conclusion of the sentencing hearing in Tennessee

2021T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210(a), (b), -103(5); State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247 , 258 -5- (Tenn. Crim.

2016Tenn. Code Ann. § 40–35–210(a), (b), –103(5); State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 258 (Tenn. Crim.

2015T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210(a), (b); -103(5); State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim.

2012T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210(a), (b); -103(5); State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim.

2022At the motion for new trial hearing, the trial court held that the transcript from the sentencing hearing would show that it went “through a pattern that satisfied the legal requirements for any sentence.” The court summarized the findings it made at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing and then stated, “I don’t know how a record could be in more detail than that.” As a result, the trial court found the Defendant’s grounds regarding sentencing “not well-taken.” Although the Defendant urges us to adopt the federal system’s “harmless error” approach outlined in United States v. Gillis, 592 F

2016We must apply “a presumption of reasonableness to within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” See State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012). -6- In making its sentencing determination, the trial court, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, first determines the range of sentence and then determines the specific sentence and the appropriate combination of sentencing alternatives by considering: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the

2013State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995)).7 In this case, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant’s five-year sentence for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction and his 7 Our supreme court recently has directed that we review felony sentences imposed pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act “under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012).

2007See State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708-09 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938-39 (Tenn. 1995).4 At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that Appellant’s consecutive sentences would be based on the fact that Appellant “is a dangerous offender, whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high . . . .” T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(2), -115(b)(4).

2007See State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708-09 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938-39 (Tenn. 1995).1 At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that the defendant’s consecutive sentence would be based on the defendant’s extensive criminal history, and that the defendant “is a dangerous offender, whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and 1 We note that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Cunningham v. California 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007), which has called into question our supreme

2007See State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708-09 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938-39 (Tenn. 1995).4 At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that Appellant’s consecutive sentences would be based on the fact that Appellant “is a dangerous offender, whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high . . . .” T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(2), -115(b)(4).

2012We are to also recognize that the defendant bears “[t]he burden of showing that the sentence is improper.” Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169 . -3- Length of Sentences In making its sentencing determination, a trial court, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, first determines the range of sentence and then determines the specific sentence and the appropriate combination of sentencing alternatives by considering: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4)

2009Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169 . -4- In making its sentencing determination in the present case, the trial court, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, was obliged to determine the propriety of sentencing alternatives by considering: (1) The evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) The presentence report; (3) The principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) The nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) Evidence and information offered by the parties on the mitigating and enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-

2020Based on the findings announced at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that Defendant was not suitable for probation based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 40- 35-103(1)(B)—that “[c]onfinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses[.]” Effective Deterrence To deny an alternative sentence based on the effective deterrence prong of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(1)(B), “the record must contain some proof of

2012At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court made the following statements with regard to Appellant’s sentence: “as far as the manner of service is concerned, because of the need to deter others who just can’t believe that they could do something like this and walk away he’s got to serve confinement, . . . .” It appears that the trial court based its decision to deny alternative sentencing on the grounds that confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense and that confinement was particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others li

2022At the motion for new trial hearing, the trial court held that the transcript from the sentencing hearing would show that it went “through a pattern that satisfied the legal requirements for any sentence.” The court summarized the findings it made at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing and then stated, “I don’t know how a record could be in more detail than that.” As a result, the trial court found the Defendant’s grounds regarding sentencing “not well-taken.” Although the Defendant urges us to adopt the federal system’s “harmless error” approach outlined in United States v. Gillis, 592 F

2015The convictions in the case under examination were imposed as the result of a guilty plea agreement. “[A] plea-bargained sentence is legal so long as it does not exceed the maximum punishment authorized for the plea offense.” Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tenn. 1997).

2013State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995)).7 In this case, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant’s five-year sentence for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction and his 7 Our supreme court recently has directed that we review felony sentences imposed pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act “under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012).

2010“Lack of candor and credibility are indications of a defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” State v. Nunley, 22 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tenn. Crim.

2009See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).

2008When the “seriousness of the offense” factor forms the basis for denying alternative sentencing, “‘the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement.” State v. Grissom, 956 S.W.2d 514, 520 (Tenn. Crim.

1997Furthermore, the State argued only the torture prong of the aggravating circumstance at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. [1] Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (i)(5) (Supp. 1996). [2] Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (c). [3] See State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 744 (Tenn. 1994) (Reid, C.J., dissenting). [4] Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206 (c)(1)(D) (Supp. 1996). [5] The Washington, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina statutes, like the Tennessee statute, require a review of whether the sentence is "excessive" or "disproportionate" considering both the circumstances of "the crime" and the character of