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9 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Farber v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Johnson v. State, 608 So.2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Farber v. State, 409 So.2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). 2000The present case is similar to Farber v. State, 409 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), in which Judge Pearson wrote: In our view, "the pronouncement by the court of the penalty imposed upon the defendant," that is, the sentence, see Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.700, does not occur until the pronouncement is final. | 1 | 2 |
Amanda Lee Hobgood v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2023See Hobgood, 166 So. 3d at 847 . | 1 | 1 |
Burkhart v. Stategreen1 sentence2018"Because probation is considered a sentence in Florida, an enhancement or extension of the conditions of probation after the conclusion of the sentencing hearing generally constitutes a violation of the double jeopardy prohibitions of the United States and Florida constitutions." Burkhart v. State, 974 So. 2d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Lippman v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Lippman v. State, 633 So.2d 1061, 1064 (Fla.1994); Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Justice v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Lippman v. State, 633 So.2d 1061, 1064 (Fla.1994); Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Johnson v. State, 608 So.2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Farber v. State, 409 So.2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Stategreen1 sentence1992This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.] Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1 , 107 S.Ct. at 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 1 ; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) ("plea agreement in exchange for which the government dismissed eight counts" waives double jeopardy objection to consecutive sentences for crimes which "arose out the same transaction and constitu | 1 | 1 |
Leo F. Dermota v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1992This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.] Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1 , 107 S.Ct. at 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 1 ; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) ("plea agreement in exchange for which the government dismissed eight counts" waives double jeopardy objection to consecutive sentences for crimes which "arose out the same transaction and constitu | 1 | 1 |
Prestridge v. Stategreen1 sentence1992This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.] Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1 , 107 S.Ct. at 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 1 ; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) ("plea agreement in exchange for which the government dismissed eight counts" waives double jeopardy objection to consecutive sentences for crimes which "arose out the same transaction and constitu | 1 | 1 |
Ricketts v. Adamsongreen2 sentences1992This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.] Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1 , 107 S.Ct. at 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 1 ; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) ("plea agreement in exchange for which the government dismissed eight counts" waives double jeopardy objection to consecutive sentences for crimes which "arose out the same transaction and constitu 1992This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.] Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1 , 107 S.Ct. at 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 1 ; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) ("plea agreement in exchange for which the government dismissed eight counts" waives double jeopardy objection to consecutive sentences for crimes which "arose out the same transaction and constitu | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nelson v. State
green
2 sentences2011Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), established that if a defendant moves to discharge his court-appointed counsel before trial on the basis that the lawyer is incompetent, the court “should make a sufficient inquiry” of the defendant and counsel to determine if there is “reasonable cause to believe that the court-appointed counsel is not rendering effec tive assistance to the defendant.” Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d at 258 . 2011Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), established that if a defendant moves to discharge his court-appointed counsel before trial on the basis that the lawyer is incompetent, the court “should make a sufficient inquiry” of the defendant and counsel to determine if there is “reasonable cause to believe that the court-appointed counsel is not rendering effec tive assistance to the defendant.” Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d at 258 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Shepard v. State
green
1 sentence2007Id. at 548 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2002The court alone shall make all factual determinations required by this section or the constitution of the United States or this state." At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the judge is to determine the presence or absence of the enumerated "aggravating circumstances" and any "mitigating circumstances." The state's law authorizes the judge to sentence the defendant to death only if there is at *712 least one aggravating circumstance and "there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , ___ _ ___, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2434- 2002The court alone shall make all factual determinations required by this section or the constitution of the United States or this state." At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the judge is to determine the presence or absence of the enumerated "aggravating circumstances" and any "mitigating circumstances." The state's law authorizes the judge to sentence the defendant to death only if there is at *712 least one aggravating circumstance and "there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , ___ _ ___, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2434- | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Causey v. State
green
1 sentence2000Appellant relies on Causey v. State, 623 So.2d 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); however, in that case the defendant's sentence was increased three days after the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. Broce
green
2 sentences1992This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.] Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1 , 107 S.Ct. at 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 1 ; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) ("plea agreement in exchange for which the government dismissed eight counts" waives double jeopardy objection to consecutive sentences for crimes which "arose out the same transaction and constitu 1992This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.] Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1 , 107 S.Ct. at 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 1 ; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) ("plea agreement in exchange for which the government dismissed eight counts" waives double jeopardy objection to consecutive sentences for crimes which "arose out the same transaction and constitu | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Ruan-Esparza v. United States
green
1 sentence1992This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.] Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1 , 107 S.Ct. at 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 1 ; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) ("plea agreement in exchange for which the government dismissed eight counts" waives double jeopardy objection to consecutive sentences for crimes which "arose out the same transaction and constitu | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Olivier v. United States
green
1 sentence1992This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.] Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1 , 107 S.Ct. at 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 1 ; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) ("plea agreement in exchange for which the government dismissed eight counts" waives double jeopardy objection to consecutive sentences for crimes which "arose out the same transaction and constitu | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Haynes v. Kay
green
1 sentence1992This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.] Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1 , 107 S.Ct. at 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 1 ; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) ("plea agreement in exchange for which the government dismissed eight counts" waives double jeopardy objection to consecutive sentences for crimes which "arose out the same transaction and constitu | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.