Spradlin error in Indiana

2017The " Spradlin rule" is necessary because of "the higher sentence range for attempted murder in combination with the ambiguity involved in the proof of that crime." Ramsey v. State , 723 N.E.2d 869 , 872 (Ind. 2000).

2014It is well established that a “Spradlin claim presents the potential for fundamental error.” Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind.2000) (emphasis added).

2016Since Spradlin, our supreme court has consistently held that the “intent to kill” language must be included in instructions defining attempted murder and that simply -using “knowingly” or “knowingly or intentionally” does not suffice where the offense is attempted murder. 2 However, as noted in Williams v. State, 737 N.E.2d 734, 737 (Ind.2000), even in cases where there has been clear Spradlin error, our- supreme court has, at times, not vacated the attempted murder conviction because it has found that the intent of the *1244 perpetrator was not a central issue at trial and/or that the instruc

2015On review, we found this instruction fundamentally erroneous; moreover, we recognized that “[w]e have consistently held that this form of attempted murder instruction misinforms a jury as to the appropriate mens rea and thus constitutes fundamental error.” Id. (listing a series of cases finding “[fundamental Spradlin error” where .jury instruction with “knowingly or intentionally” or “knowingly” mens rea was deemed sufficient to establish mens rea for attempted murder).

2008It reasoned that the “higher sentencing range for attempted murder in combination ivith the ambiguity involved in the proof of that crime” justified the Spradlin rule and distinguished “other types of attempt prosecutions that involve either stringent penalties, or ambiguity, but not both.” Id. at 1011 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).

2008It reasoned that the “higher sentencing range for attempted murder in combination ivith the ambiguity involved in the proof of that crime” justified the Spradlin rule and distinguished “other types of attempt prosecutions that involve either stringent penalties, or ambiguity, but not both.” Id. at 1011 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).

2016See, e.g., Swallows v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (Ind.1996) (intent of perpetrator not central issue at trial); Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 872-73 (Ind.2000) (instructions as a whole sufficiently suggested requirement of intent to kill); Jackson v. State, 575 N.E.2d 617, 621 (Ind.1991) (intent of perpetrator not central issue and instructions as a whole sufficient on intent to kill).

2007Indeed, we have held in some cases, typically post-conviction relief appeals, that error of this sort was not fundamental especially when the intent of the perpetrator was not a central issue at trial, see Swallows v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1317 (Ind.1996), or if the wording of the instruction sufficiently suggested the requirement of intent to kill, Jackson v. State, 575 N.E.2d 617, 621 (Ind.1991).

2014However, “[a] reversal of an attempted murder conviction, despite a Spradlin error, is not required if either the intent of the perpetrator is not a central issue at trial or the instructions as a whole sufficiently suggested the requirement of the intent to kill.” Id. at 711 (citing Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind. 2000); Swallows v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (Ind. 1996)).

2014However, “[a] reversal of an attempted murder conviction, despite a Spradlin error, is not required if either the intent of the perpetrator is not a central issue at trial or the instructions as a whole sufficiently suggested the requirement of the intent to kill.” Id. at 711 (citing Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind. 2000); Swallows v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (Ind. 1996)).

2014However, “[a] reversal of an attempted murder conviction, despite a Spradlin error, is not required if either the intent of the perpetrator is not a central issue at trial or the instructions as a whole sufficiently suggested the requirement of the intent to kill.” Id. at 711 (citing Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind. 2000); Swallows v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (Ind. 1996)).

2014However, “[a] reversal of an attempted murder conviction, despite a Spradlin error, is not required if either the intent of the perpetrator is not a central issue at trial or the instructions as a whole sufficiently suggested the requirement of the intent to kill.” Id. at 711 (citing Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind. 2000); Swallows v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (Ind. 1996)).

2011See also Henderson v. State, 825 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that Spradlin rule does not apply to attempted robbery), trans. denied; McCann v. State, 742 N.E.2d 998 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (holding that Spradlin rule does not apply to attempted rape), summarily aff'd in relevant part, 749 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind.2001).

2005See Richeson v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind.1998) (Spradlin rule does not extend to attempted battery); Henderson v. State, 825 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (Spradlin rule does not apply to attempted robbery), trans. denied. 8 .

2006See Storey v. State (1990) Ind., 552 N.E.2d 477, 480 ("The use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm permits the jury to infer the defendant's knowledge that he was killing another.") Therefore, when it is said, as our Supreme Court did in Bethel v. Stute (2000) Ind., 730 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 , that the intent to commit attempted murder may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury, it may only be read as holding that the trier of fact in that case could infer a conscious objective to kill; otherw

2006See Storey v. State (1990) Ind., 552 N.E.2d 477, 480 ("The use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm permits the jury to infer the defendant's knowledge that he was killing another.") Therefore, when it is said, as our Supreme Court did in Bethel v. Stute (2000) Ind., 730 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 , that the intent to commit attempted murder may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury, it may only be read as holding that the trier of fact in that case could infer a conscious objective to kill; otherw

2006See Storey v. State (1990) Ind., 552 N.E.2d 477, 480 ("The use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm permits the jury to infer the defendant's knowledge that he was killing another.") Therefore, when it is said, as our Supreme Court did in Bethel v. Stute (2000) Ind., 730 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 , that the intent to commit attempted murder may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury, it may only be read as holding that the trier of fact in that case could infer a conscious objective to kill; otherw

2006See Storey v. State (1990) Ind., 552 N.E.2d 477, 480 ("The use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm permits the jury to infer the defendant's knowledge that he was killing another.") Therefore, when it is said, as our Supreme Court did in Bethel v. Stute (2000) Ind., 730 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 , that the intent to commit attempted murder may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury, it may only be read as holding that the trier of fact in that case could infer a conscious objective to kill; otherw

2000Metcalfe v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1236, 1237 (Ind.1999) (reversing attempted murder conviction on grounds of Spradlin error despite defendant’s failure to object to the instruction at trial).

2000The claim that a trial court inadequately instructed the jury on the mens rea for attempted murder has been called a “Spradlin claim.” Metcalfe, 715 N.E.2d at 1237 .

2007Cf. Yerden v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1283, 1285 (Ind.1997) (noting erroneous enumerated elements, but concluding no fundamental error because last two sentences of attempted murder instruction required that defendant “must have had specific intent to commit murder.”); Greenlee v. State, 655 N.E.2d 488 (Ind.1995) (noting Spradlin error, but concluding not fundamental where jury was adequately informed of Spradlin via charging information that essentially included intent to kill as element and by defendant’s instructions, which mentioned intent to kill, intent to commit murder, and specific intent at

2000And while the presence of the “knowingly” language is highly problematic, this result does comport with three of our post- Spradlin decisions: Yerden v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind.1997); Greenlee v. State, 655 N.E.2d 488 (Ind.1995); and Price v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind.1992). 6 II Ramsey also argues that the 30-year habitual offender enhancement imposed upon him should be vacated because the Spradlin error asserted supra renders the underlying attempted murder conviction invalid.

2007Cf. Yerden v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1283, 1285 (Ind.1997) (noting erroneous enumerated elements, but concluding no fundamental error because last two sentences of attempted murder instruction required that defendant “must have had specific intent to commit murder.”); Greenlee v. State, 655 N.E.2d 488 (Ind.1995) (noting Spradlin error, but concluding not fundamental where jury was adequately informed of Spradlin via charging information that essentially included intent to kill as element and by defendant’s instructions, which mentioned intent to kill, intent to commit murder, and specific intent at

2000And while the presence of the “knowingly” language is highly problematic, this result does comport with three of our post- Spradlin decisions: Yerden v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind.1997); Greenlee v. State, 655 N.E.2d 488 (Ind.1995); and Price v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind.1992). 6 II Ramsey also argues that the 30-year habitual offender enhancement imposed upon him should be vacated because the Spradlin error asserted supra renders the underlying attempted murder conviction invalid.

2005See id; see also Woodson v. State, 767 N.E.2d 1022, 1028-29 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (holding that accomplice lability instruction lacking "specific intent to kill" language, even when combined with separate attempted murder instruction which includes "specific intent to murder" language, does not adequately inform jury of need to find the accomplice had the specific intent to kill when he took the steps to help the principal), aff'd on reh'g, 778 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). 5 The State argues that even if the instructions as given constitute Spradlin error, the error is harmless because Specht's i

2005See id; see also Woodson v. State, 767 N.E.2d 1022, 1028-29 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (holding that accomplice lability instruction lacking "specific intent to kill" language, even when combined with separate attempted murder instruction which includes "specific intent to murder" language, does not adequately inform jury of need to find the accomplice had the specific intent to kill when he took the steps to help the principal), aff'd on reh'g, 778 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). 5 The State argues that even if the instructions as given constitute Spradlin error, the error is harmless because Specht's i

2000See also Taylor v. State, 616 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Ind.1993), for a strong statement of this principle. 4 B Here the first sentence of the trial court’s instruction is erroneous.

1997In Taylor v. State, 616 N.E.2d 748 (Ind.1993), the court explained that Spradlin instituted a two-step analysis for attempt crimes: first that the defendant intended to commit the underlying crime, and second that the defendant’s conduct was an attempt to commit that crime.

2019See Lee v. State, 91 N.E.3d 978, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding no Spradlin error because instructions as a whole set out the proper mens rea), trans. denied.

2018“However, error in an attempted murder instruction does not rise to the level of fundamental error where either 1) the instructions as a whole sufficiently inform the jury of the requirement of intent to kill; and/or 2) the intent of the perpetrator was not a central issue at trial.” Id. [16] In McKinley v. State, 45 N.E.3d 25, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, this court addressed the same argument that Radford makes, namely, that a Spradlin error had occurred where the term “knowingly” was included in a jury instruction on the elements of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.

2018“However, error in an attempted murder instruction does not rise to the level of fundamental error where either 1) the instructions as a whole sufficiently inform the jury of the requirement of intent to kill; and/or 2) the intent of the perpetrator was not a central issue at trial.” Id. [16] In McKinley v. State, 45 N.E.3d 25, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, this court addressed the same argument that Radford makes, namely, that a Spradlin error had occurred where the term “knowingly” was included in a jury instruction on the elements of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.

2018Under the Spradlin rule, a jury “should not Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1710-CR-2273 | April 9, 2018 Page 9 of 12 be instructed that a ‘knowing’ mens rea is sufficient to establish guilt of attempted murder, and our supreme court has found fundamental error and reversed attempted murder convictions where the jury was instructed that it could convict of attempted murder based on a ‘knowing’ mens rea.” Clay v. State, 766 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

2018Under the Spradlin rule, a jury “should not Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1710-CR-2273 | April 9, 2018 Page 9 of 12 be instructed that a ‘knowing’ mens rea is sufficient to establish guilt of attempted murder, and our supreme court has found fundamental error and reversed attempted murder convictions where the jury was instructed that it could convict of attempted murder based on a ‘knowing’ mens rea.” Clay v. State, 766 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

2015Yet, even in cases of a “clear Spradlin error,” a conviction will not be vacated if “(i) the intent of the perpetrator was not a central issue at trial; (ii) the instructions as a whole sufficiently suggested the requirement of intent to kill; or (iii) both.” Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 12 (Ind.2015) (citation omitted). ■ [16] In Ramsey , our supreme court found no fundamental error in the following jury instruction: A person attempts to commit murder when, acting with the culpability required for commission of Murder, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commiss

2011In Harris v. State, 884 N.E.2d 399, 403-04 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied, we held that the Spradlin rule does apply to attempted voluntary manslaughter because that crime is not a "lesser offense" as contemplated in Richeson .

2011In Harris v. State, 884 N.E.2d 399, 403-04 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied, we held that the Spradlin rule does apply to attempted voluntary manslaughter because that crime is not a "lesser offense" as contemplated in Richeson .

2007See Specht v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1081, 1091 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (noting fundamental Spradlin error where intent was squarely at issue and instructions were deficient), trans. denied; see also Williams, 737 N.E.2d at 737 (finding Spradlin error fundamental where the instructions as a whole did not sufficiently suggest the requirement of intent to kill and where intent was hotly contested). 8 Accordingly, we affirm the convictions of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and carrying a handgun without a license, but remand with instructions to vacate Jones’ convictions for attempted murder.

2006See Booker, 741 N.E.2d at 751 .

2005See id; see also Woodson v. State, 767 N.E.2d 1022, 1028-29 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (holding that accomplice lability instruction lacking "specific intent to kill" language, even when combined with separate attempted murder instruction which includes "specific intent to murder" language, does not adequately inform jury of need to find the accomplice had the specific intent to kill when he took the steps to help the principal), aff'd on reh'g, 778 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). 5 The State argues that even if the instructions as given constitute Spradlin error, the error is harmless because Specht's i

2005See id; see also Woodson v. State, 767 N.E.2d 1022, 1028-29 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (holding that accomplice lability instruction lacking "specific intent to kill" language, even when combined with separate attempted murder instruction which includes "specific intent to murder" language, does not adequately inform jury of need to find the accomplice had the specific intent to kill when he took the steps to help the principal), aff'd on reh'g, 778 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). 5 The State argues that even if the instructions as given constitute Spradlin error, the error is harmless because Specht's i