Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. Kindle (1987)
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· 86 citation events
across 28 courts.
Showing the 15 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
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Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales (1989)
But see Patchogue Nursing Center v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 1137, 1145 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987); Okoli v. N.Y.S.
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Evans v. Clarke (1988)
See also Jenkins v. Coombe, 821 F.2d 158, 161 (2d Cir.1987) (Strickland inapplicable where appellate counsel submits a “paltry” and “inexcusably deficient” brief); but see Lockhart v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 1275, 1283 (5th Cir.1986) (applying, without discussion, Strickland prejudice test to determine that counsel’s filing of an “affidavit of counsel,” which stated that petitioner’s appeal was without merit, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel despite the existe…
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Perales v. Sullivan (1991)
Cf. Patchogue Nursing Center v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987) (“By choosing the word ‘may,’ rather than ‘shall,’ ‘must,’ or other mandatory language, Congress allowed the Secretary to exercise discretion in deciding whether regulations were needed to effectuate the statute.”).
“By choosing the word ‘may,’ rather than ‘shall,’ ‘must,’ or other mandatory language, Congress allowed the Secretary to exercise discretion in deciding whether regulations were needed to effectuate the statute.”
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Perales v. Sullivan (1991)
Cf. Patchogue Nursing Center v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987) ("By choosing the word 'may,' rather than 'shall,' 'must,' or other mandatory language, Congress allowed the Secretary to exercise discretion in deciding whether regulations were needed to effectuate the statute.").
"By choosing the word 'may,' rather than 'shall,' 'must,' or other mandatory language, Congress allowed the Secretary to exercise discretion in deciding whether regulations were needed to effectuate the statute."
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Flores v. Johnson (1997)
See Moss v. Collins, 963 F.2d at 48 ; Lofton v. Whitley, 905 F.2d at 887 ; see also Lockhart v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 1275, 1283 (5th Cir.1986), ce rt. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed.2d 827 (1987); Hamilton v. McCotter, 111 F.2d 171, 181-82 (5th Cir.1985). 120 .
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Crude Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (1996)
See United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040, 1063 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987) (holding that “[a] person who is the ‘animating force’ for regulatory violations is fully liable even though he does not personally receive all benefits of his illegal activities”). [19] Second, TCC argues that requiring TCC to pay DOE the full amount of damages awarded does not restore the status quo because DOE has not recast the tra…
holding that “[a] person who is the ‘animating force’ for regulatory violations is fully liable even though he does not personally receive all benefits of his illegal activities”
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Laverpool v. New York City Transit Authority (1993)
In Mathews the Supreme Court stated that the Court should consider: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural req…
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City of New York v. Watkins (1991)
See United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040, 1061 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987).
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Altman v. United States (1990)
See United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040, 1049-1050 (Em.App.1986) cert. denied 479 U.S. 1030 , 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987).
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Rockland Medilabs, Inc. v. Perales (1989)
See Plaza Health, 878 F.2d at 582 (discussing Patchogue Nursing Ctr. v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 1137 , 1144-45 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987) and Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602, 606, 609-10 (2d Cir.1975)).
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Continental Training Services, Inc. v. Cavazos (1989)
See, e.g., Patchogue Nursing Center v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 1137, 1144-45 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 828 (1987); Ram v. Heckler, 792 F.2d 444, 447 (4th Cir.1986).
See Patchogue Nursing Center v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 1137, 1144-45 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987); Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602, 606 (2d Cir.1975).
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Telerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro (1988)
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION In this circuit, the standard for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a showing of “(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious question going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary injunctive relief.” Kaplan v. Board of Educ., 759 F.2d 256 , 259 (2d Cir.1985…
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Doe v. Bowen (1987)
See, e.g., Patchogue Nursing Center v. Bowen, M.D., 797 F.2d 1137, 1144-45 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 873 -74, 93 L.Ed.2d 928 (1987); Ram, M.D. v. Heckler, 792 F.2d 444, 447 (4th Cir.1986); cf. Ritter, D.O. v. Cohen, 797 F.2d 119, 122 (3rd Cir.1986).
See also, United States v. Sutton, No. 82-C-1069-B, slip, op. at 32 (Northern District of Oklahoma, Sept. 14, 1984), affirmed, 795 F.2d 1040 (TECA 1986), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 873 , 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987).