Adkins v. Kaspar (2004)

The plaintiff must first show that the government has substantially burdened the plaintiff’s religious exercise grounded in a sincerely held religious belief. 4 Id. at 782–83; Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 , 360–61 (2015). “[A] government action or regulation creates a ‘substantial burden’ on a religious exercise if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs.” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 57…

See also Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2004) (“We recognize that our test requires a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the government action or regulation in question imposes a substantial burden on an adherent’s religious exercise.”). 13 Case: 09-40400 Document: 00512093372 Page: 14 Date Filed: 12/21/2012 No. 09-40400 Even assuming, arguendo, that some of the food Moussazadeh purchased was nonkosher, that does not necessarily establish…

A policy creates a substantial burden on a religious exercise “if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs.” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004).

To begin with, the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have treated RFRA and RLUIPA as analogous statutes and define “substantial burden” the same. 4 This underscores that RFRA and 4 See, e.g., Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 , 304 n.103 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007)) (“although Klem examined the definition of ‘substantial burden’ in the context of RLUIPA, the two statutes [RFRA and RLUIPA]…

Without question, all courts apply the coercion and benefit tests 4 See, e.g., Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 , 304 n.103 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007)) (“although Klem examined the definition of ‘substantial burden’ in the context of RLUIPA, the two statutes [RFRA and RLUIPA] are analogous for purposes of the substantial burden test”); U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Biden, 27 F.4th 336 , 350 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Adkins v. …

Without question, all courts apply the coercion and benefit tests 4 See, e.g., Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 , 304 n.103 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007)) (“although Klem examined the definition of ‘substantial burden’ in the context of RLUIPA, the two statutes [RFRA and RLUIPA] are analogous for purposes of the substantial burden test”); U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Biden, 27 F.4th 336 , 350 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Adkins v. …

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 2004) (alteration omitted) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90).

And under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the state may not engage in “purposeful discrimination resulting in a discriminatory effect among persons similarly situated.” Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 123 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 566 (5th Cir. 2004)).

And “a government action or regulation creates a ‘substantial burden’ on a religious exercise if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violates his religious beliefs.” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004) (involving RLUIPA).

The panel determined that, while a policy prohibiting the presence of a spiritual advisor in the execution chamber may have “denied the final measure of spiritual comfort that might be available,” such a policy “does not rise to the level of a substantial burden on religious exercise if it merely prevents the adherent from enjoying some benefit that is not otherwise generally available.” Gutierrez v. Saenz, 818 F. App’x 309 , 314–15 (citing Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 57…

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90).

See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n.13; Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[N]o test for the presence of a ‘substantial burden’ . . . may require that the religious exercise that is claimed to be thus burdened be central to the adherent’s religious belief system.”).

See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n.13; Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[N]o test for the presence of a ‘substantial burden’ . . . may require that the religious exercise that is claimed to be thus burdened be central to the adherent’s religious belief system.”).

In Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 562, 564 (5th Cir. 2004), a small religious group called Yahweh’s Evangelical Assembly complained that TDCJ allowed it to congregate only under the supervision of an outside volunteer, who could visit the prison only once a month rather than weekly as the group preferred.

To determine whether Reese has met this standard, the Court must answer two questions: “‘(1) Is the burdened activity ‘religious exercise,’ and if so (2) is the burden ‘substantial?’” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (Sth Cir. 2004); see Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200-01 (4th Cir. 2012) (employing similar two-part inquiry). a.

To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff “must prove purposeful discrimination resulting in a discriminatory effect among persons similarly situated.” Adkins v Kaspar, 393 F3d 559, 566 (5th Cir 2004), quoting Muhammad v Lynaugh, 966 F2d 901, 903 (5th Cir 1992).

Id. at 89–90; Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 2004).

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Initially, it falls to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the government practice complained of imposes a substantial burden on his religious exercise.”).

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 569 (5th Cir. 2004), citing Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). 21.

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 569 (5th Cir. 2004), citing Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). 20.

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 569 (5th Cir. 2004), citing Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). 21.

Burden of Proof “An evidentiary hearing consistent with Flowers v. Phelps amounts to a bench trial replete with credibility determinations and findings of fact.” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

“A governmental action creates a substantial burden on a religious exercise if it truly pressures the offender to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violates his religious beliefs.” Turner, 836 F. App’x at 230 (citing Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004)).

To determine whether Smith has met this standard, the Court must answer two questions: “(1) Is the burdened activity ‘religious exercise,’ and if so (2) is the burden ‘substantial?’” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004); see Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197 , 200–01 (4th Cir. 2012) (employing similar two-part inquiry).

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564 (Sth Cir. 2004) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 ) (quotations omitted).

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Initially, it falls to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the government practice complained of imposes a substantial burden on his religious exercise.”).

At a minimum, the adherent must demonstrate that the denial of a particular religious item is “more than an inconvenience to one’s religious practice.” Id. (quoting Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004)).

The Lozano court summarized RLUIPA’s burden-shifting framework: The plaintiff must first show that the government has substantially burdened the plaintiff’s religious exercise grounded in a sincerely held religious belief ….; Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 , 360-61 … (2015). “[A] government action or regulation creates a ‘substantial burden’ on a religious exercise if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his re…

See, e.g., Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 124 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing kosher prison diets and Jewish Sabbath and holy day services as religious exercise); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 568 (5th Cir. 2004) (recognizing Sabbath and holy day gatherings as cognizable religious exercises). [110] The procurement of health insurance is not a mandatory religious ritual, either, but it was at the core of a RFRA violation in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287, 302 (Tex. 2009)(following Adkins in declining to “craft a bright-line rule” or “one that will apply in every context,” and in finding that the inquiry as to whether a person’s religious exercise has been substantially burdened under the TRFRA “requires a case-by-case, fact- specific inquiry.”) 140.

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2004).

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564 (Sth Cir. 2004).

The Fifth Circuit continues to apply Turner because “not ‘every religious sect or group within a prison—however few in numbers—must have identical facilities or personnel.’ ” Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 336 (quoting Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 566 (5th Cir. 2004)).

Equal protection of the laws To succeed on his equal protection claim, a plaintiff “must prove purposeful discrimination resulting in a discriminatory effect among persons similarly situated.” Adkins v Kaspar, 393 F3d 559, 566 (5th Cir 2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Id. at *6 (citing, for example Smith v. Kyler, 295 F. App’x 479, 481 (3d Cir. 2008), and Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 2004)).

Fla. 2015) (quoting Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004)).

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).

Brown v. Collier, 929 F.3d 218, 232 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 2004)).

To determine whether Richardson has met this standard, the Court must answer two questions: “(1) [i]s the burdened activity ‘religious exercise,’ and if so (2) is the burden ‘substantial?’” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004); see Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200-01 (4th Cir. 2012) (employing similar two-part inquiry). a.

Under RLUIPA, Plaintiff carries an initial burden to show that the challenged law, regulation, or practice substantially burdens the exercise of his religion. , 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004).

Under RLUIPA, Plaintiff carries an initial burden to show that the challenged law, regulation, or practice substantially burdens the exercise of her religion. , 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004).

To demonstrate a claim under RLUIPA, a plaintiff must produce prima facie evidence that defendants substantially burdened his exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004).

In determining if Richardson has met this standard, the Court must answer two questions: “(1) Is the burdened activity ‘religious exercise,” and if so (2) is the burden ‘substantial’?” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (Sth Cir. 2004); see Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200-01 (4th Cir. 2012) (employing similar two-part inquiry).

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564 (Sth Cir. 2004) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 ).

As Defendants argue, this perception “could negatively affect prison morale and discipline.” Smith v. Kyler, 295 F. App’x. 479, 482 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that if the department of corrections “hired a Rastafarian chaplain but did not provide a chaplain for similarly-sized groups, Rastafarians could appear to be favored, a perception that could negatively affect prison morale and discipline”) (citing Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 2004)).

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004). “[A] government action or regulation creates a ‘substantial burden’ on a religious exercise if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs.” Id. at 569–70.

See Baranowski, 486 F.3d at 121-22 ; Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 2004).

The District Court correctly noted that the DOC has a legitimate interest in managing limited financial resources and in maintaining prison security.”); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the plaintiff’s assertion that, “regardless of the availability of volunteers, space, or time,” defendants should be required to accommodate every religious holiday and requirement of a religion constituting less than one percent of the inmate population).

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004).

Wright v. Lassiter, 921 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that defendants’ denial of a Rastafarian prisoner’s request for communal feasts on certain holy days did not infringe on plaintiff’s sincerely held beliefs or practices, because no other prisoners in his facility or in North Carolina adhered to his sect’s belief in the requirement; thus, a communal gathering was impossible) (citing Bader v. Wrenn, 675 F.3d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that the inability to hol…