Dwight L. McKee Allen L. Jones v. Henry Hart Wesley Rish Albert Masland James Sheehan Daniel P. Sattelle, Daniel P. Sattele (2006)

But see McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170-71 (3d Cir.2006) (three comments by supervisor that were critical of plaintiffs job performance, without more, were too trivial to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment rights). 2.

Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)).

Fair Labor Standards Act In Count XII of the Amended Complaint, Fraser reasserts his FLSA claims against Keystone Nano and Penn State, arguing that both Defendants “failed to pay [him] for all hours worked . . . outside the scope of his education Program, stipend duties, and fellowship duties.”173 The Defendants have separately moved to dismiss 169 Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted) (holding that defendants…

See Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge I v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 246 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding, in the FMLA context, that an employer visiting and questioning an employee on protected FMLA leave was “minimally intrusive” and not “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his or her rights); McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that “criticism, false accusations, or verbal reprimands” are insufficient to deter a person of ordin…

As particularly relevant here, “[t]he filing of a prison grievance is an activity protected by the First Amendment.” Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184 , 192 n.8 (3d Cir. 2015); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (allegation of false charge of misconduct in retaliation for filing complaints is conduct protected by the First Amendment); McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that alleged retaliatory conduct need only be more than de minimis).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alteration in original). was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims.

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in 6 Peterson also asserts claims against the remaining Defendants for failing to protect his constitutional right to privacy in personal medical information contained in personal correspondence to his psyc…

GAIL A. WEILHEIMER, J. ee 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original), The timing of the allegedly retaliatory behavior relative to the constitutionally protected conduct may establish a causal link between the two for purposes of establishing motivation.

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (alterations in original) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at…

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” , 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting , 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at…

To amount to retaliation, the conduct must be adverse and “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.” -15- McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson v. Rosum, 834 F.3d 423, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).

See also Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the relevant question in a retaliation case is not whether the prisoner had a “protected liberty interest in the privileges he was denied, but 6 Defendants have not discussed the second element, but the Court will assume for purposes of this opinion that if repeated harassing searches of his person and his cell occurred as alleged, this would be sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exer…

An action amounts to retaliation if the conduct is “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson v. Rosum, 834 F.3d 423, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (…

Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). 19 See Doc. 51-6 at 11:8-12. 20 Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)). 21 Doc. 51-6 at 9:15-21. 22 Mr. Johnson suggests that Mr. Davis frequently engaged in harassment of this type.

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at 170…

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)).

To amount to retaliation, the conduct must be “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at…

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at…

Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (2016) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).

The retaliatory conduct “need not be great in crder to be actionable” but must be “more than de minimus.” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at…

The retaliatory conduct “need not be great in order to be actionable” but must be “more than de minimus.” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” , 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting , 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” , 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting , 436 F.3d at 170 ).

The retaliatory conduct “need not be great in order to be actionable” but must be “more than de minimus.” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).

See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing an “adverse action” as an action “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising” their constitutional rights (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that an adverse action “must be more than de minimis” to support a retaliation claim).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at…

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson v. Yerke, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).

To amount to retaliation, the adverse action must be “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

To amount to retaliation, the conduct must be “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (…

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at…

The retaliatory action “need not be great in order to be actionable, but it must be more than de minimis.” Mckee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006).

Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).

Mokee v. Hart 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006).

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68 , 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at…

“An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).

McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006).

McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006).

McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Lauren W. ex rel.

The only actionable adverse consequences Duardo may have suffered as a result of this conversation, if any, are trivial and “more akin to petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners which are not actionable in an analogous legal context . . . than retaliation that would deter an ordinary person from speaking out.” Falco, 767 F. App’x at 311 (quotations omitted); Cf. McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[N]ot every critical comment – or serie…

See McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over [the plaintiffs] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 .”).