factfinding hearing in Indiana

2024Although the parties can waive the deadlines set forth by Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1, we do not allow these deadlines to be ignored because this would allow trial courts to “habitually set these matters outside the time frame and there would be no consequence whatsoever.” Id. (quoting In re J.R., 98 N.E.3d at 655 ). [10] Mother argues that Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1, Indiana Trial Rule 53.5, and our Supreme Court’s decision in In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279 (Ind. 2020), do not allow the juvenile court to sua sponte set the factfinding hearing after the 60-day window passed.

2024Although the parties can waive the deadlines set forth by Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1, we do not allow these deadlines to be ignored because this would allow trial courts to “habitually set these matters outside the time frame and there would be no consequence whatsoever.” Id. (quoting In re J.R., 98 N.E.3d at 655 ). [10] Mother argues that Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1, Indiana Trial Rule 53.5, and our Supreme Court’s decision in In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279 (Ind. 2020), do not allow the juvenile court to sua sponte set the factfinding hearing after the 60-day window passed.

2011Maybaum, 723 N.E.2d at 954 ("Presumably, these provisions were enacted to give the child's parent, guardian, or custodian notice of the allegations and the opportunity to contradict the OFC's case.").

2011Mayb-aum, 723 N.E.2d at 954 (“Presumably, these provisions were enacted to give the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian notice of the allegations and the opportunity to contradict the OFC’s case.”).

2026Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1315 | February 17, 2026 Page 10 of 17 has not demonstrated that he or she was prejudiced by the denial.’” In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 244 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty.

2025Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JT-1375 | November 21, 2025 Page 8 of 10 issue here is whether the trial court’s denial of the Motion—that is, its decision to hold the factfinding hearing in Mother’s absence—created a risk of error such that a due process violation occurred. [14] A parent does not have an “absolute constitutional right . . . to be present at a termination hearing,” K.W., 12 N.E.3d at 248 (citing C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 921 ), but the parent “does have the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” id. at 249 (quoting Tillotson v. Clay Cnty.

2005"It is well-settled law in Indiana that a defendant may not argue one ground for objection at trial and then raise new grounds on appeal." Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

2005"It is well-settled law. in Indiana that a defendant may not argue one ground for objection at trial and then raise new grounds on appeal." Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

2020Following the hearing, the trial court adjudicated the 1 Father also cites Matter of T.T., 110 N.E.3d 441, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), in support of his argument.

2020In its opinion, the court relied on the plain language of Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1 and its Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-JC-505 | February 20, 2020 Page 3 of 10 prior decision in Matter of T.T., 110 N.E.3d 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), to conclude that the General Assembly clearly intended that a factfinding hearing in a CHINS proceeding must be completed—without exception— within the 120-day timeframe set forth by statute.

2019Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur. 1 The DCS suggests that a juvenile court retains discretion in some circumstances to schedule a factfinding hearing outside the 120-day timeframe, citing M.M. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Servs. , 118 N.E.3d 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

2019Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur. 1 We note that another panel of this Court stated in a footnote in A.M. v. Indiana Dep't of Child Servs., 118 N.E.3d 70 , 77 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) that in certain circumstances, it is within the trial court's authority to continue the factfinding hearing beyond the statutory limit of 120 days.

2019A CHINS finding “should consider the family’s condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” Matter of N.C., 72 N.E.3d 519, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290 ).3 [14] Mother contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider her situation at the time of the factfinding hearing and that, by that time, she had rectified the reasons that led to the Children’s removal: “Mother had stable housing, had all the necessary supplies to care for her children, had clean drug screens for 7 weeks, had employment, was attending therapy and addressing he

2016See S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290 (CHINS finding should consider the family’s condition not just when the case is filed, but also when it is heard).

2026See Ad.M., 103 N.E.3d at 715 (a single act of domestic violence between parents is insufficient to show serious endangerment where the mother had since moved away from the father and filed for a protective order). 6 Although Father was arrested after the accident, the allegations did not involve intoxication, and he was never criminally charged.

2025Herein, not only did Mother not ask the trial court to adjudicate T.F. a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6 – arguably thereby waiving this issue for appeal, see Borth v. Borth, 806 N.E.2d 866, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“[a] party may not advance a theory on appeal which was not originally raised at the trial court”) – Mother also waived her right to a factfinding hearing, which means no evidence was presented at a trial that could justify an amendment of the pleadings under Trial Rule 15(B).

2025According to Mother, because Counsel “did not present [Mother’s] evidence and showed the Court an acrimonious relationship with [Mother], ‘the trial court may not have an accurate picture of the evidence.’” Appellant’s Br. at 28 (quoting In re D.A., 869 N.E.2d 501, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). [27] First, at the beginning of the May 29 hearing, all parties were present except Mother.

2025In re C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669 , 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing In re J.T., 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, abrogated in part on other grounds by Baker v. Marion Cnty.

2025Dept. of Fam. & Child., 777 N.E.2d 741, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied).

2025See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27). 3 In this case, every time the trial court scheduled and rescheduled the factfinding hearing, it always scheduled that hearing to be conducted via Zoom, and the log-on information for the Zoom-based hearing was provided in every scheduling order.

2024Brown v. State, 448 N.E.2d 10, 16 (Ind. 1993). [21] The State argues that the issue is moot because we are unable to provide a remedy to J.Q.R. for the alleged error.

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2545 | March 31, 2020 Page 9 of 15 He relies on In re C.M., 960 N.E.2d 169, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), where another panel of this Court reasoned, the court’s focus on historical conduct, absent factual findings as to Mother’s current circumstances or evidence of changed conditions, is akin to terminating parental rights to punish the parent.

2020In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

2020Likewise, “the testimony of service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. [15] Both FCM Silveus and CASA Snyder testified at the factfinding hearing that termination and adoption are in Child’s best interests.

2020Office of Family & Children, 706 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). [22] Even if the trial court’s decision to conduct the factfinding hearing outside the statutory timeframe amounted to error, the harm for such error was not substantial enough to rise to the level of fundamental error.

2020See Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2020“A party may not invite error, then Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1895| April 22, 2020 Page 11 of 19 later argue that the error supports reversal, because error invited by the complaining party is not reversible error.” Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 823 (Ind. 2002). [6] While it is true that Mother orally moved to dismiss the TPR petitions at a hearing in February of 2019 and Parents filed motions to dismiss in March of 2019, their actions and omissions, prior and subsequent to those stated above, invited the untimely factfinding hearing.3 First, on November 14, 2

2020Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013).

2020See In re R.A., 19 N.E.3d 313, 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (mere fact children are in better home cannot be sole basis for termination), trans. denied (2015).