Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n v. Spirt (1983)

Because the insurers “exist[ed] solely for the purpose of enabling universities to delegate their responsibility to provide retirement benefits for their employees” they were “so closely intertwined with those universities ... that they must be deemed an ‘employer’ for purposes of Title VII.” Id.; but see Peters v. Wayne State University, 691 F.2d 235, 238 (6th Cir.1982) (holding that same two insurance companies could not be held hable under Title VII because an insurance c…

See, e.g., Wainwright v. Henry, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3566 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1983).

Compare Peters v. Wayne State University, 691 F. 2d 235 (CA6 1982) (use of sex-based tables does not violate Title VII if actuarial value of pension plans for similarly situated males and females is equal), and EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F. 2d 1139, 1146 (CA1 1978) (Coffin, J., concurring) (Manhart does not necessarily preclude pension system that offers employees equal benefit plans as well as optional “actuarially sound” plans, with unequal benefits, based on sex-based tab…

See, e. g., Wainwright v. Henry, 463 U. S. 1223 (1983).

EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d at 1141 ; see also Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association, 475 F.Supp. 1298 , 1308 n. 16 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir.1982), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3565 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983), on remand, judgment reinstated with modification on other ground, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 , 105 S.Ct. 247 , 83 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984).

See Sawyer v. Louisiana, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3567 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1983).

See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1065 (2d Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3565 , 3566, 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983).

See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3566 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983) (adopting a variant on the interference theory on the express assumption that Congress intended to define the term ''employer” well beyond its general common law definition); Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (D.C.Cir.1973) (first articulating the interference theory on the ground that Title VII’…

See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1066 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1223 (1982), reinstated as modified, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act had no application to civil rights statutes, labor laws, and other areas of “national concern”).

See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & ___ _____ _______________ Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054 , 1063 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and ______________ ___________ rem'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983), reinstated and ________________________ ______________ modified on other grounds, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. ___________________________ _____ denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984) (interpreting the term "employer" ______ under Title VII) ("term 'employer,' . . . is sufficiently broad to e…

See Sawyer v. Louisiana, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3567 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1983).

See Henry v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 311, 314 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3566 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1983). 4 *1522 Here, it is difficult to imagine a more timely objection.

See Henry v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3566 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1983). 13 Given the policies underlying Sykes and Carrier, this result is ineluctable.

See Henry v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3566 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1983). 13 Given the policies underlying Sykes and Carrier , this result is ineluctable.

See, e.g., Spirt v. Teachers’ Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 93 F.R.D. 627, 637 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3565 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F.Supp. 1067, 1082-83 (W.D.N.Y.1982); see also Fleming v. Citizens for Albemarle, Inc., 577 F.2d 236, 237-38 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 , 99 S.Ct. 842 , 59 L.Ed.2d …

The following cases have adopted the more expansive "economic realities" test for determining employee status under Title VII: E.E.O.C. v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir.1984) (cf. Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir.1981), vacated on other grounds, 456 U.S. 1002 , 102 S.Ct. 2288 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1297 (1982), on remand, 693 F.2d 703 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1102 , 103 S.Ct. 1801 , 76 L.Ed.2d 366 & 46, 4 U.S. 1017 , 104 S.Ct. 549 , 78…

See, e.g., Crowder, 569 F. Supp. at 828 (“[D]elegation of [an employer’s] authority [can] result[] in [a third party] having control of an aspect of the terms and conditions of employment.” (distinguishing Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d in part and _ rev’d in part, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), judg’ □ vacated and remanded, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983))).

See Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir.1982) (''[I]t is generally recognized that the term 'employer,' as it is used in Title VII, is sufficiently broad to encompass any party who significantly affects access of any individual to employment opportunities, regardless of whether that party may technically be described as an 'employer' of an aggrieved individual as that term has generally been defined at common law” (citations and interna…

See Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1104 ; see also, Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 *1100 F.2d 235, 238 (6th Cir.1982) (insurance company providing services to employer and its employees is not an "employer" for the purposes of Title VII), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3566 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983).

See Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2nd Cir.1982) (holding that insurance company which existed solely for providing retirement benefits to university employees "are so closely intertwined with those universities ... that they must be deemed an "employer” for purposes of Title VII.”), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3565 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983).

See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054 , 1059 n. 4 (2d Cir.1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3565 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983); People v. Holiday Inns, 656 F.Supp. 675, 683 (W.D.N.Y.1984).

This term has been construed “as comprehending individuals who do not stand in direct employment relationship with an employer.” Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973); see also Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Associates, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir.1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3566 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983); Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 611 F.Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y.1984)…

Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a) provides as follows: When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all of the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary cost or delay. “[Cjourts have taken the view that considerations of judicial economy favor consolidation.” Johnson v. Celotex …

See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1065 (2d Cir.1982) (ERISA is “a statute which clearly ‘specifically relates to the business of insurance’ ”), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3566 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (there are “ERISA sections that undeniably ‘specifically relate’ to the business of insur-ance_ If McCarran-Ferguson applies, therefore, ERIS…

See, Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir.1982) {Spirt II), vacated and remanded, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3566 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983), decision on remand, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.1984) {Spirt II), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 , 105 S.Ct. 247 , 83 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984).

See, e.g., Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3566 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983); York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Association, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir.1982); United States v. City of Yonkers, 592 F.Supp. 570, 590 (S.D.N.Y.1984).

See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054 , 1059 n. 4 (2d Cir.1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 , 103 S.Ct. 3565 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983), modified 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 , 105 S.Ct. 247 , 83 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, A Div. of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211, 1219 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 , 103 S.Ct. 729 , 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983).