41 California opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Lawrencegreen2 sentences2015The party challenging the determination has the burden of showing that it "is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 .) The Trial Court Did Not Misinterpret the Supreme Court's Decision in Lawrence The trial court concluded that its decision is "identical for all practical purposes to the decision that the Board of Parole Hearings . . . make[s] when a life-term inmate is up for his or her Initial Parole Hearing." Appellant contends that the trial court "incorrectly interpreted the parole suitability standard of c 2011In Prather, the Supreme Court held that when a court finds the Board’s decision to deny parole is not supported by some evidence, the court granting relief to the petitioner “generally should direct the Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of the court . . . .” (In re Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 244 .) The court stressed that it was considering “the limited procedural question of the proper scope of the decision of a reviewing court that concludes the Board has abused its discretion in denying a prisoner a | 3 | 7 |
In Re Rosenkrantzgreen2 sentences2015(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 658 .) In such a case, we “generally should direct the Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of the court.” (Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 244 .) As Justice Moreno pointed out in his concurrence in Prather, however, the Prather court addressed only the first remand after a parole denial. 2012(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 658.) In such a case, we “generally should direct the Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of the court, and should not place improper limitations on the type of evidence the Board is statutorily obligated to consider.” (Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 244 .) II. | 3 | 5 |
In Re Prathergreen2 sentences2015(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 658 .) In such a case, we “generally should direct the Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of the court.” (Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 244 .) As Justice Moreno pointed out in his concurrence in Prather, however, the Prather court addressed only the first remand after a parole denial. 2013In that case, the state Supreme Court explained “that a decision granting habeas corpus relief in these circumstances generally should direct the Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of the court, and should not place improper limitations on the type of evidence the Board is statutorily obligated to consider.” (In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238, 244 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 291 , 234 P.3d 541 ].) The current case involves a different type of determination than a parole hearing, which is held periodically to determin | 2 | 11 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2017The minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) is the earliest date on which a life prisoner may legally be released on parole. (§ 3046; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2000, subd. (b)(67).) An inmate is entitled to a parole suitability hearing one year before his MEPD. (§ 3041, subd. (a)(2).) While a subdivision (b)(5) enhancement could be a factor tending to show a defendant is unsuitable for parole (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402 ; People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ), a subdivision (b)(1)(C) enhancement would postpone the inmate's suitability hearing for 10 2017The minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) is the earliest date on which a life prisoner may legally be released on parole. (§ 3046; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2000, subd. (b)(67).) An inmate is entitled to a parole suitability hearing one year before his MEPD. (§ 3041, subd. (a)(2).) While a subdivision (b)(5) enhancement could be a factor tending to show a defendant is unsuitable for parole (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402 ; People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ), a subdivision (b)(1)(C) enhancement would postpone the inmate's suitability hearing for 10 | 1 | 2 |
In Re Dannenberggreen2 sentences2015On the contrary, the Supreme Court explicitly upheld this practice in In re Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at page 1095 , finding that the Board need not ‘refer to its base term matrices . . . before deeming a particular life inmate unsuitable’ for parole. 2009The Board cites In re Ramirez (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 549 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 ], disapproved on another ground in In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1100 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 ], a case involving the permissible scope of habeas corpus relief where the decision being reversed was made by the Board, not by the Governor. | 1 | 2 |
In re Shaputisgreen2 sentences2010(In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1221 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d 535 ]; In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1255 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 213 , 190 P.3d 573 ].) We are to view the reasons relied upon by the Board to deny parole and determine if a nexus exists between those reasons and danger to the public. 2009Disposition The trial court’s order that directs the Board to conduct a new parole suitability hearing and to proceed in accordance with due process is modified to direct the Board to reconsider petitioner’s parole suitability in light of In re Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1181 and In re Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1241 and is further modified to omit all restrictions upon the Board’s full exercise of its discretion under law. | 1 | 2 |
In re Mcgheegreen1 sentence2021However, nothing in Proposition 57 “dictates the timing of an inmate’s actual parole suitability hearing.” (Arroyo, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 731 ; cf. In re McGhee (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 902, 909 [distinguishing parole eligibility determinations made by CDCR from parole suitability decisions made by the Board of Parole Hearings].) Moreover, our Supreme Court has continued to emphasize that “[t]he evaluation of an inmate’s suitability for parole and the processes involved in conducting that evaluation remain squarely within the purview of the [CDCR] and the Board of Parole Hearings.” (Gadlin, | 1 | 1 |
Esberg v. Union Oil Companyred1 sentence2015(Prather, supra, 50 28 Cal.4th at p. 262 (conc. opn. of Moreno, J.).) Justice Moreno observed, “Should the Board on remand again deny parole, and the court again rule that the parole denial is unjustified, then a more drastic intervention, such as an outright order that the Board grant parole, may well be warranted. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Scottgreen2 sentences2012I, § 7), “the ‘some evidence’ test may be understood as meaning that suitability determinations must have some rational basis in fact” (In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 590, fn. 6 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 905 ]); that is, “the factual basis of a decision by the Board denying parole must be premised upon some evidence relevant to the factors the Board is required to consider.” (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 663 (Rosenkrantz).) As Justice Liu has recently articulated the proposition, “the focus of judicial review is on the rationality of the Board’s . . . decision—not only the ultima 2012I, § 7), “the ‘some evidence’ test may be understood as meaning that suitability determinations must have some rational basis in fact” (In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 590, fn. 6 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 905 ]); that is, “the factual basis of a decision by the Board denying parole must be premised upon some evidence relevant to the factors the Board is required to consider.” (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 663 (Rosenkrantz).) As Justice Liu has recently articulated the proposition, “the focus of judicial review is on the rationality of the Board’s . . . decision—not only the ultima | 1 | 1 |
In Re Shaputisgreen1 sentence2012I, § 7), “the ‘some evidence’ test may be understood as meaning that suitability determinations must have some rational basis in fact” (In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 590, fn. 6 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 905 ]); that is, “the factual basis of a decision by the Board denying parole must be premised upon some evidence relevant to the factors the Board is required to consider.” (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 663 (Rosenkrantz).) As Justice Liu has recently articulated the proposition, “the focus of judicial review is on the rationality of the Board’s . . . decision—not only the ultima | 1 | 1 |
In re Gomezgreen2 sentences2011In such an instance, the Supreme Court concluded, “a decision granting habeas corpus relief . . . generally should direct the Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of the court, and should not place improper limitations on the type of evidence the Board is statutorily obligated to consider.” (Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 244 .) The reviewing court may not “direct the Board to reach a particular result or to consider only a limited category of evidence in making a suitability determination.” (Id. at p. 253.) 2011In such an instance, the Supreme Court concluded, “a decision granting habeas corpus relief . . . generally should direct the Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of the court, and should not place improper limitations on the type of evidence the Board is statutorily obligated to consider.” (Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 244 .) The reviewing court may not “direct the Board to reach a particular result or to consider only a limited category of evidence in making a suitability determination.” (Id. at p. 253.) | 1 | 1 |
In Re Gaulgreen2 sentences2010Generally, ‘ “parole applicants in this state have an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Gaul (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 20, 31 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 736 ], citation omitted (Gaul), quoting In re Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204 (Lawrence), disapproved on other grounds in In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 291 , 234 P.3d 541 ].) “Under the Board’s regulations it may properly deny par 2010Generally, ‘ “parole applicants in this state have an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Gaul (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 20, 31 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 736 ], citation omitted (Gaul), quoting In re Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204 (Lawrence), disapproved on other grounds in In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 291 , 234 P.3d 541 ].) “Under the Board’s regulations it may properly deny par | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Graygreen | 1 | 1 |
In Re Smithgreen2 sentences2009(Cf. In re Smith (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 489, 507 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 781 ] [affirming order granting petition for writ of habeas corpus and declining to remand to Governor, which “would amount to an idle act”]; In re Gray (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 379, 411 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 ] [same]; see generally Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 118 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 ] [“law does not require a futile act”]; Civ. 2009(Cf. In re Smith (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 489, 507 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 781 ] [affirming order granting petition for writ of habeas corpus and declining to remand to Governor, which “would amount to an idle act”]; In re Gray (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 379, 411 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 ] [same]; see generally Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 118 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 ] [“law does not require a futile act”]; Civ. | 1 | 1 |
NICKOLAS F. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2009(Cf. In re Smith (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 489, 507 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 781 ] [affirming order granting petition for writ of habeas corpus and declining to remand to Governor, which “would amount to an idle act”]; In re Gray (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 379, 411 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 ] [same]; see generally Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 118 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 ] [“law does not require a futile act”]; Civ. 2009(Cf. In re Smith (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 489, 507 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 781 ] [affirming order granting petition for writ of habeas corpus and declining to remand to Governor, which “would amount to an idle act”]; In re Gray (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 379, 411 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 ] [same]; see generally Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 118 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 ] [“law does not require a futile act”]; Civ. | 1 | 1 |
| COX v. McCARTHYgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rhyne v. Municipal Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mendoza v. County of Tularegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| California Department of Corrections v. Moralesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Stanworthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Coleman
green
2 sentences2025(Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 880 .) The “ ‘threshold question’ ” was “ ‘whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.’ ” (Ibid.) 7 Lek fleetingly contends that his statements at the parole suitability hearing were involuntary but does not develop this point or support it with citation to authority. 2021Defendant relies on People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman) and its progeny to argue that statements made in a parole suitability hearing and during a risk assessment should be inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt. | 3 | 2021–2026 |
In Re Jackson
green
2 sentences2013(Stats. 1982, ch. 1435, § 1, p. 5474.) We held that the amendment was “a procedural change outside the purview of the ex post facto clause” (Jackson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 472 ) because it did not alter the criteria related to parole suitability or release on parole, and it “did not entirely deprive an inmate of the right to a parole suitability hearing.” (Id. at p. 473.) We acknowledged that the change in the frequency of hearings “did eliminate the possibility that a parole date would be set within the period of the postponement. 2013(Stats. 1982, ch. 1435, § 1, p. 5474.) We held that the amendment was “a procedural change outside the purview of the ex post facto clause” (In re Jackson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 472 ) because it did not alter the criteria related to parole suitability or release on parole, and it “did not entirely deprive an inmate of the right to a parole suitability hearing” (id. at p. 473). | 2 | 1988–2013 |
In Re Rosenkrantz
green
2 sentences2002In accordance with the decision in Rosenkrantz II, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 409 , 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 279 , the Board held a new parole suitability hearing in June 2000. 2002In accordance with the decision in Rosenkrantz II, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 409 , 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 279 , the Board held a new parole suitability hearing in June 2000. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Simmons v. United States
green
1 sentence2025(Duran, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 931–932.)3 3 In arguing for the exclusion of his prior statements, Lek also relies in part on Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. McWhorter
green
1 sentence2025To determine whether a confession is involuntary, a court must look at “ ‘ “ ‘the uncontradicted facts surrounding the making of the statements to determine independently whether the prosecution met its burden and proved that the statements were voluntarily given without previous inducement, intimidation or threat.’ ” ’ ” (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346 .) Here, unlike the concurrent revocation and trial proceedings at issue in Coleman, in a section 1172.6 proceeding the fact of a resentencing petitioner’s liability—under former law—has already been adjudicated. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Sheena K.
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688 , 696 (Myles); People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 ; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 , 880–881.) Defendant did not raise an objection to admission of the parole suitability hearing transcript excerpts on the basis that it constituted an involuntary confession. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. McCullough
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688 , 696 (Myles); People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 ; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 , 880–881.) Defendant did not raise an objection to admission of the parole suitability hearing transcript excerpts on the basis that it constituted an involuntary confession. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In re Cook
green
1 sentence2023(Delgado, at pp. 103-104; Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 458-459; Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 285-286.) On our own motion, we notified the parties that we were contemplating taking judicial notice of the fact that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s inmate locator Web site indicates defendant has a parole suitability hearing set for July of 2032 under the Elderly Parole Program. (<https://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/Details.aspx? | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In re Mohammad
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Viehmeyer, supra, G033447.) Viehmeyer requested a parole suitability hearing pursuant to Proposition 57 and In re Mohammad (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 719 (see Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th 518 [reversed]). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Towne
green
1 sentence2022Regardless of the total aggregate sentence, Staley, who is now 52 years old, will be entitled to a parole suitability hearing under the Elderly Parole Program once he has served 20 years of continuous incarceration. (§ 3055, subd. (a).) 15 term sentence,’ ‘any additional factfinding engaged in by the trial court in selecting the appropriate sentence among the three available options does not violate the defendant’s right to jury trial’”]; People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 75 .) We also agree with the Attorney General that we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt a jury, if asked, would ha | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re Gadlin
green
1 sentence2021However, nothing in Proposition 57 “dictates the timing of an inmate’s actual parole suitability hearing.” (Arroyo, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 731 ; cf. In re McGhee (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 902, 909 [distinguishing parole eligibility determinations made by CDCR from parole suitability decisions made by the Board of Parole Hearings].) Moreover, our Supreme Court has continued to emphasize that “[t]he evaluation of an inmate’s suitability for parole and the processes involved in conducting that evaluation remain squarely within the purview of the [CDCR] and the Board of Parole Hearings.” (Gadlin, | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re Arroyo
green
1 sentence2021However, nothing in Proposition 57 “dictates the timing of an inmate’s actual parole suitability hearing.” (Arroyo, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 731 ; cf. In re McGhee (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 902, 909 [distinguishing parole eligibility determinations made by CDCR from parole suitability decisions made by the Board of Parole Hearings].) Moreover, our Supreme Court has continued to emphasize that “[t]he evaluation of an inmate’s suitability for parole and the processes involved in conducting that evaluation remain squarely within the purview of the [CDCR] and the Board of Parole Hearings.” (Gadlin, | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Graham v. Florida
green
2 sentences2018The potential for disparate parole dates for similar offenses is not only unfair to defendants and an administrative nightmare for prison officials, it is inconsistent with the categorical requirements of Graham , supra , 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 . 2018The potential for disparate parole dates for similar offenses is not only unfair to defendants and an administrative nightmare for prison officials, it is inconsistent with the categorical requirements of Graham , supra , 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Carmony
green
1 sentence2015The party challenging the determination has the burden of showing that it "is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 .) The Trial Court Did Not Misinterpret the Supreme Court's Decision in Lawrence The trial court concluded that its decision is "identical for all practical purposes to the decision that the Board of Parole Hearings . . . make[s] when a life-term inmate is up for his or her Initial Parole Hearing." Appellant contends that the trial court "incorrectly interpreted the parole suitability standard of c | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Mesa
green
1 sentence2015Although a similar issue could very well arise when Alvarenga is resentenced, the Supreme Court may resolve the fundamental question presented by Alvarenga in the near future: In In re Alatriste (S214652, rev. granted Feb. 19, 2014) and In re Bonilla (S214960, rev. granted Feb. 19, 2014), the Supreme gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,”’ and (3) ‘the person “willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang. ”’” (People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, 197 .) 33 Court will consider whether the opportun | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In re Young
green
1 sentence2012(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 658.) In such a case, we ‘generally should direct the Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of the court, and should not place improper limitations on the type of evidence the Board is statutorily obligated to consider.’ (Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 244 .)” (In re Young, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 304 .) Additionally, because the state cannot deprive any person of liberty without due process of law (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| In Re Ramirez green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In Re Masoner green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| BOARD OF PRISON TERMS v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| In Re Dannenberg neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Belmontes green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.