33 California opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Adairgreen2 sentences2007(People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1116 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 , 79 P.3d 1030 ] [explaining probable cause is “a determination of the facts in light of an objective legal standard” and citing Adair].) A legal conclusion that there was “no reasonable cause” to arrest in the context of section 851.8 clearly implies a predicate factual finding that the suspect was innocent (see People v. Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 905, fn. 4 [noting facts subsequently disclosed may establish a defendant’s factual innocence even when there was sufficient probable cause to arrest]). 2006Whichever the choice, the analytical perspective is ultimately the same, and the statutory standard is satisfied.” (People v. Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 907-908.) “The terms of [Penal Code] section 851.8[, subdivision] (b)—precluding a finding of factual innocence ‘unless no reasonable cause exists’—impose an objective legal standard on both trial and appellate courts, and do not accommodate any exercise of discretion to which the appellate court should defer.” (People v. Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 908.) “In sum, the record must exonerate, not merely raise a substantial question as to | 5 | 6 |
People v. Butlergreen2 sentences2025(People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1123 .) “Probable cause is an objective legal standard—in this case, whether the facts known would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong belief that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim.” (People v. Butler, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1127 .) If a trial court orders AIDS testing without articulating its required reasons on the record, an appellate court will presume an implied finding of probable cause, but “the appellate court can s 2025(People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1123 .) “Probable cause is an objective legal standard—in this case, whether the facts known would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong belief that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim.” (People v. Butler, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1127 .) If a trial court orders AIDS testing without articulating its required reasons on the record, an appellate court will presume an implied finding of probable cause, but “the appellate court can s | 4 | 11 |
People v. Millergreen2 sentences1992For example, in the arrest context the court said: “Probable cause to arrest without a warrant represents an objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer’s subjective beliefs that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.] ‘[U]nless it is first established that the police officer believed that the crime . . . had been committed by the [defendant], the issue of probable cause does not arise, for it would be a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked to determine the reasonableness of an officer’s belief that [the] particular crime 1992For example, in the arrest context the court said: “Probable cause to arrest without a warrant represents an objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer’s subjective beliefs that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.] ‘[U]nless it is first established that the police officer believed that the crime . . . had been committed by the [defendant], the issue of probable cause does not arise, for it would be a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked to determine the reasonableness of an officer’s belief that [the] particular crime | 4 | 5 |
The People v. Super. Ct.green2 sentences2015(Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1306, fn. 29 .) We disagree. 10 First, the People misread the footnote in Kaulick. 2015(Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1306, fn. 29 .) We disagree. 10 First, the People misread the footnote in Kaulick. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Mosleygreen2 sentences2023Custody, for these purposes, means that the person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. [Citation.] Furthermore, in determining if a person is in custody for Miranda purposes 9 the trial court must apply an objective legal standard and decide if a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe his freedom of movement was restrained to a degree normally associated with formal arrest.” (People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088 (Mosley).) “The totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident must be considered as a whole 2023Custody, for these purposes, means that the person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. [Citation.] Furthermore, in determining if a person is in custody for Miranda purposes 9 the trial court must apply an objective legal standard and decide if a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe his freedom of movement was restrained to a degree normally associated with formal arrest.” (People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088 (Mosley).) “The totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident must be considered as a whole | 2 | 3 |
Ornelas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014“We observed that the issue presented in Butler extended beyond mere disagreement over the import of certain facts: ‘Probable cause is an objective legal standard—in this case, whether the facts known would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong belief that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim.’ (Butler, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1127 .) A probable cause 7 determination requires ‘applying th[is] particular legal standard to the facts as found.’ (Ibid.; see Ornelas v. United 2014“We observed that the issue presented in Butler extended beyond mere disagreement over the import of certain facts: ‘Probable cause is an objective legal standard—in this case, whether the facts known would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong belief that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim.’ (Butler, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1127 .) A probable cause 7 determination requires ‘applying th[is] particular legal standard to the facts as found.’ (Ibid.; see Ornelas v. United | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rhinehartgreen2 sentences2003(Cf. People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 799 , 62 *735 P.3d 45 [reasonable cause to establish factual innocence]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410 , 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 [reasonable or probable cause to arrest]; People v. Rhinehart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 139, 151 , 107 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 507 P.2d 642 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213, 214 , 152 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 589 P.2d 396 [reasonable cause to entertain suspicion of guilt].) Under the substantial evidence rule, a reviewing court will defer to a trial court's factual 2003(Cf. People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 799 , 62 *735 P.3d 45 [reasonable cause to establish factual innocence]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410 , 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 [reasonable or probable cause to arrest]; People v. Rhinehart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 139, 151 , 107 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 507 P.2d 642 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213, 214 , 152 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 589 P.2d 396 [reasonable cause to entertain suspicion of guilt].) Under the substantial evidence rule, a reviewing court will defer to a trial court's factual | 2 | 2 |
People v. Pricered2 sentences2003(Cf. People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 799 , 62 *735 P.3d 45 [reasonable cause to establish factual innocence]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410 , 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 [reasonable or probable cause to arrest]; People v. Rhinehart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 139, 151 , 107 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 507 P.2d 642 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213, 214 , 152 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 589 P.2d 396 [reasonable cause to entertain suspicion of guilt].) Under the substantial evidence rule, a reviewing court will defer to a trial court's factual 2003(Cf. People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 799 , 62 *735 P.3d 45 [reasonable cause to establish factual innocence]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410 , 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 [reasonable or probable cause to arrest]; People v. Rhinehart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 139, 151 , 107 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 507 P.2d 642 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213, 214 , 152 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 589 P.2d 396 [reasonable cause to entertain suspicion of guilt].) Under the substantial evidence rule, a reviewing court will defer to a trial court's factual | 2 | 2 |
People v. Boltongreen2 sentences2003(Cf. People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 799 , 62 *735 P.3d 45 [reasonable cause to establish factual innocence]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410 , 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 [reasonable or probable cause to arrest]; People v. Rhinehart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 139, 151 , 107 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 507 P.2d 642 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213, 214 , 152 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 589 P.2d 396 [reasonable cause to entertain suspicion of guilt].) Under the substantial evidence rule, a reviewing court will defer to a trial court's factual 2003(Cf. People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 799 , 62 *735 P.3d 45 [reasonable cause to establish factual innocence]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410 , 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 [reasonable or probable cause to arrest]; People v. Rhinehart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 139, 151 , 107 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 507 P.2d 642 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213, 214 , 152 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 589 P.2d 396 [reasonable cause to entertain suspicion of guilt].) Under the substantial evidence rule, a reviewing court will defer to a trial court's factual | 2 | 2 |
Agar v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1980Thus the requirement set forth in Agar v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 24, 28-29 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 148 ] and People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at page 226 , that it first be established that the police officer believes the crime has been committed before the issue of probable cause (the objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer’s subjective beliefs) arises, is fulfilled. 1980Thus the requirement set forth in Agar v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 24, 28-29 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 148 ] and People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at page 226 , that it first be established that the police officer believes the crime has been committed before the issue of probable cause (the objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer’s subjective beliefs) arises, is fulfilled. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1980The trial court found—based on all the circumstances surrounding York’s detention and the first report of a prowler’s attempted burglary—and the description given of that prowler, there was “objective probable cause to arrest the defendant.. .. ” The Supreme Court recently again defined the standard for probable cause to arrest in these words: “Cause for arrest exists when the facts known to the arresting officer ‘would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.’ [Citations.]” (People v. 1980The trial court found—based on all the circumstances surrounding York’s detention and the first report of a prowler’s attempted burglary—and the description given of that prowler, there was “objective probable cause to arrest the defendant.. .. ” The Supreme Court recently again defined the standard for probable cause to arrest in these words: “Cause for arrest exists when the facts known to the arresting officer ‘would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.’ [Citations.]” (People v. | 2 | 2 |
People v. PILSTERgreen2 sentences2023Custody, for these purposes, means that the person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. [Citation.] Furthermore, in determining if a person is in custody for Miranda purposes 9 the trial court must apply an objective legal standard and decide if a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe his freedom of movement was restrained to a degree normally associated with formal arrest.” (People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088 (Mosley).) “The totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident must be considered as a whole 2013Custody, for these purposes, means that the person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. [Citation.] Furthermore, in determining if a person is in custody for Miranda purposes the trial court must apply an objective legal standard and decide if a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe his freedom of movement was restrained to a degree normally associated with formal arrest. [Citation.]” (People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088 (Mosley).) “The totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident must be considered | 1 | 2 |
Haworth v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Countygreen2 sentences2015We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence (Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 692 ), and the court’s assessment of the fairness of the deal and adequacy of disclosures de novo because both are measured by an objective legal standard (see Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 385 ). 2014We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence (Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 692 ), and the court’s assessment of the fairness of the deal and the adequacy of disclosures de nova because both are measured by an objective legal standard (see Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 385 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 853 , 235 P.3d 152 ]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Stowellgreen2 sentences2014(People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 .) “Nevertheless, because the terms of the statute condition imposition on the existence of probable cause, the appellate court can sustain the order . . . if it finds evidentiary support, which it can do simply from examining the record.” (People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1127 (Butler).) “Probable cause is an objective legal standard—in this case, whether the facts known would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong belief that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has b 2007(People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1116 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 , 79 P.3d 1030 ] [explaining probable cause is “a determination of the facts in light of an objective legal standard” and citing Adair].) A legal conclusion that there was “no reasonable cause” to arrest in the context of section 851.8 clearly implies a predicate factual finding that the suspect was innocent (see People v. Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 905, fn. 4 [noting facts subsequently disclosed may establish a defendant’s factual innocence even when there was sufficient probable cause to arrest]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ochoagreen2 sentences2015(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 (Ochoa).) To make that determination, “ ‘[t]wo discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 401-402; Thompson, supra, 516 U.S. at pp. 112-113.) On appeal, we accept the trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence but independently measure those facts against the objective legal 2015(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 (Ochoa).) To make that determination, “ ‘[t]wo discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 401-402; Thompson, supra, 516 U.S. at pp. 112-113.) On appeal, we accept the trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence but independently measure those facts against the objective legal | 1 | 1 |
People v. Alfordgreen2 sentences2013Defendant asks us simply “to follow Butler.” He asserts that when a trial court finds sufficient evidence to impose a booking fee, it is finding “facts in light of an objective legal standard” that we should review as a matter of law in the same manner as the probable cause finding discussed in Butler. “[A]s with an HIV testing order that is based in part on a factual finding (probable cause), an order to pay booking fees also partial[ly] rests on a factual finding (ability-to-pay); however, both employ an objective legal standard in assaying the factual finding.” Defendant argues that because 2013Defendant asks us simply “to follow Butler.” He asserts that when a trial court finds sufficient evidence to impose a booking fee, it is finding “facts in light of an objective legal standard” that we should review as a matter of law in the same manner as the probable cause finding discussed in Butler. “[A]s with an HIV testing order that is based in part on a factual finding (probable cause), an order to pay booking fees also partial[ly] rests on a factual finding (ability-to-pay); however, both employ an objective legal standard in assaying the factual finding.” Defendant argues that because | 1 | 1 |
Stansbury v. Californiagreen2 sentences1999(Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442 [ 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-3152 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 ].) The test for custody does not depend on the subjective view of the interrogating officer or the person being questioned. *1089 (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325 [ 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1530 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 ].) The only relevant inquiry is “ ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s shoes would have understood his situation.’ ” (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 , 889 P.2d 588 ].) The second component of custodial interrogation is obviously interrogation. 1999(Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442 [ 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-3152 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 ].) The test for custody does not depend on the subjective view of the interrogating officer or the person being questioned. *1089 (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325 [ 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1530 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 ].) The only relevant inquiry is “ ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s shoes would have understood his situation.’ ” (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 , 889 P.2d 588 ].) The second component of custodial interrogation is obviously interrogation. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stansburygreen2 sentences1999(Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442 [ 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-3152 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 ].) The test for custody does not depend on the subjective view of the interrogating officer or the person being questioned. *1089 (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325 [ 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1530 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 ].) The only relevant inquiry is “ ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s shoes would have understood his situation.’ ” (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 , 889 P.2d 588 ].) The second component of custodial interrogation is obviously interrogation. 1999(Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442 [ 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-3152 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 ].) The test for custody does not depend on the subjective view of the interrogating officer or the person being questioned. *1089 (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325 [ 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1530 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 ].) The only relevant inquiry is “ ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s shoes would have understood his situation.’ ” (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 , 889 P.2d 588 ].) The second component of custodial interrogation is obviously interrogation. | 1 | 1 |
Berkemer v. McCartygreen2 sentences1999(Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442 [ 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-3152 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 ].) The test for custody does not depend on the subjective view of the interrogating officer or the person being questioned. *1089 (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325 [ 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1530 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 ].) The only relevant inquiry is “ ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s shoes would have understood his situation.’ ” (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 , 889 P.2d 588 ].) The second component of custodial interrogation is obviously interrogation. 1999(Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442 [ 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-3152 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 ].) The test for custody does not depend on the subjective view of the interrogating officer or the person being questioned. *1089 (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325 [ 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1530 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 ].) The only relevant inquiry is “ ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s shoes would have understood his situation.’ ” (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 , 889 P.2d 588 ].) The second component of custodial interrogation is obviously interrogation. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lance W.green2 sentences1992For example, in the arrest context the court said: “Probable cause to arrest without a warrant represents an objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer’s subjective beliefs that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.] ‘[U]nless it is first established that the police officer believed that the crime . . . had been committed by the [defendant], the issue of probable cause does not arise, for it would be a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked to determine the reasonableness of an officer’s belief that [the] particular crime 1992For example, in the arrest context the court said: “Probable cause to arrest without a warrant represents an objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer’s subjective beliefs that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.] ‘[U]nless it is first established that the police officer believed that the crime . . . had been committed by the [defendant], the issue of probable cause does not arise, for it would be a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked to determine the reasonableness of an officer’s belief that [the] particular crime | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Texasgreen2 sentences1992For example, in the arrest context the court said: "Probable cause to arrest without a warrant represents an objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer's subjective beliefs that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.] `[ U ] nless it is first established that the police officer believed that the crime ... had been committed by the [defendant], the issue of probable cause does not arise, for it would be a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked to determine the reasonableness of an officer's belief that [the] particular crime 1992For example, in the arrest context the court said: "Probable cause to arrest without a warrant represents an objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer's subjective beliefs that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.] `[ U ] nless it is first established that the police officer believed that the crime ... had been committed by the [defendant], the issue of probable cause does not arise, for it would be a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked to determine the reasonableness of an officer's belief that [the] particular crime | 1 | 1 |
People v. Inglegreen2 sentences1985(People v. Ingle (1960) 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ].) Probable cause to arrest without a warrant “represents an objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer’s subjective beliefs that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 219, 226 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 860 , 496 P.2d 1228 ].) It would be unreasonable to require police to justify 3,490 arrests for probable cause in one suit. 1985(People v. Ingle (1960) 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ].) Probable cause to arrest without a warrant “represents an objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer’s subjective beliefs that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 219, 226 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 860 , 496 P.2d 1228 ].) It would be unreasonable to require police to justify 3,490 arrests for probable cause in one suit. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Triggsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Friersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beck v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Talleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. McCullough
green
2 sentences2015The defendant argued that booking fee orders result from the application of “ ‘an objective legal standard’ ” akin to orders for involuntary HIV testing under section 1202.1 and People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119 .6 ( McCullough, supra, at pp. 596-597 .) The Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant’s argument in McCullough. 2014The defendant argued that booking fee orders result from the application of “‘an objective legal standard’” akin to orders for involuntary HIV testing under section 1202.1 and People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119 . ( McCullough, supra, at pp. 596-597 .) The Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant’s argument. | 4 | 2013–2015 |
People v. Boyce
green
2 sentences2015We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence (Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 692 ), and the court’s assessment of the fairness of the deal and adequacy of disclosures de novo because both are measured by an objective legal standard (see Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 385 ). 2014We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence (Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 692 ), and the court’s assessment of the fairness of the deal and the adequacy of disclosures de nova because both are measured by an objective legal standard (see Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 385 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 853 , 235 P.3d 152 ]). | 2 | 2014–2015 |
United States v. Deborah B. Burns, A/K/A Mary Jennings
green
1 sentence2023Custody, for these purposes, means that the person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. [Citation.] Furthermore, in determining if a person is in custody for Miranda purposes 9 the trial court must apply an objective legal standard and decide if a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe his freedom of movement was restrained to a degree normally associated with formal arrest.” (People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088 (Mosley).) “The totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident must be considered as a whole | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Aguilera
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 (Ochoa).) To make that determination, “ ‘[t]wo discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 401-402; Thompson, supra, 516 U.S. at pp. 112-113.) On appeal, we accept the trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence but independently measure those facts against the objective legal | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Thompson v. Keohane
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 (Ochoa).) To make that determination, “ ‘[t]wo discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 401-402; Thompson, supra, 516 U.S. at pp. 112-113.) On appeal, we accept the trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence but independently measure those facts against the objective legal | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Forster
green
1 sentence2013Custody, for these purposes, means that the person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. [Citation.] Furthermore, in determining if a person is in custody for Miranda purposes the trial court must apply an objective legal standard and decide if a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe his freedom of movement was restrained to a degree normally associated with formal arrest. [Citation.]” (People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088 (Mosley).) “The totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident must be considered | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Pacheco
green
2 sentences2013The court itself stated, “Given that imposition of a fee is of much less moment than imposition of sentence, and that the goals advanced by judicial forfeiture apply equally here, we see no reason to conclude that the rule permitting challenges made to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment for the first time on appeal „should apply to a finding of‟ ability to pay a booking fee under Government Code section 29550.2. [Citation.] We disapprove People v. Pacheco, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1392 , to the extent it holds the contrary.” (McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 599 ; fn. omitt 2013The court itself stated, “Given that imposition of a fee is of much less moment than imposition of sentence, and that the goals advanced by judicial forfeiture apply equally here, we see no reason to conclude that the rule permitting challenges made to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment for the first time on appeal „should apply to a finding of‟ ability to pay a booking fee under Government Code section 29550.2. [Citation.] We disapprove People v. Pacheco, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1392 , to the extent it holds the contrary.” (McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 599 ; fn. omitt | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Scott v. United States
green
2 sentences1992For example, in the arrest context the court said: "Probable cause to arrest without a warrant represents an objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer's subjective beliefs that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.] `[ U ] nless it is first established that the police officer believed that the crime ... had been committed by the [defendant], the issue of probable cause does not arise, for it would be a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked to determine the reasonableness of an officer's belief that [the] particular crime 1992For example, in the arrest context the court said: "Probable cause to arrest without a warrant represents an objective legal standard by which to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer's subjective beliefs that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.] `[ U ] nless it is first established that the police officer believed that the crime ... had been committed by the [defendant], the issue of probable cause does not arise, for it would be a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked to determine the reasonableness of an officer's belief that [the] particular crime | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Pope green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Duke v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.