Seventh Circuit analysis in Illinois

2004Thus, in [Wilson], we elected to follow the precedent of the Seventh Circuit with regard to its interpretation of the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA) ( 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1994)), because we found the Seventh Circuit analysis to be “reasonable and logical.” More recently, however, we declined to follow Seventh Circuit precedent in a case involving a preemption issue under FELA when there was a split of authority among the federal circuits and we believed the Seventh Circuit case was wrongly decided. [Citation], Nevertheless, as we have repeatedly recognized, uniformity of decision

2004Thus, in [Wilson], we elected to follow the precedent of the Seventh Circuit with regard to its interpretation of the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA) ( 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1994)), because we found the Seventh Circuit analysis to be “reasonable and logical.” More recently, however, we declined to follow Seventh Circuit precedent in a case involving a preemption issue under FELA when there was a split of authority among the federal circuits and we believed the Seventh Circuit case was wrongly decided. [Citation], Nevertheless, as we have repeatedly recognized, uniformity of decision

2018The Court stated that in Rogers, FELA’s causation standard was described as follows: “ ‘Under [FELA] the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.’ ” CSX Transportation, 564 U.S. at 692 (quoting Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506 ). ¶ 32 In reliance on Rogers, every court of appeals reviewing judgments in FELA cases has approved jury instructions identical or substantively equivalent to the Seventh Circuit’s instruction.

2017The Court stated that in Rogers, FELA’s causation standard was described as follows: “ ‘Under [FELA] the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the -8- slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.’ ” CSX Transportation, 564 U.S. at 692 (quoting Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506 ). ¶ 32 In reliance on Rogers, every court of appeals reviewing judgments in FELA cases has approved jury instructions identical or substantively equivalent to the Seventh Circuit’s instruction.

2014Marconi, 2013 IL App (3d) 110865, ¶ 37 .

2014Marconi, 2013 IL App (3d) 110865, ¶ 37 .

2014We point to the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Deere finding "an identity of cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deere, 533 F. App'x at 648 .

2014We point to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Deere finding “an identity of cause of action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deere, 533 F. App’x at 648 .

2002Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (the court made an assessment of the plaintiffs reputation and determined that because he was a heavy drinker, a bad husband, a bad father, and an erratic employee, the challenged statements did not cause injury to the plaintiff over and above that caused by the truth); Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (the court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint and remanded to the circuit court to allow discovery to proceed because it could not determine the plaintiffs deserved reputation).

2002Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. , 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (the court made an assessment of the plaintiff's reputation and determined that because he was a heavy drinker, a bad husband, a bad father, and an erratic employee, the challenged statements did not cause injury to the plaintiff over and above that caused by the truth); Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos. , 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (the court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint and remanded to the circuit court to allow discovery to proceed because it could not determine the plaintiff's deserved reputation).

2002Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (the court made an assessment of the plaintiffs reputation and determined that because he was a heavy drinker, a bad husband, a bad father, and an erratic employee, the challenged statements did not cause injury to the plaintiff over and above that caused by the truth); Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (the court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint and remanded to the circuit court to allow discovery to proceed because it could not determine the plaintiffs deserved reputation).

2002Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. , 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (the court made an assessment of the plaintiff's reputation and determined that because he was a heavy drinker, a bad husband, a bad father, and an erratic employee, the challenged statements did not cause injury to the plaintiff over and above that caused by the truth); Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos. , 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (the court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint and remanded to the circuit court to allow discovery to proceed because it could not determine the plaintiff's deserved reputation).

2002While the Seventh Circuit did not rule out the possibility that a malpractice suit could go forward on the basis of a loss of procedural entitlement (Jones Motor, 197 F.3d at 1194 ), the court concluded that the attorney’s waiver of his client’s jury trial right in this context did not give rise to a claim for malpractice (Jones Motor, 197 F.3d at 1195 ).

2002While the Seventh Circuit did not rule out the possibility that a malpractice suit could go forward on the basis of a loss of procedural entitlement (Jones Motor, 197 F.3d at 1194 ), the court concluded that the attorney’s waiver of his client’s jury trial right in this context did not give rise to a claim for malpractice (Jones Motor, 197 F.3d at 1195 ).

2025App. 3d 107, 124 (2007) (citing the “old principle” that “ ‘where the note is barred, the mortgage being but an incident to it, all right of action on the mortgage is also barred’ ” (quoting Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Ill. 124, 132 (1896), overruled on other grounds by ABN AMRO, 237 Ill. 2d at 538 )), overruled 3 In First Midwest Bank v. Cobo, 2018 IL 123038 , ¶ 39 n.2, our supreme court noted the Seventh Circuit’s reference to “an old Illinois rule prohibiting a lender from suing under the mortgage when a statute of limitations or other procedural rule barred a suit under the note” and indicate

2025App. 3d 107, 124 (2007) (citing the “old principle” that “ ‘where the note is barred, the mortgage being but an incident to it, all right of action on the mortgage is also barred’ ” (quoting Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Ill. 124, 132 (1896), overruled on other grounds by ABN AMRO, 237 Ill. 2d at 538 )), overruled 3 In First Midwest Bank v. Cobo, 2018 IL 123038 , ¶ 39 n.2, our supreme court noted the Seventh Circuit’s reference to “an old Illinois rule prohibiting a lender from suing under the mortgage when a statute of limitations or other procedural rule barred a suit under the note” and indicate

2025As the supreme court has not affirmatively overruled the rule, however, it appears to remain good law despite its age. 8 No. 1-24-1333 on other grounds by ABN AMRO, 237 Ill. 2d at 538 ; Dunas v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 41 Ill.

2023Id. at 998 . ¶ 84 We cannot agree with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis.

2021Specifically, Powell relies on the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, in which the court, in dicta, observed that broadly interpreting a police officer’s scope of employment to include sexual assault “has a footing in other jurisdictions and may well be the wave of the future” and that a police officer is “an authority figure trained to develop and project an intimidating aura.” Id. at 671 . ¶ 36 But in Doe v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit rejected the City’s argument against indemnification since the defendant’s liability had not been established yet and the court had “warned repeatedly again

2021Specifically, Powell relies on the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, in which the court, in dicta, observed that broadly interpreting a police officer’s scope of employment to include sexual assault “has a footing in other jurisdictions and may well be the wave of the future” and that a police officer is “an authority figure trained to develop and project an intimidating aura.” Id. at 671 . ¶ 36 But in Doe v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit rejected the City’s argument against indemnification since the defendant’s liability had not been established yet and the court had “warned repeatedly again

2013During his Milwaukee 2 As a practical matter, the requirements for admission under the common-law completeness doctrine in Illinois do not differ significantly from the factors in the Seventh Circuit’s test, and our result would not be different were we to apply the federal test. -19- 2013 IL App (2d) 111300 interview, defendant denied having knowledge of the stolen Saturn or being in Waukegan on October 18, 2007.

2012The Diaz court warned, “We do not intend to suggest by our analysis that one consensual entry means that law enforcement agents may thereafter enter and exit a home at will.” Id. -10- ¶ 34 Most recently, in United States v. Akinsanya, the Seventh Circuit held the doctrine applied to a situation where a defendant consented to a confidential informant’s entry, the confidential informant “saw the heroin (thus establishing probable cause),” and then the confidential informant “immediately summoned the agents, who entered the apartment just as [the confidential informant] was leaving.” Akinsanya, 5

2012The Akinsanya court noted that the consent given to the confidential informant by the defendant “was not withdrawn simply because [the confidential informant] stepped out of the apartment moments before, or at the same time, the agents entered.” Id. at 856 .1 ¶ 35 We hold that the doctrine of consent once removed does not apply in this case because the State failed to prove the second and third elements of the doctrine, i.e. that the confidential informant Tardona established the existence of probable cause and then immediately summoned for help.

2012The Diaz court warned, “We do not intend to suggest by our analysis that one consensual entry means that law enforcement agents may thereafter enter and exit a home at will.” Id. -10- ¶ 34 Most recently, in United States v. Akinsanya, the Seventh Circuit held the doctrine applied to a situation where a defendant consented to a confidential informant’s entry, the confidential informant “saw the heroin (thus establishing probable cause),” and then the confidential informant “immediately summoned the agents, who entered the apartment just as [the confidential informant] was leaving.” Akinsanya, 5

2009However, as the Seventh Circuit reasoned in United States v. Steward, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004), where the initial violation of Miranda “was not part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert.” Moving forward, in People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322 , 892 N.E.2d 1047 (2008), the Illinois Supreme Court concurred in the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, holding that in applying Seibert, courts must first determine whether the detectives deliberately employed a question-first, warn-later strategy when interrogating a defendant.

2009However, as the Seventh Circuit reasoned in United States v. Steward, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004), where the initial violation of Miranda “was not part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert.” Moving forward, in People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322 , 892 N.E.2d 1047 (2008), the Illinois Supreme Court concurred in the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, holding that in applying Seibert, courts must first determine whether the detectives deliberately employed a question-first, warn-later strategy when interrogating a defendant.

2004Accordingly, federal circuit court decisions are considered persuasive, but not binding on us or our supreme court in the absence of a decision by the United States Supreme Court as recognized in Sprietsma.” (Emphasis omitted.) Mekertichian, 347 Ill.

2004Accordingly, federal circuit court decisions are considered persuasive, but not binding on us or our supreme court in the absence of a decision by the United States Supreme Court as recognized in Sprietsma.” (Emphasis omitted.) Mekertichian, 347 Ill.

1987In its supplemental brief, SIU also cites Batiste v. Burke (5th Cir.1984), 746 F.2d 257 .

1987In its supplemental brief, SIU also cites Batiste v. Burke (5th Cir.1984), 746 F.2d 257 .