excessive sentence claim in Alaska

2024When we review an excessive sentence claim, we independently examine the record to determine whether the sentence is clearly mistaken. 25 The “clearly mistaken” standard contemplates that different reasonable judges, confronted with identical facts, will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence, and that a reviewing court will not modify a sentence that falls within a “permissible range of reasonable sentences.” 26 Here, the superior court acknowledged Cowan’s potential for rehabilitation, but it expressed some skepticism about his statements of remorse and noted that it did not know

2024When we review an excessive sentence claim, we independently examine the record to determine whether the sentence is clearly mistaken. 25 The “clearly mistaken” standard contemplates that different reasonable judges, confronted with identical facts, will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence, and that a reviewing court will not modify a sentence that falls within a “permissible range of reasonable sentences.” 26 Here, the superior court acknowledged Cowan’s potential for rehabilitation, but it expressed some skepticism about his statements of remorse and noted that it did not know

2024When we review an excessive sentence claim, we independently examine the record to determine whether the sentence is clearly mistaken. 25 The “clearly mistaken” standard contemplates that different reasonable judges, confronted with identical facts, will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence, and that a reviewing court will not modify a sentence that falls within a “permissible range of reasonable sentences.” 26 Here, the superior court acknowledged Cowan’s potential for rehabilitation, but it expressed some skepticism about his statements of remorse and noted that it did not know

2021Conclusion The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 33 See Toney v. State, 785 P.2d 902, 903 (Alaska App. 1990) (explaining that, when imposing a defendant’s suspended sentence, the sentencing court must consider “all available sentencing evidence” in light of the Chaney criteria (citing State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970))); see also DeMario v. State, 933 P.2d 558, 562 (Alaska App. 1997). 34 See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974). 35 See Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997). – 26 – 2711

2021Conclusion The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 33 See Toney v. State, 785 P.2d 902, 903 (Alaska App. 1990) (explaining that, when imposing a defendant’s suspended sentence, the sentencing court must consider “all available sentencing evidence” in light of the Chaney criteria (citing State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970))); see also DeMario v. State, 933 P.2d 558, 562 (Alaska App. 1997). 34 See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974). 35 See Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997). – 26 – 2711

2021As a result, the court found that Galindo was “a persistent threat to the community.” The court engaged in a thorough analysis of the Chaney criteria, and ultimately determined that the sentence imposed was necessary for public safety and to reaffirm societal norms and the seriousness of the offense.14 11 Asitonia v. State, 508 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 1973). 12 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 689 (Alaska App. 1990). 13 Pickard v. State, 965 P.2d 755, 760 (Alaska App. 1998) (citing Nicholas v. State, 477 P.2d 447, 448-49 (Alaska 1970)). 14 See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970); A

2024When we review an excessive sentence claim, we independently examine the record to determine whether the sentence is clearly mistaken. 25 The “clearly mistaken” standard contemplates that different reasonable judges, confronted with identical facts, will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence, and that a reviewing court will not modify a sentence that falls within a “permissible range of reasonable sentences.” 26 Here, the superior court acknowledged Cowan’s potential for rehabilitation, but it expressed some skepticism about his statements of remorse and noted that it did not know

2023AS 12.55.127(c)(2)(F). 7 See State v. Korkow, 314 P.3d 560, 565 (Alaska 2013) (providing that, when restricting a defendant’s parole eligibility, a sentencing court must explain its reasons for concluding that the statutorily prescribed parole eligibility period is insufficient after specifically considering all of the Chaney criteria); Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166, 1173 (Alaska App. 2008). –5– 2758 sentence was imposed in accordance with a plea agreement that provided for a sentence equal to or less than a specified maximum sentence.8 In the present case, neither party has suggested that th

2023AS 12.55.127(c)(2)(F). 7 See State v. Korkow, 314 P.3d 560, 565 (Alaska 2013) (providing that, when restricting a defendant’s parole eligibility, a sentencing court must explain its reasons for concluding that the statutorily prescribed parole eligibility period is insufficient after specifically considering all of the Chaney criteria); Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166, 1173 (Alaska App. 2008). –5– 2758 sentence was imposed in accordance with a plea agreement that provided for a sentence equal to or less than a specified maximum sentence.8 In the present case, neither party has suggested that th

2021As a result, the court found that Galindo was “a persistent threat to the community.” The court engaged in a thorough analysis of the Chaney criteria, and ultimately determined that the sentence imposed was necessary for public safety and to reaffirm societal norms and the seriousness of the offense.14 11 Asitonia v. State, 508 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 1973). 12 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 689 (Alaska App. 1990). 13 Pickard v. State, 965 P.2d 755, 760 (Alaska App. 1998) (citing Nicholas v. State, 477 P.2d 447, 448-49 (Alaska 1970)). 14 See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970); A

2021Conclusion The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 33 See Toney v. State, 785 P.2d 902, 903 (Alaska App. 1990) (explaining that, when imposing a defendant’s suspended sentence, the sentencing court must consider “all available sentencing evidence” in light of the Chaney criteria (citing State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970))); see also DeMario v. State, 933 P.2d 558, 562 (Alaska App. 1997). 34 See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974). 35 See Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997). – 26 – 2711

2021Conclusion The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 33 See Toney v. State, 785 P.2d 902, 903 (Alaska App. 1990) (explaining that, when imposing a defendant’s suspended sentence, the sentencing court must consider “all available sentencing evidence” in light of the Chaney criteria (citing State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970))); see also DeMario v. State, 933 P.2d 558, 562 (Alaska App. 1997). 34 See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974). 35 See Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997). – 26 – 2711

2021As a result, the court found that Galindo was “a persistent threat to the community.” The court engaged in a thorough analysis of the Chaney criteria, and ultimately determined that the sentence imposed was necessary for public safety and to reaffirm societal norms and the seriousness of the offense.14 11 Asitonia v. State, 508 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 1973). 12 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 689 (Alaska App. 1990). 13 Pickard v. State, 965 P.2d 755, 760 (Alaska App. 1998) (citing Nicholas v. State, 477 P.2d 447, 448-49 (Alaska 1970)). 14 See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970); A

2021As a result, the court found that Galindo was “a persistent threat to the community.” The court engaged in a thorough analysis of the Chaney criteria, and ultimately determined that the sentence imposed was necessary for public safety and to reaffirm societal norms and the seriousness of the offense.14 11 Asitonia v. State, 508 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 1973). 12 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 689 (Alaska App. 1990). 13 Pickard v. State, 965 P.2d 755, 760 (Alaska App. 1998) (citing Nicholas v. State, 477 P.2d 447, 448-49 (Alaska 1970)). 14 See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970); A

2021As a result, the court found that Galindo was “a persistent threat to the community.” The court engaged in a thorough analysis of the Chaney criteria, and ultimately determined that the sentence imposed was necessary for public safety and to reaffirm societal norms and the seriousness of the offense.14 11 Asitonia v. State, 508 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 1973). 12 Machado v. State, 797 P.2d 677, 689 (Alaska App. 1990). 13 Pickard v. State, 965 P.2d 755, 760 (Alaska App. 1998) (citing Nicholas v. State, 477 P.2d 447, 448-49 (Alaska 1970)). 14 See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970); A

2007See, eg., Jordan v. State, 681 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska App.1984) (considering an excessive sentence claim involving the forfeiture of an airplane although Jordan did not receive any unsus-pended incarceration); Perez v. State, Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 2486 at 8 (Aug. 12, 1992), 1992 WL 12153294 at *3 (considering an excessive senterice claim involving a $1000 fine with $500 suspended, 150 hours of community work service, and 180 days with 165 days suspended although Perez only received 15 days of unsuspended incarceration); Kuznicki v. Anchorage, Alaska App. Memorandum Opi

2007See, eg., Jordan v. State, 681 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska App.1984) (considering an excessive sentence claim involving the forfeiture of an airplane although Jordan did not receive any unsus-pended incarceration); Perez v. State, Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 2486 at 8 (Aug. 12, 1992), 1992 WL 12153294 at *3 (considering an excessive senterice claim involving a $1000 fine with $500 suspended, 150 hours of community work service, and 180 days with 165 days suspended although Perez only received 15 days of unsuspended incarceration); Kuznicki v. Anchorage, Alaska App. Memorandum Opi