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2018 Georgia Code 19-7-3 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 19 DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Section 7. Parent and Child Relationship Generally, 19-7-1 through 19-7-54.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

19-7-3. Actions by grandparents or other family members for visitation rights or intervention; revocation or amendment of visitation rights; appointment of guardian ad litem; mediation; hearing; notification to family members of child's participation in events.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. "Family member" means a grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling.
    2. "Grandparent" means the parent of a parent of a minor child, the parent of a minor child's parent who has died, and the parent of a minor child's parent whose parental rights have been terminated.
    3. "Great-grandparent" means the parent of the parent of a parent of a minor child, the parent of the parent of a minor child's parent who has died, and the parent of the parent of a minor child's parent whose parental rights have been terminated.
    4. "Sibling" means the brother or sister of a parent of a minor child, the brother or sister of a minor child's parent who has died, and the brother or sister of a minor child's parent whose parental rights have been terminated.
    1. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection:
      1. Any grandparent shall have the right to file an original action for visitation rights to a minor child; and
      2. Any family member shall have the right to intervene in and seek to obtain visitation rights in any action in which any court in this state shall have before it any question concerning the custody of a minor child, a divorce of the parents or a parent of such minor child, a termination of the parental rights of either parent of such minor child, or visitation rights concerning such minor child or whenever there has been an adoption in which the adopted child has been adopted by the child's blood relative or by a stepparent, notwithstanding the provisions of Code Section 19-8-19.
    2. This subsection shall not authorize an original action when the parents of the minor child are not separated and the child is living with both parents.
    1. Upon the filing of an original action or upon intervention in an existing proceeding under subsection (b) of this Code section, the court may grant any family member of the child reasonable visitation rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted and if the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation. The mere absence of an opportunity for a child to develop a relationship with a family member shall not be considered as harming the health or welfare of the child when there is no substantial preexisting relationship between the child and such family member. In considering whether the health or welfare of the child would be harmed without such visitation, the court shall consider and may find that harm to the child is reasonably likely to result when, prior to the original action or intervention:
      1. The minor child resided with the family member for six months or more;
      2. The family member provided financial support for the basic needs of the child for at least one year;
      3. There was an established pattern of regular visitation or child care by the family member with the child; or
      4. Any other circumstance exists indicating that emotional or physical harm would be reasonably likely to result if such visitation is not granted.

        The court shall make specific written findings of fact in support of its rulings.

    2. An original action requesting visitation rights shall not be filed by any grandparent more than once during any two-year period and shall not be filed during any year in which another custody action has been filed concerning the child. After visitation rights have been granted to any grandparent, the legal custodian, guardian of the person, or parent of the child may petition the court for revocation or amendment of such visitation rights, for good cause shown, which the court, in its discretion, may grant or deny; but such a petition shall not be filed more than once in any two-year period.
    3. While a parent's decision regarding family member visitation shall be given deference by the court, the parent's decision shall not be conclusive when failure to provide family member contact would result in emotional harm to the child. A court may presume that a child who is denied any contact with his or her family member or who is not provided some minimal opportunity for contact with his or her family member when there is a preexisting relationship between the child and such family member may suffer emotional injury that is harmful to such child's health. Such presumption shall be a rebuttable presumption.
    4. In no case shall the granting of visitation rights to a family member interfere with a child's school or regularly scheduled extracurricular activities.
    5. Visitation time awarded to a family member shall not be less than 24 hours in any one-month period; provided, however, that when more than one individual seeks visitation under this Code section, the court shall determine the amount of time to award to each petitioner which shall not be less than 24 hours in any one-month period in the aggregate.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this Code section, if one of the parents of a minor child dies, is incapacitated, or is incarcerated, the court may award the parent of the deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated parent of such minor child reasonable visitation to such child during his or her minority if the court in its discretion finds that such visitation would be in the best interests of the child. The custodial parent's judgment as to the best interests of the child regarding visitation shall be given deference by the court but shall not be conclusive.
  3. If the court finds that the family member can bear the cost without unreasonable financial hardship, the court, at the sole expense of the petitioning family member, may:
    1. Appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor child; and
    2. Assign the issue of visitation rights of a family member for mediation.
  4. In the event that the court does not order mediation or upon failure of the parties to reach an agreement through mediation, the court shall fix a time for the hearing of the issue of visitation rights of the family member.
  5. Whether or not visitation is awarded to a family member, the court may direct a custodial parent, by court order, to notify such family member of every performance of the minor child to which the public is admitted, including, but not limited to, musical concerts, graduations, recitals, and sporting events or games.
  6. When more than one family member files an action pursuant to this Code section, the court shall determine the priority of such actions.

(Ga. L. 1976, p. 247, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 936, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1318, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 10, § 19; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1516, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 864, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1572, § 4; Ga. L. 1993, p. 456, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1089, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 860, § 1/HB 1198; Ga. L. 2016, p. 87, § 1/HB 229.)

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, rewrote this Code section.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1996, p. 1089, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "The trial court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs to a respondent in an action filed pursuant to this Act upon the finding that the petition is brought for the purpose of harassment or any other improper purpose."

Law reviews.

- For article surveying developments in Georgia domestic relations law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (1981). For article citing developments in Georgia juvenile court practice and procedure from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 167 (1981). For survey article on domestic relations, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (1982). For annual survey of law of domestic relations, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 179 (1986). For annual survey article discussing developments in domestic relations law, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 263 (1999). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 221 (2004). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 133 (2006). For survey article on domestic relations law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 139 (2007) and 60 Mercer L. Rev. 121 (2008). For annual survey on domestic relations law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 121 (2012). For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 320 (2012). For annual survey on domestic relations law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 107 (2016). For annual survey on domestic relations, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2017). For note on permissive intervention of grandparents in divorce proceedings, see 26 Ga. L. Rev. 787 (1992). For review of 1996 domestic relations legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 148 (1996). For comment on "Grandparents' Visitation Rights in Georgia," see 29 Emory L.J. 1083 (1980). For comment on Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 454 S.E.2d 769 (1995), appearing below, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 779 (1995).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Unconstitutional.

- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 is unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions because the statute does not clearly promote the health or welfare of the child and does not require a showing of harm before state interference is authorized. Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 454 S.E.2d 769 (1995).

Order granting a grandparent visitation rights to the child of the grandparent's deceased son under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d) was reversed because the statute was unconstitutional under the Georgia Constitution as violating the right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children since the statute did not require clear and convincing evidence of imminent harm to the child. Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 816 S.E.2d 633 (2018).

Section not an exception to adoption statute terminating legal relationships.

- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3, which provides visitation rights for grandparents in certain situations, is not an exception to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-14, which operates to terminate all legal relationships between an adopted person and that person's relatives, when both the natural mother and father have released the child for adoption. Mitchell v. Erdmier, 253 Ga. 335, 320 S.E.2d 163 (1984).

"Grandparents' Bill of Rights" is not an exception to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-14. The only provision which grants grandparents visitation rights after an adoption is the limited one of the death of one parent, the remarriage of the surviving parent, followed by the adoption of the child by the stepparent. In other adoptions, the severance of relationships provision of § 19-8-14 controls, and no rights of visitation by former grandparents exist. Heard v. Coleman, 181 Ga. App. 899, 354 S.E.2d 164 (1987).

Construction of word "parent".

- Limiting language of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), forbidding original actions for grandparent visitation if the parents are together and living with the child, includes adoptive parents because in the absence of language limiting the term "parent" to only "natural parents" or "biological parents," there is no legislative intent to withhold from adoptive parents the same constitutionally protected status enjoyed by biological parents to raise their children without state interference, and in construing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), the definition of parent in the adoption statute, O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1(6) and (8), which gives full legal status to adoptive parents, cannot be ignored; grandparents may have a sincere, beneficent interest in participating in their grandchildren's lives, and this interest often coincides with the best interest of the child, but beyond constitutional considerations, policy decisions addressing disputes between grandparents and parents are the province of the legislature. Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. 710, 706 S.E.2d 98 (2011), aff'd, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

Purpose.

- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)(3) has been enacted to provide a mechanism for courts to grant a grandparent visitation rights with their minor grandchild, when a child's parent objects and, in that regard, the statute codified a standard for the trial courts to utilize in balancing the wishes of an alienated grandparent, the rights of the parents, and the interests of the child. Keith v. Callahan, 332 Ga. App. 291, 772 S.E.2d 386 (2015).

Adoption compared to proceeding to terminate parental rights.

- An adoption is not the equivalent to a proceeding to terminate parental rights within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3. Murphy v. McCarthy, 201 Ga. App. 101, 410 S.E.2d 198 (1991).

Grandparents' rights not affected by stepparent adoption.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19 provides for the termination of all legal relationships between an adopted child and his or her relatives, under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), grandparents' rights are not affected by an adoption by a stepparent. Lightfoot v. Hollins, 308 Ga. App. 538, 707 S.E.2d 491 (2011), overruled on other grounds, Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

Amendment to custody petition as "original action for visitation rights".

- Child custody action originated by a grandmother who sought visitation rights through an amendment to the custody petition was an "original action for visitation rights" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b). Sewell v. Bill Johnson Motors, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 853, 446 S.E.2d 239 (1994).

Legislative intent of subsection (c).

- General Assembly, by the enactment of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c), has sought to limit the number of original actions for visitation which grandparents may file. Anderson v. Sanford, 198 Ga. App. 410, 401 S.E.2d 604 (1991).

Basis of grandparents' right to visitation with grandchildren.

- Any right of grandparents to visitation with their grandchildren is based on Ga. L. 1976, p. 247, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3). Spitz v. Holland, 243 Ga. 9, 252 S.E.2d 406 (1979).

Grandparents have no right to visitation, but only a right to request privilege of visitation. Sachs v. Walzer, 242 Ga. 742, 251 S.E.2d 302 (1978).

Grant of visitation rights to grandparents is purely discretionary.

- Statute allows court having before it a custody question to grant visitation to child's grandparents. However, any such grant is purely discretionary, and may be exercised only when the court is considering custody matters and finds that conditions are such that it is appropriate to allow this privilege to the grandparents. Sachs v. Walzer, 242 Ga. 742, 251 S.E.2d 302 (1978).

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 allows trial court discretion to grant or deny visitation rights to grandparents. Ryback v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 163 Ga. App. 165, 293 S.E.2d 563 (1982); Welch v. Suggs, 175 Ga. App. 233, 333 S.E.2d 31 (1985).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying visitation rights to grandparent since the court found that to grant visitation privileges would disturb present stability of the child and would probably result in severe emotional trauma. Ryback v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 163 Ga. App. 165, 293 S.E.2d 563 (1982).

Trial court may grant any grandparent reasonable visitation rights if the court finds the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted and if the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation. Keith v. Callahan, 332 Ga. App. 291, 772 S.E.2d 386 (2015).

Parent's decision not conclusive on grandparent visitation.

- Georgia law expressly provides that while a parent's decision shall be given deference by the court, the parent's decision shall not be conclusive when failure to provide the grandparent contact would result in emotional harm to the child. Keith v. Callahan, 332 Ga. App. 291, 772 S.E.2d 386 (2015).

When section may be invoked.

- It is only when custody questions are in issue that statute may be invoked. Spitz v. Holland, 243 Ga. 9, 252 S.E.2d 406 (1979).

Court may consider grant of visitation rights to grandparents only in cases when the court has before it a question concerning custody. Mead v. Owens, 149 Ga. App. 303, 254 S.E.2d 431 (1979).

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 only authorizes grandparents to intervene to obtain visitation rights in the proceedings specified in the section. Murphy v. McCarthy, 201 Ga. App. 101, 410 S.E.2d 198 (1991).

Grandparents had standing to bring original action based on their child/parent being deceased.

- Dismissal of the grandparents' action on the ground that the grandparents lacked standing for failing to comply with O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b) was error because the grandparents were the parents of the deceased parent of the minor child at issue and fell within the ambit of § 19-7-3(d), and the trial court erred by interpreting that § 19-7-3(d) applied only when one parent was dead, resulting in a single parent situation only, as a result of the father being remarried. Fielder v. Johnson, 333 Ga. App. 658, 773 S.E.2d 831 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1893, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 1 (Ga. 2016).

Specific findings of fact required.

- Trial court's conclusory statement to the effect that the granddaughter's visitation with the maternal grandparents was in the granddaughter's best interests failed to set forth specific findings of fact supporting the trial court's grant of grandparent visitation; those findings enable a reviewing court to conduct an intelligent review of the merits of the visitation case, and absent those findings the case had to be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for adequate findings. Rainey v. Lange, 261 Ga. App. 491, 583 S.E.2d 163 (2003).

Trial court erred in failing to rule upon a maternal grandfather's request for visitation with a mother's child because the trial court was required to apply O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c) and determine whether the grandfather had presented clear and convincing evidence that the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless visitation was granted and whether the child's best interests would be served by allowing such visitation. Sheppard v. McCraney, 317 Ga. App. 91, 730 S.E.2d 721 (2012).

Trial court erred in failing to show that the court applied the proper evidentiary standard and in failing to include written findings of fact to support the court's broad, conclusory ruling as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)(1); the trial court stated only that the court had considered the entire record before concluding that the grandmother had shown, pursuant to § 19-7-3, that the health and welfare of the minor child would be harmed unless visitation was provided for the child with the grandmother. Van Leuvan v. Carlisle, 322 Ga. App. 576, 745 S.E.2d 814 (2013).

When grandparents seek modification of order denying grandparents custody.

- Custody question arises when grandparents seek modification of habeas corpus order denying the grandparents custody. George v. Sizemore, 238 Ga. 525, 233 S.E.2d 779 (1977).

Modification of grandparents' visitation rights.

- Mother argued that the grandparents were not authorized to seek, and the trial court was not authorized to grant, a change of the grandparent visitation provided in the original consent order, but O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 did not limit the grandparents' ability to counterclaim for a modification of visitation in response to an action by the mother in which the mother requested that the grandparents' visitation rights be revisited, reviewed, and modified on a temporary and permanent basis and that their visitation for summer 2016 be suspended pending further investigation of the court; thus, the grandparents had the authority to seek, and the trial court had the authority to grant, a temporary modification of the grandparents' visitation rights. Pate v. Sadlock, 345 Ga. App. 591, 814 S.E.2d 760 (2018).

Grandparents' rights to bring action for custody not dependent on legitimation.

- Although the definition of "grandparents" found in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(a) is limited to that Code section, outlining visitation rights for grandparents, the statute sheds light upon a grandparent's status as that of the parent of a parent; the paternal grandparents' right to bring an action for custody of a child was controlled by a showing that their son was the parent of the child, not by their son legitimating that child, and a trial court's order dismissing the paternal grandparents' custody action for lack of standing due to a void legitimation of the child was reversed. Reeves v. Hayes, 266 Ga. App. 297, 596 S.E.2d 668 (2004).

Grandparents' visitation deemed tried by consent when parent did not object.

- Because a parent's only objection to the grandparents' visitation raised at the hearing was the parent's concern for advance notice by the grandparents before scheduling a visit, the parent failed to preserve any objection that the grandparents had failed to intervene in the action as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c), pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(b). Grove v. Grove, 296 Ga. 435, 768 S.E.2d 453 (2015).

Legislature's intent in enacting 1980 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 was to give grandparents standing to seek visitation in a situation in which their own child had lost his or her parental rights through death or termination. Smith v. Finstad, 247 Ga. 603, 277 S.E.2d 736 (1981).

Law as amended in 1980 applies retroactively, and reviewing court should apply law as the law exists at time of the court's judgment rather than law prevailing at rendition of judgment under review. Houston v. Houston, 156 Ga. App. 47, 274 S.E.2d 91 (1980).

Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 granting visitation rights to grandparents are retroactive. Ryback v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 163 Ga. App. 165, 293 S.E.2d 563 (1982).

Retroactive application of section not unconstitutional.

- Because no one may acquire a vested interest in custody of a minor child, no vested rights are affected by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 and, therefore, the statute's retroactive application is not unconstitutional. Smith v. Finstad, 247 Ga. 603, 277 S.E.2d 736 (1981).

Application of the 1976 law (Ga. L. 1976, p. 247, § 1) in modification of the 1975 child custody award was not impermissible as a retroactive application of the 1976 statute. George v. Sizemore, 238 Ga. 525, 233 S.E.2d 779 (1977).

Incorrect standard used.

- In ruling on the grandfather's request for visitation, the trial court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the evidence, necessitating remand. Ballweg v. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs., 336 Ga. App. 372, 785 S.E.2d 47 (2016).

Grandmother's motion to intervene denied but merits fully considered.

- Although the juvenile court technically denied the grandmother's motion to intervene seeking custody of and visitation with the child, the juvenile court held a hearing in which the grandmother was allowed to present evidence in support of the grandmother's request for visitation and custody, and the court fully considered the merits of the grandmother's claims before denying the grandmother's motion to intervene. In the Interest of L. R. M., 333 Ga. App. 1, 775 S.E.2d 254 (2015).

Direct appeal in child custody case.

- Because the trial court denied the grandmother's petition for custody and visitation, the denial of the grandmother's motion was directly appealable. In the Interest of L. R. M., 333 Ga. App. 1, 775 S.E.2d 254 (2015).

Cited in Dyer v. Allen, 238 Ga. 516, 233 S.E.2d 772 (1977); Rhodes v. Peacock, 142 Ga. App. 328, 235 S.E.2d 762 (1977); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 194 Ga. App. 147, 390 S.E.2d 247 (1990); Motes v. Love, 202 Ga. App. 749, 415 S.E.2d 334 (1992); Bergmann v. McCullough, 218 Ga. App. 353, 461 S.E.2d 544 (1995); Scott v. Scott, 311 Ga. App. 726, 716 S.E.2d 809 (2011).

Application

Child in temporary custody of paternal grandmother.

- When a child was in the temporary custody of the child's paternal grandmother, the trial court erred in applying O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 to the petition of the maternal grandmother for unsupervised visitation with her grandchild. Perrin v. Stansell, 243 Ga. App. 475, 533 S.E.2d 458 (2000).

In order to gain visitation rights with a grandchild who is in the temporary custody of a third party, i.e., another grandparent or a stranger, it is not necessary for the petitioning grandparent to prove that the child would be harmed without visitation; instead, the petitioner must demonstrate by a simple preponderance of the evidence that visitation is in the best interest of the child. Perrin v. Stansell, 243 Ga. App. 475, 533 S.E.2d 458 (2000).

Effect of intervention in deprivation proceeding.

- Grandparents' intervention in a proceeding to determine deprivation did not bar their subsequent petition for visitation rights since there had been no previous adjudication of their right to visitation, nor had the grandparents brought any other action seeking visitation with their grandchildren. Anderson v. Sanford, 198 Ga. App. 410, 401 S.E.2d 604 (1991).

Paternal grandparents cannot intervene in adoption proceeding.

- Adoption proceeding in which all paternal rights are sought to be severed is not such a proceeding concerning custody or guardianship as will support an intervening petition by paternal grandparents for visitation privileges. Mead v. Owens, 149 Ga. App. 303, 254 S.E.2d 431 (1979).

Superior court erred in permitting the paternal grandparents of a minor child to intervene in the third party's petition to adopt the child because O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 only authorized the grandparents to intervene to obtain visitation rights, and the statute did not authorize intervention by the grandparents to object to the adoption and to obtain custody themselves. McDowell v. Bowers, 342 Ga. App. 811, 805 S.E.2d 136 (2017).

When grandparents are not entitled to relief.

- When grandparents have not intervened in the proceedings, the grandparents are not parties to the action, nor are the grandparents otherwise before the trial court, and the grandparents are not entitled to be granted relief. Smith v. Smith, 174 Ga. App. 903, 332 S.E.2d 41 (1985).

Grandparents were not statutorily authorized to intervene in adoption proceedings brought by a married couple who were not blood relatives of the child since the child's parents were living, and the grandparents did not intervene to seek visitation rights, but instead intervened to object to the adoption and to seek to adopt the child themselves. Murphy v. McCarthy, 201 Ga. App. 101, 410 S.E.2d 198 (1991).

Grandmother who was temporary legal custodian of child under juvenile court deprivation order did not have standing to intervene in adoption proceedings. Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 422 S.E.2d 234 (1992).

Trial court erred in denying a motion filed by a child's mother and stepfather to dismiss a paternal grandparents' petition for visitation with the child because the petition was not authorized, and the trial court erred by interpreting the word "parent" in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b) to include only biological parents; the child's father surrendered his parental rights, the stepfather adopted the child, and the mother and stepfather lived with the child. Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. 710, 706 S.E.2d 98 (2011), aff'd, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

Visitation rights precluded when child adopted by stepfather.

- Paternal grandparents were not entitled to visitation rights after the child's natural father's parental rights had been terminated and the child had been adopted by his stepfather, who was not a "blood relative". Campbell v. Holcomb, 193 Ga. App. 474, 388 S.E.2d 65 (1989); Echols v. Smith, 207 Ga. App. 317, 427 S.E.2d 820 (1993).

Term "parents" in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b) did not exclude a child's adoptive parent; therefore, because a child was living with the child's mother and adoptive father, who were not separated, the child's natural grandparents had no right to file an original action for visitation with the child under the statute. Upon their son's termination of his parental rights to the child, the grandparents became strangers to the child, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19. Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

Paternal grandparents entitled to visitation award in stepfather's adoption.

- Trial court was specifically authorized to award grandparent visitation into a stepparent adoption decree pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)(1); although, generally, the adoption of the child would have extinguished any visitation rights of the child's former grandparents under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19(a)(1). Evans v. Sangster, 330 Ga. App. 533, 768 S.E.2d 278 (2015).

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 does not require finding that parent is unfit, but simply that the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless grandparent visitation is granted. Rogers v. Barnett, 237 Ga. App. 301, 514 S.E.2d 443 (1999).

Grandparent enabling parent to have visitation denied custody and visitation.

- Grandmother's request for custody and visitation was properly denied because the Division of Family and Children Services (DFCS) took the child into custody while the child was living with the grandmother and mother, and there was some evidence that the mother continued to live with the grandmother despite their protestations otherwise; the conditions precipitating the DFCS's involvement remained as the mother had not made any progress with the DFCS case plan and continued to use drugs; and the grandmother knew that the mother was not allowed to have unsupervised visitation with the child, but the grandmother ignored that restriction and allowed the mother to have such visitation while the child was in the grandmother's care. In the Interest of L. R. M., 333 Ga. App. 1, 775 S.E.2d 254 (2015).

Grandparent visitation properly denied.

- In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the child would experience actual physical, mental, or emotional harm if visitation was denied, the trial court's order granting visitation rights to the grandparents was not justified. Hunter v. Carter, 226 Ga. App. 251, 485 S.E.2d 827 (1997).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in relying on the testimony of the grandparents and the father to make the court's judgment denying the grandparents' request for visitation rights with their granddaughter or in choosing not to appoint a guardian ad litem because, while the grandparents claimed that the trial court failed to consider their granddaughter's best interests, the trial court heard testimony on that subject from them as well as from the father; both the grant of visitation rights to a grandparent under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c), and the appointment of a guardian ad litem under § 19-7-3 (d) are purely within the discretion of the trial court. Srader v. Midkiff, 303 Ga. App. 514, 693 S.E.2d 856 (2010).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the grandparents' request for visitation rights with their granddaughter because the trial court held a hearing on the issue of grandparent visitation and determined that the grandparents failed to show that the health or welfare of the granddaughter would be harmed unless such visitation was granted and that the best interests of the granddaughter would be served by such visitation; the trial court did not err in failing to assign the issue to mediation because under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d)(2), assignment of grandparent visitation cases to mediation was within the discretion of the trial court. Srader v. Midkiff, 303 Ga. App. 514, 693 S.E.2d 856 (2010).

Grandparent visitation should have been denied.

- Because the mother and the father objected to court-mandated visitation with the grandparents and there was no showing that a failure to grant visitation to the grandparents would be harmful to the children, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c), the trial court erred in awarding visitation to the grandparents. Ormond v. Ormond, 274 Ga. App. 869, 619 S.E.2d 370 (2005).

Grandparent visitation properly granted.

- Trial court's grandparent visitation award contained a finding that the children would have suffered emotional harm unless grandparent visitation was granted, and that such visitation was in the best interests of the children; thus, visitation was granted on the grounds authorized by the Grandparent Visitation Statute, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3. Luke v. Luke, 280 Ga. App. 607, 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006).

Juvenile court erred by terminating a grandparent's visitation rights previously granted by relying on the child's out-of-court statements and by failing to recite what standard the court was using to modify the previous visitation awarded to the grandparent. In re K. I. S., 294 Ga. App. 295, 669 S.E.2d 207 (2008).

Trial court did not err by granting the maternal grandmother visitation rights over the child because the mother's decision against it was not conclusive and the court considered all of the circumstances, including the grandmother's fear of the mother's new husband, whom had been aggressive and combative toward the grandmother in the past. Keith v. Callahan, 332 Ga. App. 291, 772 S.E.2d 386 (2015).

Discretionary appeal procedure applicable to grandparent's visitation privileges.

- Since visitation privileges are, of course, part of custody, grandparents seeking appellate review of an unfavorable ruling regarding visitation privileges are, like parents, required to follow the procedure necessary to secure a discretionary appeal. Tuttle v. Stauffer, 177 Ga. App. 112, 338 S.E.2d 544 (1985).

Grandparent visitation continued.

- When the trial court denied a couple's petition to adopt a child and to terminate the parental rights of the child's legal father, the trial court did not err in also finding that it was in the child's best interest to continue the child's relationship with a paternal grandmother; the couple offered no evidence that it was not in the child's best interest to continue such visitation, and the trial court found that the paternal grandmother exercised regular visitation with the child and that it was in the child's best interests for all of the grandparents to cooperate in providing for the child. Thaggard v. Willard, 285 Ga. App. 384, 646 S.E.2d 479 (2007).

Efforts at grandparent visitation thwarted by parent.

- Trial court did not err in denying a father's motion for summary judgment in maternal grandparents' action seeking visitation with his child pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b) because the trial court had the discretion to choose to allow the case to go forward under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(f) in order for the guardian ad litem to investigate the facts since the lack of a relationship between the grandparents and the child could or could not be the fault of the grandparents when there was some evidence that the father had thwarted attempts at visitation in the early years following the mother's death; although the grandparents' affidavits in opposition to the father's motion for summary judgment contained information about the child's best interests, the grandparents did not provide any direct evidence of harm that the child would suffer as a result of not having visitation with the grandparents, but instead, the grandparents relied on § 9-11-56(f) and the trial court's appointment of a guardian ad litem under § 19-7-3(d)(1) to argue that the facts needed to be further developed and that a decision on summary judgment was premature. Lightfoot v. Hollins, 308 Ga. App. 538, 707 S.E.2d 491 (2011), overruled on other grounds, Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).

Mother was a proper party to a maternal grandfather's action seeking visitation with the mother's child, and the mother's objection to the grandfather's request for visitation was pertinent to the claim under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 because the award of temporary guardianship and custody of the child to the paternal grandparents did not terminate the mother's rights or confer permanent guardianship or custody. Sheppard v. McCraney, 317 Ga. App. 91, 730 S.E.2d 721 (2012).

Visitation to father's sister improper.

- Trial court erred in granting a father's sister visitation because the sister was neither a grandparent seeking visitation nor a family member seeking custody but was a non-party to the mother's action seeking child support and the father's counterclaim for legitimation. Morris v. Morris, 309 Ga. App. 387, 710 S.E.2d 601 (2011).

Proper standard to apply when parent incarcerated.

- Order denying the paternal grandparents' visitation was vacated when the grandparents' son was incarcerated, the trial court should have applied the best interests standard set out in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d) instead of the less favorable harmed unless such visitation is granted standard set out in subsection (c). Vincent v. Vincent, 333 Ga. App. 902, 777 S.E.2d 729 (2015).

Trial court required to make findings of fact.

- Trial court erred in dismissing a paternal grandmother's petition for visitation with three minor grandchildren who had been adopted by their stepfather because the trial court was required to determine if the parents were separated and whether the child was living with both of the parents. If the parents were separated and the child was not living with both of the parents, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 would authorize the grandmother to seek visitation. Hudgins v. Harding, 313 Ga. App. 613, 722 S.E.2d 355 (2012).

To resolve the issue of visitation, a trial court is required to apply O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c) in the court's determination of whether a grandparent has presented clear and convincing evidence that the child's health or welfare would be harmed unless visitation was granted, and whether such visitation was in the child's best interests with the inclusion of specific written findings of fact supported by clear and convincing record evidence being mandatory to justify a grant of visitation. Therefore, the trial court erred by awarding a biological grandmother visitation when the court failed to make the specific findings of fact. Esasky v. Ford, 321 Ga. App. 891, 743 S.E.2d 550 (2013).

Denial of grandparent's request to appear by telephone.

- In a grandparent visitation matter, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in connection with the court's denial of the grandmother's request to appear by telephone, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-9-50(b), because the trial court properly determined that the grandmother was not indigent based on the information provided that the grandmother's monthly income was $4,669. Devlin v. Devlin, 339 Ga. App. 520, 791 S.E.2d 840 (2016).

Attorney fees.

- After entering judgment for the defendant in an action for grandparent's visitation, the trial court abused the court's discretion in deciding the defendant's motion for attorney fees without properly reviewing her claim that the grandparents harassed her or unnecessarily expanded the proceedings by other improper conduct. McKeen v. McKeen, 224 Ga. App. 410, 481 S.E.2d 236 (1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 13.

Grandparent Visitation and Custody Awards, 69 POF3d 281.

C.J.S.

- 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 52 et seq., 357, 358.

ALR.

- Award of custody of child where contest is between child's father and grandparent, 25 A.L.R.3d 7.

Award of custody of child where contest is between child's parents and grandparents, 31 A.L.R.3d 1187.

Grandparents' visitation rights, 90 A.L.R.3d 222.

Visitation rights of persons other than natural parents or grandparents, 1 A.L.R.4th 1270.

Religion as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 22 A.L.R.4th 971.

Attorneys' fee awards in parent-nonparent child custody cases, 45 A.L.R.4th 212.

Grandparents' visitation rights where child's parents are deceased, or where status of parents is unspecified, 69 A.L.R.5th 1.

Grandparent's visitation rights where child's parents are living, 71 A.L.R.5th 99.

Validity of grandparent visitation statutes, 86 A.L.R.6th 1.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 133 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 17, 1995 | 454 S.E.2d 769

...Decided March 17, 1995. Sutton & McCreary, Timothy A. McCreary, for appellants. Lela S. Bridgers, Robert E. Flournoy III, for appellee. HUNT, Chief Justice. This appeal presents the issue of the constitutionality of Georgia's "Grandparent Visitation Statute," OCGA § 19-7-3. We hold that the statute is unconstitutional under both our state and federal constitutions, and reverse the trial court's order to the contrary. Parkerson, the child's maternal grandmother, filed a petition for visitation under OCGA § 19-7-3....
...e and, assuming its constitutionality, the appropriate burden of proof in grandparent visitation cases. [1] Because we find the statute unconstitutional, we need not reach the second question. 1. The Statute. The Grandparent Visitation Statute, OCGA § 19-7-3, enacted substantially in its present form in 1988, [2] grants any grandparent the right to seek visitation of a minor grandchild in three ways: by filing an original action for visitation rights, by intervening in certain existing actions including those where the custody of a minor child is in issue, or by proceeding where there has been an adoption in which the adopted child has been adopted by the child's blood relative or a stepparent. OCGA § 19-7-3 (b). The statute further provides that "the court may grant any grandparent of the child reasonable visitation rights upon proof of special circumstances which make such visitation rights necessary to the best interests of the child." OCGA § 19-7-3 (c)....
...to dismiss is reversed. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Benham, P. J., and Hunstein, J., who dissent. *195 SEARS, Justice, concurring. Both the majority and the dissent say much of Georgia's "Grandparent Visitation Statute," OCGA § 19-7-3, that today we declare unconstitutional....
...The statute makes the judicial process available for grandparents to use to require their children to provide them visitation rights with their grandchildren upon a showing of "special circumstances which make such visitation rights necessary to the best interest of the child." OCGA § 19-7-3 (c)....
...ority over their children, thereby undermining the privacy and primacy of the American family. The statute cannot be allowed to stand. BENHAM, Presiding Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority's sweeping pronouncement that OCGA § 19-7-3, Georgia's "Grandparent Visitation Statute," [8] violates the constitutions of both Georgia and the United States....
...g judicial assumption' that grandparent-grandchild relationships always benefit children. . .." Rather, it requires grandparents to establish "special circumstances which make such visitation rights necessary to the best interest of the child." OCGA § 19-7-3 (c)....
...isitation As Unconstitutional Invasions of Family Life and Invalid Exercises of State Power, 3 George Mason Univ. Civil Rights L. Journal 271, 289 (1992)), except that an original petition may not be filed more than once in any two-year period. OCGA § 19-7-3 (c)....
...constitutes an unconstitutional invasion of privacy rights under the Tennessee Constitution. Id. at 582. The majority does not so limit its condemnation of the Georgia statute. In addition, I wish to note that, in 1993, a trial court ruled that OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) was unconstitutional insofar as it authorized court-ordered grandparent visitation after the grandchild had been adopted by a blood relative....
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Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 130 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 16, 2001 | 273 Ga. 587

...Thus, a parent's right to the custody and control of his child is to be fiercely guarded and should be infringed upon only under the most compelling circumstances. Id.; In re: Suggs, 249 Ga. 365, 367, 291 S.E.2d 233 (1982). In Brooks at 190, 454 S.E.2d 769, this Court found the Georgia Grandparent Visitation Statute (OCGA § 19-7-3) unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions....
...Id. That the legislature enacted OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1) after this Court rendered the decision in Brooks, supra, does not demonstrate ipso facto its intention to comply with Brooks at that time. After all, following Brooks, the legislature amended the grandparent visitation statute, OCGA § 19-7-3, to require a showing of "harm"; yet it failed to include such a requirement in subsection (b.1)....
...854, 238 S.E.2d 917 (1977) (parent retains right to consent to child's adoption despite transfer of legal custody to another person). [37] See In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246, 254-255 (Colo.1995). [38] 265 Ga. at 194, 454 S.E.2d 769. [39] Id. at 193, 454 S.E.2d 769. [40] See OCGA § 19-7-3(c) (1999). [41] 530 U.S....
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Stone v. Stone, 297 Ga. 451 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 29, 2015 | 774 S.E.2d 681

...cated. This result does not mean, however, that the statute does not respect and promote the interaction of loving grandparents with a minor child. To the contrary, the statute encourages contact with grandparents in OCGA § 19-9-3 (d), and OCGA § 19-7-3 provides a mechanism for a grant of visitation rights to grandparents when necessary to ensure and preserve this contact....
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Patten v. Ardis, 816 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 29, 2018 | 304 Ga. 140

...ent of the deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated parent of such minor child reasonable visitation to such child during his or her minority if the court in its discretion finds that such visitation would be in the best interests of the child. OCGA § 19-7-3 (d)....
...nvincing proof that those decisions have harmed or threaten to harm the child, and based simply on the conclusion of a judge that he knows better than the parent what is best for the child. Adhering to our decision in Brooks, we hold today that OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) violates the right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children, as that fundamental right is guaranteed by the Constitution of 1983. 1....
...In November 2015, the widowed Patten gave birth to a baby girl, and Patten permitted Shaughnessy's mother, Mary Jo Ardis, to visit with the baby on a couple of occasions. But those visits apparently did not go well,3 and in November 2016, Ardis filed a petition in the Superior **141Court of Lowndes County pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) for court-ordered visitation with her granddaughter.4 Citing Brooks, Patten responded that subsection (d) unconstitutionally impairs a parent's "right to raise his or her child without undue state interference," and upon this ground, Patten moved to dismiss the petition for visitation....
...e courts "may grant any grandparent of [a] child reasonable visitation rights upon proof of special circumstances which make such visitation rights necessary to the best interests of the child." 265 Ga. at 190 (1), 454 S.E.2d 769 (citing former OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) )....
...The statute in question is unconstitutional under [the Constitution of 1983] because it does not ... require a showing of harm before state interference is authorized. Id. at 194 (2) (c), 454 S.E.2d 769 (footnote omitted).11 **145The statute at issue in this case, OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), is materially indistinguishable from the statute that we held unconstitutional in Brooks. Indeed, OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) suffers from precisely the same infirmity as the statute in Brooks-it authorizes an award of visitation to a grandparent over the objection of a fit parent and without any showing whatsoever (much less a showing by clear and convincing evidence) that the visitation is required to keep the child from actual or threatened harm. To be sure, OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) applies in a more limited set of circumstances than the statute we held unconstitutional in Brooks- OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) applies only when a parent of a child has died, become incapacitated, or been incarcerated, and it authorizes an award of visitation only to the parents of the deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated parent of the child....
...Even so, we find no strong reason to conclude that grandparent visitation is always (or almost always) essential to keep a child from actual or threatened harm upon the death, incapacity, or incarceration of a parent. Consequently, we cannot conclude that harm is so inherent in the limited circumstances in which OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) applies that proof by clear and convincing evidence of actual or threatened harm to the child is constitutionally unnecessary....
...at 194 (2) (c), 454 S.E.2d 769 ("While there are, to be sure, many instances where the grandparent-grandchild bond is beneficial to the child, we have found, and the parties cite, little evidence that this is most often the case."). Brooks leads inescapably to the conclusion that OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) violates the Constitution of 1983. **1464. The trial court awarded visitation to Ardis under OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), and given the unconstitutionality of subsection (d), that award must be reversed. The case is remanded for the trial court to consider whether Ardis is entitled to visitation under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c). *638Judgment reversed, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur. See Ga. L. 1988, p. 864. See Ga. L. 2012, p. 860. The parties dispute why these visits went badly, and they also dispute whether Ardis was estranged from Shaughnessy at the time of his death. Ardis also sought visitation under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), which provides in pertinent part that a court can grant "any family member of the child reasonable visitation rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted and if the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation." The trial court based the judgment from which this appeal is taken, however, entirely upon OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), and no issue concerning OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) is presented to this Court. In its order, the trial court did not mention Brooks, did not explain its thinking about the constitutional question, and said only in conclusory fashion that it "hereby affirms the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3 (d)." More specifically, the trial court ordered that, until the girl's sixth birthday, Ardis is entitled to visit with her between 11:00 am and 3:00 pm on the third Saturday of March, the third Saturday of May, the third Saturday of August, the third Saturday of November, and December 28....
...After her sixth birthday, Ardis is entitled to have visitation with the girl over four weekends each year (from Friday evening until Sunday evening), one full week in July, and from the evening of December 28 to the evening of December 30. In the trial court and on appeal, Patten contends that OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) violates the United States Constitution and the Constitution of 1983. Our decision in Brooks rested on both. We limit our decision today, however, to the Constitution of 1983. Because OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) violates the state constitution, there is no need for us to decide whether it also violates the national constitution. "In 1784, our General Assembly adopted the statutes and common law of England as of May 14, 1776, except to the extent that they were displaced by our own constitutional or statutory law....
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Mathenia v. Brumbelow, 843 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 18, 2020 | 308 Ga. 714

...Furthermore, this Court has already declared unconstitutional other statutes that used a “best interests” standard when those statutes were applied to cases in which a “fit parent” standard was necessary. See Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 145 (3) (816 SE2d 633) (2018) (holding that OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), which authorized an award of visitation to a grandparent in the “best interests” of the child and over the objection of a “fit parent,” was unconstitutional, because the statute authorized such visitation “without any showing whatsoever (much less a showing by clear and convincing evidence) that the visitation [was] required to keep the child from actual or threatened harm”); Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 190 (1) -194 (2) (c) (454 SE2d 769) (1995) (holding former OCGA § 19-7-3 unconstitutional where statute provided that courts “may grant any grandparent of [a] child reasonable visitation rights upon proof of special circumstances which make Brumbelow, supra, 347 Ga....
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McAlister v. Clifton, 313 Ga. 737 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 19, 2022

...CLIFTON. ELLINGTON, Justice. Erin McAlister appeals from trial court orders awarding Wendi Clifton, McAlister’s former domestic partner, visitation rights to McAlister’s adopted daughter, Catherine, pursuant to the equitable caregiver statute, OCGA § 19-7-3.1.1 McAlister contends the trial court erred in declaring the statute “constitutional, both facially and as applied to [Clifton],” as well as finding that Clifton had standing to seek visitation rights as Catherine’s equitable caregiver....
...granted the motion. Thus, as discussed below, this portion of the final order is already a nullity. 2 petition for visitation with Catherine, rejecting McAlister’s challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3.1.3 Also on January 25, the trial court issued its “Final Order on Equitable Caregiver,” in which it found that Clifton had satisfied the statute’s criteria for standing as an equitable caregiver, and it awarded her “parenting time” with Catherine....
...pensation; and (5) Demonstrated that the child will suffer physical harm or long-term emotional harm and that continuing the relationship between such individual and the child is in the best interest of the child. OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (d). 4 The Supreme Court of Georgia has exclusive jurisdiction over cases 3 Thereafter, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding whether this appeal is moot....
...duty of this court to raise the question of its jurisdiction in all cases in which there may be any doubt as to the existence of such jurisdiction.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 1. Clifton contends that McAlister’s challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3.1 is moot because Catherine is now legally an adult and no longer in the custody or control of her parent....
...preventing a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. Accordingly, we vacate those portions of the trial court’s orders regarding the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3.1 as moot and remand the case to the trial court with direction to dismiss Clifton’s claim for visitation, which was based on the statute....
... appeal as moot after appellant’s requested remedy was afforded during pendency of appeal), we ought to consider in an appropriate case the proper scope and nature of Georgia’s mootness doctrine. Decided May 17, 2022. OCGA § 19-7-3.1; constitutional question....
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Mitchell v. Erdmier, 320 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 26, 1984 | 253 Ga. 335

...The trial court denied Jewell Mitchell's petition for visitation rights with her 21-month-old grandchild. The basis for denial was that the relationship between the grandparent and grandchild had been terminated by adoption. We affirm. The issue is whether OCGA § 19-7-3, which provides visitation rights for grandparents in certain situations, is an exception to OCGA § 19-8-14, which operates to terminate all legal relationships between the adopted person and his relatives....
...the adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes. . . ." This language clearly eliminates any claim of right to visitation with the adopted child by a former relative. However, the grandmother relies upon OCGA § 19-7-3 as an exception....
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Dias v. Boone, 912 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 18, 2025 | 320 Ga. 785

320 Ga. 785 FINAL COPY S24A0887. DIAS v. BOONE. PETERSON, Presiding Justice. This case presents the question of the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3.1, known as the Equitable Caregiver Statute....
...that certain criteria have been met, including that he or she has undertaken a “parental” role with the child and developed a “bonded and dependent” relationship with the child that “was fostered or supported by a parent of the child[.]” OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (d)....
...Such an application of the statute also would be in tension with constitutional presumptions against retroactive legislation. And so, based on both the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and those presumptions against retroactivity, we conclude as a matter of statutory construction that OCGA § 19-7-3.1 does not authorize trial courts to confer equitable caregiver status based on conduct by the legal parent that took place prior to the effective date of the statute....
...Several years later, the couple broke off their romantic relationship. Boone continued to be involved in M. D.’s life after the breakup until 2018, when Dias stopped further contact between Boone and M. D. Boone filed an action in superior court seeking equitable caregiver status under OCGA § 19-7-3.1 in August 2019, one month after the new statute became effective. The statute provides that a court may “adjudicate an individual to be an equitable caregiver.” OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (a). It provides both procedural and substantive requirements for an individual to establish “standing to maintain the action” to be adjudicated as an equitable caregiver. See OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (b), (d)....
...compensation; and (5) Demonstrated that the child will suffer physical harm or long-term emotional harm and that continuing the relationship between such individual and the child is in the best interest of the child. OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (d). The statute also sets forth factors that the court “shall consider” “[i]n determining the existence of harm[.]” OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (e)....
...The statute provides that “[t]he court may enter an order as appropriate to establish parental rights 4 and responsibilities for such individual” — presumably, someone “adjudicated” as an equitable caregiver — “including, but not limited to, custody or visitation.” OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (g). In her lawsuit, Boone sought joint physical and legal custody of and parenting time with M....
...The trial court issued an order granting Boone’s “request for determination of prima facie case for standing” and reserving ruling on Dias’s motion to dismiss. Dias later filed another motion styled as a “Motion for Declaratory Judgment/Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support.” Dias argued that OCGA § 19-7-3.1 was unconstitutional, because it does not sufficiently protect a parent’s fundamental right under the federal and state constitutions to the care, custody, and control of 5 her child.1 Although Dias...
...case presumptively falls under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2): Generally, appeals from orders in “domestic relations cases” must be pursued through an application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). The equitable caregiver statute, OCGA § 19-7-3.1, falls under the “domestic relations” statutory scheme....
...The remedy available through the Equitable Caregiver Statute is, per the language of the statute, “to establish parental rights and responsibilities for” the equitable caregiver “including, but not 16 limited to, custody or visitation.” OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (g).6 And the General Assembly in 2007 specifically removed “[a]ppeals from judgments or orders in ....
...at 144-145 (3) (citing Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 194 (2) (c) (454 SE2d 769) (1995)). We have applied these constitutional principles to hold unconstitutional provisions in prior versions of the state’s relative-visitation statute, OCGA § 19-7-3, because those provisions permitted a court to set aside the decisions of a fit parent 27 about what is best for his or her child, without requiring clear and convincing proof that particular decisions not to permit grandparent visitation harmed or threatened to harm the child....
...ustody, and control of her child. The statute requires a putative equitable caregiver to show by clear and convincing evidence “that the child 28 will suffer physical harm or long-term emotional harm[.]” OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (d) (5). The statute also states that “[t]he adjudication of a person under this Code section as an equitable caregiver does not disestablish the parentage of any other parent.” OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (j).11 But Dias raises serious constitutional questions about the statute....
...But unlike Georgia’s relative-visitation statute, the Equitable Caregiver Statute does not explicitly require trial courts to give deference to a parent’s judgment as to the best interests of the child regarding visitation with a third party. Compare OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (3), (d) (1) with OCGA § 19-7-3.1....
...fit parent’s rights. 29 the Equitable Caregiver Statute contains no presumption that it is in the best interests of a child to be in the custody of her legal parent. Compare OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1) with OCGA § 19-7-3.1. Even more troubling, the Equitable Caregiver Statute on its face does not require that relief awarded to an equitable caregiver be narrowly tailored to the harm or threatened harm that has been shown....
...Again, one of the prerequisites for establishing “standing” as an equitable caregiver under the statute is demonstrating “that the child will suffer physical harm or long-term emotional harm and that continuing the relationship between such individual and the child is in the best interest of the child.” OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (d) (5)....
...of the statute what more, if anything, must be shown before the trial court “enter[s] an order as appropriate to establish parental rights and responsibilities for such individual, including, but not limited to, custody or visitation.” OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (g). At the very least, our case law requires a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer harm from a fit parent’s particular decision regarding the child’s contact with a third party, and that the trial court’s remedy be tailored to the harm caused by that decision....
...to share legal custody (as opposed to merely allowing some visitation or other contact) with a third party. And yet the Equitable Caregiver Statute purports to allow a grant of “custody” to someone other than the child’s legal parent, OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (g), without explicitly requiring a finding that the legal parent is unfit to exercise custodial rights....
...nto whether retroactive application would “injuriously affect the vested rights of citizens.” Southern States Chemical, 316 Ga. at 708 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, there is absolutely no indication in the text of OCGA § 19-7-3.1 or its enacting legislation that the statute is to be applied retroactively. Compare OCGA § 19-7-3.1 and Ga....
...interest in the custody of a minor child.” Smith v. Finstad, 247 Ga. 603, 604 (277 SE2d 736) (1981); see also George v. Sizemore, 238 Ga. 525, 527 (233 SE2d 779) (1977); Adams, 219 Ga. at 634. To the extent this is an argument that applying OCGA § 19-7-3.1 to the conduct of a parent undertaken prior to the statute’s effective date is not really a retroactive application at all because no vested right 43 is implicated, we cannot agree.14 We have said...
...lost parental rights through termination, notwithstanding prior decree of adoption by stepparent); George, 238 Ga. at 528 (permitting 14 To the extent Boone is arguing based on this line of cases that the retroactive application of OCGA § 19-7-3.1 is constitutionally permissible, we are not faced with that question here, given that the statute does not contain a clear indication that it is to be applied retroactively. 44 application of new 1976...
...y from grandparents to father). On their face, these cases could be understood to stand for the proposition that a new statute may be applied to upset a prior child custody determination. But the possible retroactivity problem with applying OCGA § 19-7-3.1 to this case that we have identified is not that it would upset a prior court decree about custody of a child. Instead, the reason that applying OCGA § 19-7-3.1 arguably constitutes a retroactive application of the statute is that this would “ascribe to” Dias’s conduct “essentially different effects” than it would have had “in view of the law at the time of their occurrence[.]” Adams, 219 Ga....
...of the cases before it at all but remanded for the trial court to do that. See 273 Ga. at 599-600 (V). 48 does not apply to parental conduct occurring before its effective date. In sum, Dias’s challenge to OCGA § 19-7-3.1 raises novel, difficult, and important questions....
...r child. These constitutional questions may largely be obviated by concluding that any sort of waiver of a constitutional right contemplated by the statute cannot be premised on conduct by the parent prior to the statute’s effective date. OCGA § 19-7-3.1 contains no clear indication that it is to apply to actions by a parent fostering or supporting a relationship between the petitioner and the child prior to the effective date of the statute, and we hold that it does not do so. Becaus...
...court’s January 2024 order granting Boone equitable caregiver status and associated custody and visitation is reversed. 49 Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. Decided February 18, 2025. OCGA § 19-7-3.1; constitutional question....
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Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 9, 2012 | 720 S.E.2d 634, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 79

...Prior to and for a time after the adoption, appellants were allowed to visit the child and maintain a familial relationship with the child. At some point, however, appel-lees denied appellants access to the child. In 2009, appellants petitioned for visitation rights pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3 (b). OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) provides as follows: Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, any grandparent shall have the right to file an original action for visitation rights to a minor child or to intervene in and seek to obtain visitation rights in any...
...§ 5-6-34 (a) (11). *362Applying the tenets of statutory construction, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of appellees’ motion to dismiss, concluding the appellants’ original action for visitation was not permitted by OCGA § 19-7-3 (b). Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. 710, 712-713 (706 SE2d 98) (2011). In support of its decision, the Court of Appeals determined that the term “parent” as used in OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) included a “legal father” as found in the adoption statute; and it also determined that the term “parent” as used in the last sentence of OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) was not limited to natural parents, but included adoptive parents as well. Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. at 712-713. We granted appellants’ petition for certiorari and posed the following question: Did the Court of Appeals correctly “conclude that the limiting language of OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) — forbidding original actions for grandparent visitation if the parents are together and living with the child — includes adoptive parents”? Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. 710 (2011). Compare Lightfoot v. Hollins, 308 Ga. App. 538 (2011). Because we answer the question in the affirmative, we must uphold the judgment by the Court of Appeals. A plain reading of OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) offers two avenues by which grandparents may seek court-sanctioned visitation rights to their grandchildren....
...ermination of rights case of either parent; in the termination of visitation rights of either parent; and in the adoption of the grandchild by a blood relative or by a stepparent. Also, by virtue of the limiting language in the last sentence of OCGA § 19-7-3 (b), grandparents may only file an original action for visitation when the parents are separated and the child is not living with both parents....
...517, 518 *363(636 SE2d 704) (2006) (language cannot be added to a statute by judicial decree). If the General Assembly intended such a limitation, it would have included specific language to that effect in the statute. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err when it concluded that the term “parents” in OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) did not exclude an adoptive parent such as Mr....
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Barnhill v. Alford, 882 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 20, 2022 | 315 Ga. 304

...304 FINAL COPY S22A1075. BARNHILL et al. v. ALFORD. LAGRUA, Justice. In this appeal, we have been asked to decide whether a grandmother’s action for visitation rights to her biological granddaughter (the minor child of her deceased daughter) under OCGA § 19-7-3 — commonly known as the grandparent visitation statute — was precluded by the adoption of the child by her stepmother, and whether certain paragraphs of the grandparent visitation statute are unconstitutional, among other issues....
...Child went to live with Barnhill and his wife, Appellant Katheryn A. Barnhill (“Katheryn”). Two months later, on May 22, 2018, Alford filed the underlying petition for grandparent visitation, seeking visitation rights to the Child pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3.3 In Alford’s petition, she alleged that, after Hush passed away and Barnhill took custody of the Child, Barnhill allowed Alford only “limited and sporadic visitation” with the Child — despite the fact that the Child lived with A...
...hill and/or Katheryn. Several months after Alford initiated the grandparent visitation action, Katheryn filed a petition for adoption ————————————————————— 3 Under OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (1) (A), “[a]ny grandparent shall have the right to file an original action for visitation rights to a minor child.” The statute defines “[g]randparent” as “the parent of a parent of a minor child” or “the parent of a minor child’s parent who has died.” OCGA § 19-7-3 (a) (2). 3 of the Child, which was finalized on February 11, 2019, without providing notice to Alford or the trial court.4 In October 2019, Barnhill moved to dismiss Alford’s petition for grandparent visitation, arguing that Katheryn’s adoption severed all legal ties between Alford and the Child under OCGA § 19-8-195 and that Alford had “no standing” to prosecute her action for grandparent visitation under OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (2).6 Barnhill also moved to dismiss Alford’s petition on the theory that the petition was prematurely filed in violation of OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (2)7 because another custody action between Hush and Barnhill was pending. ————————————————————— 4 On November 5, 2019, Katheryn moved to be added as a party- d...
...l terminate all legal relationships between the adopted individual and his or her relatives, including his or her parent, so that the adopted individual thereafter shall be a stranger to his or her former relatives for all purposes.” 6 OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (2) provides that “[t]his subsection shall not authorize an original action when the parents of the minor child are not separated and the child is living with both parents.” 7 Under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (2), “[a]n original action requesting visitation rights shall not be filed by any grandparent more than once during any two- year period and shall not be filed during any year in which another custody action has been filed concerning...
...e trial court denied Barnhill’s motion. The trial court scheduled a final hearing on Alford’s petition for grandparent visitation on March 16, 2021. One week before the scheduled hearing, the Barnhills filed a “Motion to Declare OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), (c) (3), and (c) (5) Unconstitutional.” In their motion, the Barnhills asserted, among other claims, that OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), (c) (3), and (c) (5) are unconstitutional because these paragraphs (1) fail to give paramount import to the child’s best interests; (2) create presumptions in favor of family member visitation if the child has a preexisting re...
...5 Barnhills’ motion. On March 31, 2021, the trial court issued a final order granting Alford’s petition for grandparent visitation. On the same date, the trial court issued an order denying the Barnhills’ motion to declare OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), (c) (3), and (c) (5) unconstitutional. In denying the Barnhills’ motion, the trial court summarily concluded that [b]ecause all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, the burden is on...
...determination in the best interests of the child; and (C) [paragraph] (c) (5) is not implicated in this Court’s decision, but even if it were, it is severable from the statute. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Specifically, with respect to OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1),8 the trial court determined that this subsection ————————————————————— 8 OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) provides: 6 does not create any presumption of harm or any presumption of custody determination in favor of any party [because] the statute provides the Court with the discretion to award c...
...likely to result if such visitation is not granted. The court shall make specific written findings of fact in support of its rulings. 7 (Emphasis in original.) The trial court also noted that the factors set forth in OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) (A) to (D) were to be considered by the court “in making that determination,” but did not “impose any presumption of harm or presumption in favor of the family member seeking custody.” (Emphasis in original.) The trial court concluded that, because Alford had to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that there would be harm to the child without visitation and that such visitation is in the child’s best interests,” OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) “does not contain any implication of a presumption of harm.” (Emphasis in original.) As to OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (3),9 the trial court explained that this paragraph “does not unconstitutionally interfere with the parent- ————————————————————— 9 OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (3) provides: While a parent’s decision regarding family member visitation shall be given deference by the court, the parent’s decision shall not be conclusive when failure to provide family member contact would result in emotional harm to the child....
... child relationship” because the “rebuttable presumption” in this paragraph “is not automatic,” and the provision “remains subservient to the clear and convincing evidence standard imposed by [paragraph] (c) (1).” In other words, OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (3) does not displace the requirement in OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) that “the court find[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted and if the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation.” OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1). Additionally, in the trial court’s final order awarding grandparent visitation rights to Alford, the trial court held that — “even without a rebuttable presumption” in paragraph (c) (3) — Alford “met her burden” pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) because “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the Child would suffer actual emotional harm unless visitation [with Alford] is granted,” and “it is in the best interests of the Child that visitation be granted.” 9 Finally, as to OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (5),10 the trial court noted that, because the court determined it was in the best interests of the Child to have more than 24 hours of visitation per month with Alford — i.e., more than the statutory minimum — the court did not...
...onstitutional provision has been called into question. See Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 657 (1) (469 SE2d 22) (1996). ————————————————————— 10 OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (5) provides: Visitation time awarded to a family member shall not be less than 24 hours in any one-month period; provided, however, that when more than one individual seeks visitation under this Code section,...
...Analysis (a) Barnhill’s Motion to Dismiss On appeal, the Barnhills contend that the trial court erred in denying Barnhill’s motion to dismiss because Alford had no standing to bring and prosecute this grandparent visitation action under OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (2) and because she filed the action prematurely in violation of OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (2)....
...d’s standing is not really at issue in this case. Unquestionably, at the time Alford filed her petition for grandparent visitation rights in May 2018, she had standing to do so as the “parent of a minor child’s parent who has died.” OCGA § 19-7-3 (a) (2). The Barnhills’ real position — as suggested by their arguments and the law cited in support thereof — is that Katheryn’s 11 subsequent adoption of the Child prohibited Alford from continuing to seek visitation rights to the Child and “mooted” Alford’s petition. Regardless of how they frame it, however, the Barnhills’ arguments fail. The Barnhills argue that Alford’s action is precluded by OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (2) (“This subsection shall not authorize an original action when the parents of the minor child are not separated and the child is living with both parents.”)....
...February 2019 when Katheryn adopted the Child) and the Child has lived with them continuously, Alford’s action is not permitted. See Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 362 (720 SE2d 634) (2012) (holding that “by virtue of the limiting language in the last sentence of OCGA § 19-7-3 (b), grandparents may only file an original action for visitation when the parents are separated and the child is not living with both parents” (emphasis in original)). 12 The Barnhills also argue that, after Katheryn initiated the adoption proceedings, Alford’s only avenue for obtaining visitation rights to the Child was by intervening in the adoption action pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (1) (B) (“[a]ny family member shall have the right to intervene in and seek to obtain visitation rights ....
...purposes[.]”). With respect to the first argument, the Barnhills only address Alford’s authorization — or lack thereof — to pursue this action for 13 visitation rights under the framework of OCGA § 19-7-3 (b). Notably, however, in Alford’s response to Barnhill’s motion to dismiss in the trial court, Alford questioned Barnhill’s reliance on OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) and on Kunz, 290 Ga. at 362, and responded that she was authorized to seek visitation rights to the Child under OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), relying on Fielder v....
...response brief and explicitly held that Alford was authorized to ————————————————————— 11 In 2012, several months after this Court issued its decision in Kunz, the General Assembly amended OCGA § 19-7-3 by, among other things, adding subsection (d), which then provided: Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this Code section, if one of the parents of a minor child dies, is incapacitated, or is...
...The custodial parent’s judgment as to the best interests of the child regarding visitation shall be given deference by the court but shall not be conclusive. Ga. L. 2012, p. 862, § 1. After the issuance of the Fielder decision in 2015, OCGA § 19-7-3 was amended again by the General Assembly, effective July 1, 2022, to expand upon the language in subsection (d). See Ga. L. 2022, p. 749, § 1. 14 pursue this action under Fielder, 333 Ga. App. at 662-663 (concluding that biological grandparents were permitted by OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) to seek visitation rights to their grandchild — the child of their deceased daughter — after the stepmother’s adoption of the child despite the language of OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (2) and OCGA § 19- 8-19).12 On appeal, the Barnhills have not argued that Alford is not permitted to pursue this action under OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), nor have they addressed, much less challenged, the trial court’s decision based on Fielder. With respect to the Barnhills’ second argument — that Alford failed to intervene and seek visitation rights in the adoption action under OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (1) (B) — this argument is disingenuous ————————————————————— 12 In the order, the trial court also observed that Katheryn filed and finalized her petition fo...
...15 given that the Barnhills failed to disclose Katheryn’s adoption of the Child to Alford until after the adoption was finalized, depriving her of the opportunity to intervene in that action under OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (1) (B).13 Ultimately, however, the Barnhills’ failure to provide Alford with notice of the adoption proceeding — while inexcusable — was not legally dispositive because the trial court found that Alford was authorized to pursue this action under OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) and Fielder, and the Barnhills have not challenged that ruling on appeal. (ii) The Timing of Alford’s Petition for Grandparent Visitation The Barnhills also assert on appeal that Alford prematurely filed her action for...
...———————— 13 Additionally, when this Court inquired during oral argument about why the adoption was not disclosed to Alford, the Barnhills claimed attorney- client privilege. 16 OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (2) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n original action requesting visitation rights shall not be filed by any grandparent ....
...Barnhill argues that Alford should have waited until December 6, 2018 — one year from the date the Consent Final Parenting Plan was entered in the custody action — to file her action for grandparent visitation, and that by filing it in May 2018 — less than a year later — Alford violated OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (2). 17 Under the plain language of OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (2), the date upon which the clock starts to run for purposes of filing a grandparent visitation action is the date the custody action was filed — i.e., May 2016 — not the date the corresponding final order was entered — i.e., December 2017. Accordingly, Alford’s petition was timely, and this contention is without merit. (b) The Barnhills’ Constitutional Challenges to OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), (c) (3), and (c) (5) The Barnhills also assert on appeal that the trial court erred in declining to declare OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), (c) (3), and (c) (5) unconstitutional....
...as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Bell v. Hargrove, 313 Ga. 30, 32 (2) (867 SE2d 101) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). As discussed above, in the Barnhills’ motion attacking the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), (c) (3), and (c) (5), the 19 Barnhills argue that these paragraphs are unconstitutional on their face because they: (1) ignore the best interests of the child; (2) violate the fundamental ri...
...care, custody, and control of their children; and (3) infringe upon the presumption that fit parents will act in the best interests of their children by creating presumptions in favor of a family member’s visitation. Specifically, with respect to OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), the Barnhills argue that the reasonable harm factors in this paragraph create presumptions in favor of family member visitation if the child has a preexisting relationship with the family member, which violates the constitution...
...57, 66-68 (II) (120 SCt 2054, 147 LE2d 49) (2000) (holding that “there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children”). The 20 Barnhills assert that the concurring judge in that case correctly concluded in Davis that “OCGA § 19-7-3 unconstitutionally infringes on [the] parental right [to the custody and control of one’s child] because it creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of family members’ visitation rights that must be overcome by parents.” Davis, 356 Ga. App. at 878 (Coomer, J., concurring). The Barnhills contend that, because OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) creates a presumption in favor of family member visitation that directly contravenes the presumption that fit parents will act in the best interests of their children, this paragraph is unconstitutional. We disagree. OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) provides in pertinent part that the court may grant any family member of the child reasonable visitation rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the health or welfare of the child would b...
...ion to a child’s family member only where there is “clear and convincing evidence” that the health and welfare of the child would be harmed without visitation and the best interests of the child would be served by that visitation. OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1)....
...rs to be considered by the trial court in making a holistic assessment of whether family member visitation is in the best interest of the child. Moreover, as addressed in more detail below, in awarding visitation rights to Alford under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), the trial court determined that Alford met her burden to prove — by clear and convincing evidence — that there would be harm to the Child without visitation with Alford and that such visitation was in the Child’s best interest. Accordingly, we conclude that OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) is not unconstitutional on its face, and as applied in this case, it also does not unconstitutionally interfere with the parent-child relationship. As to OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (3), the Barnhills argue that paragraph (c) (3) is unconstitutional because it creates a presumption that family member visitation is in the best interests of a child, shifting 23 the burden to parents to rebut that presumption and prove that their decision to withhold a grandparent’s visitation is the correct decision for the child. As to OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (5), the Barnhills argue that this paragraph unconstitutionally requires a minimum of 24 hours for grandparent visitation, without considering what would be in the best interest of the child....
...sting relationship between the child and such family member may suffer emotional injury that is harmful to such child’s health. Such presumption shall be a rebuttable presumption. 24 OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (3)....
...however, that when more than one individual seeks visitation under this Code section, the court shall determine the amount of time to award to each petitioner which shall not be less than 24 hours in any one-month period in the aggregate. OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (5). In awarding grandparent visitation rights to Alford, the trial court did not rely upon or even apply the presumption allowed by OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (3) but, instead, concluded that Alford met her burden to show by “clear and convincing evidence” that the Child would be harmed without visitation and that visitation was in the Child’s best interest under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1). Additionally, the trial court unequivocally withheld ruling on the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (5), observing that this paragraph was “not implicated in this Court’s decision” because the trial court was granting Alford more than the 24-hour minimum mandated by (c) (5). 25 Therefore, because the trial court did not rely upon paragraph (c) (3) in awarding grandparent visitation rights to Alford or directly rule upon the constitutionality of (c) (5), we do not consider the Barnhills’ constitutional challenges to OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (3) and (c) (5). (c) The Trial Court’s Award of Grandparent Visitation Rights to Alford under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) The Barnhills also contend on appeal that, notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that Alford met her burden under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1)....
...met her burden to show — by clear and convincing evidence — that the health and welfare of the Child would be harmed unless visitation with Alford was granted and that the best interests of the Child would be served by such visitation. See OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1). 26 We observe at the outset that, although the trial court concluded that Alford was authorized to pursue this action under OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), the trial court did not apply that subsection in determining that Alford was entitled to an award of grandparent visitation rights — applying paragraph (c) (1) instead....
...140, 145 (3) (816 SE2d 633) (2018), paragraph (c) (1) — as we have already concluded — is 27 constitutional, and that is the standard the trial court applied here. Thus, there was no harm in the trial court’s application of OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) in this case. “The decision to grant or deny a grandparent’s petition for visitation is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will affirm the court’s decision absent an abuse of that discretion.” In the Interest of L....
...presented to support Alford’s claim for grandparent visitation, including testimony from the parties, the parties’ experts, the Child’s therapist, and the Family Coordinator. After the hearing, the trial court concluded that all of the factors required by OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) have been met in this case and that the evidence and testimony presented established the following: (1) the Child resided with Alford for more than four years; (2) Alford provided parental care, nurturing, and supervision of the...
...financial support for the basic needs of the Child for more than one year; and (4) the Child would suffer emotional injury that was harmful to her health if visitation with Alford was not granted, given the preexisting relationship established between Alford and the Child. See OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) (A)-(D). The trial court thus held that Alford “met her burden” pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) and that “[i]t is in the best interests of the Child that [Alford] have 29 visitation with the Child to ensure the Child’s emotional and psychological development and well-being.”...
...ially jeopardized when, during the pendency of the petition, the Child’s stepmother initiated and completed an adoption of the Child without providing notice to Alford or the court where Alford’s petition for visitation was pending. See OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (2)....
...he legal process. I close with an invitation to the General Assembly to consider the current state of our Code in light of the facts of this case. 34 Decided December 20, 2022. OCGA § 19-7-3; constitutional question....
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Walls v. Walls, 599 S.E.2d 173 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 12, 2004 | 278 Ga. 206, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2339

...[3] Those third parties are "limited to grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent...." OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1). [4] In advancing this argument, Conner relies upon the definition of "grandparent" found in OCGA § 19-7-3(a); "the parent of a parent of a minor child, the parent of a minor child's parent who has died, and the parent of a minor child's parent whose parental rights have been terminated." However, OCGA § 19-7-3(a) states that this definition of "grandparent" applies as the term is "used in this Code section." Because of our analysis based upon the language of OCGA § 19-8-19(a)(1), we need not determine whether the definition found in OCGA § 19-7-3(a) applies to OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1)....
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Crary v. Clautice, 899 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 5, 2024 | 318 Ga. 573

...573 FINAL COPY S24A0004. CRARY v. CLAUTICE et al. COLVIN, Justice. In this case, the trial court granted Appellant Allison Crary’s petition to set aside and revoke a final consent order, which had granted grandparent visitation rights under OCGA § 19-7-3 to Appellees Khristel Clautice and Frank Clautice, the maternal grandparents of Appellant’s minor child....
...On November 16, 2022, Appellant filed a petition asking the trial court to set aside and revoke the Grandparent Visitation Order, to issue a citation of contempt against Appellees for their failure to comply with the Grandparent Visitation Order, to declare OCGA § 19-7-3 facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied, and to award Appellant attorney fees and expenses. Appellant also filed a separate motion to declare the grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional....
...e prevented from granting or required to revoke grandparent visitation where the child lives with both parents. Based on her constitutional arguments, Appellant asked the trial court to vacate the Grandparent Visitation Order and “declare OCGA § 19-7-3 facially unconstitutional and [unconstitutional] as applied here.” After Appellees answered the petition, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s petition. The parties made arguments at the hearing but did not present any evidence or testimony. On December 5, 2022, the court entered an order summarily denying Appellant’s motion to declare OCGA § 19-7-3 3 unconstitutional....
...the father had not been joined as a necessary party under OCGA § 9-11-19 (a) (providing for joinder of indispensable parties), and because the court had failed to make certain factual findings by clear and convincing evidence, as required by OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) (providing that “the court may grant ....
...reasonable visitation rights if the court [makes certain findings] by clear and convincing evidence,” and requiring courts to “make specific written findings of fact in support of its rulings”). On January 30, 2023, Appellant filed a “Second Motion for an Award of OCGA § 19-7-3 Attorney’s Fees and Expenses.”1 Appellant argued that attorney fees and expenses were warranted under 1 While the record does not contain a “first” motion for attorney fees and expenses, Appellant’s petition seeking to va...
...On appeal, Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in failing to declare the grandparent visitation statute facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied. In particular, Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the legal standards for granting visitation rights to a grandparent under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) and for revoking visitation rights that have previously been granted to a grandparent under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (2).3 According to 3 In relevant part, paragraphs (1) and (2) of OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) provide: (1) Upon the filing of an original action or upon intervention in an existing proceeding under subsection (b) of this Code section, the court may grant any family member of the child reasonable vis...
...parenting decisions and all personal decisions she makes henceforth 8 will require consideration of the impact, if any, on that ever lurking, ever threatening grandparent visitation action authorized by OCGA § 19-7-3,” and she “lives in fear that she may be served with a summons and petition for grandparent visitation.” Appellant is correct that [a] declaratory judgment is authorized when there are circumstances showing a necessi...
...Accordingly, Appellant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for attorney fees and expenses. Judgment affirmed in part and appeal dismissed in part. All the Justices concur. Decided March 5, 2024. OCGA § 19-7-3; constitutional question....
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Fowler v. Knebel, 266 Ga. 317 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 1996 | 467 S.E.2d 177, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 876

Hines, Justice. We granted this discretionary appeal to consider the constitutionality of Georgia’s “Grandparent Visitation Statute,” OCGA § 19-7-3....
...clearly promote the health or welfare of the child and does not require a showing of harm before state interference is authorized.” Id. at 194. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting grandparent visitation rights based on OCGA § 19-7-3, and remand this case to the trial court for disposition in accord with our *318holding in Brooks. Decided March 4, 1996. John B....
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Grove v. Grove, 296 Ga. 435 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 20, 2015 | 768 S.E.2d 453

...with the child as a substitute for the father. The signature of Wife’s counsel indicates he approved the final judgment as to form. On appeal, Wife challenges the order’s grant of visitation rights to the paternal grandparents. 1. OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) grants to grandparents of a minor child the right to seek visitation rights “[u]pon the filing of an original action or upon intervention in an existing proceeding” such as a divorce action where the custody of the child is at issue....
...failure to raise the objection that the wife’s pleadings did not include a specific prayer for attorney fees, while permitting the court to litigate the matter, served as consent to the court’s authority to make such an award). 2. OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) further provides that a grant of visitation rights to any grandparent may be made “if the court finds the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted, and if the best interest of the child would be served by such visitation....

Venticinque v. Lair (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 9, 2025 | 768 S.E.2d 453

...Amber Lair, her former romantic partner, joint legal custody and primary physical custody of Venticinque’s biological minor child, L.V. Among other things, Venticinque argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating Lair as an equitable caregiver of the child under OCGA § 19-7-3.1 and challenges the constitutionality of the Equitable Caregiver Statute....
...For the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court’s order granting Lair equitable caregiver status, vacate the trial court’s custody order, and remand this case to the trial court with direction to apply the correct legal standard under OCGA § 19-7-3.1. 1....
...Despite purchasing a return plane ticket, Venticinque did not return to Savannah.2 Venticinque testified that she subsequently stopped all contact between Lair and L.V. On December 18, 2022, Lair filed an action seeking equitable caregiver status of L.V. under OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (the “Petition”). Venticinque responded to the Petition and challenged the 2Venticinque testified that she left Lair due to abuse, that she felt “pressured” to refer to L.V. as a “Lair baby,” and that Lair did not take on “full parent responsibility” with L.V., only changing “a handful of diapers and fe[eding] him a couple of times.” 3 constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3.1. On March 27, 2023, the trial court held a hearing at which Lair, Venticinque, and a family friend testified. After the hearing, Venticinque filed a motion to dismiss Lair’s Petition, again arguing that the Equitable Caregiver Statute, OCGA § 19-7-3.1, is unconstitutional....
...harm or long-term emotional harm if plaintiff’s [Lair’s] petition is granted, and whether continuing the relationship between plaintiff [Lair] and the child is in the best interest of the child.” (emphasis added). “Considering the factors set forth in OCGA § 19-7-3.1(d),” the trial court awarded Lair equitable caregiver status of L.V....
...7 undertaken a ‘parental’ role with the child and developed a ‘bonded and dependent’ relationship with the child that ‘was fostered or supported by a parent of the child.’” Dias v. Boone, 320 Ga. 785, 785 (2025) (quoting OCGA § 19-7-3.1(d)). The statute “provides both procedural and substantive requirements for an individual to establish ‘standing to maintain the action’ to be adjudicated as an equitable caregiver.” Id. at 786 (quoting OCGA § 19-7-3.1(b), (d)). Relevant here, OCGA § 19-7-3.1(d)(5) states that [i]n order to establish standing, the court shall first find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual has … [d]emonstrated that the child will suffer physical harm or long-term emotio...
...or long-term emotional harm if [Lair’s] petition is granted[.]”). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s June 2023 Order granting Lair equitable caregiver status and remand the case with direction to apply the correct standard under OCGA § 19-7-3.1.5 Because we are vacating 5 Because we are vacating the trial court’s June 2023 Order granting Lair equitable caregiver status, we must also vacate the Amended Final Order and Parenting Plan, which are predicated on Lair’s equitable caregiver status....
...re before judgment.” (quoting Kirkland v. Southern Discount Co., 187 Ga. App. 453 (1988))). 9 the trial court’s orders on statutory grounds, we do not reach Venticinque’s constitutional challenge to OCGA § 19-7-3.1 or her other enumerations of error....
...things, “that the child will suffer physical harm or long-term emotional harm” — harm from what, the statute leaves unspecified — “and that continuing the relationship between [the putative equitable caregiver] and the child is in the best interest of the child.” OCGA § 19-7-3.1(d)(5)....
...This is not to demean in any way equitable caregivers, who by definition will have “[f]ully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, 20 committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life[.]” OCGA § 19-7-3.1(d)(1). Lair argues on appeal that it is proper to treat a parent and an adjudicated equitable caregiver as constitutional equals for purposes of determining custody under OCGA § 19-9-3, because “[o]nce the trial court bestows...
...provides a mechanism for identifying an alternative placement for a 8 Moreover, the Equitable Caregiver Act specifies that the “adjudication of a person under this Code section as an equitable caregiver does not disestablish the parentage of any other parent.” OCGA § 19-7-3.1(j)....
...hts. But Lair does not seriously argue how Venticinque’s resistance to the trial court’s visitation order harmed the child, saying simply that the 9 A person who meets the criteria for adjudication as an equitable caregiver under OCGA § 19-7-3.1 might also meet the definition of fictive kin, allowing for consideration as a possible foster care placement....

McAlister v. Clifton (Ga. 2022).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 19, 2022 | 768 S.E.2d 453

...CLIFTON. ELLINGTON, Justice. Erin McAlister appeals from trial court orders awarding Wendi Clifton, McAlister’s former domestic partner, visitation rights to McAlister’s adopted daughter, Catherine, pursuant to the equitable caregiver statute, OCGA § 19-7-3.1.1 McAlister contends the trial court erred in declaring the statute “constitutional, both facially and as applied to [Clifton],” as well as finding that Clifton had standing to seek visitation rights as Catherine’s equitable caregiver....
...anted the motion. Thus, as discussed below, this portion of the final order is already a nullity. 2 petition for visitation with Catherine, rejecting McAlister’s challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3.1.3 Also on January 25, the trial court issued its “Final Order on Equitable Caregiver,” in which it found that Clifton had satisfied the statute’s criteria for standing as an equitable caregiver, and it awarded her “parenting time” with Catherine....
...pensation; and (5) Demonstrated that the child will suffer physical harm or long-term emotional harm and that continuing the relationship between such individual and the child is in the best interest of the child. OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (d). 4 The Supreme Court of Georgia has exclusive jurisdiction over cases 3 Thereafter, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding whether this appeal is moot....
...466, 466 (15 SE2d 619) (1941) (“[I]t is the duty of this court to raise the question of its jurisdiction in all cases in which there may be any doubt as to the existence of such jurisdiction.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 1. Clifton contends that McAlister’s challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3.1 is moot because Catherine is now legally an adult and no longer in the custody or control of her parent....

McAlister v. Clifton (Ga. 2021).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 14, 2021 | 768 S.E.2d 453

...CLIFTON. ELLINGTON, Justice. Erin McAlister appeals from trial court orders awarding Wendi Clifton, McAlister’s former domestic partner, visitation rights to McAlister’s adopted daughter, Catherine, pursuant to the equitable caregiver statute, OCGA § 19-7-3.1.1 McAlister contends the trial court erred in declaring the statute “constitutional, both facially and as applied to [Clifton],” as well as finding that Clifton had standing to seek visitation rights as Catherine’s equitable caregiver....
...ed. The record shows that, on January 25, 2021, the trial court entered an order denying McAlister’s motion to dismiss Clifton’s petition for visitation with Catherine, rejecting McAlister’s challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3.1.3 Also on 2 McAlister moved the trial court to set aside a portion of the final order granting Clifton visitation after Catherine’s eighteenth birthday, citing Francis-Rolle v....
...466, 466 (15 SE2d 619) (1941) (“[I]t is the duty of this court to raise the question of its jurisdiction in all cases in which there may be any doubt as to the existence of such jurisdiction.” (citation and between such individual and the child is in the best interest of the child. OCGA § 19-7-3.1 (d). 4 The Supreme Court of Georgia has exclusive jurisdiction over cases challenging the constitutionality of a statute....
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Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140 (Ga. 2018).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 29, 2018

...visitation to such child during his or her minority if the court in its 1 See Ga. L. 1988, p. 864. 2 See Ga. L. 2012, p. 860. discretion finds that such visitation would be in the best interests of the child. OCGA § 19-7-3 (d)....
...or her child, without clear and convincing proof that those decisions have harmed or threaten to harm the child, and based simply on the conclusion of a judge that he knows better than the parent what is best for the child. Adhering to our decision in Brooks, we hold today that OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) violates the right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children, as that fundamental right is guaranteed by the Constitution of 1983. 1....
...Mary Jo Ardis, to visit with the baby on a couple of occasions. But those visits 2 apparently did not go well,3 and in November 2016, Ardis filed a petition in the Superior Court of Lowndes County pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) for court- ordered visitation with her granddaughter.4 Citing Brooks, Patten responded that subsection (d) unconstitutionally impairs a parent’s “right to raise his or her child without undue state interference,” and upon this ground, Patten moved to dismiss the petition for visitation....
...ection (d), concluding that 3 The parties dispute why these visits went badly, and they also dispute whether Ardis was estranged from Shaughnessy at the time of his death. 4 Ardis also sought visitation under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1), which provides in pertinent part that a court can grant “any family member of the child reasonable visitation rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted and if the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation.” The trial court based the judgment from which this appeal is taken, however, entirely upon OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), and no issue concerning OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) (1) is presented to this Court. 5 In its order, the trial court did not mention Brooks, did not explain its thinking about the constitutional question, and said only in conclusory fashion that it “hereby affirms the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3 (d).” 3 visitation with Ardis is consistent with the best interests of the girl.6 Patten appeals, and we reverse and remand with direction.7 2....
...After her sixth birthday, Ardis is entitled to have visitation with the girl over four weekends each year (from Friday evening until Sunday evening), one full week in July, and from the evening of December 28 to the evening of December 30. 7 In the trial court and on appeal, Patten contends that OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) violates the United States Constitution and the Constitution of 1983. Our decision in Brooks rested on both. We limit our decision today, however, to the Constitution of 1983. Because OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) violates the state Constitution, there is no need for us to decide whether it also violates the national Constitution. 8 “In 1784, our General Assembly adopted the statutes and common law of England as of May 14, 1776,...
...In Brooks, we considered the constitutionality of a statute that provided that the courts “may grant any grandparent of [a] child reasonable visitation rights upon proof of special circumstances which make such visitation rights necessary to the best interests of the child.” 265 Ga. at 190 (1) (citing former OCGA § 19-7-3 (c))....
...longstanding approach of Georgia law. And in this case, no party asks us to reconsider Brooks with regard to its interpretation and application of our state Constitution. 10 The statute at issue in this case, OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), is materially indistinguishable from the statute that we held unconstitutional in Brooks. Indeed, OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) suffers from precisely the same infirmity as the statute in Brooks — it authorizes an award of visitation to a grandparent over the objection of a fit parent and without any showing whatsoever (much less a showing by clear and convincing evidence) that the visitation is required to keep the child from actual or threatened harm. To be sure, OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) applies in a more limited set of circumstances than the statute we held unconstitutional in Brooks — OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) applies only when a parent of a child has died, become incapacitated, or been incarcerated, and it authorizes an award of visitation only to the parents of the deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated parent of the child....
...keep a child from actual or 11 threatened harm upon the death, incapacity, or incarceration of a parent. Consequently, we cannot conclude that harm is so inherent in the limited circumstances in which OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) applies that proof by clear and convincing evidence of actual or threatened harm to the child is constitutionally unnecessary....
...at 194 (2) (c) (“While there are, to be sure, many instances where the grandparent-grandchild bond is beneficial to the child, we have found, and the parties cite, little evidence that this is most often the case.”). Brooks leads inescapably to the conclusion that OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) violates the Constitution of 1983. 4. The trial court awarded visitation to Ardis under OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), and given the unconstitutionality of subsection (d), that award must be reversed. The case is remanded for the trial court to consider whether Ardis is entitled to visitation under OCGA § 19-7-3 (c). Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur. 12 Decided June 29, 2018. OCGA § 19-7-3 (d); constitutional question....

Stone v. Stone (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 29, 2015

...This result does not mean, however, that the statute does not respect and 6 promote the interaction of loving grandparents with a minor child. To the contrary, the statute encourages contact with grandparents in OCGA § 19-9-3 (d), and OCGA § 19-7-3 provides a mechanism for a grant of visitation rights to grandparents when necessary to ensure and preserve this contact....

Grove v. Grove (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 20, 2015

...a substitute for the father. The signature of Wife’s counsel indicates he 2 approved the final judgment as to form. On appeal, Wife challenges the order’s grant of visitation rights to the paternal grandparents. 1. OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) grants to grandparents of a minor child the right to seek visitation rights “[u]pon the filing of an original action or upon intervention in an existing proceeding” such as a divorce action where the custody of the child is at issue....
...failure to raise the objection that the wife’s pleadings did not include a specific prayer for attorney fees, while permitting the court to litigate the matter, served as consent to the court’s authority to make such an award). 2. OCGA § 19-7-3 (c) further provides that a grant of visitation rights to any grandparent may be made “if the court finds the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted, and if the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation....