United States v. Francis Crowley (2003)

And in United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir.2003), we found sufficient evidence of an attempt to commit a sexual act by force after the defendant pinned his victim to the bed, put his hand in her shorts and sought to penetrate her with his fingers.

And in United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir. 2003), we found sufficient evidence of an attempt to commit a sexual act by force after the defendant pinned his victim to the bed, put his hand in her shorts and sought to penetrate her with his fingers. -6- By comparison, the meager evidence of any action by Sabir to further the criminal objective falls far short of a substantial step.

See United States v. Simels, 654 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir.2011); United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.2003).

United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 414 (2d Cir. 2003).

See United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 413 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he mere fact that a defendant submitted his proposed language as part of a requested charge does not in itself preserve the point for appeal.”).

We therefore will reverse only for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir. 2003), and we see none here.

United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 413 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2002).

For an error to be plain, “it must be a ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ deviation from current law that ‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 415 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).

This generic definition of attempt requires proof that the defendant “had the intent to commit the crime.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 2003); see also 2 Wayne R.

This Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” Id. “[A] party who has requested an instruction that has not been given is not relieved of the requirement that he state distinctly his objection to the instruction that is given.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 412 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

That makes sense. “[I]f the law punished only the very last act necessary to accomplish the criminal result, legal intervention would be delayed to a point at which it may well be too late to prevent harm.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir. 2003).

“In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant faces an 18 uphill battle, and bears a very heavy burden, because the evidence must be viewed in the light most 19 favorable to the Government, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the verdict.” United 20 States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks 21 omitted). 22 Because “willfulness under the tax laws requires ‘a voluntary, intentional violation of a 2…

A district court typically “exercises [its] discretion by balancing the probative value of the evidence against the potential for unfair prejudice,” Watson v. Greene, 640 F.3d 501, 511 (2d Cir. 2011), and “[o]nly when this broad discretion is abused will we reverse a trial court’s decision to restrict cross-examination,” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir. 2003).

See United States v. Hertular, 562 F.3d 433, 444 (2d Cir. 2009); cf. United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 414 (2d Cir. 2003).

United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 414 (2d Cir. 2003). 8 We conclude that Tagliaferri waived his challenge to the instruction.

United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 414 (2d Cir.2003).

United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 414 (2d Cir.2003).

See United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 412-13 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A party who has requested an instruction that has not been given is not relieved of the requirement that he state distinctly his objection to the instruction that is given.”) (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted).

“For an error to be plain, ‘it must be a clear or obvious deviation from current law that affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 415 (2d Cir.2003)).

A plaintiff seeking to overturn a conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence bears “a very heavy burden.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the verdict.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Trial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

“In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant faces an uphill battle, and bears a very heavy burden-” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir.2003) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Auth. of City of New Haven, 251 F.3d 307 , 312–13 (2d Cir. 2001); cf. United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 413 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying Fed.

Auth. of City of New Haven, 251 F.3d 307, 312-13 (2d Cir.2001); cf. United *51 States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 413 (2d Cir.2003) (applying Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 and holding that “the mere fact that a defendant submitted his proposed language as part of a requested charge does not in itself preserve the point for appeal”), and identify none here. 3.

Whether an individual takes a substantial step in the commission of a criminal offense ultimately depends “on the particular factual context of each case.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 988 (2d Cir.1980)).

We take these issues in turn. i. Sufficiency of the evidence An appellant arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction bears “a very heavy burden.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the verdict.” Id.

See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (“[T]rial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about ... confusion of the issues ... or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”); United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 ).

In fact, “[i]t is difficult to understand what further act [the defendant] could have performed toward the goal of forced penetration, short of actual completion of the [substantive offense].” See United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir.2003).

An error is plain if it *719 represents a “clear or obvious deviation from current law that affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 415 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

“Only when [the trial court’s] broad discretion is abused will we reverse a trial court’s decision to restrict cross-examination.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

E.g., United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417-18 (2d Cir. 2003).

Suriel contends that this objection was preserved by a pre-charge letter to the district court requesting amendments to the government’s proposed charge, but we conclude that the objection was not preserved. 2 “[A] request for an instruction before the jury retires does not preserve an objection to the instruction actually given by the court.... [and] a party who has requested an instruction that has not been given is not relieved of the requirement that he state distinctly …

Suriel contends that this objection was preserved by a pre-charge letter to the district court requesting amendments to the government’s proposed charge, but we conclude that the objection was not preserved. 2 “[A] request for an instruction before the jury retires does not preserve an objection to the instruction actually given by the court.... [and] a party who has requested an instruction that has not been given is not relieved of the requirement that he state distinctly …

We will reverse a district court’s decision to restrict cross-examination only where a court abuses “broad discretion.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 894 , 124 S.Ct. 239 , 157 L.Ed.2d 171 (2003); accord United States v. Rossomando, 144 F.3d 197 , 203 n. 6 (2d Cir.1998).

We will reverse a district court’s decision to restrict cross-examination only where a court abuses “broad discretion.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 894 , 124 S.Ct. 239 , 157 L.Ed.2d 171 (2003); accord United States v. Rossomando, 144 F.3d 197 , 203 n. 6 (2d Cir.1998).

For an error to be plain, “it must be a clear or obvious deviation from current law that affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 415 (2d Cir.2003) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).

Standard of Review “Only when th[e] broad discretion [of the district court] is abused will we reverse [the] court’s decision to restrict cross-examination.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 894 , 124 S.Ct. 239 , 157 L.Ed.2d 171 (2003).

However, this request did not constitute a proper objection to the jury charge, particularly because Zayed’s counsel indicated after the charge was completed that he had “[n]o objections or exceptions.” We have held that “[a] party who has requested an instruction that has not been given is not relieved of the requirement [under Rule 30] that he state distinctly his objection to the instruction that is given.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 412 (2d Cir.2003) (quotin…

See Fed.R.Evid. 403; United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.2003). 5.

Mar. 19, 2015) (quoting Thomas v. Astrue, 674 F. Supp. 2d 507, 511 (S.D.N.Y.2009)). “‘When a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case.’” U.S. v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 420 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting U.S. v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1991)).

Four types of 29 behavior constitute a “sexual act” under § 2246: 26 a e first, the term “sexual act” means “contact between the penis and the vulva 28 or the penis and the anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact ° 1 involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however slight,” 18 U.S.C. 2 § 2246(2)(a); 3 4 e second, the term means “contact between the mouth and the penis, the 5 mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus,” 18 U.S.C. § 2246 (2)(b); 6 ] e third…

See, e.g., United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 419 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]hile evidence of a witness’s psychological history may be relevant to the witness’s credibility, courts should carefully weigh the probative value of such evidence . . . .”); United States v. Wilson, 493 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Delio, 2003 WL 22956953 , at *13.

These requests raise issues under Federal Rules of Evidence 402, which requires that evidence be relevant to be admissible, United States v. Shvartsman , 317 Fed.Appx. 68 , 70 (2d Cir. 2009), and 403, which requires that relevant evidence be excluded if its probative value "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative e…

It is the sentencing court that “is in the best position to judge the appropriateness of a- sentencing departure in light of the defendant’s overall history and character, his remorse or lack of it, and other factors bearing on the sentence to be imposed.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 421 (2d Cir.2003); see also D.M., 942 F.Supp.2d at 341 .

It is the sentencing court that “is in the best position to judge the appropriateness of a' sentencing departure in light of the defendant’s overall history and character, his remorse or lack of it, and other factors bearing on the sentence to be imposed.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 421 (2d Cir.2003); see also United States v. D.M., 942 F.Supp.2d 327, 341 (E.D.N.Y.2013).

It is the sentencing court that “is in the best position to judge the appropriateness of a sentencing departure in light of the defendant’s overall history and character, his remorse or lack of it, and other factors bearing on the sentence to be imposed.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 421 (2d Cir.2003).

Limine Opp’n at 4. (citing United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417-18 (2d Cir.2003).(denying cross-examination on alleged false statements where “voir dire examination established that [the witness] would deny making false accusations or lying,” and where, if cross-examination on these false statements were permitted, “the only evidence before the jury on the subject would have been [the witness’s] denial of falsehood”)).) Although it is almost never productive to questi…

To the extent that defendant attempts to reargue those points that it raised in unsuccessfully opposing the motion to amend, this Court reiterates that these issues cannot be decided at the motion to dismiss stage in this case. “ ‘When a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case.’” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 420 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753, 758 (2d…

To the extent that defendant attempts to reargue those points that it raised in unsuccessfully opposing the motion to amend, this Court reiterates that these issues cannot be decided at the motion to dismiss stage in this case. "`When a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case.'" United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 420 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753, 758 (2d …

Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 416-17 (2d Cir. 2003) (court authorized to limit cross-exam of sexual assault victim concerning false accusations where risk of unfair prejudice and confusion outweighed its probative value); see also Redmond v .