United States v. Kim Eugene Aldrich, United States of America v. Kim Eugene Aldrich (1999)

He contends the joinder of these counts with the others runs afoul of our decision in United States v. Aldrich, where we stated, “[E]vidence that [the defendant] is a felon [is] of the inflammatory sort that may . . . sway[] the jury to convict him of the other charges even if the evidence [does] not support[] those charges.” 169 F.3d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 1999) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).

United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1999).

Sometimes courts refer to prejudicial spillover as "retroactive misjoinder." See, e.g., United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 1997).

See United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 571 (3d Cir.1991) (stating that a defendant was not prejudiced by the denial of his motion to sever RICO from non-RICO counts where “the same evidence” was admissible to prove both sets of counts); United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 640 (5th Cir.2002) (holding that defendants alleging prejudicial spillover from fraud counts dismissed by district court after jury verdict “must *318 show” that “otherwise inadmissible evidence w…

See, e.g., United States v. Tellier, 83 F.3d 578, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding retroactive misjoinder where a RICO count on which the court found there had been insufficient evidence to convict had allowed the government to introduce "enormous amount[s] of prejudicial spillover evidence" related to "criminal activities in which [the] defendant did not participate"); Jones, 16 F.3d at 492-93 (applying retroactive misjoinder where count on which court had vacated conviction …

Id. at 528 (emphasis added).

United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1999).

United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1999).

United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1999).

United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1999).

United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1999).

United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1999).

United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1999).

In such cases, there is “a high risk of undue prejudice” as “joinder of counts allows evidence of other crimes to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible.” United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1999) (internal quotation omitted).

“Retroactive misjoinder arises when joinder of multiple counts was proper initially, but later developments ... render the initial joinder improper.” United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1999) (quotation omitted).

Retroactive misjoinder "occurs when joinder of multiple counts was initially proper but, through later developments such as an appellate court's reversal of less than all convictions, joinder has been rendered improper." State v. McGuire, 204 Wis.2d 372 , 556 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Wis.App.1996) (citing United States v. Vebeliunas, 76 F.3d 1283, 1293 (2d Cir.1996)); see also United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 693 (6th Cir.2009); United States v. Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 895-96 (5…

See, e.g., Hamilton, 334 F.3d at 181; United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 1997); but see Cross, 308 F.3d at 317 n.14 (stating that the description of “prejudicial spillover” as “retroactive misjoinder” can be misleading).

On the other hand, “ ‘a high risk of undue prejudice [exists] whenever ... joinder of counts allows evidence of other crimes to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible.’ ” United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C.Cir.1985)).

Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 , 101 S.Ct. 188, 190 , 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980) (“The authority to grant a new trial ... is confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court.”); United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1999) (applying abuse of discretion standard of review to trial court’s denial of motion for new trial); United States v. Grey Bear, 116 F.3d 349, 350 (8th Cir.1997) (same); Perkins v. U.S. West Communicatio…

See United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1999) (retroactive misjoinder arises when joinder of multiple counts was proper initially, but later developments render initial joinder improper; clear-prejudice requirement).

Compare United States v. Kind, 194 F.3d 900, 906 (8th cir.1999), and cases cited, with United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1999).

Compare United States v. Kind, 194 F.3d -4- 900, 906 (8th cir. 1999), and cases cited, with United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1999).

See United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Jones, 16 F.3d 487, 493 (2d Cir. 1994).

See United States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528-29 (8th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Jones, 16 F.3d 487, 493 (2d Cir. 1994).