Schlup claim in Texas

2017A Schlup claim of innocence is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Id. at 676 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 , 133 S.Ct. at 862).

2017A Schlup claim of innocence is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Id. at 676 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 , 133 S.Ct. at 862).

2022Importantly, “a petitioner may succeed on a Schlup claim only if the petitioner’s claims for habeas relief are procedurally barred.” Id.

2022Importantly, “a petitioner may succeed on a Schlup claim only if the petitioner’s claims for habeas relief are procedurally barred.” Id.

2012Proc. art. 11.07, § 4(a)(1), (2) 3 *704 This second type of innocence claim—a Schlup claim—is one that “ ‘does not by itself provide a basis for relief,’ but is intertwined with constitutional error that renders a person’s conviction constitutionally invalid.” Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544 -45 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 , 115 S.Ct. 851 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995)).

2012Proc. art. 11.07, § 4(a)(1), (2) 3 *704 This second type of innocence claim—a Schlup claim—is one that “ ‘does not by itself provide a basis for relief,’ but is intertwined with constitutional error that renders a person’s conviction constitutionally invalid.” Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544 -45 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 , 115 S.Ct. 851 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995)).

2017A Schlup claim of innocence is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Id. at 676 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 , 133 S.Ct. at 862).

2017A Schlup claim of innocence is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Id. at 676 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 , 133 S.Ct. at 862).

2015Appellee insists that a Schlup claim can only be raised after a prior writ asserting an actual innocence claim under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) has been denied, citing Ex Parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 208 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), and Ex Parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).

2015Appellee insists that a Schlup claim can only be raised after a prior writ asserting an actual innocence claim under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) has been denied, citing Ex Parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 208 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), and Ex Parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).

2023Cf. Schlup, 547 U.S. at 332 (in assessing a Schlup claim, a court may consider “how the timing of the submission … bear[s] on the probable reliability of that evidence”).

2023Cf. Schlup, 547 U.S. at 332 (in assessing a Schlup claim, a court may consider “how the timing of the submission … bear[s] on the probable reliability of that evidence”).

2023On the other hand, when we resolved the Section 5(a)(2)/Schlup claim Reed raised in his -03 application, we considered “all of the evidence that was not presented at [Reed’s] trial,” leaving for another day the question of “exactly what new evidence, not presented at trial, may be considered in the purview of Section 5(a)(2).” Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 734 (emphasis added).

2023On the other hand, when we resolved the Section 5(a)(2)/Schlup claim Reed raised in his -03 application, we considered “all of the evidence that was not presented at [Reed’s] trial,” leaving for another day the question of “exactly what new evidence, not presented at trial, may be considered in the purview of Section 5(a)(2).” Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 734 (emphasis added).

2014The Texas Legislature has essentially adopted and codified the Schlup exception to the state abuse-of-the-writ doctrine in certain state habeas proceedings. 8 Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 733 ; Brooks, 219 S.W.3d at 399-400 ; see Tex. Code Crim.

2014The Texas Legislature has essentially adopted and codified the Schlup exception to the state abuse-of-the-writ doctrine in certain state habeas proceedings. 8 Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 733 ; Brooks, 219 S.W.3d at 399-400 ; see Tex. Code Crim.

2018Ex parte Villegas, 415 S.W.3d 885, 887 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Ex parte Villegas, 415 S.W.3d at 887 (concluding Schlup claim improper when applicant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims not procedurally barred); Ex parte Skelton, 434 S.W.3d 709 , 733–34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet ref’d) (concluding applicant “did not need to pass through a procedural gateway” to present substantive claim of constitutional 15 We overrule appellant’s first issue.

2007See Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577 (6th Cir.2005), and cases cited at 601.

2007See Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577 (6th Cir.2005), and cases cited at 601.

2006Schlup's claim of innocence is thus 'not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits'") (footnote omitted); Ex parte Tuley , 109 S.W.3d at 390 . 11.

2006Schlup’s claim of innocence is thus ‘not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits’ ”) (footnote omitted); Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 390 . 11 .

2017A Schlup claim of innocence is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Id. at 676 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 , 133 S.Ct. at 862).

2017A Schlup claim of innocence is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Id. at 676 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 , 133 S.Ct. at 862).

2016The [appellant] has failed to prove under Herrera that by clear and convincing evidence that a jury would acquit him based on newly-discovered evidence.[5] He has also failed to prove under Schlup that, in light of newly discovered evidence, the constitutional error “probably” resulted in a conviction of the one who was actually innocent.[6] 4 See Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tex. Crim.

2015In Schlup, the United States Supreme Court held that Schlup could assert a procedural form of “actual innocence” to overcome the procedural bar against raising subsequent habeas corpus claims in federal court.33 The Court made clear that Schlup’s “constitutional claims are based not on his innocence, but rather on his contention that the ineffectiveness of his counsel, . . . and the withholding of evidence by the prosecution, . . . denied him the full panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants by the Constitution.” 34 Schlup’s claim of actual innocence, the Court noted, was offered

2015In Schlup, the United States Supreme Court held that Schlup could assert a procedural form of “actual innocence” to overcome the procedural bar against raising subsequent habeas corpus claims in federal court.33 The Court made clear that Schlup’s “constitutional claims are based not on his innocence, but rather on his contention that the ineffectiveness of his counsel, . . . and the withholding of evidence by the prosecution, . . . denied him the full panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants by the Constitution.” 34 Schlup’s claim of actual innocence, the Court noted, was offered

2012Ex parte Spencer, 337 S.W.3d 869, 878 (Tex.Crim.

2012Ex parte Spencer, 337 S.W.3d 869, 878 (Tex.Crim.