parental benefit exception in California

2026(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) Only in “exceptional circumstances” may the court “choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 .) The parental-benefit exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) is meant to recognize parent-child relationships that “promote[ ] the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 .) The exception “must 16 be examined on a cas

2026(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) Only in “exceptional circumstances” may the court “choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 .) The parental-benefit exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) is meant to recognize parent-child relationships that “promote[ ] the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 .) The exception “must 16 be examined on a cas

2026A. Legal Framework If a juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence at the section 366.26 hearing that a child is likely to be adopted, “the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption” unless, as relevant here, it “finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more” enumerated exceptions. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B); see also Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 630-631.) “The statutory exceptions merely 10 permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option o

2026(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) Only in “exceptional circumstances” may the court “choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 .) The parental-benefit exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) is meant to recognize parent-child relationships that “promote[ ] the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 .) The exception “must 16 be examined on a cas

2025When we conclude that the parental-benefit exception does not apply, we often characterize the evidence as showing the biological parents filled the role of “‘friendly visitor’” or friendly aunt, or that they enjoyed merely “‘pleasant visits.’” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303 , 319; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529 ; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 ; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 .) There is no way to characterize the evidence that way in this case.

2023(In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503 , 530–531.) We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the existence of the parental-benefit exception, for substantial evidence.

2021(In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343 .) “[I]t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 .) The exception at issue here, commonly called the parental benefit exception, “applies when there is a compelling reason that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.

2021At the permanency stage, we must balance the bond the child shares with the parent and the harm that might arise from terminating parental rights against the benefits of a permanent stable home, and “it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350 .) The parental benefit exception will apply only where the parent has demonstrated the benefits to the child of continuing the 18 parental relationship outweigh the benefits of permanence through ad

2022The section 366.26 10 report shows the child would tolerate her parents during their monitored visits and would play with them, but she was at times uninterested and any attachment they had by this point was not “significant.” (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [listing factors for the second prong of the parental-benefit exception]; see also In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1316 [no beneficial parental relationship where mother’s supervised interactions with child, although frequent and loving, “amounted to little more than playdates for him with a loving adult” and there

2022However, “we are aware of no requirement— and [mother] cites no authority supporting the proposition—that the juvenile court, in finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding any or all of the three elements of the exception.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131 , 1156 [“[A]lthough a statement by the trial court of its findings (or reasons) for its decision is helpful in conducting appellate review, it [is] not a legal requirement in this instance.”].) Regardless, “[e]ven if the mother had established the existence o

2025(See In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131 , 1156 [“we are aware of no requirement . . . that the juvenile court, in finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding any or all of the three elements of the exception”]; see, e.g., In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1109 .) After making its ruling, the court specifically stated: “During the morning, the Court has had many discussions, some more relevant than others.

2024To the contrary, we infer 11 from section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)—under which the juvenile court is required to ‘state its reasons in writing or on the record’ when it makes a finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child—that the court is not required to make findings when it concludes that parental rights termination would not be detrimental.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131 , 1156; see also In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1109 [appellate record supported implied finding by juvenile court that parents had failed to establish the parent

2026(Id. at pp. 575–576.) To satisfy the exception, “a parent must prove all three components of the beneficial relationship exception,” and a “failure of proof on any one of them is fatal.” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303 , 322, fn. 10.) The parental-benefit exception requires a parent to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) “the parent has regularly visited with the child,” taking into account the extent of visitation permitted; (2) “the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefi

2025(Id. at pp. 575–576.) To satisfy the exception, “a parent must prove all three components of the beneficial relationship exception,” and a “failure of proof on any one of them is fatal.” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303 , 322, fn. 10.) The parental-benefit exception requires a parent to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) “the parent has regularly visited with the child,” taking into account the extent of visitation permitted; (2) “the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefi

2025(See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi), (4)(A).) As we have previously explained, ‘[t]he statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630-631.) “ ‘[I]t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.’ “ (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621 .) The relevant exception to adoption here is the parental benefit exception.

2022(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 622 .) Here, the juvenile court ruled: “It is in the minors’ best interest to have parental rights terminated, and termination of parental rights is not detrimental to the minors. [¶] None of the exceptions pursuant to . . . section 366.26[, subdivision] (c)(1) exist[].” As such, it appears the court found mother’s evidence of two of the required elements to establish the parental benefit exception was lacking.

2025(See In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 [affirming the juvenile court’s conclusion that the parental-benefit exception did not apply where “there was no hint in the record before the juvenile court that Angel would be harmed in any way if her relatively brief, albeit happy, visits with Mother were to end”].) In all events, F.P.’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it rejected the requests for a bonding study.

2025When we conclude that the parental-benefit exception does not apply, we often characterize the evidence as showing the biological parents filled the role of “‘friendly visitor’” or friendly aunt, or that they enjoyed merely “‘pleasant visits.’” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303 , 319; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529 ; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 ; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 .) There is no way to characterize the evidence that way in this case.

2025(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) Because the parent bears the burden of establishing that the parental-benefit exception applies, the juvenile court’s findings that visitation has not been regular or that the relationship is not beneficial may be reversed only if the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard and the evidence would support a finding for the parent (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833 , 865; In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526 , 533), or the evidence compels a finding in favor of the parent on these issues as a matter of law (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th

2022“The exception requires the parent to prove both that he or she has maintained regular visitation and that his or her relationship with the child ‘“‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.’”’ [Citations.]” (In re Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 646 .) 6 Our Supreme Court has recently decided a case, Caden C., 11 Cal.5th 614 , that deals in some detail with the parental benefit exception.

2022Mother further argues the juvenile court improperly relied on the promise of the prospective adoptive parents to allow contact and “attempted to induce [mother] to accept the adoption of her daughter . . . [based] on expectations that she would be allowed to continue to be a second mother to [S.R.].” She relies on In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 , which found the juvenile court erred when it found the parental benefit exception did not apply.

2022In evaluating this element, the court “decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634.) “When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Ibid.) “In many cases, ‘the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship’ will substantially determine how detriment

2023First, Chastity plucks the word “overall” from In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549 , where the court held that, while the mother’s visitation became “more consistent . . . as the section 366.26 hearing neared,” “overall her visitation was sporadic.” (Id. at p. 554, italics added.) The court in C.F. continued: “Sporadic visitation is insufficient to satisfy the first prong of the parent- child relationship exception to adoption.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the parent in C.F. took advantage of more than half of her permitted visits, a stronger visitation record than Chastity’s, but still failed to sati

2022(See In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 557 [observing that there had been “no bonding study or other evidence” supporting the mother’s parental-benefit exception claim].) Her own testimony provided little information about 34 her current relationship with the minor.

2022We therefore address these elements together here. 10 10 The Supreme Court In Caden C. explained that the exception involved a three- element analysis in which “[t]he parent must show [1] regular visitation and contact with the child . . . [2] the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent— the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship . . . [and 3] that terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5

2022We therefore address these elements together here. 10 10 The Supreme Court In Caden C. explained that the exception involved a three- element analysis in which “[t]he parent must show [1] regular visitation and contact with the child . . . [2] the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent— the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship . . . [and 3] that terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5

2022(See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53 [“trial court was entitled to find the social worker credible and to give greater weight to her assessments and testimony”], disapproved on another ground in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636, fn. 5; see also In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411 , 1420- 1421.) Father also notes—addressing his substance abuse history and his compliance with his plan requirements during the time he received reunification services—that under Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pages 637 to 638, “a parent’s continued struggles with issues leading to dependenc

2021When the parent has met that burden, the parental-benefit exception applies such that it would not be in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption. 5 We now disapprove opinions to the extent they have held to the contrary: In re Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pages 109–115; In re Logan B., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pages 1010– 1013; In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at page 1349 ; and In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at page 51 .

2025(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) Because the parent bears the burden of establishing that the parental-benefit exception applies, the juvenile court’s findings that visitation has not been regular or that the relationship is not beneficial may be reversed only if the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard and the evidence would support a finding for the parent (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833 , 865; In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526 , 533), or the evidence compels a finding in favor of the parent on these issues as a matter of law (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th

2024(In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) Because father does not show the juvenile court erred in assessing the second prong of the parental benefit exception, we do not need to analyze the third prong: whether it would be harmful to J.G. to sever the parental relationship with father in favor of adoption.

2024(See In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221 [“[a] party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court”].) Father did not object to the setting of the section 366.26 hearing, and he did not seek to stay or continue the hearing on the grounds that any of his rights had been violated, 13 including his First Amendment and due process rights.

2021(In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229 .) “‘A biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent. [Citation.] A child who has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court should not be deprived of an adoptive parent 8 when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree, but that does not meet the child’s need for a parent.’” (In re Jason J., supra, at p. 937.) In

2025(See In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292 .) Even if mother had not forfeited her argument on appeal, we would reject it on the merits. “[W]e are aware of no requirement . . . that the juvenile court, in finding the parental- benefit exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding any or all of the three elements of the exception.

2024(In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292 [no sua sponte duty to consider sibling relationship exception to adoption, so parent’s failure to raise it in the juvenile court precludes her from raising it on appeal from termination of her parental rights]; In re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282 , 1292–1293 [forfeiture applies in dependency proceedings].) Father did not appear at the section 366.26 hearing, his attorney presented no evidence on his behalf, and his attorney did not raise the parental-benefit exception specifically.

2025(See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 640–641 [a juvenile court’s determination regarding the parental-benefit exception is reviewed under a hybrid standard of review].) Mother argues In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452 (Scott B.), compels a different result.

2020(In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 469 .) The parental benefit exception applies when the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); see In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466 .) To show that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship with the parent, the parent “must do more than demonstrate . . . an emotional bond with the child”; the parent “must show that he or she occupies a ‘parental role’ in the child’s life.” (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal

2025(In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411 , 1418–1419.) One of these is the parental benefit exception.

2024(In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411 , 1418–1419.) 17 One of these is the parental benefit exception.

2025The burden falls to the parent to show that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions.” (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534 [cleaned up].) One of the exceptions to the preference for adoption is the parental- benefit exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) For this exception to apply, the parent must show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) regular visitation and contact with the child; (2) the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent; and (3) terminating that attachment would be detriment

2025(In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534 .) “Adoption is the preferred plan and, absent an enumerated exception, the juvenile court is required to select adoption as the permanent plan. [Citation.] The burden falls to the parent to show that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions.” (Ibid.; § 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi).) One of the exceptions to the preference for adoption is the parental- benefit exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) For this exception to apply, the parent must show by a preponderance of

2024(In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 .) 6 “‘“At a permanency plan hearing, the [juvenile] court may order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long- term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.” [Citation.]’” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303 , 316, quoting In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218 , 1224.) If the juvenile court finds the child adoptable, it must terminate parental rights unless one of several statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(

2021But where, as with the parental-benefit exception, “the appellate court will be evaluating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion, there likely will be no practical difference in application of the two standards.” (Eisenberg & Hepler, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 8:88; see also Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 [“The practical differences between the two standards of review are not significant”].) At its core, the hybrid standard we now endorse simply embodies the principle that “[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a reviewing

2026I love being here.’” The feeling was mutual as Ms. B. stated, “‘I would not want her to go to another home, I can provide stability for her.’” 11 Considering the evidence, there is no indication that the detriment (if any) A.A. would suffer from terminating parental rights “‘outweigh[s] the sense of security and belonging an adoptive home would provide.’” (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 938 .) Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that mother failed to carry her burden of establishing the parental benefit exception to adoption.

2021The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child’s life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942 , 953-954, quoting Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 .) The second requirement for the parental benefit exception to apply requires that Father prove that the children would benefit from continuing the relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) “The existence of this relatio

2025“Section 388 plays a critical role in the dependency scheme” by “serv[ing] as an ‘escape mechanism’ to ensure that new evidence may be considered before the actual, final termination of parental rights.” (In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1506 (Hunter S.) The juvenile court, by combining the hearing on the section 388 petition with the second 366.26 hearing, and then continuing that combined hearing so that it was not completed until January 31, 2025, denied Mother and Father that escape mechanism and virtually doomed any chance they had of proving the parental benefit exception.

2025Had the visitation order been enforced, and there had been no such lapse in time, it is not only more likely the juvenile court’s own finding of detriment would have been different, it is also more likely the 27 juvenile court likely would have found Borelli’s testimony on the third element of the parental benefit exception to be persuasive.5 F. The Hunter S. Case Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 1497 is analogous.

2023(See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632–633; In re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1230–1231 [reversing for misapplication of Caden C.]; see also In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159 [a “disposition that rests on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion”].) Because the juvenile court did not have the guidance of Caden C. when it rendered its decision (maj. opn. ante, at p. 21 & fn. 5), it should be afforded another opportunity to exercise its discretion in light of that decision.

2022(In re Charlisse C., supra, (2008) 45 Cal.4th at p. 159 ; In re D.M., at p. 271.) On remand, whether the parents can fulfill parental roles is not a factor for the juvenile court to consider. 18 DISPOSITION The order terminating parental rights is reversed.

2023But a parent who seeks to invoke the parental-benefit exception “must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond with the child, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.] Instead, the parent must show that he or she occupies a ‘parental role’ in the child’s life.” (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 .) While there was evidence of mother’s generally positive interactions with R.R., the juvenile court noted there was some concern raised by the agency regarding how much time and how much interaction mother had with R.R.

2021In applying the parental-benefit exception, courts have traditionally required the parent to show that the parent occupies a “ ‘parental role’ in the child’s life.” (E.g., In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 .) This required showing is based on Autumn H., where the court observed, “[t]he exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.” (Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 , italics added; e.g., In re Derek W., at p. 827; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th

2023(In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, 105 [“Of necessity, however, the relationship at issue must be parental. ‘No matter how loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the existence of an “emotional bond” with the child, “the parents must show that they occupy ‘a parental role’ in the child’s life” ’ ”], revd. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 ; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528 [same].) Indeed, several appellate decisions went on to say that such a role “ ‘characteristically aris[es] from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences[,]’ ” although “day-to-day con

2023(In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, 105 [“Of necessity, however, the relationship at issue must be parental. ‘No matter how loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the existence of an “emotional bond” with the child, “the parents must show that they occupy ‘a parental role’ in the child’s life” ’ ”], revd. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 ; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528 [same].) Indeed, several appellate decisions went on to say that such a role “ ‘characteristically aris[es] from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences[,]’ ” although “day-to-day con