felony violation in California

2025Under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(28), a serious felony includes any prior “felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22.” “[S]ection 1192.7(c)(28) includes within its ambit any felony offense committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang under the section 186.22(b)(1) gang sentence enhancement.” (Briceno, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 459 .) We requested supplemental briefing on the relevance, if any, of Assembly Bill No. 333 (Assembly Bill 333).

2025(Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 833 .)2 Here, the relevant inquiry is whether the prior conviction was for “any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22.” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(28).) This definition includes the substantive offense of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) as well as “any felony offense committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang under the section 186.22[, subdivision] (b)(1) gang sentence enhancement.” (Briceno, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 459 .) Where a serious felony is defined by reference to a speci

2023It is well-established, however, that “[a] guilty plea is the ‘legal equivalent’ of a ‘verdict’. . .and is ‘tantamount’ to a ‘finding.’ ” (People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 688, fn. 2 ; see People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 601 [“A guilty plea is, for most purposes, the legal equivalent of a verdict of guilty reached by a jury”].) Accordingly, the Kennedy court found that the defendant, who had pleaded no contest to a felony violation of sections 664 and 288.2, was “ ‘charged with an offense . . . for which the trier of fact has found the defendant guilty.’ ” (Kennedy, supra, 19

2023It is well-established, however, that “[a] guilty plea is the ‘legal equivalent’ of a ‘verdict’. . .and is ‘tantamount’ to a ‘finding.’ ” (People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 688, fn. 2 ; see People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 601 [“A guilty plea is, for most purposes, the legal equivalent of a verdict of guilty reached by a jury”].) Accordingly, the Kennedy court found that the defendant, who had pleaded no contest to a felony violation of sections 664 and 288.2, was “ ‘charged with an offense . . . for which the trier of fact has found the defendant guilty.’ ” (Kennedy, supra, 19

1993To complicate matters, except for the decision in People v. Bowie, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at pages 1266-1269, all of the other aforementioned cases which determined that federal bank robbery was not a serious felony applied the rule of People v. Alfaro (1986) 42 Cal.3d 627, 632-635 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 724 P.2d 1154 ], which held “that proof that a prior conviction was a ‘serious felony’ for the purpose of the five-year enhancement under sections 667 and 1192.7(c) was limited to matters necessarily established by the prior judgment of conviction.” (Pe ople v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 348

1993To complicate matters, except for the decision in People v. Bowie, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at pages 1266-1269, all of the other aforementioned cases which determined that federal bank robbery was not a serious felony applied the rule of People v. Alfaro (1986) 42 Cal.3d 627, 632-635 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 724 P.2d 1154 ], which held “that proof that a prior conviction was a ‘serious felony’ for the purpose of the five-year enhancement under sections 667 and 1192.7(c) was limited to matters necessarily established by the prior judgment of conviction.” (Pe ople v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 348

2016Code, § 666.5.) The Solis concurring opinion finds potential for conflict where “[a] recidivist who stole a vehicle worth less than $950 could not be punished for his or her recidivism,” because “under [Penal Code] section 666.5 both the current and prior crimes must be felonies.” (Solis, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1118 (conc. opn. of Aldrich, J.).) I do not see how this creates a conflict of law.

2016Code, § 666.5.) The Solis concurring opinion finds potential for conflict where “[a] recidivist who stole a vehicle worth less than $950 could not be punished for his or her recidivism,” because “under [Penal Code] section 666.5 both the current and prior crimes must be felonies.” (Solis, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1118 (conc. opn. of Aldrich, J.).) This scenario creates no conflict.

2006(Howard, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1139.) In a footnote, the majority stated: “Justice Baxter’s dissenting opinion argues forcefully that the trial court’s instructional error was harmless because (1) there was overwhelming evidence that defendant acted with implied malice, and (2) the jury implicitly found, based on the trial court’s instructions, that defendant acted with malice.” (Id. at p. 1139, fn. 4, italics added.) *894 In Howard , the jury was instructed on second degree felony murder, with the underlying felony being a violation of section 2800.2.

2005(See, e.g., People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312 , 394-395, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 935 P.2d 708 .) [7] We are aware that the court in People v. Johnson (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 169 , 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 650 appears to have equated the two in its statement that a felony violation of section 2800.2 has, as its key element, wanton disregard for human life. ( Johnson, supra, at p. 173 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 650 .) That case was decided under an earlier version of the statute, however (see People v. Howard, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1137, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 104 P.3d 107 ), and was not concerned with the issue

2018(See People v. Van Orden , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1287 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 ; but see Page , at p. 1188, fn. 5, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 406 P.3d 319 [declining to consider "whether equal protection or the avoidance of absurd consequences requires that misdemeanor sentencing under [Penal Code] sections 490.2 and 1170.18 extend not only to those convicted of theft under Vehicle Code section 10851, but also to those convicted for taking a vehicle without the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession"].) 9 *857 The court's instructions here allowed the jury to convict Gutierrez of

2018(See People v. Van Orden , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1287 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 ; but see Page , at p. 1188, fn. 5, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 406 P.3d 319 [declining to consider "whether equal protection or the avoidance of absurd consequences requires that misdemeanor sentencing under [Penal Code] sections 490.2 and 1170.18 extend not only to those convicted of theft under Vehicle Code section 10851, but also to those convicted for taking a vehicle without the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession"].) 9 *857 The court's instructions here allowed the jury to convict Gutierrez of

2024(Former § 290, subds. (b) & (c); see also Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527 [§ 290 imposes “ ‘a lifelong obligation to register’ ”].) A felony violation of section 288.2 was an enumerated offense and thus required lifetime registration; a misdemeanor violation of section 288.2 was not an enumerated offense and thus did not require registration at all.

2023A. Section 290’s Sex Offender Registration Requirements Before and After the 2021 Amendments At the time Manzoor pleaded guilty to a felony violation of section 288.2, the Sex Offender Registration Act (§§ 290–290.04) required lifetime registration for defendants convicted of certain offenses, including “any felony violation of Section 288.2 . . . .” (Former § 290, subd. (a)(2)(A), as amended by Stats. 2005, ch. 722, § 3.5.) “Section 290 ‘applies automatically to the enumerated offenses, and imposes on each person convicted a lifelong obligation to register.’ ” (Wright v. Superior Court (1997)

2015(See Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 838-839 [finding rational basis for statutory scheme allowing the “‘lesser’” offense of battery without injury to be punished more severely than the “‘greater’” offense of battery with injury].) 8 changes to the Penal Code or Vehicle Code beyond those expressed in the plain language of the additions or amendments resulting from the adoption of Proposition 47.

2015(See Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 838-839 [finding rational basis for statutory scheme allowing the “‘lesser’” offense of battery without injury to be punished more severely than the “‘greater’” offense of battery with injury].) 8 Penal Code or Vehicle Code beyond those expressed in the plain language of the additions or amendments resulting from the adoption of Proposition 47.

2025(Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 794 ; see, e.g., § 17, subd. (e) [section 17 “does not authorize a judge to relieve a defendant of the duty to register as a sex offender” if the defendant is found guilty of a crime requiring sex offender registration]; People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426, 442, fn. 8 [under the Three Strikes Law, a wobbler reduced to a misdemeanor under section 17, subd. (b)(3) after a court suspends the imposition of a sentence can serve as a strike if the defendant suffers a subsequent felony conviction].) We discern no legislative intent to override section 17, subdivision

2017Moreover, cases have held in analogous contexts that factual allegations resulting in increased punishment, even if admitted by the defendant, are inapplicable and of "no moment" unless the wobbler is a felony. ( People v. Kunkel (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 46 , 55, 221 Cal.Rptr. 359 ( Kunkel ).) For example, in People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426 , 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 518 , 226 P.3d 998 ( Feyrer ), 9 the defendant pled no contest to felony assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, a wobbler offense, and "also admitted the factual allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily inj

2025(Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 684 ; see Prop. 21, §§ 14, 16; Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 573; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 577, fn. 11 .) This harmonized the list of strike priors with the then-current list of serious felonies under section 1192.7(c), including Proposition 21’s expansion of that list to include “any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22.” (§ 1192.7(c)(28), added by Prop. 21, § 17.) But this harmony was short-lived; in 2002, the Legislature added a new serious felony (the use of a weapon of mass destruction)

2016In March 2000, voters passed Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, which, among other things, altered the definition of a “serious felony” offense to include “any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22.” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(28).) “[T]he definition of ‘serious felony’ in section 1192.7(c)(28) also includes ‘any felony offense’ that was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22(b)(1).)” (People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451, 456 .) Our Supreme Court recently held th

2024Bill No. 2680 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 15, 1998, p. 1.) Thus, our 7 construction promotes rather than defeats the general purpose of the statute.” (Kennedy, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492 .) Kennedy thus teaches that a person who is convicted of a felony violation of section 288.2, and who later has his or her conviction reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, is still required to register for life.

2023(Kennedy, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491 , collecting cases.) “ ‘If ultimately a misdemeanor sentence is imposed, the offense is a misdemeanor from that point on, but not retroactively . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) With that authority in mind, the Kennedy court found that it was “undisputed…that defendant was ‘charged with an offense for which registration as a sex offender is required pursuant to Section 290, and for which the trier of fact has found the defendant guilty.’ (§ 17, subd. (e).) Defendant was charged with a felony violation of sections 664 and 288.2, subdivision (b), and he pleaded no co

2018Romanowski does not establish that the only method for valuing access card information is the fair market value test. ( *893 Romanowski , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 914 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 391 P.3d 633 .) The defendant in Romanowski pled no contest to a felony violation of section 484e, subdivision (d), and the opinion does not state or imply that the defendant had used the access card information to obtain property. ( Id . at p. 906, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 391 P.3d 633 .) Where, as here, the access card information was actually used to procure goods or services, common sense tells us that the

2018Romanowski does not establish that the only method for valuing access card information is the fair market value test. ( *893 Romanowski , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 914 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 391 P.3d 633 .) The defendant in Romanowski pled no contest to a felony violation of section 484e, subdivision (d), and the opinion does not state or imply that the defendant had used the access card information to obtain property. ( Id . at p. 906, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 391 P.3d 633 .) Where, as here, the access card information was actually used to procure goods or services, common sense tells us that the

2020(Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1226 .) The jury was instructed that “all of you do not have to agree on the same theory,” so it is possible that at least some jurors found defendant guilty under the identity theory.

2018"When a trial court instructs a jury on two theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and one legally incorrect, reversal is required unless there is a basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on a valid ground." ( People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 , 167, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 438 , 325 P.3d 972 ; see People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116 , 1128-1129, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) "An instruction on an invalid theory may be found harmless when 'other aspects of the verdict or the evidence leave no reasonable doubt that the jury made the findings necessary' under a l

2016(See People v. Young, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 114 [the language of § 666.5, subd. (a), “closely parallels” that of section 666].) Section 666 provides that a person who has been convicted of various theft-related crimes, and “who is subsequently convicted of petty theft,” is punishable as a felon or a misdemeanant. (§ 666, subd. (a).) Similarly, section 666.5 provides that a person who has been previously convicted of a felony violation of various theft-related statutes, and “is subsequently convicted of any of these offenses shall be punished” as a felon. (§ 666.5, subd. (a), italics adde

2015Penal Code Section 666.5 Penal Code section 666.5, captioned “[p]unishment for second offense of felony theft of automobile,” provides that “[e]very person who, having been previously convicted of a felony violation of Section 10851 of the Vehicle Code . . . is subsequently convicted of any of these offenses shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two, three, or four years, or a fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both the fine and the imprisonment.” (Id., subd. (a).) It further provides that “[t]he existence of any fact which would bring a pers

2011That section states in relevant part: ‘When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following circumstances: [f] . . . [][] (3) When the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor.’ “Once the court exercises its discretion to find the offense to be a felony violation of

2011That section states in relevant part: ‘When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following circumstances: [f] . . . [][] (3) When the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor.’ “Once the court exercises its discretion to find the offense to be a felony violation of

2022The challenged instruction “allowed the jury to convict [defendant] of a felony violation of [Vehicle Code ]section 10851 … even though no value was proved—a legally incorrect theory—or for a [posttheft] driving offense—a legally correct one.” (Gutierrez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 857 ; see Jackson, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 373 .) When that happens, the Supreme Court instructs we “must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, 10. and considering all relevant circumstances, [we] determine[] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (

2022As other courts have recognized, this instruction fails “to [distinguish adequately] among, and separately define the elements for, each of the ways in which [Vehicle Code ]section 10851 can be violated.” (Gutierrez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 856 .) The instruction allows the jury to find a felony violation based on either an unlawful taking or an unlawful driving theory, but it does not require the vehicle to be valued at more than $950, nor does it require a substantial break between the driving and the taking of the vehicle in order to convict on posttheft driving.

2020(Jackson, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 378 .) “The court’s instructions here allowed the jury to convict [defendant] of a felony violation of section 10851 for stealing the . . . car, even though no value was proved—a legally incorrect theory—or for a nontheft taking or driving offense—a legally correct one.” (Gutierrez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 857 .) “ ‘When a trial court instructs a jury on two theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and one legally incorrect, 4 Although Proposition 47 was enacted prior to trial in this matter, the instructional error requiring a finding of th

2019(Gutierrez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 858 ; Bussey, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1064 ; Jackson, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 381 .) III DISPOSITION We vacate the sentence and remand for the People to decide whether to accept a reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor or to retry Martell for a felony violation of section 10851.

2019(Gutierrez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 858 ; Bussey, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1064 ; Jackson, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 381 .) III DISPOSITION We vacate the sentence and remand for the People to decide whether to accept a reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor or to retry Martell for a felony violation of section 10851.

2019(Gutierrez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 858 ; Bussey, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1064 ; Jackson, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 381 .) III DISPOSITION We vacate the sentence and remand for the People to decide whether to accept a reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor or to retry Martell for a felony violation of section 10851.

2017There, the defendant caused a stolen vehicle report to be filed with law enforcement based on her false report that her car had been stolen. ( Murphy , supra , 52 Cal.4th at p. 85 , 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 78 , 253 P.3d 1216 .) She was later convicted of a felony violation of section 115, which prohibits the filing of a false "instrument" with the State. ( Murphy , at p. 85, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 78 , 253 P.3d 1216 .) On appeal, she argued her prosecution under section 115 was precluded by two more specific statutes, including Vehicle Code section 10501, subdivision (a), which prohibits the filing of a fals

2017There, the defendant caused a stolen vehicle report to be filed with law enforcement based on her false report that her car had been stolen. ( Murphy , supra , 52 Cal.4th at p. 85 , 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 78 , 253 P.3d 1216 .) She was later convicted of a felony violation of section 115, which prohibits the filing of a false "instrument" with the State. ( Murphy , at p. 85, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 78 , 253 P.3d 1216 .) On appeal, she argued her prosecution under section 115 was precluded by two more specific statutes, including Vehicle Code section 10501, subdivision (a), which prohibits the filing of a fals

2017(See *774 People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164 , 178-179, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 139 , 347 P.3d 1130 ( Cross ).) In Cross , supra , 61 Cal.4th 164 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 139 , 347 P.3d 1130 , the defendant was charged with a felony violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a).

2017(See *774 People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164 , 178-179, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 139 , 347 P.3d 1130 ( Cross ).) In Cross , supra , 61 Cal.4th 164 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 139 , 347 P.3d 1130 , the defendant was charged with a felony violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a).

2020In 2007, defendant pleaded guilty to one felony count of gang participation in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a) (section 186.22(a)), and a felony violation of section 186.22 is a strike. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(28) [defining serious felonies for purposes of the Three Strikes law]; see People v. Ulloa (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 405, 410 [noting “[i]t is undisputed that the substantive offense of active participation in a street gang” in § 186.22(a) is a serious felony].) However, evolution of the law has turned a simple issue into a more complicated one. 1 All further statutory references

2013In support, he relies on Ulloa, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at page 408 , in which Division Four of the Second Appellate District held that Penal Code1 “section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(28),[2] 1 All further section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 Section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(28) states that “ ‘serious felony’ ” includes “any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22.” 3 which appears within the definition of ‘serious felony,’ does not include a misdemeanor punishable as a felony pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (d).”3 T

1970While it is perfectly true that a defendant may emerge from a superior court trial convicted of a misdemeanor and nothing else, that is possible only if that misdemeanor is either an offense necessarily included in a felony or properly joined with a felony under the rule of Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d 822, 826-827 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 409 P.2d 206 ].

1970While it is perfectly true that a defendant may emerge from a superior court trial convicted of a misdemeanor and nothing else, that is possible only if that misdemeanor is either an offense necessarily included in a felony or properly joined with a felony under the rule of Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d 822, 826-827 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 409 P.2d 206 ].

2017(People v. Young (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 111, 113, 115 [§ 666.5(a) does not define a new offense, following People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 478 , which held petty theft with a prior (§ 666) is not an enhancement provision, nor is the prior conviction an element of the offense; rather, the statute specifies punishment for the present offense and makes the prior conviction a sentencing factor]; People v. Demara (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 448, 452, 455 [§ 666.5(a) imposes a greater base term, not an enhancement; hence, the same prior conviction may be used both to impose an elevated sentence unde

2003Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 14, 2004. 1 Penal Code section 666 provides: “Every person who, having been convicted of petty theft, grand theft, auto theft under Section 10851 of the Vehicle Code, burglary, carjacking, robbery, or a felony violation .of Section 496 [receiving stolen property] and having served a term therefor in any penal institution or having been imprisoned therein as a condition of probation for that offense, is subsequently convicted of petty theft, then the person convicted of that subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment

2004(See, e.g., People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 143 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 ] [“the electorate and the Legislature have both shown that they know how to use language expressly requiring a violation of [a specific Penal Code section] when that is their intent”].) Defendant argues, however, that if section 1192.7(c)(28) defines a “serious felony” as any felony conviction that includes a gang enhancement under *463 section 186.22(b)(1), there would be no need for Proposition 21 to have enacted section 667.5, subdivision (c)(19), which adds to the list of violent felonies “[e]xtor

2004(See, e.g., People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 143 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 ] [“the electorate and the Legislature have both shown that they know how to use language expressly requiring a violation of [a specific Penal Code section] when that is their intent”].) Defendant argues, however, that if section 1192.7(c)(28) defines a “serious felony” as any felony conviction that includes a gang enhancement under *463 section 186.22(b)(1), there would be no need for Proposition 21 to have enacted section 667.5, subdivision (c)(19), which adds to the list of violent felonies “[e]xtor

1997HQ The Legislature finds and declares that these specified crimes merit special consideration when imposing a sentence to display society’s condemnation for these extraordinary crimes of violence against the person.” 4 At the time the defendant in Hernandez committed his crimes, section 667.8 provided, “ ‘Any person convicted of a felony violation of Section 261, 264.1, 286, 288, 288a or 289 who, for the purpose of committing such sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of Section 207, shall be punished by an additional term of three years.’ (Stats. 1983, ch. 950, § 1, pp. 3418-3419.

1994In People v. *9 Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194 [ 249 Cal. Rptr. 850 , 757 P.2d 1013 ], we held that section 667.8, which at the time provided for an "additional term of three years" for any person convicted of a felony violation of various sexual offenses, "who, for the purpose of committing [that] sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of Section 207," was an enhancement, not a substantive offense. (46 Cal.3d at pp. 200, 207-208.) We observed that "an enhancement `means an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.'" ( Id. at p. 207, quoting Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4