discriminatory practice violation in Connecticut

2026Section 46a-60 (b) provides in relevant part: “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (1) [f]or an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s . . . present or past . . . physical disability . . . .” “[W]e review federal precedent concerning employment discriminatio

2026Section 46a-60 (b) provides in relevant part: “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (1) [f]or an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s . . . present or past . . . physical disability . . . .” “[W]e review federal precedent concerning employment discriminatio

2024We now turn to the language of § 46a-60 (b), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualifica- tion or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color, religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, nat

2024We now turn to the language of § 46a-60 (b), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualifica- tion or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color, religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, nat

2022The alleged inaccuracies go to the weight of the forms, and we decline the defendant’s attempt to relitigate the case by asking this court to assess the weight of the documentary evidence at issue, which task is within the sole province of the trial court. ‘‘The weight given the evidence before it is within the sole province of the trial court.’’ Dubicki v. Dubicki, 186 Conn. 709, 713 , 443 A.2d 1268 (1982). 3 The defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s ultimate conclusion that she engaged in a discriminatory practice in violation of § 46a-64c (a) (1) b

2022The alleged inaccuracies go to the weight of the forms, and we decline the defendant’s attempt to relitigate the case by asking this court to assess the weight of the documentary evidence at issue, which task is within the sole province of the trial court. ‘‘The weight given the evidence before it is within the sole province of the trial court.’’ Dubicki v. Dubicki, 186 Conn. 709, 713 , 443 A.2d 1268 (1982). 3 The defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s ultimate conclusion that she engaged in a discriminatory practice in violation of § 46a-64c (a) (1) b

2018Conn. 2008), aff'd, 391 Fed.

2018Section 46a-60 (a) provides in relevant part that "[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section ... (5) [f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any act declared to be a discriminatory employment practice or to attempt to do so ...." The court noted that in Connecticut, "an individual employee may be held liable for aiding and abetting his employer's discrimination; an employer [however] cannot be liable for aiding and abetting its own discriminatory conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Far

2017"To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show four elements: (1) that [s]he participated in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of *95 the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action against [her]; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Ayantola v. Board of Trustees of Technical Colleges , 116 Conn.App. 531 , 536, 976 A.2d 784 (2009).

2017"To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show four elements: (1) that [s]he participated in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of *95 the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action against [her]; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Ayantola v. Board of Trustees of Technical Colleges , 116 Conn.App. 531 , 536, 976 A.2d 784 (2009).

2015In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 At all relevant times, Kevin Trudelle was the business manager of the Norwich/Niantic center of United Parcel Service, Inc. We refer to United Parcel Service, Inc., individually, as the defendant, to Trudelle by name and to both parties collectively as the defendants. 2 General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or emp

2015In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 At all relevant times, Kevin Trudelle was the business manager of the Norwich/Niantic center of United Parcel Service, Inc. We refer to United Parcel Service, Inc., individually, as the defendant, to Trudelle by name and to both parties collectively as the defendants. 2 General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or emp

2013As a result, [i]t is incumbent on a plaintiff to allege some recognizable cause of action in h[er] complaint. . . . [I]f the complaint puts the defendant on notice of the relevant claims, then a plaintiffs failure specifically to allege a particular fact or issue is not fatal to h[er] claim unless it results in prejudice to the defendant.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 130-31 , 2 A.3d 859 (2010).

2013As a result, [i]t is incumbent on a plaintiff to allege some recognizable cause of action in h[er] complaint. . . . [I]f the complaint puts the defendant on notice of the relevant claims, then a plaintiffs failure specifically to allege a particular fact or issue is not fatal to h[er] claim unless it results in prejudice to the defendant.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 130-31 , 2 A.3d 859 (2010).

2009See Practice Book § 10-30; Füippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8 , 866 A.2d 599 (2005).

2009See Practice Book § 10-30; Füippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8 , 866 A.2d 599 (2005).

2008Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 252 , 828 A.2d 64 (2003).

2008Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 252 , 828 A.2d 64 (2003).

2007That breach of contract action is not at issue in this appeal. [2] The court did not address the defendant's alternate grounds for summary judgment. [3] Entitled "Discriminatory employment practices prohibited," General Statutes ž 46a-60 provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to . . . discharge from employment any individual . . . because of the individual's . . . age. . . ." [4] In the event that this c

2007That breach of contract action is not at issue in this appeal. [2] The court did not address the defendant's alternate grounds for summary judgment. [3] Entitled "Discriminatory employment practices prohibited," General Statutes ž 46a-60 provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to . . . discharge from employment any individual . . . because of the individual's . . . age. . . ." [4] In the event that this c

2006DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 78 Conn. App. 865, 880 , 829 A.2d 38 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931 , 837 A.2d 805 (2003).

2006DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 78 Conn. App. 865, 880 , 829 A.2d 38 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931 , 837 A.2d 805 (2003).

2006DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 78 Conn. App. 865, 880 , 829 A.2d 38 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931 , 837 A.2d 805 (2003).

2006DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 78 Conn. App. 865, 880 , 829 A.2d 38 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931 , 837 A.2d 805 (2003).

2002“To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition of the term.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, 250 Conn. 188 , 200 n.12, 736 A.2d 790 (1999).

2002“To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition of the term.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, 250 Conn. 188 , 200 n.12, 736 A.2d 790 (1999).

2002DISCUSSION General Statutes § 46a-64c provides, in parts pertinent to this case, that: "(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, lawful source of income or familial status . . . (b) . . . (5) The provisions of this section with respect to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of lawful sou

2001Both federal and state case law have interpreted the above cited federal and state legislation to preclude the creation and maintenance of a hostile work environment, which is created when "the workplace [is] . . . permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148 , 166-67 , 717 A.2d 1254 (1998); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 ,

2001Both federal and state case law have interpreted the above cited federal and state legislation to preclude the creation and maintenance of a hostile work environment, which is created when "the workplace [is] . . . permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148 , 166-67 , 717 A.2d 1254 (1998); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 ,

2001Both federal and state case law have interpreted the above cited federal and state legislation to preclude the creation and maintenance of a hostile work environment, which is created when "the workplace [is] . . . permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148 , 166-67 , 717 A.2d 1254 (1998); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 ,