Flores claim in California

2023(Id. at p. 159.) She alleged injury due to the clinic’s act of putting the scale in a place where it posed a tripping hazard, which “implicat[ed] [the clinic’s] duty to all users of its facility, including patients, employees, and other invitees, to maintain safe premises.” (Id. at p. 160.) Johnson discussed Canister and concluded: “While the court’s rationale, in Canister, does not comport with Flores’s analysis, the outcome is arguably correct, in that (1) the negligent performance of tasks requiring no medical skill or training may nonetheless implicate professional services and trigger the

2022The issue in Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th 75 was whether Flores’s claim was governed by MICRA’s limitations period or the two-year period in section 335.1 for ordinary personal injury actions—more specifically, whether the alleged negligent act or omission occurred “in the rendering of professional services” for purposes of section 340.5 and, as such, constituted professional negligence.

2025A. Background At sentencing, the court granted Flores’s motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and struck his strike prior, which involved a 23-year-old conviction for domestic violence.

2025At the sentencing hearing, the trial court partially granted Flores’s motion to strike his two prior strike convictions by striking one. (§ 1385, subd. (a); People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 .) The court sentenced Flores to prison for two years eight months, to be served consecutively to the seven-year prison term the court had imposed in the prior case in which he had violated probation.

2023Canister focused on the foreseeability of the injury to a passenger ( Canister, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 407- 408), while Lopez adopted the Flores framework and found that the passenger was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services and did not need to be the recipient of the services (Lopez, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 347).

2023Canister focused on the foreseeability of the injury to a passenger ( Canister, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 407- 408), while Lopez adopted the Flores framework and found that the passenger was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services and did not need to be the recipient of the services (Lopez, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 347).

2023(People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346 , 1355, fn. 8 (Ross), review granted March 15, 2023, S278266).) In so doing, the court noted it had based its Flores test entirely on Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th 825 , which had addressed Cunningham error under the previous version of section 1170.

2023(People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346 , 1355, fn. 8 (Ross), review granted Mar. 15, 2023, S278266.) In so doing, the court noted it had based its Flores test entirely on Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th 825 , which had addressed Cunningham error under the previous version of section 1170.

2022This assertion ignores the reality that the probative value of prior domestic violence evidence “is principally in its cumulative nature.” (People v. Cabrera, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 706 ; People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020 , 1027–1028 [“ ‘propensity inference is particularly appropriate in the area of domestic violence because on-going violence and abuse is the norm’ ”].) Finally, because we have concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior acts evidence, we need not address Flores’s claim of prejudice.

2022This assertion ignores the reality that the probative value of prior domestic violence evidence “is principally in its cumulative nature.” (People v. Cabrera, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 706 ; People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020 , 1027–1028 [“ ‘propensity inference is particularly appropriate in the area of domestic violence because on-going violence and abuse is the norm’ ”].) Finally, because we have concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior acts evidence, we need not address Flores’s claim of prejudice.

2022This assertion ignores the reality that the probative value of prior domestic violence evidence “is principally in its cumulative nature.” (People v. Cabrera, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 706 ; People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020 , 1027–1028 [“ ‘propensity inference is particularly appropriate in the area of domestic violence because on-going violence and abuse is the norm’ ”].) Finally, because we have concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior acts evidence, we need not address Flores’s claim of prejudice.

2022This assertion ignores the reality that the probative value of prior domestic violence evidence “is principally in its cumulative nature.” (People v. Cabrera, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 706 ; People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020 , 1027–1028 [“ ‘propensity inference is particularly appropriate in the area of domestic violence because on-going violence and abuse is the norm’ ”].) Finally, because we have concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior acts evidence, we need not address Flores’s claim of prejudice.

2016Defendant Flores cites People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151 (Aguilera) as support for his position that he was in custody from the beginning of the interview.

2015Defendant Flores cites People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151 (Aguilera) as support for his position that he was in custody from the beginning of the interview.

2026Code, § 800; People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 153 .) The same is true with respect to Flores’s challenge to the testimony that his facial injuries were not inconsistent with “injuries a perpetrator may have when someone is trying to stop them from strangling them.”4 As with 4 Confusingly, Flores’s briefs often phrase his argument in a way suggesting he is challenging opinion testimony that would seem to support his defense.

2026(See, e.g., People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267 , 269, 270, 275–276 [upholding search condition that permitted “access to any electronic device, including all 13 passwords to any social media accounts and applications” where defendant pled no contest to transporting a controlled substance]; People v. Ebertowski (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1172 , 1176–1177 [probation condition requiring disclosure of passwords to “ ‘any electronic devices’ ” was not unreasonable where defendant pled to gang related offenses].) Thus, Flores’s challenge fails for the additional and independent reason

2025(People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266 ; People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48 , 61; Witcraft, at p. 665.) 8 In sum, we conclude the contentions Flores raised in his supplemental brief lack merit.

2025Exchange (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 685, 694 .) In light of the above, we deny Flores’s motion to deem constructively filed an appeal as to the S.D. restitution order. 19 DISPOSITION The judgment is modified by reducing H.O.’s restitution award to $3,667.98.

2024Accordingly, we decide this appeal “on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by the appellant.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220.) Sprewell waived oral argument. 5 determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination.” (Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 138, 143 [emphasis omitted]; accord, Adams v. Adams (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 654, 656 [reviewing trial court’s factual findings in quiet title action for substantial evidence]; Fallert v. Hamilton (1952) 1

2024Accordingly, we decide this appeal “on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by the appellant.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220.) Sprewell waived oral argument. 5 determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination.” (Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 138, 143 [emphasis omitted]; accord, Adams v. Adams (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 654, 656 [reviewing trial court’s factual findings in quiet title action for substantial evidence]; Fallert v. Hamilton (1952) 1

2024Professional negligence remains limited to “only that negligent conduct engaged in for the purpose of (or the purported purpose of) delivering health care to a patient.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652 , 666–667 [finding section 340.5 does not apply where doctor “acted for her own benefit . . . not for the benefit of her patient”].) Here, Lopez does not question Dayton’s purported intent to transport the patient to the hospital.

2023“If a judgment rests on admissible evidence it will not be reversed because the trial court admitted that evidence upon a different theory, a mistaken theory, or one not raised below.” (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 901 .) To analyze Flores’s challenge to the trial court’s overruling of his objection, it is first important to understand the scope of that objection.

2023(Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 .) At no point did the trial court suggest that this conviction factored into its decision declining to exercise its discretion to strike one or both of the five-year enhancements.

2023At the first step of the Lopez analysis, the court, applying the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , decides whether “to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt every factor on which the court relied, because the amended statute requires that every factor on which a court intends to rely in imposing an upper term, with the exception of factors related to a defendant’s prior conviction(s), have been admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury.” (Lopez, supra, at p. 466.) If so, then the error is not prejudicia

2023At the first step of the Lopez analysis, the court, applying the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , decides whether “to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt every factor on which the court relied, because the amended statute requires that every factor on which a court intends to rely in imposing an upper term, with the exception of factors related to a defendant’s prior conviction(s), have been admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury.” (Lopez, supra, at p. 466.) If so, then the error is not prejudicia

2023Over Flores’s objection, the trial court reappointed Wilschke and then allowed Flores to voice his concerns in a hearing outside the presence of the prosecution under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).

2023(People v. Clayburg (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 86, 93 .) Even if we were to consider this argument, Flores’s claim presents no basis for reversal.

2023(Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 22 p. 843.) Flores’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s true finding on the torture special circumstance accordingly lacks merit.

2022In so finding, the court, citing Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at page 113 , indicated it was interpreting the arbitration provision as requiring Kertel to “bear the arbitration forum costs, including mediation costs which would not otherwise arise.”6 The court ruled that “each of plaintiff’s claims are subject to arbitration” and rejected Flores’ claim that he may continue to pursue his claims in the civil action.

2022In so finding, the court, citing Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at page 113 , indicated it was interpreting the arbitration provision as requiring Kertel to “bear the arbitration forum costs, including mediation costs which would not otherwise arise.”6 The court ruled that “each of plaintiff’s claims are subject to arbitration” and rejected Flores’ claim that he may continue to pursue his claims in the civil action.

2022The court wrote: “In the case at bar, [Flores] cites to Roldan [v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87 ] for the proposition that he has the right to bring this lawsuit—as a result of [Kertel’s] refusal to pay mediation costs.

2021Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 356 ; Bergman v. Drum (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 11, 15, fn. 3 .) The rule “serves to promote finality of litigation by preventing a party from relitigating questions previously decided by a reviewing court.” (George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1279, 1291 .) In Flores I, we upheld the court’s ruling dismissing Flores’s claim that Sharp breached a duty by failing to keep and provide records to him in 2014.