factfinding hearing in District of Columbia

1988We recognize the "general rule that on credibility questions, the factfinding of hearing officers is entitled to great weight." In re Dwyer, 399 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C.1979).

1988We recognize the “general rule that on credibility questions, the factfinding of hearing officers is entitled to great weight.” In re Dwyer, 399 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C.1979).

2006R. 33.” 6 The District re lies on our decision in In re E.G.C., 373 A.2d 903, 905 (D.C.1977), but that decision does not support the District’s position; and nothing in the plain words of Rule 33 requires a respondent to file a motion for a new factfinding hearing or for a new trial in order to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the District claims. 7 Nevertheless, as we have stated previously, “in the overwhelming majority of cases, it is inappropriate to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.

2006Rule 33 specifically provides that: "A motion for a new factfinding hearing based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within 2 years after final judgment. ...” The appellant's alleged newly discovered evidence in E.G.C., supra, was the ineffective assistance of his counsel.

2006Attempts to do so are rarely if ever successful." Johnson v. United States, 883 A.2d 135, 145 (D.C.2005) (quoting Simpson v. United States, 576 A.2d 1336, 1338-1339 (D.C.1990) (internal quotation marks and other citation omitted)).

2006Attempts to do so are rarely if ever successful.” Johnson v. United States, 883 A.2d 135, 145 (D.C.2005) (quoting Simpson v. United States, 576 A.2d 1336, 1338-1339 (D.C.1990) (internal quotation marks and other citation omitted)).

2006Attempts to do so are rarely if ever successful." Johnson v. United States, 883 A.2d 135, 145 (D.C.2005) (quoting Simpson v. United States, 576 A.2d 1336, 1338-1339 (D.C.1990) (internal quotation marks and other citation omitted)).

2006Attempts to do so are rarely if ever successful.” Johnson v. United States, 883 A.2d 135, 145 (D.C.2005) (quoting Simpson v. United States, 576 A.2d 1336, 1338-1339 (D.C.1990) (internal quotation marks and other citation omitted)).

2002Counsel for the mother interposed no objection, however, and "[hjearsay evidence admitted without objection may be properly considered by the trier of fact and given its full probative value." Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1991) (quoting Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777, 782 (D.C.1990)). .

2002Counsel for the mother interposed no objection, however, and "[h]earsay evidence admitted without objection may be properly considered by the trier of fact and given its full probative value." Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1991) (quoting Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777, 782 (D.C.1990)). [7] The mother and J.C. had beaten Z.C., inter alia, with a belt buckle and with other hard objects. [8] J.C. was convicted of a similar charge, and he received the same sentence as the mother did. [9] These consequences include the court's finding under D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)

2002Counsel for the mother interposed no objection, however, and "[hjearsay evidence admitted without objection may be properly considered by the trier of fact and given its full probative value." Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1991) (quoting Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777, 782 (D.C.1990)). .

2002Counsel for the mother interposed no objection, however, and "[h]earsay evidence admitted without objection may be properly considered by the trier of fact and given its full probative value." Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1991) (quoting Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777, 782 (D.C.1990)). [7] The mother and J.C. had beaten Z.C., inter alia, with a belt buckle and with other hard objects. [8] J.C. was convicted of a similar charge, and he received the same sentence as the mother did. [9] These consequences include the court's finding under D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)

1998In re M.C.F., 293 A.2d 874, 877 (D.C.1972).

1998In re M.C.F., 293 A.2d 874, 877 (D.C.1972).

1977Smith v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 30 , 283 F.2d 607, 609 (1960) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 950 , 82 S.Ct. 1599 , 8 L.Ed.2d 816 (1962); Balestreri v. United States, 224 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1955); Wright v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 307 , 215 F.2d 498 (1954).

1977Smith v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 30 , 283 F.2d 607, 609 (1960) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 950 , 82 S.Ct. 1599 , 8 L.Ed.2d 816 (1962); Balestreri v. United States, 224 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1955); Wright v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 307 , 215 F.2d 498 (1954).

1974See, e. g., United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 976 , 90 S.Ct. 1096 , 25 L.Ed.2d 271 (1970); Price v. State, 7 Md.App. 131 , 254 A.2d 219, 226-227 (1969).

1974See, e. g., United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 976 , 90 S.Ct. 1096 , 25 L.Ed.2d 271 (1970); Price v. State, 7 Md.App. 131 , 254 A.2d 219, 226-227 (1969).

1974See, e. g., United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 976 , 90 S.Ct. 1096 , 25 L.Ed.2d 271 (1970); Price v. State, 7 Md.App. 131 , 254 A.2d 219, 226-227 (1969).

1974See, e. g., United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 976 , 90 S.Ct. 1096 , 25 L.Ed.2d 271 (1970); Price v. State, 7 Md.App. 131 , 254 A.2d 219, 226-227 (1969).

1974See, e. g., United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 976 , 90 S.Ct. 1096 , 25 L.Ed.2d 271 (1970); Price v. State, 7 Md.App. 131 , 254 A.2d 219, 226-227 (1969).

1974See, e. g., United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 976 , 90 S.Ct. 1096 , 25 L.Ed.2d 271 (1970); Price v. State, 7 Md.App. 131 , 254 A.2d 219, 226-227 (1969).

1972V, 1972). [11] It appears that prior to the factfinding hearing in this case the parties had agreed to the entry of a consent decree but on the day of the hearing the juvenile changed his mind. [12] Hearings on S. 2981 Before the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 1803 (1969). [13] See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 , 91 S.Ct. 1976 , 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971).

1972V, 1972). [11] It appears that prior to the factfinding hearing in this case the parties had agreed to the entry of a consent decree but on the day of the hearing the juvenile changed his mind. [12] Hearings on S. 2981 Before the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 1803 (1969). [13] See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 , 91 S.Ct. 1976 , 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971).

2013Area Transit Auth. v. District of Columbia Dept. of Emp’t Servs., 683 A.2d 470, 477 (D.C.1996) (quoting In re Dwyer, 399 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C.1979)).

2013See id. at 575 , 105 S.Ct. 1504 ("[Ojnly the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.”); In re S.G., 581 A.2d at 774 ("The trial judge presided over the factfinding hearing and was able to observe and assess the demeanor of the witnesses.

2013See id. at 575 , 105 S.Ct. 1504 ("[Ojnly the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.”); In re S.G., 581 A.2d at 774 ("The trial judge presided over the factfinding hearing and was able to observe and assess the demeanor of the witnesses.

2013See id. at 575 , 105 S.Ct. 1504 ("[Ojnly the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.”); In re S.G., 581 A.2d at 774 ("The trial judge presided over the factfinding hearing and was able to observe and assess the demeanor of the witnesses.

2000Cf. In re T.G., 684 A.2d at 791 (staying mandate of termination upon reversal to permit the trial court and the parties to take such action "as the family's current circumstances and the children's best interest may require"); In re S.K., 564 A.2d 1382 , 1391 n. 14 (D.C.1989) (separate opinion of Schwelb, J.) ("Because a child's safety may be at stake, I would not preclude the government on remand from proving the truth of Children's Hospital's allegations in spite of the fact that it could have done so at the original hearing, for I am not prepared to insist on rigorous adherence to principle

1993G.S., supra, 820 P.2d at 1180. 16 We are not persuaded that a full factfinding hearing on the neglect petition, see D.C.Code §§ 16-2316, -2317, is appropriate in order.to resolve the motion to dismiss even over the objection of the GAL.

1993G.S., supra, 820 P.2d at 1180. 16 We are not persuaded that a full factfinding hearing on the neglect petition, see D.C.Code §§ 16-2316, -2317, is appropriate in order.to resolve the motion to dismiss even over the objection of the GAL.

1987Accord, George Hyman Const. Co. v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 498 A.2d 563, 566 (D.C.1985) (“A hearing examiner’s decisions are especially weighty when they involve credi- bility determinations.”); Arthur v. District of Columbia Nurses’ Examining Bd., 459 A.2d 141, 146 (D.C.1983) (quoting In re Dwyer, 399 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C.1979)).

1987Accord, George Hyman Const. Co. v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 498 A.2d 563, 566 (D.C.1985) (“A hearing examiner’s decisions are especially weighty when they involve credi- bility determinations.”); Arthur v. District of Columbia Nurses’ Examining Bd., 459 A.2d 141, 146 (D.C.1983) (quoting In re Dwyer, 399 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C.1979)).