deviation from the accepted standard in New York

2024If the defendant satisfies this standard, the \ . . burden then shifts to the plaintiff to "present· expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of [the] injury" (id. at 1080 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "[E]xpert opinions that are conclusory, speculative, or unsupported by the record are insufficient to raise triable issues of fact" (Longhi v Lewit, 187 AD3d 873, 878 [2d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Schwenzfeier, 213 AD3d at 108,0-1083 ).

2024If the defendant satisfies this standard, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to "present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of [the] injury" (id. at 1080 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "[E]xpert opinions that are conclusory, speculative, or unsupported by the record are insufficient to raise triable issues of fact" (Longhi v Lewit, 187 AD3d 873, 878 [2d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Schwenzfeier, 213 AD3d at 1080-1083 ).

2012Once a defendant has met that requirement, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, through competent expert medical opinion evidence, that there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and whether there exists a causal nexus between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injuries (see Adams v Anderson, 84 AD3d 1522, 1524 [2011]; Plourd v Sidoti, 69 AD3d 1038, 1039 [2010]; Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]).

2012Once a defendant has met that requirement, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, through competent expert medical opinion evidence, that there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and whether there exists a causal nexus between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injuries (see Adams v Anderson, 84 AD3d 1522, 1524 [2011]; Plourd v Sidoti, 69 AD3d 1038, 1039 [2010]; Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]).

2024There is no dispute that the foregoing satisfied defendants' initial burden and "shifted [the burden] to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of [her] injury" ( Fischella v Saint Luke's Cornwall Hosp. , 204 AD3d 1343, 1344 [3d Dept 2022]; see Schwenzfeier v St.

2023As the hospitalist defendants met their prima facie burden, "the burden shifted to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of [decedent's] injury" ( Fischella v Saint Luke's Cornwall Hosp. , 204 AD3d 1343, 1344 [3d Dept 2022]; see Busch v Sherman , 209 AD3d 1230, 1232 [3d Dept 2022]).

2017Thus, “the burden shifted to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care” (Carter v Tana, 68 AD3d 1577, 1579 [2009]; see Fuller v Aberdale, 130 AD3d at 1283 ; Longtemps v Oliva, 110 AD3d at 1318 ).

2014Accordingly, the burden shifted to plaintiff “to establish, through competent expert medical opinion evidence, that there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and whether there exists a causal nexus between that deviation and [decedent’s] injuries” (Helfer v Chapin, 96 AD3d 1270 , 1272 [2012]; see Longtemps v Oliva, 110 AD3d 1316, 1318 [2013]; Derusha v Sellig, 92 AD3d at 1194 ).

2012Once a defendant has met that requirement, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, through competent expert medical opinion evidence, that there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and whether there exists a causal nexus between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injuries (see Adams v Anderson, 84 AD3d 1522, 1524 [2011]; Plourd v Sidoti, 69 AD3d 1038, 1039 [2010]; Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]).

2012Once a defendant has met that requirement, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, through competent expert medical opinion evidence, that there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and whether there exists a causal nexus between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injuries (see Adams v Anderson, 84 AD3d 1522, 1524 [2011]; Plourd v Sidoti, 69 AD3d 1038, 1039 [2010]; Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]).

2010The burden accordingly shifted to plaintiff to show, by competent medical proof, that a deviation from the accepted standard of care occurred and that a causal nexus existed between that deviation and her injuries (see Daugharty v Marshall, 60 AD3d 1219, 1221 [2009]; Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]; Snyder v Simon, 49 AD3d 954, 956 [2008]).

2010Defendant’s submissions were sufficient to show that it was not negligent in the manner in which it treated plaintiff, shifting the burden to plaintiff to show “ ‘through competent expert medical opinion evidence, both a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that the departure was a proximate cause of [plaintiff’s injuries]’ ” (Daugharty v Marshall, 60 AD3d 1219, 1221 [2009], quoting Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]; see Hoffman v Pelletier, 6 AD3d 889, 890 [2004]; Gage v Dutkewych, 3 AD3d 629, 630 [2004]).

2013Accordingly, the burden shifted to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence establishing a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that such departure was a proximate cause of Longtemps’ injuries (see Martino v Miller, 97 AD3d 1009, 1010 [2012]; Derusha v Sellig, 92 AD3d at 1194 ).

2013Accordingly, the burden shifted to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence establishing a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that such departure was a proximate cause of Longtemps’ injuries (see Martino v Miller, 97 AD3d 1009, 1010 [2012]; Derusha v Sellig, 92 AD3d at 1194 ).

2025In order not to be considered speculative or conclusory, expert opinions in opposition [to a physician's motion for summary judgment] should address specific assertions made by the [physician]'s experts, setting forth an explanation of the reasoning and relying on specifically cited evidence in the record." (Emphasis added; internal quotations and citations omitted) (See also, In Fuller v Aberdale , 130 AD3d 1277, 1280 [3d Dept. 2015], the court held "Turning to plaintiff's medical malpractice claims, the burden in a medical malpractice action is to establish both a deviation from accepted pra

2017Thus, “the burden shifted to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care” (Carter v Tana, 68 AD3d 1577, 1579 [2009]; see Fuller v Aberdale, 130 AD3d at 1283 ; Longtemps v Oliva, 110 AD3d at 1318 ).

2024If the defendant satisfies this standard, the \ . . burden then shifts to the plaintiff to "present· expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of [the] injury" (id. at 1080 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "[E]xpert opinions that are conclusory, speculative, or unsupported by the record are insufficient to raise triable issues of fact" (Longhi v Lewit, 187 AD3d 873, 878 [2d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Schwenzfeier, 213 AD3d at 108,0-1083 ).

2024If the defendant satisfies this standard, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to "present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of [the] injury" (id. at 1080 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "[E]xpert opinions that are conclusory, speculative, or unsupported by the record are insufficient to raise triable issues of fact" (Longhi v Lewit, 187 AD3d 873, 878 [2d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Schwenzfeier, 213 AD3d at 1080-1083 ).

2022Ctr., Inc. , 190 AD3d 1212 , 1214 [2021[*2]]; Young v Sethi , 188 AD3d 1339, 1341 [2020], lv denied 37 NY3d 902 [2021]; Furman v Desimone , 180 AD3d 1310, 1311 [2020]).

2022The foregoing satisfied defendants' initial burden on a motion for summary judgment and shifted the burden "to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of his injury" ( Fischella v Saint Luke's Cornwall Hosp. , 204 AD3d 1343, 1344 [3d Dept 2022]; see Marshall v Rosenberg , 196 AD3d at 818 ; Furman v DeSimone , 180 AD3d 1310, 1311 [3d Dept 2020]).

2021Therefore, the burden shifted to plaintiff to raise an issue of fact by submitting an expert's affidavit establishing such a deviation ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp ., 68 NY2d 320, 324-325 [1986]; Bubar , 177 AD3d at 1359).

2009The burden then shifted to plaintiff to show, “through competent expert medical opinion evidence, both a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that the departure was a proximate cause of decedent’s death” (Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]; see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]).

2012Once a defendant has met that requirement, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, through competent expert medical opinion evidence, that there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and whether there exists a causal nexus between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injuries (see Adams v Anderson, 84 AD3d 1522, 1524 [2011]; Plourd v Sidoti, 69 AD3d 1038, 1039 [2010]; Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]).

2012Once a defendant has met that requirement, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, through competent expert medical opinion evidence, that there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and whether there exists a causal nexus between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injuries (see Adams v Anderson, 84 AD3d 1522, 1524 [2011]; Plourd v Sidoti, 69 AD3d 1038, 1039 [2010]; Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]).

2009In our view, plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact regarding Marshall’s alleged deviation from accepted standards of medical care and provided a sufficient link between the deviation and the harm to decedent (see Flower v Noonan, 271 AD2d 825, 826 [2000]).

2008As Syed had testified that the decision to defer a surgical consultation until morning was made jointly with Gorla, the expert affirmation, which was based upon a review of decedent’s medical records, medical history and the discovery materials exchanged, adequately set forth the elements of the medical malpractice claim by factual references to the care and treatment of decedent (see Dandrea v Hertz, 23 AD3d 332, 333 [2005]; Flower v Noonan, 271 AD2d at 826 ; Lowery v Hise, 202 AD2d 948, 949 [1994]).

2025Hosp. , 154 AD3d 1229, 1231 [3d Dept 2017]). "[T]he burden shifted to plaintiff[s] to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of [the] injur[ies]" ( Schwenzfeier v St.

2024Peter's Health Partners , 213 AD3d at 1080 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Mattison v OrthopedicsNY, LLP , 189 AD3d 2025, 2027 [3d Dept 2020]; Butler v Cayuga Med.

2024Specifically. he opines that if the decedent' s cancer "was diagnosed when it should have been, in 2015, there were treatments available that very likely would have cured [the decedent' s] cancer.·· He further opines that at that time the ··cancer was in its early stages, confined to the bladder and possibly the prostatic urethra, and could have been treated with BCG intravesical immunotherapy" and that, if unsuccessful, the treatment could have included surgery. 2 [* 2] ·' present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this depar

2023"In order not to be considered speculative or conclusory, expert opinions in opposition [to a physician's motion for summary judgment] should address specific assertions made by the [physician]'s experts, setting forth an explanation of the reasoning and relying on specifically cited evidence in the record" ( Tsitrin v New York Community Hosp. , 154 AD3d 994, 996 [2d Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2023In our view, the foregoing was sufficient to satisfy the Bryant defendants' prima facie burden and, "[a]ccordingly, the burden shifted to plaintiff[s] to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of [Bardaglio's] injury" ( Fischella v Saint Luke's Cornwall Hosp. , 204 AD3d 1343, 1344 [3d Dept 2022]; see Grzelecki v Sipperly , 2 AD3d 939, 941 [3d Dept 2003]).

2023As the hospitalist defendants met their prima facie burden, "the burden shifted to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of [decedent's] injury" ( Fischella v Saint Luke's Cornwall Hosp. , 204 AD3d 1343, 1344 [3d Dept 2022]; see Busch v Sherman , 209 AD3d 1230, 1232 [3d Dept 2022]).

2022Ctr., Inc. , 190 AD3d 1212 , 1214 [2021[*2]]; Young v Sethi , 188 AD3d 1339, 1341 [2020], lv denied 37 NY3d 902 [2021]; Furman v Desimone , 180 AD3d 1310, 1311 [2020]).

2022The foregoing satisfied defendants' initial burden on a motion for summary judgment and shifted the burden "to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that this departure was a proximate cause of his injury" ( Fischella v Saint Luke's Cornwall Hosp. , 204 AD3d 1343, 1344 [3d Dept 2022]; see Marshall v Rosenberg , 196 AD3d at 818 ; Furman v DeSimone , 180 AD3d 1310, 1311 [3d Dept 2020]).

2017Thus, “the burden shifted to plaintiff to present expert medical opinion evidence that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care” (Carter v Tana, 68 AD3d 1577, 1579 [2009]; see Fuller v Aberdale, 130 AD3d at 1283 ; Longtemps v Oliva, 110 AD3d at 1318 ).

2011Expert testimony is necessary to prove a deviation from the accepted standard of medical care and to establish proximate cause where, as here, the matter is not within the experience of the ordinary juror (see Lyons v McCauley, 252 AD2d 516, 517 [1998]).

2010Defendant’s submissions were sufficient to show that it was not negligent in the manner in which it treated plaintiff, shifting the burden to plaintiff to show “ ‘through competent expert medical opinion evidence, both a deviation from the accepted standard of care and that the departure was a proximate cause of [plaintiff’s injuries]’ ” (Daugharty v Marshall, 60 AD3d 1219, 1221 [2009], quoting Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]; see Hoffman v Pelletier, 6 AD3d 889, 890 [2004]; Gage v Dutkewych, 3 AD3d 629, 630 [2004]).