37 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2026 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Saldivargreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 265-66 , 497 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (1986); People v. Reed, 2018 IL App (1st) 160609, ¶ 54 , 118 N.E.3d 642 ; Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶¶ 39-41 . ¶ 22 In Johnson, the defendant did essentially the same thing. 2021See, e.g., People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 265-66 , 497 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (1986); People v. Reed, 2018 IL App (1st) 160609, ¶ 54 , 118 N.E.3d 642 ; Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶¶ 39-41 . ¶ 22 In Johnson, the defendant did essentially the same thing. | 4 | 4 |
People v. Alexandergreen2 sentences2025To succeed on an excessive sentence claim, a defendant must show that the trial court abused its discretion, which occurs when a sentence “is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212 . ¶ 39 The court exercised its discretion in imposing a sentence on Mr. Young within the statutory range, which spanned from 76 years to natural life. 2024A circuit court has “broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference.” People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). ¶ 66 Substantial deference is given to the circuit court’s sentencing decision because the sentencing judge “is in a much better position to consider factors such as the defendant’s 16 credibility, demeanor, moral character, mentality, environment, habits, and age.” People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36 . | 2 | 3 |
People v. Schnoorgreen2 sentences2024See People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 99 , 145 N.E.3d 544 (addressing an excessive sentence claim). 2023See People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 99 , 145 N.E.3d 544 (addressing an excessive sentence claim). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Staceygreen2 sentences2024We find that the circuit court applied the appropriate mitigating factors for juvenile offenders and the abuse of discretion standard applies where defendant’s challenge to his sentence amounts to an excessive sentence challenge. ¶ 65 A circuit court imposing a sentence within the statutory limits will only be deemed excessive and an abuse of discretion where the sentence is “greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000). 2023See People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 211 (2000). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hodgesgreen2 sentences2021People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). 2020“An example of an indisputably meritless legal theory is one which is completely contradicted by the record.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16 , 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (2009). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Reedgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 265-66 , 497 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (1986); People v. Reed, 2018 IL App (1st) 160609, ¶ 54 , 118 N.E.3d 642 ; Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶¶ 39-41 . ¶ 22 In Johnson, the defendant did essentially the same thing. 2021See, e.g., People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 265-66 , 497 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (1986); People v. Reed, 2018 IL App (1st) 160609, ¶ 54 , 118 N.E.3d 642 ; Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶¶ 39-41 . ¶ 22 In Johnson, the defendant did essentially the same thing. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Lusbygreen2 sentences2022People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 35 . ¶ 65 We generally review an excessive-sentence claim for an abuse of discretion. 2021See Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶¶ 38-52 ; see also Holman, 2017 IL 120655 , ¶¶ 48-50. ¶ 58 As a final note, because we find defendant’s sentencing hearing was Miller- compliant, his remaining arguments resemble an excessive sentence challenge which has been previously addressed on direct appeal. | 1 | 2 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen1 sentence2026He then argues, citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-72 (2012), that his youth is an excellent basis for establishing his rehabilitative potential and the court failed to consider his youth. ¶ 75 Unfortunately for defendant’s claim, the trial court specifically stated it was considering the “character of the Defendant with the objective of restoring him to useful citizenship.” The language indubitably addresses defendant’s rehabilitation potential. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Caballerogreen1 sentence2025The State responds that Mr. Young’s claim is too conclusory and fails to state even the gist of a claim that his counsel performed deficiently or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. ¶ 34 The Act establishes procedures by which a criminal defendant may challenge his conviction or sentence based on a substantial deprivation of his state or federal constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122–1(a)(1) (West 2022); People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79, 83 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Brunton v. Krugergreen1 sentence2024See Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 76 (“We require parties to preserve issues or claims for appeal; we do not require them to limit their arguments here to the same arguments that were made below.”). ¶ 108 In deciding the import of the court’s comments, McKinley is again instructive. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Evansgreen1 sentence2023People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 332 (1996). ¶ 10 The State relies on People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 122956 , to reinforce its assertion that defendant’s challenge to the restitution amount as unsupported by the evidence is an excessive sentence claim. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Heidergreen2 sentences2023See People v. Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1, 18 , 896 N.E.2d 239, 249 (2008) (“[W]here the trial court clearly had an opportunity to review the same essential claim that was later raised on appeal, *** there was no forfeiture.”). ¶ 61 Under the circumstances presented, the record reflects that defendant was afforded a full and fair second opportunity to present his motion for reconsideration of his sentence, the only motion he chose to pursue during the proceedings below. 2023See People v. Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1, 18 , 896 N.E.2d 239, 249 (2008) (“[W]here the trial court clearly had an opportunity to review the same essential claim that was later raised on appeal, *** there was no forfeiture.”). ¶ 61 Under the circumstances presented, the record reflects that defendant was afforded a full and fair second opportunity to present his motion for reconsideration of his sentence, the only motion he chose to pursue during the proceedings below. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Holmanred1 sentence2021See Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶¶ 38-52 ; see also Holman, 2017 IL 120655 , ¶¶ 48-50. ¶ 58 As a final note, because we find defendant’s sentencing hearing was Miller- compliant, his remaining arguments resemble an excessive sentence challenge which has been previously addressed on direct appeal. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ferngreen1 sentence2021We will consider it regardless but find it without merit. ¶ 61 The circuit court retains “great discretion” to “fashion an appropriate sentence within the statutory limits.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hensleygreen2 sentences2020This court has explained appellate review of a defendant’s excessive sentence claim as follows: “A trial court’s sentencing determination must be based on the particular circumstances of each case, including factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. [Citations.] Generally, the trial court is in a better position than a court of review to determine an appropriate sentence based upon the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. [Citation.] Thus, the trial court is the proper forum for the det 2020App. 3d 224, 234-35 , 819 N.E.2d 1274, 1284 (2004)); see also People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d - 13 - 205, 212-13, 940 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Price
green
2 sentences2020This court has explained appellate review of a defendant’s excessive sentence claim as follows: “A trial court’s sentencing determination must be based on the particular circumstances of each case, including factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. [Citations.] Generally, the trial court is in a better position than a court of review to determine an appropriate sentence based upon the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. [Citation.] Thus, the trial court is the proper forum for the det 2020This court has explained appellate review of a defendant’s excessive sentence claim as follows: “A trial court’s sentencing determination must be based on the particular circumstances of each case, including factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. [Citations.] Generally, the trial court is in a better position than a court of review to determine an appropriate sentence based upon the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. [Citation.] Thus, the trial court is the proper forum for the det | 7 | 2015–2020 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2024The problem with the State’s reliance on Payne is that, effectively, the argument accepted in that case—that there is a difference between an excessive sentence challenge and an improper sentence challenge—is the same issue the court resolved in Johnson; it found the different characterizations of the arguments to be “a distinction without a difference for purposes of Rule 604(d).” Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶ 41 . 2023People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 332 (1996). ¶ 10 The State relies on People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 122956 , to reinforce its assertion that defendant’s challenge to the restitution amount as unsupported by the evidence is an excessive sentence claim. | 6 | 2020–2024 |
People v. Snyder
green
2 sentences2024Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36 . “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs when the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit or purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120 , ¶ 66. ¶ 77 Here, Aguilar was sentenced to 25 years in prison for first degree murder, which falls well within the applicable sentencing range of 20 to 60 years (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2022)). 2024Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36 . “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs when the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit or purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120 , ¶ 66. ¶ 80 Here, Aguilar was sentenced to 25 years in prison for first degree murder, which falls well within the applicable sentencing range of 20 to 60 years (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2022)). | 4 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Colon
green
2 sentences2024Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36 . “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs when the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit or purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120 , ¶ 66. ¶ 77 Here, Aguilar was sentenced to 25 years in prison for first degree murder, which falls well within the applicable sentencing range of 20 to 60 years (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2022)). 2024Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36 . “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs when the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit or purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120 , ¶ 66. ¶ 80 Here, Aguilar was sentenced to 25 years in prison for first degree murder, which falls well within the applicable sentencing range of 20 to 60 years (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2022)). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2023Citing People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (4th) 200515 , the amended motion explained that defendant may not base his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on an excessive-sentence challenge. 2021CONCLUSION ¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we dismiss the appeal. ¶ 27 Appeal dismissed. - 14 - No. 4-20-0515 Cite as: People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (4th) 200515 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County, No. 18-CF- 361; the Hon. | 2 | 2021–2023 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2006The court reasoned that, if the defendant should have received only one conviction and sentence, then “the other conviction and the sentence imposed was certainly excessive.” Jackson, 64 Ill. 2006The court reasoned that, if the defendant should have received only one conviction and sentence, then "the other conviction and the sentence imposed was certainly excessive." Jackson, 64 Ill. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Moshier
green
2 sentences2006Moshier, 312 Ill. 2006Moshier, 312 Ill.App.3d at 881 , 245 Ill.Dec. 740 , 728 N.E.2d 822 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Addison
green
1 sentence2025In support, defendant contends that postconviction counsel failed to attach supporting documentation of his rehabilitative potential for the Truth in Sentencing Act claim, added an excessive sentencing claim that was not a cognizable claim under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and further failed to support the excessive sentence claim with evidence. ¶ 33 “In a postconviction proceeding, there is no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.” People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 19 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Young
green
1 sentence2024Id. ¶ 33 On appeal, the defendant contended in part that his waiver of counsel was ineffective because the trial court had provided no Rule 401(a) admonishments after learning that the defendant wanted to represent himself. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Palmer-Smith
green
1 sentence2024In coming to this conclusion, Johnson explicitly abrogated People v. Palmer-Smith, 2015 IL App (4th) 130451 , which indulged in this distinction. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re H.L.
green
1 sentence2023He seeks remand for further postplea proceedings. ¶ 54 “Rule 604(d) governs the procedure to be followed when a defendant wishes to appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea.” In re H.L., 2015 IL 118529, ¶ 7 , 48 N.E.3d - 19 - 1071. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Shirley
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 370 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Boykins
green
1 sentence2020Accordingly, we reject the State’s suggestion that this court should determine the claim’s ultimate merit. ¶ 30 The State also describes the excessive-sentence claim as “frivolous or spurious.” A claim is frivolous and patently without merit only if it has “no arguable basis either in law or in fact, relying instead on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Boykins, 2017 -9- IL 121365, ¶ 9, 93 N.E.3d 504 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Daly
neutral
1 sentence2020Defendant argues that an excessive-sentence challenge to his 45-year sentence for aggravated DUI would not be frivolous or patently without merit. ¶ 31 Regarding sentencing, “[t]he Illinois Constitution provides penalties are to be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” People v. Daly, 2014 IL App (4th) 140624, ¶ 26 , 21 N.E.3d 810 (citing Ill. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Daly
green
1 sentence2020Defendant argues that an excessive-sentence challenge to his 45-year sentence for aggravated DUI would not be frivolous or patently without merit. ¶ 31 Regarding sentencing, “[t]he Illinois Constitution provides penalties are to be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” People v. Daly, 2014 IL App (4th) 140624, ¶ 26 , 21 N.E.3d 810 (citing Ill. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Belmont green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.