license suspension hearing in Connecticut

1999Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 511-12 , 529 A.2d 177 (1987); Buckley v. Muzio, supra, 200 Conn. 6 -8; Piorek v. DelPonte, 28 Conn. App. 911 , 610 A.2d 201 (1992).

1999Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 511-12 , 529 A.2d 177 (1987); Buckley v. Muzio, supra, 200 Conn. 6 -8; Piorek v. DelPonte, 28 Conn. App. 911 , 610 A.2d 201 (1992).

2026Wolf v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 70 Conn. App. 76, 85 , 797 A.2d 567 (2002); accord Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 330 Conn. 668 (court in administrative appeal cannot substitute its own judgment for that of hearing officer on questions of fact); Pizzo v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 571, 578 , 771 A.2d 273 (2001) (“the determination of factual issues [is a matter] within the province of the administrative agency” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2026Wolf v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 70 Conn. App. 76, 85 , 797 A.2d 567 (2002); accord Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 330 Conn. 668 (court in administrative appeal cannot substitute its own judgment for that of hearing officer on questions of fact); Pizzo v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 571, 578 , 771 A.2d 273 (2001) (“the determination of factual issues [is a matter] within the province of the administrative agency” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2026Wolf v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 70 Conn. App. 76, 85 , 797 A.2d 567 (2002); accord Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 330 Conn. 668 (court in administrative appeal cannot substitute its own judgment for that of hearing officer on questions of fact); Pizzo v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 571, 578 , 771 A.2d 273 (2001) (“the determination of factual issues [is a matter] within the province of the administrative agency” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2026Wolf v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 70 Conn. App. 76, 85 , 797 A.2d 567 (2002); accord Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 330 Conn. 668 (court in administrative appeal cannot substitute its own judgment for that of hearing officer on questions of fact); Pizzo v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 571, 578 , 771 A.2d 273 (2001) (“the determination of factual issues [is a matter] within the province of the administrative agency” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2022There are several procedural protec- tions that are expressly included in the criminal coun- terpart, § 14-227a (b),6 that are not included in the civil statute, however, ‘‘a license suspension hearing is not a criminal proceeding and . . . the subject of such a hearing is not entitled to all of the procedural protec- tions that would be available in a criminal proceeding. . . . [T]he legislative history of § 14-227b reveals that a principal purpose [of] the enactment of the statute was to protect the public by removing potentially dangerous drivers from the state’s roadways with all dispatch

2022There are several procedural protec- tions that are expressly included in the criminal coun- terpart, § 14-227a (b),6 that are not included in the civil statute, however, ‘‘a license suspension hearing is not a criminal proceeding and . . . the subject of such a hearing is not entitled to all of the procedural protec- tions that would be available in a criminal proceeding. . . . [T]he legislative history of § 14-227b reveals that a principal purpose [of] the enactment of the statute was to protect the public by removing potentially dangerous drivers from the state’s roadways with all dispatch

2019"In State v. Hickam , 235 Conn. 614 , 624, 668 A.2d 1321 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 , 116 S.Ct. 1851 , 134 L.Ed.2d 951 (1996), we [explained] that ... the legislative history of § 14-227b reveals that a principal purpose [of] the enactment of the statute was to protect the public by removing potentially dangerous drivers from the state's roadways with all dispatch compatible with due process.

2019"In State v. Hickam , 235 Conn. 614 , 624, 668 A.2d 1321 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 , 116 S.Ct. 1851 , 134 L.Ed.2d 951 (1996), we [explained] that ... the legislative history of § 14-227b reveals that a principal purpose [of] the enactment of the statute was to protect the public by removing potentially dangerous drivers from the state's roadways with all dispatch compatible with due process.

2019While the legislature has attached certain consequences to departures from the procedures specified in § 14-227b(b) and has provided a substantial incentive for the police to comply with those procedures in the context of criminal proceedings ... the legislature has manifested its intention that noncompliance with subsection (b), not involving one of the four issues to be determined pursuant to subsection [what is now § 14-227b(g) ], does not preclude the suspension of the license of a driver when the four enumerated elements have been demonstrated." (Citations omitted; internal quotation mark

2019While the legislature has attached certain consequences to departures from the procedures specified in § 14-227b(b) and has provided a substantial incentive for the police to comply with those procedures in the context of criminal proceedings ... the legislature has manifested its intention that noncompliance with subsection (b), not involving one of the four issues to be determined pursuant to subsection [what is now § 14-227b(g) ], does not preclude the suspension of the license of a driver when the four enumerated elements have been demonstrated." (Citations omitted; internal quotation mark

2019While the legislature has attached certain consequences to departures from the procedures specified in § 14-227b(b) and has provided a substantial incentive for the police to comply with those procedures in the context of criminal proceedings ... the legislature has manifested its intention that noncompliance with subsection (b), not involving one of the four issues to be determined pursuant to subsection [what is now § 14-227b(g) ], does not preclude the suspension of the license of a driver when the four enumerated elements have been demonstrated." (Citations omitted; internal quotation mark

2019While the legislature has attached certain consequences to departures from the procedures specified in § 14-227b(b) and has provided a substantial incentive for the police to comply with those procedures in the context of criminal proceedings ... the legislature has manifested its intention that noncompliance with subsection (b), not involving one of the four issues to be determined pursuant to subsection [what is now § 14-227b(g) ], does not preclude the suspension of the license of a driver when the four enumerated elements have been demonstrated." (Citations omitted; internal quotation mark

2019While the legislature has attached certain consequences to departures from the procedures specified in § 14-227b(b) and has provided a substantial incentive for the police to comply with those procedures in the context of criminal proceedings ... the legislature has manifested its intention that noncompliance with subsection (b), not involving one of the four issues to be determined pursuant to subsection [what is now § 14-227b(g) ], does not preclude the suspension of the license of a driver when the four enumerated elements have been demonstrated." (Citations omitted; internal quotation mark

2019While the legislature has attached certain consequences to departures from the procedures specified in § 14-227b(b) and has provided a substantial incentive for the police to comply with those procedures in the context of criminal proceedings ... the legislature has manifested its intention that noncompliance with subsection (b), not involving one of the four issues to be determined pursuant to subsection [what is now § 14-227b(g) ], does not preclude the suspension of the license of a driver when the four enumerated elements have been demonstrated." (Citations omitted; internal quotation mark

2019"In State v. Hickam , 235 Conn. 614 , 624, 668 A.2d 1321 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 , 116 S.Ct. 1851 , 134 L.Ed.2d 951 (1996), we [explained] that ... the legislative history of § 14-227b reveals that a principal purpose [of] the enactment of the statute was to protect the public by removing potentially dangerous drivers from the state's roadways with all dispatch compatible with due process.

2019"In State v. Hickam , 235 Conn. 614 , 624, 668 A.2d 1321 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 , 116 S.Ct. 1851 , 134 L.Ed.2d 951 (1996), we [explained] that ... the legislative history of § 14-227b reveals that a principal purpose [of] the enactment of the statute was to protect the public by removing potentially dangerous drivers from the state's roadways with all dispatch compatible with due process.

2019"In State v. Hickam , 235 Conn. 614 , 624, 668 A.2d 1321 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 , 116 S.Ct. 1851 , 134 L.Ed.2d 951 (1996), we [explained] that ... the legislative history of § 14-227b reveals that a principal purpose [of] the enactment of the statute was to protect the public by removing potentially dangerous drivers from the state's roadways with all dispatch compatible with due process.

2013See Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 512 , 529 A.2d 177 (1987) (because hearing limited to four enumerated issues, multiple failures by arresting officer to comply with statutory dictates of § 14-227b not sufficient grounds for overturning commissioner’s determination that operator’s license should be suspended); Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 7 , 509 A.2d 489 (1986) (hearing limited to four enumerated issues and commissioner not required to determine whether subject of hearing understood consequences of refusal to submit to chemical testing before suspending license); Santiago v. Commissioner o

2013See Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 512 , 529 A.2d 177 (1987) (because hearing limited to four enumerated issues, multiple failures by arresting officer to comply with statutory dictates of § 14-227b not sufficient grounds for overturning commissioner’s determination that operator’s license should be suspended); Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 7 , 509 A.2d 489 (1986) (hearing limited to four enumerated issues and commissioner not required to determine whether subject of hearing understood consequences of refusal to submit to chemical testing before suspending license); Santiago v. Commissioner o

1998In both Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101, 101-102 , 598 A.2d 670 (1991), and Piorek v. DelPonte, 28 Conn. App. 911, 911-12 , 610 A.2d 201 (1992), we disregarded indications in each case that the police had not permitted the arrested drivers to telephone attorneys before requesting them to be tested, as subsection (b) provides.

1998In both Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101, 101-102 , 598 A.2d 670 (1991), and Piorek v. DelPonte, 28 Conn. App. 911, 911-12 , 610 A.2d 201 (1992), we disregarded indications in each case that the police had not permitted the arrested drivers to telephone attorneys before requesting them to be tested, as subsection (b) provides.

1995The plaintiff relies heavily on Tarascio v. Muzio , 40 Conn. Sup. 505 (1986) which held that the arresting officer's failure to inform the plaintiff that his refusal to submit to a chemical sobriety test could be used against him in a criminal case rendered the commissioner's decision to suspend the plaintiff's license "contrary to law", id. at page 511.

1995The plaintiff relies heavily on Tarascio v. Muzio , 40 Conn. Sup. 505 (1986) which held that the arresting officer's failure to inform the plaintiff that his refusal to submit to a chemical sobriety test could be used against him in a criminal case rendered the commissioner's decision to suspend the plaintiff's license "contrary to law", id. at page 511.

1994Coracci v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 42 Conn. Sup. 599 (1993), citing Balch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 165 Conn. 559 , 569 (1973).

1994Coracci v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 42 Conn. Sup. 599 (1993), citing Balch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 165 Conn. 559 , 569 (1973).

1991The Connecticut Supreme Court did not sustain Volck’s claims and stated in a footnote that Holland v. Parker, supra, did not involve a provision similar to § 14-227b (d) restricting the issues at the license suspension hearing to those prescribed.

1987When hearsay statements have come into a case without objection they may be relied upon by the trier, “in proof of the matters stated therein, for whatever they were worth on their face.” Sears v. Curtis, 147 Conn. 311, 317 , 160 A.2d 742 (1960); Danahy v. Cuneo, 130 Conn. 213, 217 , 33 A.2d 132 (1943).

1987When hearsay statements have come into a case without objection they may be relied upon by the trier, “in proof of the matters stated therein, for whatever they were worth on their face.” Sears v. Curtis, 147 Conn. 311, 317 , 160 A.2d 742 (1960); Danahy v. Cuneo, 130 Conn. 213, 217 , 33 A.2d 132 (1943).

1987The plaintiff also relies upon State v. Towry, 26 Conn. Sup. 35, 41 , 210 A.2d 455 (1965), a decision questioning the constitutionality of allowing a police officer to request a blood sample from a driver before having arrested him.

1987The plaintiff also relies upon State v. Towry, 26 Conn. Sup. 35, 41 , 210 A.2d 455 (1965), a decision questioning the constitutionality of allowing a police officer to request a blood sample from a driver before having arrested him.