 S.E.2d 633 ("More than a hundred years ago, this Court identified [the right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children] as among the inherent rights that are derived from the law of nature."); see Sloan v. Jones , 130 Ga. 836 , 847, 62 S.E. 21 (1908), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Proctor v. Proctor , 164 Ga. …

See Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 145 (3) ( 816 SE2d 633 ) (2018) (holding that OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), which authorized an award of visitation to a grandparent in the “best interests” of the child and over the objection of a “fit parent,” was unconstitutional, because the statute authorized such visitation “without any showing whatsoever (much less a showing by clear and convincing evidence) that the visitation [was] required to keep the child from actual or threatened harm”); B…

See Patten , 304 Ga. at 144-145 (3), 816 S.E.2d 633 (Under OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), when a child's parent was dead, incapacitated, or incarcerated, the trial court had the discretion to award visitation to the parent of the deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated parent without requiring clear and convincing evidence that the child would be harmed absent visitation.

See also Patten, 304 Ga. at 140 , 144–45 (holding that grandparent-visitation statute 14 violated the Georgia constitutional right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children because “it permit[ted] a court to set aside the decisions of a fit parent about what is best for his or her child, without clear and convincing proof that those decisions have harmed or threatened to harm the child”; non-parent visitation may not be imposed “over the objection of fit…

See also Patten, 304 Ga. at 144 (3).

See Patten, 304 Ga. at 144-145 (3) (Under OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), when a child’s parent was dead, incapacitated, or incarcerated, the trial court had the discretion to award visitation to the parent of the deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated parent without requiring clear and convincing evidence that the child would be harmed absent visitation.