Paula Leever v. Carson, City of Consolidated Municipality of Carson City (2004)

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004).

Id. (quoting Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004)). 2 23-2465 Ramsey presents no evidence that Dr. Rasheed was deliberately indifferent by scheduling surgery four days after Ramsey’s injury.

Klem v. County of Santa Clara, 208 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000).2 2 We have said that the employer must meet its burden “plainly and unmistakably.” Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004).

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Hargis v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404, 409 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Hargis v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404, 409 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004).

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004).

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009).

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2009).

“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Id. (quoting Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004)).

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir.2004) ("[T]he [Township] has the burden of proving, plainly and unmistakably, that (1) there was an agreement to compensate [Krause and Martin] for [their] overtime work caring for [the dogs], and (2) the agreement was reasonable, having taken into account all of the pertinent facts.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We review de novo, Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.

We review de novo summary judgment, Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.

We review the district court’s application of its local rules for an abuse of discretion, Prof'l Programs Group v. Dep’t of Commerce, 29 F.3d 1349 , 1353 (9th Cir.1994), and we review de novo the grant of summary judgment, Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004).

“We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo ” Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm the grant as to all of these claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.” Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 4 Appellants do not appeal the denial of their cross-motion for summary judgment. 15206 BURKE v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 2004).

STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.” Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004).

“We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo ” Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm the grant as to all of these claims.

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004).

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004).

“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004).

“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant sub- PERFECT 10, INC. v. CCBILL LLC 6545 stantive law.” Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004).

“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004).

“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant sub- stantive law.” Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004).

Leever v. City of Carson, 360 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir.2004). 6 As the party seeking the benefit of section 785.23, Heslep bears the burden of proving that the employment agreement at issue was reasonable.

Leever v. City of Carson, 360 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir.2004). 6 As the party seeking the benefit of *200 section 785.23, Heslep bears the burden of proving that the employment agreement at issue was reasonable.

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004).

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004).

Section 785.23 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that where compensable work is done at home and the exact hours are difficult to determine, “any reasonable agreement of the parties which takes into consideration all of the pertinent facts will be accepted.” In the context of off-duty care and training of narcotics dogs, a unilateral decision by the employer concerning the dog handler’s compensation will not be considered “reasonable.” See Leever, 360 F.3d at 1018-…

And, during the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, while Plaintiffs could not leave the premises, they could still engage in 198 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 . 199 Leever v. City of Carson, 360 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Rudolph v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, 103 F.3d 677, 684 (8th Cir.1996); Leever, 360 F.3d at 1019 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Rudolph with approval).

Leaver v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004), is inapposite because there the city had conceded that caring for and training the police dog at home was compensable work under the FLSA. 5 .

Heslep Assocs., Inc., 405 F.3d 194 , 199 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Leever v. City of Carson, 360 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Heslep Assocs., Inc., 405 F.3d 194 , 199 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Leever v. City of Carson, 360 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004).

Heslep Assocs., 405 F.3d 194 , 199 (4th Cir. 2005); Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004); Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 806 (6th Cir. 2001)).

First, the policy calls for an employee to be compensated whenever the sleep interruption results in the employee doing work. "[A]n agreement under§ 785.23 must take into account some approximation of the hours actually worked, or reasonably required to be worked, by the employee." Leever v. City if Carson, .' 360 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, the FLSA “is to be liberally construed to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with Congressional direction.” Leever v. Carson, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Klem, 208 F.3d at 1089).

Since defendants seek to benefit from Section 785.23, it is their “burden of proving ‘plainly and unmistakably,’ that (1) there was an agreement to compensate [plaintiff] for [his] overtime work ..., and (2) the agreement was ‘reasonable,’ having taken into account ‘all of the pertinent facts.’ ” Leever v. City of Carson, 360 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir.2004); Garofolo, 405 F.3d at 199-200.

Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)); see Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 902 (“[i]t is axiomatic, under the FLSA, that employers must pay employees for all ‘hours worked’ ”).

Heslep Assocs., 405 F.3d 194 , 199 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 ); accord Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004); Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 806 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining that an agreement is reasonable under 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 if it “falls within a broad zone of reasonableness, considering its terms and all of the facts and circumstances of the parties’ relationship”).

See Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2009).

See Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004).

See Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he cases interpreting the regulation, however, suggest that, at a minimum, an agreement must take into account some approximation of the number of hours actually worked by the employee or that the employee could reasonably be required to work”).

The Garofolo court explained, however, that Section 785.23 is not an exception to an employer’s FLSA obligations but instead “simply offers a methodology for calculating how many hours the employees actually worked within the meaning of the FLSA.” Garofolo, 405 F.3d at 199 n.6 (quoting Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014 , 1018 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Leever, 360 F.3d at 1019 (“[T]he very purpose of an agreement pursuant to § 785.23 is to approximate the number of . …

See Leever v. City of Carson, 360 F.3d 1014 , 1017 n. 1 (9th Cir.2004).

See Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014 , 1020 n. 4 (9th Cir.2004) ("'We accept the Department of Labor's interpretive regulations of the FLSA, including § 785.23, as persuasive, although they are not binding."). 34 . 357 F.3d at 941 . 35 .