Trinity hearing in Colorado

2025Dozier contended that the employee had known about the puddle for closer to twenty minutes. ¶5 The district court held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster , 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993) (a " Trinity hearing"), to resolve the "genuine factual dispute" over how much time had elapsed between the County learning of the spill and Dozier falling.

2025Malott called Massey, former Fire Chief Rich Rupp, and Kyle Heer — an expert in engineering and mechanical design — as witnesses. ¶8 Massey testified that while he and other crew members were responsible for weekly inspections of the Fire Department’s vehicles, 2 Mallot abandoned this argument, but the district court still made findings on the claim based on the evidence presented. 3 A Trinity hearing is an evidentiary hearing in accordance with Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 927 (Colo. 1993).

2022Dennis, ¶ 11, 418 P.3d at 494 ; see also City & Cty of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627, 632 (Colo. 2007) (explaining that “in a Trinity hearing on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must carry the burden of proving jurisdictional facts adequate to support subject matter jurisdiction”).

2022Dennis, ¶ 11, 418 P.3d at 494 ; see also City & Cty of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627, 632 (Colo. 2007) (explaining that “in a Trinity hearing on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must carry the burden of proving jurisdictional facts adequate to support subject matter jurisdiction”).

2026It’s true that a court should hold a Trinity hearing when jurisdictional facts are in dispute, Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 85-86 , and it should afford the parties the opportunity to request such a hearing, Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty.

2026It’s true that a court should hold a Trinity hearing when jurisdictional facts are in dispute, Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 85-86 , and it should afford the parties the opportunity to request such a hearing, Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty.

2016Accordingly, we reject the City’s 11 argument that the preponderance standard applies in a Trinity hearing. ¶ 24 Following Tidwell, the court, in Finnie v. Jefferson County School District R-1, 79 P.3d 1253 (Colo. 2003), rejected the argument Heyboer makes here that Rule 12(b)(5) applies and requires a court to covert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.

2016Accordingly, we reject the City’s 11 argument that the preponderance standard applies in a Trinity hearing. ¶ 24 Following Tidwell, the court, in Finnie v. Jefferson County School District R-1, 79 P.3d 1253 (Colo. 2003), rejected the argument Heyboer makes here that Rule 12(b)(5) applies and requires a court to covert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.

2025The trial court has discretion to decide whether a Trinity hearing is necessary, Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo. 2001), and “[w]e review the court’s decision whether to conduct a Trinity hearing for abuse of discretion,” Bilderback v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133, ¶ 10 .

2025The trial court has discretion to decide whether a Trinity hearing is necessary, Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo. 2001), and “[w]e review the court’s decision whether to conduct a Trinity hearing for abuse of discretion,” Bilderback v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133, ¶ 10 .

2024Martinez v. Est. of Bleck, 2016 CO 58, ¶ 27 (holding that “Trinity and its progeny govern claims of public employee sovereign immunity”).

2024Martinez v. Est. of Bleck, 2016 CO 58, ¶ 27 (holding that “Trinity and its progeny govern claims of public employee sovereign immunity”).

2026However, when jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, the district court “may rule on the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion and decide the sovereign immunity question without a hearing.” Bilderback v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133, ¶ 9 . 11 ¶ 25 A district court’s decision “whether to conduct a Trinity hearing [is reviewed] for abuse of discretion.” Id. at ¶ 10.

2026However, when jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, the district court “may rule on the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion and decide the sovereign immunity question without a hearing.” Bilderback v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133, ¶ 9 . 11 ¶ 25 A district court’s decision “whether to conduct a Trinity hearing [is reviewed] for abuse of discretion.” Id. at ¶ 10.

2025See In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 308 (Colo. App. 2006) (the inferences drawn from the evidence are the “sole discretion” of the district court); cf. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 13 (in a Trinity hearing, the court affords the plaintiff “the reasonable inferences from [their] undisputed evidence” (citation omitted)). 7 ¶ 16 The city also argues that other evidence presented at the hearing favors the city and not Reynolds, noting that (1) Officer Hurd’s statements in his post-accident interviews were consistent with his testimony that the lights and siren were on and (2) Re

2025See In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 308 (Colo. App. 2006) (the inferences drawn from the evidence are the “sole discretion” of the district court); cf. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 13 (in a Trinity hearing, the court affords the plaintiff “the reasonable inferences from [their] undisputed evidence” (citation omitted)). 7 ¶ 16 The city also argues that other evidence presented at the hearing favors the city and not Reynolds, noting that (1) Officer Hurd’s statements in his post-accident interviews were consistent with his testimony that the lights and siren were on and (2) Re

2018This CGIA provision waives immunity for injuries resulting from the operation and maintenance of any public “sanitation [or] electrical facility.” After the district court held a Trinity hearing on the motion, it granted the City’s motion to dismiss. ¶6 Applying the analytical framework of Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000), we conclude that the waiver of immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(f) applies even if the operation or maintenance was performed by a public entity’s independent contractor. ¶7 Given this conclusion, and based on the facts found by the district c

2018This CGIA provision waives immunity for injuries resulting from the operation and maintenance of any public “sanitation [or] electrical facility.” After the district court held a Trinity hearing on the motion, it granted the City’s motion to dismiss. ¶6 Applying the analytical framework of Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000), we conclude that the waiver of immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(f) applies even if the operation or maintenance was performed by a public entity’s independent contractor. ¶7 Given this conclusion, and based on the facts found by the district c

2026In such cases, the jurisdictional issue may be determined as a matter of law, and the appellate court reviews the district court’s ruling de novo.” Hansen v. Long, 166 P.3d 248, 250-51 (Colo. App. 2007). ¶ 11 Like the prior division, we note that neither party requested a Trinity hearing at which the district court could have considered disputes regarding jurisdictional facts, and neither party asserts on 5 appeal that the district court erred by not holding such a hearing.

2026In such cases, the jurisdictional issue may be determined as a matter of law, and the appellate court reviews the district court’s ruling de novo.” Hansen v. Long, 166 P.3d 248, 250-51 (Colo. App. 2007). ¶ 11 Like the prior division, we note that neither party requested a Trinity hearing at which the district court could have considered disputes regarding jurisdictional facts, and neither party asserts on 5 appeal that the district court erred by not holding such a hearing.

2025See In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 308 (Colo. App. 2006) (the inferences drawn from the evidence are the “sole discretion” of the district court); cf. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 13 (in a Trinity hearing, the court affords the plaintiff “the reasonable inferences from [their] undisputed evidence” (citation omitted)). 7 ¶ 16 The city also argues that other evidence presented at the hearing favors the city and not Reynolds, noting that (1) Officer Hurd’s statements in his post-accident interviews were consistent with his testimony that the lights and siren were on and (2) Re

2025See In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 308 (Colo. App. 2006) (the inferences drawn from the evidence are the “sole discretion” of the district court); cf. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 13 (in a Trinity hearing, the court affords the plaintiff “the reasonable inferences from [their] undisputed evidence” (citation omitted)). 7 ¶ 16 The city also argues that other evidence presented at the hearing favors the city and not Reynolds, noting that (1) Officer Hurd’s statements in his post-accident interviews were consistent with his testimony that the lights and siren were on and (2) Re

2025The district court may receive “any competent evidence” pertaining to the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint, Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36 , ¶ 12 (quoting Trinity, 848 P.2d at 924 ), and it is “free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case,” Trinity, 848 P.2d at 925 (quoting Boyle v. Governor’s Veterans Outreach & Assistance Ctr., 925 F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1991)). ¶8 “The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove the government has waived its immunity, but this burden is relatively lenient, as the plaintiff is afforded the

2025The district court may receive “any competent evidence” pertaining to the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint, Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36 , ¶ 12 (quoting Trinity, 848 P.2d at 924 ), and it is “free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case,” Trinity, 848 P.2d at 925 (quoting Boyle v. Governor’s Veterans Outreach & Assistance Ctr., 925 F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1991)). ¶8 “The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove the government has waived its immunity, but this burden is relatively lenient, as the plaintiff is afforded the

2025It accepted the well-pleaded facts as true and determined that “because [the Plaintiff Districts] did not offer any evidence by way of [a]ffidavit or exhibits that raises a dispute, the [c]ourt does not believe that a Trinity hearing is necessary.” See City of Aspen v. Kinder Morgan, Inc., 143 P.3d 1076, 1078 (Colo. App. 2006) (a plaintiff may present evidence outside their pleadings to resolve a jurisdictional challenge). ¶ 41 Because the complaint did not create a dispute by alleging facts sufficient to support a finding that the Individual Defendants acted outside the scope of their employm

2025It accepted the well-pleaded facts as true and determined that “because [the Plaintiff Districts] did not offer any evidence by way of [a]ffidavit or exhibits that raises a dispute, the [c]ourt does not believe that a Trinity hearing is necessary.” See City of Aspen v. Kinder Morgan, Inc., 143 P.3d 1076, 1078 (Colo. App. 2006) (a plaintiff may present evidence outside their pleadings to resolve a jurisdictional challenge). ¶ 41 Because the complaint did not create a dispute by alleging facts sufficient to support a finding that the Individual Defendants acted outside the scope of their employm

2025See Ferrel v. Colo. Dep't of Corr. , 179 P.3d 178, 184 (Colo.App. 2007) (explaining that, "when the resolution of disputed facts is necessary to determine the court's jurisdiction, application of a prima facie standard is directly at odds with the very 11 purpose of a Trinity hearing"); see also Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty.

2025See Ferrel v. Colo. Dep't of Corr. , 179 P.3d 178, 184 (Colo.App. 2007) (explaining that, "when the resolution of disputed facts is necessary to determine the court's jurisdiction, application of a prima facie standard is directly at odds with the very 11 purpose of a Trinity hearing"); see also Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty.

2022They 3Olathe and Officer Hice denominated their filing as a trial brief, although it was more accurately a pre-hearing brief, as it was submitted prior to the Trinity hearing. 8 asked the court to not just limit its inquiry and analysis to the nine seconds immediately prior to the crash when Officer Hice activated his emergency lights. ¶ 18 “We do not require that parties use ‘talismanic language’ to preserve particular arguments for appeal.” People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004).

2022They 3Olathe and Officer Hice denominated their filing as a trial brief, although it was more accurately a pre-hearing brief, as it was submitted prior to the Trinity hearing. 8 asked the court to not just limit its inquiry and analysis to the nine seconds immediately prior to the crash when Officer Hice activated his emergency lights. ¶ 18 “We do not require that parties use ‘talismanic language’ to preserve particular arguments for appeal.” People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004).

2022See also Pierce, 694 N.W.2d at 68 - 69 (concluding that a public parking structure fell within the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “building” as used in a public building exception to governmental immunity). ¶ 23 Moreover, evidence presented at the Trinity hearing indicated that the parking structure had to comply with the “building code.” Both the County and the City of Golden, where the parking structure sits, have adopted the International Code Council’s 2018 International Building Code (IBC).

2022See also Pierce, 694 N.W.2d at 68 - 69 (concluding that a public parking structure fell within the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “building” as used in a public building exception to governmental immunity). ¶ 23 Moreover, evidence presented at the Trinity hearing indicated that the parking structure had to comply with the “building code.” Both the County and the City of Golden, where the parking structure sits, have adopted the International Code Council’s 2018 International Building Code (IBC).

2018Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064, 1065 (Colo. 2007). 7The Directors raised the immunity issue in a motion and at the Trinity hearing. 6 1.

2018Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064, 1065 (Colo. 2007). 7The Directors raised the immunity issue in a motion and at the Trinity hearing. 6 1.

2018See Estate of Stevenson v. Hollywood Bar & Cafe, Inc., 832 P.2d 718 , 721 n.5 (Colo. 1992). 11 agents or representatives of Oakwood.” But in the Trinity hearing, Falcon’s president, Randy DeYoung, testified that Falcon is suing the Directors because they’re on the District’s board of directors.

2018See Estate of Stevenson v. Hollywood Bar & Cafe, Inc., 832 P.2d 718 , 721 n.5 (Colo. 1992). 11 agents or representatives of Oakwood.” But in the Trinity hearing, Falcon’s president, Randy DeYoung, testified that Falcon is suing the Directors because they’re on the District’s board of directors.

2018See § 13-21-102(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2018; cf. Ferrer v. Okbamicael, 2017 CO 14M, ¶ 44 (“Exemplary damages do not present a separate, distinct cause of action, but, rather, depend on an underlying claim for actual damages.”).2 Before she did so, defendants moved to dismiss and sought a Trinity hearing.

2018See § 13-21-102(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2018; cf. Ferrer v. Okbamicael, 2017 CO 14M, ¶ 44 (“Exemplary damages do not present a separate, distinct cause of action, but, rather, depend on an underlying claim for actual damages.”).2 Before she did so, defendants moved to dismiss and sought a Trinity hearing.

2016On remand, the trial court should determine whether Martinez's conduct in discharging his weapon was willful and wanton, meaning conduct that is "not only, negligent, but exhibit[s] conscious disregard for safety of others." Moody v. Ungerer, 885 P.2d 200, 205 (Colo.1994) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1434-85 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis added).

2016On remand, the trial court should determine whether Martinez's conduct in discharging his weapon was willful and wanton, meaning conduct that is "not only, negligent, but exhibit[s] conscious disregard for safety of others." Moody v. Ungerer, 885 P.2d 200, 205 (Colo.1994) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1434-85 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis added).

2015See Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 , 570 (Colo.App.1996) ; see also Pack, 894 P.2d at 38 ("Statutes pertaining to the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia in order to further legislative intent and to avoid inconsistencies."). ¶ 25 At the Trinity hearing, evidence established that the Gas Admin Building was built in the 1960s or 1970s and remained on the property until it was demolished beginning sometime in late 2012.

2015See Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 , 570 (Colo.App.1996) ; see also Pack, 894 P.2d at 38 ("Statutes pertaining to the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia in order to further legislative intent and to avoid inconsistencies."). ¶ 25 At the Trinity hearing, evidence established that the Gas Admin Building was built in the 1960s or 1970s and remained on the property until it was demolished beginning sometime in late 2012.

2015See Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 , 570 (Colo.App.1996) ; see also Pack, 894 P.2d at 38 ("Statutes pertaining to the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia in order to further legislative intent and to avoid inconsistencies."). ¶ 25 At the Trinity hearing, evidence established that the Gas Admin Building was built in the 1960s or 1970s and remained on the property until it was demolished beginning sometime in late 2012.

2015See Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 , 570 (Colo.App.1996) ; see also Pack, 894 P.2d at 38 ("Statutes pertaining to the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia in order to further legislative intent and to avoid inconsistencies."). ¶ 25 At the Trinity hearing, evidence established that the Gas Admin Building was built in the 1960s or 1970s and remained on the property until it was demolished beginning sometime in late 2012.

2014See id.; see also City of Colo. Springs v. Conners, 993 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Colo.2000) (noting that whether a trial court has jurisdiction to hear a particular claim under the CGIA is a matter of statutory construction subject to de novo review).

2014See id.; see also City of Colo. Springs v. Conners, 993 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Colo.2000) (noting that whether a trial court has jurisdiction to hear a particular claim under the CGIA is a matter of statutory construction subject to de novo review).

2007See Travers v. Rainey, 888 P.2d 372, 374 (Colo.App.1994); see also Miller, 971 P.2d at 263 .