time-barred claim in New York

2017Pursuant to CPLR 203 (d), a time-barred claim may be used to set off another claim only to the extent that the two claims arise from the same incident or transaction (see Matter of SCM Corp. [Fisher Park Lane Co.], 40 NY2d 788, 789 [1976]; Killian v Captain Spicer’s Gallery, LLC, 140 AD3d 1764 , 1765 [2016]).

2016Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that a setoff could be raised despite that waiver, we note that it is well settled that a time-barred claim may be used to set off another claim only to the extent that the two claims arise from the same incident or transaction {see Matter of SCM Corp. [Fisher Park Lane Co.], 40 NY2d 788, 791-792 [1976]; Robson & Miller, LLP v Sakow, 121 AD3d 562, 563 [2014]; Matter of Watson, 8 AD3d 1092 , 1093-1094 [2004]), which is not the case here.

2026Corp. v Prospect Park Yeshiva, Inc. , 124 AD3d 732, 733 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Yadegar v Deutsche Bank Natl.

2020Corp. v Prospect Park Yeshiva, Inc. , 124 AD3d 732, 733 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Nelux Holdings Intl., N.V. v Dweck , 160 AD3d 520 , 521).

2016Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that a setoff could be raised despite that waiver, we note that it is well settled that a time-barred claim may be used to set off another claim only to the extent that the two claims arise from the same incident or transaction {see Matter of SCM Corp. [Fisher Park Lane Co.], 40 NY2d 788, 791-792 [1976]; Robson & Miller, LLP v Sakow, 121 AD3d 562, 563 [2014]; Matter of Watson, 8 AD3d 1092 , 1093-1094 [2004]), which is not the case here.

2016Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that a setoff could be raised despite that waiver, we note that it is well settled that a time-barred claim may be used to set off another claim only to the extent that the two claims arise from the same incident or transaction {see Matter of SCM Corp. [Fisher Park Lane Co.], 40 NY2d 788, 791-792 [1976]; Robson & Miller, LLP v Sakow, 121 AD3d 562, 563 [2014]; Matter of Watson, 8 AD3d 1092 , 1093-1094 [2004]), which is not the case here.

2022"General Obligations Law § 17-101 effectively revives a time-barred claim when the debtor has signed a writing which validly acknowledges the debt" ( Lynford v Williams , 34 AD3d 761, 762 ).

2021General Obligations Law § 17-101 provides that "[a]n acknowledgment or promise contained in a writing signed by the party to be charged thereby is the only competent evidence of a new or continuing contract whereby to take an action out of the operation of the provisions of limitations of time for commencing actions under the [CPLR]." Section 17-101 "effectively revives a time-barred claim when the debtor has signed a writing which validly acknowledges the debt" ( Lynford v Williams , 34 AD3d 761, 762 ; see Commodore Factors Corp. v Deutsche Bank Natl.

2024Trust Co. , 189 AD3d 766, 768 (2nd Dept. 2020).

2021Trust Co. , 189 AD3d 766, 768 ; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Dorsin , 180 AD3d 1054, 1056 ; Yadegar v Deutsche Bank Natl.

2022"A writing, in order to constitute an acknowledgment of a debt, must recognize an existing debt and contain nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay it" ( Estate of Vengroski v Garden Inn , 114 AD2d 927, 928 ; see Commodore Factors Corp. v Deutsche Bank Natl.

2008Here, the 1998 Golden Valley tax return and the 1999 Golden Valley financial statement were insufficient, since it cannot be determined from the record whether they “constituted an acknowledgment of the debt sufficient to revive or toll the statute of limitations” (Cognetta v Valencia Devs., Inc., 8 AD3d 318, 320 [2004]; see Estate of Vengroski v Garden Inn, 114 AD2d 927, 928-929 [1985]).

2011Instead, the proposed cause of action predicated upon Public Health Law § 2801-d, seeking attorneys’ fees pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801-d (6) and punitive damages based on the alleged willful deprivation and reckless disregard of decedent’s rights, “constituted a new and separate time-barred claim against the defendants” (Young v A. Holly Patterson Geriatric Ctr., 17 AD3d 667, 667 [2005]; see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]).

2011Instead, the proposed cause of action predicated upon Public Health Law § 2801-d, seeking attorneys’ fees pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801-d (6) and punitive damages based on the alleged willful deprivation and reckless disregard of decedent’s rights, “constituted a new and separate time-barred claim against the defendants” (Young v A. Holly Patterson Geriatric Ctr., 17 AD3d 667, 667 ; see § 50-e [5]).

1993Nor can the claim be deemed to "relate back” (CPLR 203 [f]; see, Brock v Bua, 83 AD2d 61, 69 ) since the parties are not united in interest (see, Connell v Hayden, 83 AD2d 30, 40 ), the original pleading did not give notice of the claim, and no reásonable excuse for the delay in asserting the claim was offered.

1991A time-barred claim against a new party will relate back to the date upon which the plaintiffs claim was interposed against the original defendant (CPLR 203 [b]) where (1) both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence, (2) the new party is "united in interest” with the original defendant, and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for an excusable mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against it as well (Brock v Bua, 83 AD2d 61, 69 ).

2026Pursuant to CPLR 203(c) and (f), "the relation-back doctrine permits, under certain defined circumstances, the commencement of claims against a party that has not been timely sued, but which relate back to the original timely complaint" ( Bisono v Mist Enters., Inc. , 231 AD3d at 141; see Buran v Coupal , 87 NY2d 173, 177-178).

2026Pursuant to CPLR 203(c) and (f), "the relation-back doctrine permits, under certain defined circumstances, the commencement of claims against a party that has not been timely sued, but which relate back to the original timely complaint" ( Bisono v Mist Enters., Inc. , 231 AD3d at 141; see Buran v Coupal , 87 NY2d 173, 177-178).

2026Under the relation-back doctrine, "[a] claim asserted in an amended pleading is [*2] deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading" (CPLR 203[f]; see Moezinia v Ashkenazi , 136 AD3d 990, 992 ).

2025Here, when the amended complaint was filed, it superseded the original complaint [*2]and became the only complaint in the action ( see R & G Brenner Income Tax Consultants v Gilmartin , 166 AD3d 685, 688; Taub v Schon , 148 AD3d 1200, 1201).

2025Here, when the amended complaint was filed, it superseded the original complaint [*2]and became the only complaint in the action ( see R & G Brenner Income Tax Consultants v Gilmartin , 166 AD3d 685, 688; Taub v Schon , 148 AD3d 1200, 1201).

2022Co. v PolyVision Corp., 9 NY3d 52, 57 [2007]), we agree with the courts below that HSBC could not invoke CPLR 205 (a) to avoid dismissal of this time-barred claim, and we therefore affirm.

2020Corp. v Campagna, plaintiff contended that a newly enacted statute permitting a court to grant relief from an unconscionable lease or clause – which the Legislature deemed “applicable to all leases, regardless of when executed” – revived a time-barred claim to rescind a lease ( 48 NY2d 813, 814-815 [1979]).

2018Recognition here would not be "the approval of a transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense" ( Intercontinental Hotels Corp. [Puerto Rico] v Golden , 15 NY2d 9, 13 [1964]; see also Blacklink Transp.

2008Additionally, while General Obligations Law § 17-101 effectively revives a time-barred claim when the debtor has signed a writing validly acknowledging the debt (see Erdheim v Gelfman, 303 AD2d 714, 715 [2003]), “[w]hether a purported acknowledgment is sufficient to restart the running of a period of limitations depends on the circumstances of the individual case” (Cognetta v Valencia Devs., Inc., 8 AD3d 318, 319-320 [2004]; see Fade v Pugliani/Fade, 8 AD3d 612, 613 [2004]).

2008Here, the 1998 Golden Valley tax return and the 1999 Golden Valley financial statement were insufficient, since it cannot be determined from the record whether they “constituted an acknowledgment of the debt sufficient to revive or toll the statute of limitations” (Cognetta v Valencia Devs., Inc., 8 AD3d 318, 320 [2004]; see Estate of Vengroski v Garden Inn, 114 AD2d 927, 928-929 [1985]).

2008Additionally, while General Obligations Law § 17-101 effectively revives a time-barred claim when the debtor has signed a writing validly acknowledging the debt (see Erdheim v Gelfman, 303 AD2d 714, 715 [2003]), “[w]hether a purported acknowledgment is sufficient to restart the running of a period of limitations depends on the circumstances of the individual case” (Cognetta v Valencia Devs., Inc., 8 AD3d 318, 319-320 [2004]; see Fade v Pugliani/Fade, 8 AD3d 612, 613 [2004]).

2008Additionally, while General Obligations Law § 17-101 effectively revives a time-barred claim when the debtor has signed a writing validly acknowledging the debt (see Erdheim v Gelfman, 303 AD2d 714, 715 [2003]), “[w]hether a purported acknowledgment is sufficient to restart the running of a period of limitations depends on the circumstances of the individual case” (Cognetta v Valencia Devs., Inc., 8 AD3d 318, 319-320 [2004]; see Fade v Pugliani/Fade, 8 AD3d 612, 613 [2004]).

2006Indeed, to read subdivision 1 of section 10’s three-year provision to require a contrary result when what the Legislature amended was subdivision 6 of section 10 is to create a lacuna which, viewed against the circumstances in which the amendment was enacted, the Legislature cannot reasonably be thought to have intended.” (Sessa v State of New York, 47 NY2d 976, 978 [1979].) The Sessa majority affirmed for the reasons stated by Justice Mains at the Appellate Division, who noted that “the enactment of subdivision 6 . . . by its express terms served only to expand the court’s discretionary power

2006Assuming arguendo that the references to the debt in the financial aid application and the alleged statement of net worth otherwise satisfied the elements of a valid acknowledgment (see generally Hon Fui Hui v East Broadway Mall, Inc., 4 NY3d 790, 791 [2005]; Sullivan v Troser Mgt., Inc., 15 AD3d 1011, 1011-1012 [2005]; Knoll v Datek Sec.

2006Assuming arguendo that the references to the debt in the financial aid application and the alleged statement of net worth otherwise satisfied the elements of a valid acknowledgment (see generally Hon Fui Hui v East Broadway Mall, Inc., 4 NY3d 790, 791 [2005]; Sullivan v Troser Mgt., Inc., 15 AD3d 1011, 1011-1012 [2005]; Knoll v Datek Sec.