appellant must overcome presumption in Texas

2019Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim.

2014Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim.

2015Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim.

2015Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim.

2010Id.; Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984).

2010Id. ; Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d 401, 403 ( Tex.Crim.App . 1984).

2023Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S. Ct. at 2065 ; Tong, 25 S.W.3d at 712 .

2015See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2024We indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and, therefore, the appellant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action constituted “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687 .

2020We indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and, therefore, the appellant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action constituted “sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 ; Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim.

2009Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Gamble v. State, 916 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.). “[A]ny allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (quoting Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 ).

2008Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S. Ct. at 2065 ; Gamble , 916 S.W.2d at 93 . “[A]ny allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Mallett v. State , 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim.

2023Id.

2022For an appellate court to find that counsel was ineffective, “counsel’s deficiency must be affirmatively demonstrated in the trial record; the court must not engage in retrospective speculation.” Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142 (citing Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim.

2024We indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and, therefore, the appellant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action constituted “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687 .

2023Amand v. State, No. 01- 11-00648-CR, 2013 WL 175705 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 17, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“We indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and, therefore, the appellant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action constituted ‘sound trial strategy.’”) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ); Jaime v. State, No. 01-11-00307-CR, 2012 WL 6754993 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 28, 2012, pet. struck) (mem. op., not designated for pub

2004Jackson , 877 S.W.2d at 771 ; Calderon , 950 S.W.2d at 126 .

2004Jackson , 877 S.W.2d at 771 ; Calderon , 950 S.W.2d at 126 .

2017See Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. Crim.

2012Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Hayden v. State, 155 S.W.3d 640, 648 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2005, pet. refd).

2009Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Tong, 25 S.W.3d at 712 ; Hayden v. State, 155 S.W.3d 640, 648 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. ref’d).

2011We indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and therefore the appellant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action constituted “sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 , 104 S. Ct. at 2065 ; McFarland v. State , 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim.

2001In order to meet this standard, the appellant must overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct lies within the "wide range of reasonable representation." McFarland v. State , 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim.

1988The appellant must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89 , 104 S.Ct. at 2065 ; Stenson v. State, 695 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, no pet.).

1986The appellant must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66 ; Stenson v. State, 695 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1984, no pet.).

2011Salinas, 163 S.W.3d at 740 ; Mallett, 65 S.W.3d at 63 ; Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 508-09 (Tex. Crim.

2009Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89 , 104 S.Ct. at 2065 ; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 506 .

2011Salinas, 163 S.W.3d at 740 ; Mallett, 65 S.W.3d at 63 ; Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 508-09 (Tex. Crim.

2009Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Gamble v. State, 916 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.). “[A]ny allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (quoting Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 ).

2023Prejudice The Strickland prejudice prong “requires that we look to the totality of the circumstances and evidence presented to determine if there is a reasonable probability that, but for Counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891, 903 (Tex. Crim.

2020Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891, 900 (Tex. Crim.

2015A reasonable probability is one which undermines confidence in the outcome.17 A reviewing court indulges in the presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of “reasonable professional assistance.”18 “The right to effective assistance of counsel … may in a particular case be violated even by an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”19 An appellant must overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct “might be considered sound trial strategy.”20 However, there are some omissions which defy explanation as, and cannot be justified on t

2015A reasonable probability is one which undermines confidence in the outcome.17 A reviewing court indulges in the presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of “reasonable professional assistance.”18 “The right to effective assistance of counsel … may in a particular case be violated even by an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”19 An appellant must overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct “might be considered sound trial strategy.”20 However, there are some omissions which defy explanation as, and cannot be justified on t

2015App. 1987). 23 Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 1987). 23 Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. Crim.

2015A reasonable probability is one which undermines confidence in the outcome.17 A reviewing court indulges in the presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of “reasonable professional assistance.”18 “The right to effective assistance of counsel … may in a particular case be violated even by an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”19 An appellant must overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct “might be considered sound trial strategy.”20 However, there are some omissions which defy explanation as, and cannot be justified on t

2015A reasonable probability is one which undermines confidence in the outcome.17 A reviewing court indulges in the presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of “reasonable professional assistance.”18 “The right to effective assistance of counsel … may in a particular case be violated even by an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”19 An appellant must overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct “might be considered sound trial strategy.”20 However, there are some omissions which defy explanation as, and cannot be justified on t

2015A reasonable probability is one which undermines confidence in the outcome.17 A reviewing court indulges in the presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of “reasonable professional assistance.”18 “The right to effective assistance of counsel … may in a particular case be violated even by an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”19 An appellant must overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct “might be considered sound trial strategy.”20 However, there are some omissions which defy explanation as, and cannot be justified on t

2015A reasonable probability is one which undermines confidence in the outcome.17 A reviewing court indulges in the presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of “reasonable professional assistance.”18 “The right to effective assistance of counsel … may in a particular case be violated even by an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”19 An appellant must overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct “might be considered sound trial strategy.”20 However, there are some omissions which defy explanation as, and cannot be justified on t

2015See Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. Crim.

2015A reasonable probability is one which undermines confidence in the outcome.17 A reviewing court indulges in the presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of “reasonable professional assistance.”18 “The right to effective assistance of counsel … may in a particular case be violated even by an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”19 An appellant must overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct “might be considered sound trial strategy.”20 However, there are some omissions which defy explanation as, and cannot be justified on t

2015A reasonable probability is one which undermines confidence in the outcome.17 A reviewing court indulges in the presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of “reasonable professional assistance.”18 “The right to effective assistance of counsel … may in a particular case be violated even by an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”19 An appellant must overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct “might be considered sound trial strategy.”20 However, there are some omissions which defy explanation as, and cannot be justified on t

1997Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771 ; Lyon v. State, 885 S.W.2d 506, 519 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1994, pet. ref'd).

1996Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771 ; Lyon v. State, 885 S.W.2d 506, 519 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, pet. ref'd).

2022We “indulge a strong presumption” that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and an appellant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be considered “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142 .

2022We “indulge a strong presumption” that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and an appellant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be considered “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142 .

2020Evid. 403. 26 See Wells v. State, 558 S.W.3d 661, 669 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim.

2020Evid. 403. 26 See Wells v. State, 558 S.W.3d 661, 669 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim.

2020App. 2009) (“An appellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.”). 14 Courts indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and, therefore, the appellant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action constituted “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687 ; see also Robinson, 514 S.W.3d at 823 .