City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba CA6 (2013)

Under the circumstances, these orders, although subsequently determined to be erroneous, were not void.” (Id. at p. 776, fn. omitted.) Stated differently, even where the underlying order is ultimately determined to be erroneous, such an order—the violation of which will support a contempt finding—does not become “a nullity.” (Id. at p. 777.) That is because, as the court later explained in Berry, the temporary restraining order in Signal Oil “suffered from no jurisdictional …

Under the circumstances, these orders, although subsequently determined to be erroneous, were not void.” (Id. at p. 776, fn. omitted.) Stated differently, even where the underlying order is ultimately determined to be erroneous, such an order—the violation of which will support a contempt finding—does not become “a nullity.” (Id. at p. 777.) That is because, as the court later explained in Berry, the temporary restraining order in Signal Oil “suffered from no jurisdictional …

Under the circumstances, these orders, although subsequently determined to be erroneous, were not void.” (Id. at p. 776, fn. omitted.) Stated differently, even where the underlying order is ultimately determined to be erroneous, such an order—the violation of which will support a contempt finding—does not become “a nullity.” (Id. at p. 777.) That is because, as the court later explained in Berry, the temporary restraining order in Signal Oil “suffered from no jurisdictional …

Under the circumstances, these orders, although subsequently determined to be erroneous, were not void.” (Id. at p. 776, fn. omitted.) Stated differently, even where the underlying order is ultimately determined to be erroneous, such an order—the violation of which will support a contempt finding—does not become “a nullity.” (Id. at p. 777.) That is because, as the court later explained in Berry, the temporary restraining order in Signal Oil “suffered from no jurisdictional …

(City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079 [appeal from expired injunction order was moot].) We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties on this issue.

(In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1 , 13 [except in certain situations, dependency jurisdiction terminates once a child turns 18, which renders an appeal from those proceedings moot]; City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079 [appeal from expired injunction order was moot].) We requested and received supplemental briefing from D.B. and Mother on this issue.

(See City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079 [“ ‘If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot’ ”].) unopposed request.

(See City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079 [“ ‘If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot.’ ”].) Medeiros asserts that we should nevertheless consider the merits of his claims because they raise important statutory and constitutional issues.

(Christoff, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 125 [party forfeited his challenge to a dispositive issue on summary judgment when he “ma[de] no argument whatsoever on the issue” on appeal]; City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1099 [courts “ ‘are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them’ ”].)2 B.

Nuisance per se “The concept of a nuisance per se arises when a legislative body with appropriate jurisdiction, in the exercise of the police power, expressly declares a particular object or substance, activity, or circumstance, to be a nuisance. . . . [W]here the law expressly declares something to be a nuisance, then no inquiry beyond its existence need be made and in this sense its mere existence is said to be a nuisance per se.” (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific …

(Id. at p. 155; cf. Harrington v. City of Davis (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 420, 438 [city’s construction of its building code is entitled to significant deference]; City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1091 [city’s interpretation of its own code is entitled to deference].) 3.

Acknowledging that a municipality’s contemporaneous interpretation of an ordinance is entitled to great weight (City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1087 (City of Monterey), the trial court noted that the City’s interpretation of whether City Code section 5.32.040(D) requires an existing property interest “has vacillated.” The City initially determined Casino Royale’s application was incomplete because the ordinance required a statement of an existing…

(Ibid.) The general test for mootness states “[a]n appeal is moot if the appellate court cannot grant practical, effective relief.” (Citizens for the Restoration of L Street v. City of Fresno (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 340, 362 .) “ ‘If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot.’ ” (City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079 [injunction against…

“We need not address this claim for which no supporting legal authority is provided.” (City of Monterey v. 18 Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1094, fn. 23 , citing Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384 .) Ultimately Respondents’ claims fail because the Legislature has stated in four separate statutes that once an adoption petition has been filed and is pending, the guardianship petition is to be consolidated with the adoption case, “. . . and the consolid…

(City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1081 (Carrnshimba).) Local government laws are interpreted consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation.

(See City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1091 [ 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ]; Conejo Wellness Center, Inc. v. City of Agoura Hills, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1543-1544.) 10 Structural Error Finally, defendants’ claim that “the court committed structural error when it limited closing argument” to 20 minutes and “two issues” is undeveloped and unsupported by analysis or citation to legal authority, and is thus forfeited.

The restraining order that is the subject of this appeal expired on October 16, 2015. “ ‘If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot.’ ” (City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079 [ 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ].) In a supplemental letter brief, Stampolis argues that the appeal is not moot, because Harris renewed the restraining order prior to its …

(See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1091-1096 [ 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] [affirming summary judgment declaring medical marijuana dispensary a public nuisance where dispensaries were not permitted by local zoning law].) Finally, UMMP ignores distinctions within the City’s municipal code when comparing the provisions that regulate recreational vehicles to the provisions added by the 2007 ordinance regarding mobile dispensaries.

In this sense, a personal service is an economic service involving either the intellectual or manual personal effort of an individual, as opposed to the saleable product of the person’s skill,’ ” and cited City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1092 [ 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ], The County placed particular emphasis on Ramsell’s information technology and organizational structure, but the County Code exclusion for personal services contracts “does not appear t…

(City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1086 (Carrnshimba); Soffer, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at pp. 382-383; City of Bakersfield v. Miller (1966) 64 Cal.2d 93, 100 (Miller).) Government Code section 38771 provides: “By ordinance the city legislative body may declare what constitutes a nuisance.” Even in the absence of an ordinance declaring a nuisance under Government Code section 38771, cities are empowered to abate public nuisances.

We directed the parties to answer the question of whether this appeal is now moot, pointing them to the authority of City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078-1079 [challenge to issuance of permanent injunction moot because injunction had expired while appeal pending] and Covina U. H.

Although we could judicially notice the county’s legislative enactments governing medical marijuana (City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077, fn. 5 ), in this court the parties have not sought judicial notice of the guidelines to which the FAC refers.

The MMPA itself, and the Attorney General's guidelines for its enforcement, expressly contemplate the protection of mobile dispensaries. (§ 11362.768, subd. (e); Jackson, at p. 537; City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1085, fn. 17 .) In light of these express references, we are unpersuaded by the People's assertion that "[t]he holdings in Colvin and Jackson should not be extended to operators of marijuana delivery services like the respondent in this…

(See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1099 [we need not consider undeveloped challenges to the trial court’s ruling]; Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368 [absence of legal argument and citation to authorities in support of contention results in its forfeiture].) 12 DISPOSITION The judgment against Deborah Purnell is reversed.

This was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the dispensaries constituted nuisances per se. "[W]here the law expressly declares something to be a nuisance, then no inquiry beyond its existence need be made and in this sense its mere existence is said to be a nuisance per se." ( Beck, supra , 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207 , 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 ; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068 , 1086, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ["An act or condition leg…

The Mann court said that "[t]he summary judgment procedure, *768 inasmuch as it denies the right of the adverse party to a trial, is drastic and should be used with caution." ( Mann , supra , 38 Cal.3d at p. 35 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 694 P.2d 1134 .) The Kennedy court commented that "[t]he purpose of the summary judgment statute is to eliminate the necessity of trying sham and meritless cases [citation], not to stop facially meritorious cases at the summary judgment stage by …

G.D. argues the appeal is moot because the restraining order was not renewed. “ ‘A case becomes moot when events “ ‘render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.’ ” ’ ” (In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042 ; see In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1115 , 1124.) “ ‘It is well settled that an appellate court will decide only actual controversies and that a live appeal may be render…

“A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276; see In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1115 , 1124.) “ ‘It is well 6 settled that an appellate court will decide only actual controversies and that a live appeal may be rendered moot by events occurring after the notice of appeal was filed.’ ” (Building …

Accordingly, it was his burden to produce admissible evidence “prov[ing] each element of the cause of action entitling [him] to judgment on the cause of action.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once Krzemuski satisfied that burden, the burden shifted to the Zakharias “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1081 .) To establish a triable issue of materi…

Trutanich v. Joseph (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1520 (Joseph) [standard of review]; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1081 [summary judgment can resolve nuisance claims].) A The doctrine of public nuisance is ancient, wide-ranging, active, and vague.

(Id. at p. 1252; see Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 625 [“the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law- abiding citizens for lawful purposes”].) Leedy next, quoting New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Cuomo (2d Cir. 2015) 804 F.3d 242, 255 , asserts “ ‘the assault weapons . . . at issue are “in common use” as that term was used in Heller.’ ” But Leedy never shows that the assault weapons at issue in the cited case—which were weapons co…

“When an appellant . . . asserts [a point] but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to 12 authority, we treat the point as waived.” (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779 , 784–785 (Badie); see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1099 [courts “ ‘are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them’ ”].) Thus, we reject this argument as insufficiently developed.3 Accordingly, we conclude Plaintiffs’ motion to s…

(Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie) [“When an appellant . . . asserts [a point] but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived”]; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1099 [courts “ ‘are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them’ ”].) 20 Second, Appellants contend that “[t]he fleet mix for the DEIR analysis had also been manipulated to leave ou…

(Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie) [“When an appellant . . . asserts [a point] but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived”]; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1099 [courts “ ‘are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them’ ”].) 20 Second, Appellants contend that “[t]he fleet mix for the DEIR analysis had also been manipulated to leave ou…

None of the Discretionary Exceptions to the Mootness Rules Applies “‘“[T]here are three discretionary exceptions to the rules regarding mootness: (1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for the court’s determination [citation].”’” (Harris v. Stampolis, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 495 ; see Cit…

This was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the dispensaries constituted nuisances per se. “[W]here the law expressly declares something to be a nuisance, then no inquiry beyond its existence need be made and in this sense its mere existence is said to be a nuisance per se.” (Beck, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207 ; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1086 [“An act or condition legislatively declared to be a public nuisance…

(In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 209 ; see City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1079 .) There is no such concern here.

(Id. at p. 209; see City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1079 .) Here, however, there are no further issues in the trial court that the restraining order could adversely affect.

The City’s interpretation is entitled to deference in our independent review The governing principles of statutory interpretation are both well-established and familiar: “Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] ‘“‘Words must be construed in context, and statutes must be harmoni…