Microsoft Corp. v. United States (2000)

It is well established that the recusal inquiry must be “made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U. S., at 1302 (Rehnquist, C.

Section 455 “sets forth the legal criteria for disqualification of federal magistrates, judges, and Supreme Court Justices.” Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000) (Rehnquist, Chief Justice, writing separately).

And the suggestion that either my wife or the ACLU/SC could benefit in any tangible way from this court’s ultimate decision simply because the ACLU/SC signed on to peripheral lower court filings is highly “unrea- sonable and speculative.” Microsoft Corp., 530 U.S. at 1302 (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.).5 This conclusion is consistent 4 As a matter of interest, 49 amicus briefs were filed in this court, on behalf of 282 individuals and organizations. 5 Had the ACLU/SC filed a…

Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.) (“The decision whether a judge’s impartiality can ‘reasonably be questioned’ is to be made in light of the facts as they existed, and not as they were surmised or reported.”) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (mem.) (Rehnquist, C.J.)).

Court, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004) (Scalia, J., in chambers); Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.).

Court, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004) (Scalia, J., in chambers); Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.).

Co., 839 F.2d at 1229 .7 Of course, needless recusals exact a significant toll; judges therefore should exercise care in determining whether recusal is 6 (...continued) F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 1990); Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 , 1201 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 , 1204‐05 (7th Cir. 1985); SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110 , 117‐18 (7th Cir. 1977); but see Boyd, 208 F.3d at 649‐50…

“The decision whether a judge’s impartiality can ‘reasonably be questioned’ is to be made in light of the facts as they existed, and not as they were surmised or reported.” Cheney, 541 U.S. at 914 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)).

U.S. 913, 914 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal)).

This inquiry is “made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000).

This inquiry is “made 4 from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000).

The recusal inquiry for a judge based on perceived lack of impartiality must be “made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Microsoft Corp., 530 U.S. at 1301.

Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and 24 regardless of the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 , 121 S.Ct. 25 1819 (2001), and the exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, 26 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 , 122 S.Ct. 983, 993 (2002). 27 “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners ‘must complete the 28 administrative review process in accordance with the…

Similarly, § 455(a) requires a judge to disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (REHNQUIST, C.J., respecting recusal).

Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004) (Scalia, J., sitting alone) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)).

Court for Dist. of Columbia, 514 U.S. 913 , 924 (2004) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., Statement on Recusal)).

And any “recusal inquiry must be ‘made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.’” Cheney, 541 U.S. at 924 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)) (emphases added in Cheney).

Some of our opinions have recognized that the “inquiry under Canon 3E(1) ‘is an objective one, made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.’” Dean v. Bondurant, 193 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)); see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs.

Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal)).

Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal)).

Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal)).

Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal)).

Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal)).

Section 455(a) requires a judge to disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (REHNQUIST, C.J., respecting recusal).

The test under Section 455(a) “is an objective one, made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., Statement).

Wash. Oct. 8, 2014) (an objective, well-informed observer 7 would not reasonably question the impartiality of a judge simply because a 8 professional organization of which they are members is a party) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 9 455(a); Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)). 10 Thus, the Court finds that Judge Brand did not abuse her discretion in denying 11 Licht’s Disqualification Motion. 12 H.

In any event, even though it had not researched the matter, the State conceded that the standard should be an “informed” observer. 23 In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 , 1313 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). 24 Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1985). 25 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (mem., Rehnquist, C.J.). 26 Cheney v. United States.

Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000) (order by Chief Justice William H.

Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000) (order by Chief Justice William H.

Canon 3E(1) "is an objective one, made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances ." Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U .S . 1301, 121 S.Ct. 25, 26 (2000).2 The decision to recuse should not be made lightly by a Kentucky Supreme Court Justice .

See Microsoft Corp., 580 U.S. at 1301, 121 S.Ct. at 26-27 (“Not only is the Court deprived of the participation of one of its nine Members, but the even number of those remaining creates a risk of affir-mance of a lower court decision by an equally divided court.”).

Conduct R. 2.11(A); see also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301-02 , 121 S.Ct. 25 , 147 L.Ed.2d 1048 (2000) (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.) (setting forth the facts regarding his son's representation of Microsoft in a different matter, and concluding that those facts did not require his recusal in a case brought by Microsoft on the same subject matter because "a well-informed individual would [not] conclude that an appearance of impropriety exists" based on…

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 , 121 S.Ct. 25 , 147 L.Ed.2d 1048 (2000) (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.) (declining to recuse from Microsoft antitrust case under either § 455(a) or § 455(b)(5)(iii) where son represented Microsoft in other antitrust matters that were potentially affected by case’s outcome).

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 25 (2000).

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 25 , 147 L.Ed.2d 1048 (2000).

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 -03 (Justice Rehnquist's statement explaining his decision not to disqualify himself when his son was a partner in a law firm representing a party, Microsoft, on other related matters); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., recusing himself without motion because of his strong feelings about the issue in the case).

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 , 121 S.Ct. 25 , 147 L.Ed.2d 1048 (2000).

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 , 121 S.Ct. 25 , 147 L.Ed.2d 1048 (2000).

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301-03 , 121 S.Ct. 25 , 147 L.Ed.2d 1048 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (rejecting motion for recusal under Section 455(a) based on his son’s representation, in another case, of a party before the Court); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liab.

The Seventh Circuit has clarified that the relevant question for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) disqualification is whether “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned by a ‘well-informed, thoughtful observer rather than to a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.’” O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 988 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir.1996); citing In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir.1990)); accord Mic…

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 , 121 S.Ct. 25 , 147 L.Ed.2d 1048 (2000) (order by Chief Justice Rehnquist denying motion to recuse where his son’s law firm represented a party but his personal and financial concerns were unaffected).

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 , 121 S.Ct. 25 , 147 L.Ed.2d 1048 (2000).

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988)); see also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Statement of Chief Justice Rehnquist on decision not to recuse) (noting that, under § 455(a), the “inquiry is an objective one, 5 made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances”); United States v. Hite, 769 F.3d 1154, 1172 (D.C.

See, e.g., Microsoft Corp v. United Sates, 530 U.S. 1301 , 1302 (2000) (Chief Justice declined to recuse himself from participating in an appeal in an antitrust action even though his son represented Microsoft in separate antitrust actions).1 This Court is cognizant that recusal and transferring the case to a different judge “often results in the duplication of judicial resources and significant delay.” Smart Commc’ns., Holding, Inc. v. Global Tel-Link Corp., 590 F. Supp. 3d…

See, e.g., Microsoft Corp v. United Sates, 530 U.S. 1301 , 1302 (2000) (Chief Justice declined to recuse himself from participating in an appeal in an antitrust action even though his son represented Microsoft in separate antitrust actions).1 This Court is cognizant that recusal and transferring the case to a different judge “often results in the duplication of judicial resources and significant delay.” Smart Commc’ns., Holding, Inc. v. Global Tel-Link Corp., 590 F. Supp. 3d…

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 , 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.); Liteky, 510 US. at 548.

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 , 1301-03 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (rejecting motion for recusal 21 under Section 455(a) based on his son’s representation, in another case, of a party before the Court); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liab.

See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000).

See also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000) (Justice Rehnquist denied the motion for his disqualification.); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980) (Justice Rehnquist denied the motion to disqualify him.); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 901 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist denied the motion to disqualify him.); Gravel v. United States, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist denied the motion for his own disqualification.); and Guy v. United States, 409 U.S. 896 (19…

See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding that recusal was not required where son of Chief Justice was partner at a law firm that represented one of the parties in matters pending before another court); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods.