5 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1988–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Saffle v. Parksgreen2 sentences2007Graham, 506 U.S. at 474 , 113 S.Ct. 892 (footnote omitted); see also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 491 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), in which the Supreme Court stated, To the extent that Penry’s claim was that the Texas system prevented the jury from giving any mitigating effect to the evidence of his mental retardation and abuse in childhood, the decision that the claim did not require the creation of a new rule is not surprising. 2007Graham, 506 U.S. at 474 , 113 S.Ct. 892 (footnote omitted); see also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 491 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), in which the Supreme Court stated, To the extent that Penry’s claim was that the Texas system prevented the jury from giving any mitigating effect to the evidence of his mental retardation and abuse in childhood, the decision that the claim did not require the creation of a new rule is not surprising. | 2 | 2 |
Graham v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2007Graham, 506 U.S. at 474 , 113 S.Ct. 892 (footnote omitted); see also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 491 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), in which the Supreme Court stated, To the extent that Penry’s claim was that the Texas system prevented the jury from giving any mitigating effect to the evidence of his mental retardation and abuse in childhood, the decision that the claim did not require the creation of a new rule is not surprising. 2007Graham, 506 U.S. at 474 , 113 S.Ct. 892 (footnote omitted); see also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 491 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), in which the Supreme Court stated, To the extent that Penry’s claim was that the Texas system prevented the jury from giving any mitigating effect to the evidence of his mental retardation and abuse in childhood, the decision that the claim did not require the creation of a new rule is not surprising. | 1 | 2 |
Buffalo Marine Service, Inc. v. Monteaugreen2 sentences1995Cf. Rosalez v. State, 875 S.W.2d 705, 714-17 (Tex.App. Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd) (in context of criminal trespass, discussing advantages of necessity defense over creation of a privilege); Buffalo Marine Serv., Inc. v. Monteau, 761 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (discussing necessity as a defense to trespass). 1995Cf. Rosalez v. State, 875 S.W.2d 705, 714-17 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd) (in context of criminal trespass, discussing advantages of necessity defense over creation of a privilege); Buffalo Marine Serv., Inc. v. Monteau, 761 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (discussing necessity as a defense to trespass). | 1 | 1 |
Rosalez v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Cf. Rosalez v. State, 875 S.W.2d 705, 714-17 (Tex.App. Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd) (in context of criminal trespass, discussing advantages of necessity defense over creation of a privilege); Buffalo Marine Serv., Inc. v. Monteau, 761 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (discussing necessity as a defense to trespass). 1995Cf. Rosalez v. State, 875 S.W.2d 705, 714-17 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd) (in context of criminal trespass, discussing advantages of necessity defense over creation of a privilege); Buffalo Marine Serv., Inc. v. Monteau, 761 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (discussing necessity as a defense to trespass). | 1 | 1 |
Sherman v. DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERgreen2 sentences1993Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo.1984) (in bank); Sherman v. District Court, 637 P.2d 378, 384 (Colo.1981) (en banc); Davison v. St. 1993Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo. 1984) (in bank); Sherman v. District Court, 637 P.2d 378, 384 (Colo.1981) (en banc); Davison v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Garcia v. Peeplesgreen2 sentences1993Despite my vigorous disagreement with this creation of a new privilege, I certainly do join in the majority’s strong reaffirmation of "the doctrine of shared discovery" as recognized in Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.1987) and the right of the Biffles "to share [any] discovery with their expert witnesses and litigants in other cases.” 850 S.W.2d at 160. .See State ex. rel. 1993We expect it to produce the rest of the reports promptly in compliance with the modified order which we anticipate Respondent will render. [1] Despite its unambiguous language, counsel for Lilly responded at oral argument that this regulation "has nothing to do with the issues before this court." [2] Despite my vigorous disagreement with this creation of a new privilege, I certainly do join in the majority's strong reaffirmation of "the doctrine of shared discovery" as recognized in Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.1987) and the right of the Biffles "to share [any] discovery with th | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Chandra v. Sprinklegreen2 sentences1993Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo.1984) (in bank); Sherman v. District Court, 637 P.2d 378, 384 (Colo.1981) (en banc); Davison v. St. 1993Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo. 1984) (in bank); Sherman v. District Court, 637 P.2d 378, 384 (Colo.1981) (en banc); Davison v. St. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Eli Lilly and Co. v. Marshall
green
1 sentence1993We expect it to produce the rest of the reports promptly in compliance with the modified order which we anticipate Respondent will render. [1] Despite its unambiguous language, counsel for Lilly responded at oral argument that this regulation "has nothing to do with the issues before this court." [2] Despite my vigorous disagreement with this creation of a new privilege, I certainly do join in the majority's strong reaffirmation of "the doctrine of shared discovery" as recognized in Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.1987) and the right of the Biffles "to share [any] discovery with th | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League
green
2 sentences1988While both Whitworth and Stamos relied heavily on this court’s decision in Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 1981), that reliance does not indicate the creation of a new standard. 5 Sullivan was based solely on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; no violation of the Texas Constitution was even alleged in that case. 1988While both Whitworth and Stamos relied heavily on this court's decision in Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 1981), that reliance does not indicate the creation of a new standard. [5] Sullivan was based solely on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; no violation of the Texas Constitution was even alleged in that case. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.