Indiana double jeopardy clause in Indiana

2019Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999). [28] Two or more offenses are the “same offense” in violation of the Indiana double jeopardy clause, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.

2017See Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 53 (Ind. 1999) (explaining that under the actual evidence test of the Indiana double jeopardy analysis, “the actual evidence presented at trial is examined to determine whether each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts”).

2017Two or more offenses are the “same criminal transgression” for the purposes of the Indiana double jeopardy clause if, “with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Id. [2] Brown challenges his convictions under the actual-evidence test, which “prohibits multiple convictions if there is ‘a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense

2014Two or more offenses are the “same criminal transgression” for the purposes of the Indiana double jeopardy clause if, “with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Id. 7 Davis challenges his convictions under the actual-evidence test, which “prohibits multiple convictions if there is ‘a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense ma

2013The doctrine of collateral estop-pel (also referred to as issue preclusion) is not the same as double jeopardy, “but rather is embodied within the protection against double jeopardy.” Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind.2011). “[T]he traditional bar of jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of the crime itself, whereas collateral estoppel, in a more modest fashion, simply forbids the government from relitigating certain facts in order to establish the fact of the crime.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

2013The doctrine of collateral estop-pel (also referred to as issue preclusion) is not the same as double jeopardy, “but rather is embodied within the protection against double jeopardy.” Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind.2011). “[T]he traditional bar of jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of the crime itself, whereas collateral estoppel, in a more modest fashion, simply forbids the government from relitigating certain facts in order to establish the fact of the crime.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

2018Guyton v. State , 771 N.E.2d 1141 , 1143 (Ind. 2002) (Sullivan, J., concurring) ).

2006See Guyton, 771 N.E.2d at 1143 ( citing Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 57 (Sullivan, J., concurring)).

2017Because “Calvert’s conviction of possessing a sawed-off shotgun was based on the very same act—his having the sawed-off shotgun in his vehicle— which formed an essential element of possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon[,]” this court reversed and remanded with instruction to vacate that conviction and sentence.11 Id. at 642-43 . 11 In reaching its decision, the Calvert court discussed Alexander v. State, 772 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, where the court determined that convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and carrying a

2017See also Jarrell v. State, 818 N.E.2d 88, 93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (convictions for possession of firearm by serious violent felon and carrying a handgun without a license violated double jeopardy principles, where evidence of constructive possession of handgun found under seat during traffic stop was used to prove essential element of possession of firearm by serious violent felon and all essential elements of carrying a handgun without a license.) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1606-CR-1447 | July 25, 2017 Page 26 of 28 [43] In support of its position that the UPFSVF

2017Establishing a “‘reasonable possibility’ that the jury used the same facts to reach two convictions requires substantially more than a logical possibility.” Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008).

2017Article one, section fourteen of the Indiana Constitution provides, in relevant part, “No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” The Indiana double jeopardy clause guards “against multiple punishments for the same offense in a single trial.” Wood v. State, 999 N.E.2d 1054, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

2015Citing Chavez and Firestone, and other cases, Miske argues that all of his convictions, except for that of Resisting Law Enforcement, were for actions that were part of a continuing crime and that, as a result, “his actions should be considered as one continuous crime, with only one sentence.” (Appellant’s Br. at 12.) [44] Addressing a similar case to this one, involving charges of oral, vaginal, and anal intercourse, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated that the resolution of claims under the continuous crime doctrine “is extremely fact-sensitive and is properly resolved by determining whethe

2014See, e.g., Miller, 790 N.E.2d at 489 (“The defendant’s use of the same weapon in the commission of sepa-’ rate and distinct offenses thus does not present a violation of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause.”).

2014See, e.g., Miller, 790 N.E.2d at 489 (“The defendant’s use of the same weapon in the commission of sepa-’ rate and distinct offenses thus does not present a violation of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause.”).

2013We therefore do not address the federal double jeopardy provision other than to note that the statutory elements test of the Indiana double jeopardy clause and the Fifth Amendment test as enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), are substantially the same, Brown v. State, 912 N.E.2d 881, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, and our courts have held that convictions of both rape and criminal confinement are not precluded under the Blockburger test, see Purter v. State, 515 N.E.2d 858, 860 (Ind. 1987). 4 II.

2013We therefore do not address the federal double jeopardy provision other than to note that the statutory elements test of the Indiana double jeopardy clause and the Fifth Amendment test as enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), are substantially the same, Brown v. State, 912 N.E.2d 881, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, and our courts have held that convictions of both rape and criminal confinement are not precluded under the Blockburger test, see Purter v. State, 515 N.E.2d 858, 860 (Ind. 1987). 4 II.

2013See id.

2012Thus the overt act was not the same as the crime of murder, and the offenses of conspiracy [to commit burglary] and murder are sufficiently distinct to permit the defendant to be separately convicted and punished for each. 761 N.E.2d at 834 ; see also Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 178 (Ind. 2002) (holding under the actual evidence test “the offenses of felony-murder and class A felony conspiracy were each established by the proof of a fact not used to establish the other offense” and there was no violation of the Indiana Double Jeopardy clause).

2001Instead of relying upon the footnote in Roop, supra, the State relied upon Justice Boehm's concurring opinion in Richardson, supra, wherein he concluded that "the Indiana double jeopardy clause only prohibits subsequent prosecutions for the same offense, not multiple punishments for the same offense." Noble, 734 N.E.2d at 1125 .

2001See id. ("[MJultiple convictions (and by extension, multiple punishments), as well as multiple prosecutions, violate the Indiana double jeopardy clause.").

2000See Davies v. State, 730 N.E.2d 726, 741 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

1999The subsection of the arson statute under which Russell was charged has as its focus, “the protection of human life, not of property.” See Bustamante v. State, 557 N.E.2d at 1323 (vacating an arson sentence, where the defendant was convicted of murder for the same fire which killed his wife, because the sentence offended “Article 1, § 14 of the Indiana Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibit multiple punishment for the same offense”.

1999The subsection of the arson statute under which Russell was charged has as its focus, "the protection of human life, not of property." See Bustamante v. State, 557 N.E.2d at 1323 (vacating an arson sentence, where the defendant was convicted of murder for the same fire which killed his wife, because the sentence offended "Article 1, § 14 of the Indiana Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibit multiple punishment for the same offense".

1998See Valentin v. State, 688 N.E.2d 412, 413 (Ind. 1997) (“[i]n the absence of any separate state constitutional law argument by defendant, the Court of Appeals should not have based its reversal of defendant’s conspiracy conviction on the Indiana double jeopardy clause”).

1998See Valentin v. State, 688 N.E.2d 412, 413 (Ind. 1997) ("[i]n the absence of any separate state constitutional law argument by defendant, the Court of Appeals should not have based its reversal of defendant's conspiracy conviction on the Indiana double jeopardy clause").